05000331/FIN-2013004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Perform CHANNEL CHECKs |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to prescribe a procedure with appropriate qualitative acceptance criteria to ensure that CHANNEL CHECKs were satisfactorily accomplished in accordance with TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.6.2 prior to September 12, 2013. Specifically, Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 3.0.0-01 did not perform a qualitative assessment of channel behavior, nor did it require comparisons to other channel indications measuring the same parameter. Had STP 3.0.0-01 contained appropriate acceptance criteria, the main steam line area temperature indicating switch (TIS)-4480 would have been considered inoperable based on trending prior to switch anomalies resulting in declaring TIS-4480 inoperable on June 22, 2013. The licensee documented the issue in CR 01903528, briefed operators on the requirement to perform qualitative checks of the applicable instruments, and initiated a procedure change to restore compliance of the STP to meet the requirements of SR 3.3.6.2. The inspectors determined the licensees failure to prescribe an STP with appropriate acceptance criteria was a performance deficiency because it was the result of the failure to meet a regulatory requirement, and the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and a finding because it impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the Cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (i.e., containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents and events. The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3 for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone. Because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment or containment isolation system, the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that the performance characteristic of the finding that was the most significant causal factor of the performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution, having Corrective Action Program components, and involving the licensee periodically trending and assessing information from the CAP in aggregate to identify programmatic problems. Specifically, there was sufficient information in the CAP that indicated the instruments may have been inoperable in the past, and those previous indications of inoperability were not identified by licensee procedures. |
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000331/2013004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Shaikh C Lipa L Haeg R Murray V Myers |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | P.4, Trending |
| INPO aspect | PI.4 |
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Finding - Duane Arnold - IR 05000331/2013004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Duane Arnold) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Duane Arnold)
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