05000483/FIN-2013004-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = C Henderson, C Steely, E Schrader, G Guerra, K Clayton, N O, | | Inspector = C Henderson, C Steely, E Schrader, G Guerra, K Clayton, N O'Keefe, P Elkmann, P Smagacz, R Kumana, T Farina, T Hartman, Z Hollcraft | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Technical Specification 3.7.10, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS), requires that two control room emergency ventilation system trains shall be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. Contrary to the above, on April 18, 2013, with the plant in Mode 6 for Refueling Outage 19, Callaway workers impaired the control building envelope, causing the control room emergency ventilation system to be rendered inoperable while a fuel assembly was in movement in the fuel handling building. Specifically, licensee workers blocked open door DSK32013, breaching the control building ventilation system envelope, to run temporary power cables to the train B battery chargers. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not require a quantitative assessment as determined in Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 4, PWR Refueling Operation: RCS level > 23\'OR PWR Shutdown Operation with Time to Boil > 2 hours And Inventory in the Pressurizer. Corrective actions included coaching of operations and planning staff on the correct modes of applicability for Technical Specification 3.7.10 and enhancing procedures and forms to evaluate the technical specification appropriately. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201302882. | | description = Technical Specification 3.7.10, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS), requires that two control room emergency ventilation system trains shall be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. Contrary to the above, on April 18, 2013, with the plant in Mode 6 for Refueling Outage 19, Callaway workers impaired the control building envelope, causing the control room emergency ventilation system to be rendered inoperable while a fuel assembly was in movement in the fuel handling building. Specifically, licensee workers blocked open door DSK32013, breaching the control building ventilation system envelope, to run temporary power cables to the train B battery chargers. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not require a quantitative assessment as determined in Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 4, PWR Refueling Operation: RCS level > 23\'OR PWR Shutdown Operation with Time to Boil > 2 hours And Inventory in the Pressurizer. Corrective actions included coaching of operations and planning staff on the correct modes of applicability for Technical Specification 3.7.10 and enhancing procedures and forms to evaluate the technical specification appropriately. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201302882. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 23:20, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2013004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Henderson C Steely E Schrader G Guerra K Clayton N O'Keefe P Elkmann P Smagacz R Kumana T Farina T Hartman Z Hollcraft |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |