05000373/FIN-2016007-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.21 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.21 | ||
| Inspector = A Dahbur, C Edwards, D Reeser, J Corujo | | Inspector = A Dahbur, C Edwards, D Reeser, J Corujo-Sandin, J Leivo, M Jeffers, N Feliz-Adorno | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The team identified a finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to have the capability to verify the supply breakers of both reactor units feeding the swing diesel generator (DG) components were closed during normal plant operation. Specifically, the circuit design and procedures for the swing DG room fan, fuel oil transfer pump, and fuel storage tank room exhaust fan did not ensure the detection of the condition where one of these feeder breakers was tripped in the open position during normal plant operation. The licensee captured this issue in their CAP as AR 02668759 and created a special log to monitor the associated breakers once per day. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating System cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in the loss of system and/or function, represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train or two separate safety systems out-of-service for greater than its Technical Specifications (TS) allowable outage time, and represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant for greater than 24 hours. Specifically, a historical review did not find an example where the swing DG was non-functional for a period greater than the applicable TS allowable outage time as a result of this finding during the last year. The team did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it was not confirmed to reflect current performance due to the age of the performance deficiency. Specifically, the mean to detect an opened breaker associated with the affected loads was established more than 3 years ago. | | description = The team identified a finding of very-low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to have the capability to verify the supply breakers of both reactor units feeding the swing diesel generator (DG) components were closed during normal plant operation. Specifically, the circuit design and procedures for the swing DG room fan, fuel oil transfer pump, and fuel storage tank room exhaust fan did not ensure the detection of the condition where one of these feeder breakers was tripped in the open position during normal plant operation. The licensee captured this issue in their CAP as AR 02668759 and created a special log to monitor the associated breakers once per day. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating System cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in the loss of system and/or function, represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train or two separate safety systems out-of-service for greater than its Technical Specifications (TS) allowable outage time, and represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant for greater than 24 hours. Specifically, a historical review did not find an example where the swing DG was non-functional for a period greater than the applicable TS allowable outage time as a result of this finding during the last year. The team did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it was not confirmed to reflect current performance due to the age of the performance deficiency. Specifically, the mean to detect an opened breaker associated with the affected loads was established more than 3 years ago. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:55, 20 February 2018
| Site: | LaSalle  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000373/2016007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dahbur C Edwards D Reeser J Corujo-Sandin J Leivo M Jeffers N Feliz-Adorno |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |