05000424/FIN-2012004-02: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Failure | | title = Failure to Follow Procedure Results in a Misplaced Fuel Assembly | ||
| docket = 05000424, 05000425 | | docket = 05000424, 05000425 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000424/2012004 | | inspection report = IR 05000424/2012004 | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.2 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.2 | ||
| Inspector = A Vargas, | | Inspector = A Vargas Mendez, F Ehrhardt, G Croon, M Cain, R Williams, T Chandler | ||
| CCA = H.12 | | CCA = H.12 | ||
| INPO aspect = QA.4 | | INPO aspect = QA.4 | ||
| description = A self-revealing NCV of technical specification (TS) 5.4.1 was identified for failure to follow procedure 93641-C Rev.19.2, Development and Implementation of the Fuel Shuffle Sequence Plan during spent fuel pool fuel moves in preparation for an upcoming full core off-load. As a result, a fuel assembly was moved to an unintended, unanalyzed location and remained unanalyzed for 50 days. Upon discovery, the licensee immediately performed an analysis, determined that the location was suitable for the fuel assembly, and verified that all other fuel assemblies moved during the reshuffle sequence were located in their correct locations. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) 523617. The inspector determined that the failure to follow procedure 93641-C is a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, a spent fuel assembly was stored in a location for which it had not been analyzed for 50 days. IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 screening worksheet of the SDP, instructed the inspector to process this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shut-down Operations Significance Determination Process. Checklist 4 from IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1 was determined to be the most appropriate because the water level was greater than 23 feet and the time to boil was greater than two hours in the Spent Fuel Pool. Using Checklist 4, the inspectors determined that the finding did not require a quantitative assessment because the licensee met the Technical Specifications for the spent fuel pool, specifically water level and boron concentration. Therefore, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that the cause of this finding was related to the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area due to less than adequate procedure use and self/peer checking. | | description = A self-revealing NCV of technical specification (TS) 5.4.1 was identified for failure to follow procedure 93641-C Rev.19.2, Development and Implementation of the Fuel Shuffle Sequence Plan during spent fuel pool fuel moves in preparation for an upcoming full core off-load. As a result, a fuel assembly was moved to an unintended, unanalyzed location and remained unanalyzed for 50 days. Upon discovery, the licensee immediately performed an analysis, determined that the location was suitable for the fuel assembly, and verified that all other fuel assemblies moved during the reshuffle sequence were located in their correct locations. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) 523617. The inspector determined that the failure to follow procedure 93641-C is a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, a spent fuel assembly was stored in a location for which it had not been analyzed for 50 days. IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 screening worksheet of the SDP, instructed the inspector to process this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shut-down Operations Significance Determination Process. Checklist 4 from IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1 was determined to be the most appropriate because the water level was greater than 23 feet and the time to boil was greater than two hours in the Spent Fuel Pool. Using Checklist 4, the inspectors determined that the finding did not require a quantitative assessment because the licensee met the Technical Specifications for the spent fuel pool, specifically water level and boron concentration. Therefore, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that the cause of this finding was related to the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area due to less than adequate procedure use and self/peer checking. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:46, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Vogtle  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000424/2012004 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Vargas Mendez F Ehrhardt G Croon M Cain R Williams T Chandler |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |