05000324/FIN-2011003-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = A Minarik, A Nielsen, G Kolcum, M Speck, P O,' | | Inspector = A Minarik, A Nielsen, G Kolcum, M Speck, P O, 'Bryanr Musser | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.a, Administrative Control (Procedures), states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained, covering applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, November 1972 (Safety Guide 33, November 1972). Appendix A, Section D.24.a of Safety Guide 33, November 1972 states, in part, that procedures shall be prepared for the energizing, shutdown, and changing modes of operation for electrical systems. Contrary to this, the licensee identified that on April 3, 2011, during execution of Step 8.7.2.13 in procedure 2OP-50, Plant Electric System Operating Procedure, they rendered the Site Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) inoperable, because this control circuit delivered power to the fast-transfer function of Bus 2D. The finding was determined to be of very low-safety significance per Appendix A of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Significance Determination Process, for Unit 1, because the SAT was inoperable for less than its allowed TS outage time. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance for Unit 2 per Checklist 8 in Attachment 1 of Appendix G of IMC 0609 Significance Determination Process, because Unit 2 still had one qualified source of offsite power (The Unit Auxiliary Transformer). Upon discovery of the condition, the licensee took action to restore operability of the SAT. This finding was documented in the licensees corrective action program as NCR 457424. | | description = Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.a, Administrative Control (Procedures), states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained, covering applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, November 1972 (Safety Guide 33, November 1972). Appendix A, Section D.24.a of Safety Guide 33, November 1972 states, in part, that procedures shall be prepared for the energizing, shutdown, and changing modes of operation for electrical systems. Contrary to this, the licensee identified that on April 3, 2011, during execution of Step 8.7.2.13 in procedure 2OP-50, Plant Electric System Operating Procedure, they rendered the Site Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) inoperable, because this control circuit delivered power to the fast-transfer function of Bus 2D. The finding was determined to be of very low-safety significance per Appendix A of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Significance Determination Process, for Unit 1, because the SAT was inoperable for less than its allowed TS outage time. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance for Unit 2 per Checklist 8 in Attachment 1 of Appendix G of IMC 0609 Significance Determination Process, because Unit 2 still had one qualified source of offsite power (The Unit Auxiliary Transformer). Upon discovery of the condition, the licensee took action to restore operability of the SAT. This finding was documented in the licensees corrective action program as NCR 457424. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 20:42, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Brunswick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000324/2011003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Minarik A Nielsen G Kolcum M Speck P O 'Bryanr Musser |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |