05000269/FIN-2010005-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.06 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.06 | ||
| Inspector = A Sabisch, G Ottenberg, C Even, J Hamman, M Coursey, K Ellis, J Bartley, J Rivera | | Inspector = A Sabisch, G Ottenberg, C Even, J Hamman, M Coursey, K Ellis, J Bartley, J Rivera-Ortiz | ||
| CCA = H.7 | | CCA = H.7 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.3 | | INPO aspect = WP.3 | ||
| description = An NRC-identified finding was identified for the licensees failure to verify the operability of the East Penetration Room (EPR) expansion joint floor seals for all three units since 2006. Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 16.9.11a.7 required the licensee to verify the operability of auxiliary building (AB) floor seals every eighteen months. The licensees failure to ensure that the required EPR expansion joint floor seal inspections were performed as required by SLC SR 16.9.11a.7 was a PD. The PD was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to become a more significant safety concern in that the floor seals could further degrade and affect the function of the flood outlet devices (FOD) to protect safety-related related equipment from flooding after a HELB in the EPR. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the degradation the EPR floor seals did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of equipment they were designed to protect. The cause of this finding was directly related to the complete, accurate, and up-to-date design documentation, procedures and work packages aspect of the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area, in that, procedures and work packages to perform the surveillance were not updated following the FOD modification. | | description = An NRC-identified finding was identified for the licensees failure to verify the operability of the East Penetration Room (EPR) expansion joint floor seals for all three units since 2006. Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 16.9.11a.7 required the licensee to verify the operability of auxiliary building (AB) floor seals every eighteen months. The licensees failure to ensure that the required EPR expansion joint floor seal inspections were performed as required by SLC SR 16.9.11a.7 was a PD. The PD was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to become a more significant safety concern in that the floor seals could further degrade and affect the function of the flood outlet devices (FOD) to protect safety-related related equipment from flooding after a HELB in the EPR. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the degradation the EPR floor seals did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of equipment they were designed to protect. The cause of this finding was directly related to the complete, accurate, and up-to-date design documentation, procedures and work packages aspect of the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area, in that, procedures and work packages to perform the surveillance were not updated following the FOD modification. | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:40, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Oconee  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000269/2010005 Section 1R06 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.06 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Sabisch G Ottenberg C Even J Hamman M Coursey K Ellis J Bartley J Rivera-Ortiz |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |