05000354/FIN-2010004-02: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.12 | | CCA = H.12 | ||
| INPO aspect = QA.4 | | INPO aspect = QA.4 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety Significance because the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine oil level indicator operator aid was incorrect from April 29 to May 25, 2010. Specifically, PSEG did not use the operator aid posting procedure for the installation of a new RCIC turbine oil level indicator operator aid. This resulted in the maximum oil level mark being set too high and the minimum oil level mark being set too low on the operator aid. PSEG's corrective actions included entering the issue into the CAP and reestablishing the correct bands on the RCIC turbine oil level sightglass. The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the condition adverse to quality would lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the incorrect RCIC oil level operator aid would have led operators to refill the oil after quarterly oil samples at the incorrect maximum level. This would have caused the RCIC turbine to trip on high oil level during operation. The inspectors performed a Phase I SDP screening of the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Table 4a, Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The inspectors determined the issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in an actual loss of safety function, and was not potentially risk significant for external events. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, because PSEG did not communicate human error prevention techniques, such as self and peer checking, and proper documentation of activities. Specifically, PSEG did not use self and peer checking and did not document the installation of the operator aid. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety Significance because the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine oil level indicator operator aid was incorrect from April 29 to May 25, 2010. Specifically, PSEG did not use the operator aid posting procedure for the installation of a new RCIC turbine oil level indicator operator aid. This resulted in the maximum oil level mark being set too high and the minimum oil level mark being set too low on the operator aid. PSEG\'s corrective actions included entering the issue into the CAP and reestablishing the correct bands on the RCIC turbine oil level sightglass. The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the condition adverse to quality would lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the incorrect RCIC oil level operator aid would have led operators to refill the oil after quarterly oil samples at the incorrect maximum level. This would have caused the RCIC turbine to trip on high oil level during operation. The inspectors performed a Phase I SDP screening of the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Table 4a, Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The inspectors determined the issue was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in an actual loss of safety function, and was not potentially risk significant for external events. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, because PSEG did not communicate human error prevention techniques, such as self and peer checking, and proper documentation of activities. Specifically, PSEG did not use self and peer checking and did not document the installation of the operator aid. | ||
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Latest revision as of 19:40, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000354/2010004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Welling J Furia T Fish A Patel J Tomlinson A Burritt A Turilin K Mangan J Schoppy |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |