05000271/FIN-2009004-01: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 16: | Line 16: | ||
| CCA = H.8 | | CCA = H.8 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.4 | | INPO aspect = WP.4 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a Green NCVof 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and DraWings, in that Entergy did not initiate corrective action condition reports (CRs)'for all deficient items identified during Cooling Tower (CT) inspections. Entergy entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) and performed an operability assessment which determined that the safety related function of the CTs was always available. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, deficiencies might not be tracked to resolution, management attention or other independent reviews would not be appropriately applied, and the need for operability determinations may be missed. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not involve a design or qualification deficiency resulting in loss of operability or functionality, did not result in a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to external initiating events. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because Entergy did not follow procedures and initiate CRs to identify cooling tower deficiencies as required by operating procedure (OP) 52114. IH.4(b) | | description = The inspectors identified a Green NCVof 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and DraWings, in that Entergy did not initiate corrective action condition reports (CRs)\'for all deficient items identified during Cooling Tower (CT) inspections. Entergy entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) and performed an operability assessment which determined that the safety related function of the CTs was always available. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, deficiencies might not be tracked to resolution, management attention or other independent reviews would not be appropriately applied, and the need for operability determinations may be missed. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not involve a design or qualification deficiency resulting in loss of operability or functionality, did not result in a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to external initiating events. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because Entergy did not follow procedures and initiate CRs to identify cooling tower deficiencies as required by operating procedure (OP) 52114. IH.4(b) | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:37, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000271/2009004 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Jackson J Schoppy J Krafty S Kennedy H Jones J Commiskey D Spindler P Mckenna |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
| ' | |