05000272/FIN-2008002-01: Difference between revisions

Finding

Title

25SW24 Failure Caused 25 Service Water Pump Unavailability (Section 1R12)

Description

The inspectors identified a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, Procedures and Programs. The inspectors determined that maintenance procedures for the 25 service water strainer (SWS) blow down valve (25SW24) were inadequate because they did not ensure proper alignment of the valve and actuator. This resulted in the 25 service water pump (SWP) being inoperable for approximately 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br />. PSEG returned the 25 SW train to service following completion of corrective maintenance on the blow down valve and verification of proper alignment of the valve and actuator. PSEG also revised the applicable maintenance procedures for future maintenance activities. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, the inspectors conducted a Phase 1 screen and determined that this finding was of very low safety significance. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because PSEG did not implement and institutionalize operating experience, including internally generated lessons learned, through changes to station processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs P.2(b). Specifically, PSEG procedures did not incorporate internal operating experience to ensure proper alignment between the service water strainer blow down valve actuator and valve stem. (Section 1R12

01
Site:	Salem
Report	IR 05000272/2008002 Section 1R12
Date counted	Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:	IP 71111.12
Inspectors (proximate)	D Schroeder S Pindale J Furia J Daniel Orrh Balian J Tomlinson A Burritt S Smith L Casey
CCA	P.5, Operating Experience
INPO aspect	CL.1
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v • d • e

Finding - Salem - IR 05000272/2008002

1(0)2(4)3(4)4(0)5(5)6(0)7(4)8(0)9(0)201(0)301(0)402(0)403(0)404(0)502(0)10(0)

IR 05000272/2008002: 1 2 3 4

Finding List (Salem) @ 2008Q1

CCA Matrix: 2008Q1

	Q	CCA	Title
05000272/FIN-2008002-01	2008Q1	P.5 P.2(b)	25SW24 Failure Caused 25 Service Water Pump Unavailability (Section 1R12)
05000272/FIN-2008002-02	2008Q1	H.11 H.12	Salem Unit 2 Loss of All Three Chillers (Section 1R15)

Self-Identified List (Salem)

	Q	Title
05000272/FIN-2008002-03	2008Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000272/FIN-2008002-04	2008Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Salem Findings full list]

@@ Line 13: / Line 13: @@
 | identified by = NRC
 | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.12
-| Inspector = D Schroeder, S Pindale, J Furia, J Daniel, Orr H, Balian J, Tomlinson A, Burritt S, Smith L, Case
+| Inspector = D Schroeder, S Pindale, J Furia, J Daniel,  Orrh Balian, J Tomlinson, A Burritt, S Smith, L Casey
 | CCA = P.5
 | INPO aspect = CL.1

05000272/FIN-2008002-01: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 20:32, 20 February 2018

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05000272/FIN-2008002-01: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 20:32, 20 February 2018

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