05000390/FIN-2006007-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.2 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.2 | ||
| Inspector = A Vargas, | | Inspector = A Vargas Mendez, J Bartley, J Kreh, J Reece, R Carrion, S Cahill, S Vias, W Looc, Evansj Bartley, R Bernhard, S Cahillr, Pascarellic Casto, C Evans | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding associated with TS 5.7.1.1 requirements for procedure adherence which resulted in pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) actuations. The finding is unresolved pending significance determination assessment. The inspectors determined that procedural noncompliances had a credible impact on safety involving the challenge of reactor coolant system (RCS) integrity by PORV actuations and the challenge of RCS inventory through the loss of inventory via the open PORVs. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that the RCS physical design barrier protects the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events and the associated cornerstone attributes of human performance and procedure quality. The inspectors reviewed MC 0609, Appendix G, and determined that the finding required quantitative assessment consisting of a Phase 3 analysis because it affected the cold over-pressure mitigation or low temperature over-pressure system required by TS. The cause of the finding impacts the cross-cutting area of human performance. (Section 1R20.2) | | description = The inspectors identified a finding associated with TS 5.7.1.1 requirements for procedure adherence which resulted in pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) actuations. The finding is unresolved pending significance determination assessment. The inspectors determined that procedural noncompliances had a credible impact on safety involving the challenge of reactor coolant system (RCS) integrity by PORV actuations and the challenge of RCS inventory through the loss of inventory via the open PORVs. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that the RCS physical design barrier protects the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events and the associated cornerstone attributes of human performance and procedure quality. The inspectors reviewed MC 0609, Appendix G, and determined that the finding required quantitative assessment consisting of a Phase 3 analysis because it affected the cold over-pressure mitigation or low temperature over-pressure system required by TS. The cause of the finding impacts the cross-cutting area of human performance. (Section 1R20.2) | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:32, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000390/2006007 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2005 (2005Q1) |
| Type: | Violation: White |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Vargas Mendez J Bartley J Kreh J Reece R Carrion S Cahill S Vias W Looc Evansj Bartley R Bernhard S Cahillr Pascarellic Casto C Evans |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |