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l EGG-FM-6259 August 1983 TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF INTEGRITY OF THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY PIPING SYSTEM i
            .a Peter K. Nagata Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Operated by the U.S. Department of Energy s                  .
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I EGG-FM-6259 TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF INTEGRITY OF THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY PIPING SYSTEM Published August 1983 Peter K. Nagata Materials Engineering Branch
            '        Materials Sciences Division
                      ,    EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Responsible NRC Individual and Division:
W. H. Koo/ Division of Engineering Occket No.: 50-333 TAC No.: 46661 i
4 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-761001570 FIN .No. A6429 i
 
I i
A8STRACT NUREG-0313, Rev.1, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for 8WR Coolant Pressure Sounoary Piping, is the NRC staff's revised acceptaole metnoas to reouce intergranular stress corrosion 1
cracking in boiling water reactors. The responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 of the Power Authority of the State of New York concerning whether its James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Flant meets NUREG-0313, i                                Rev. 1 are evaluated by EG&G Idaho, Inc. in this report. Particular attention was given the leak detection systems described in Regulatory 4
Guide 1.45, Reactor Coolant Pressure Soundary Leak Detection Systems, referenced by Parts li.5.1.a.ll) and (4) found on pages / and d of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.
FOREWORD
: i.                                    This report is supplied as part of the Selected Operating Reactor Issues Program being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Licensing, by EG&G Idaho,
  ;                              Inc., Materials Engineering Branch.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under the authorization, B&R 20 19 10 11.
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!                                                                          11 i
    - , , , , - , - , , - - --          -- - - .  .      ---          ,----n    - ~ . , , , - - - - , - - . .            -
 
==SUMMARY==
 
j NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, Technical Report on Material Selection and                                            !
{              Processing Guidelines for B'aR Coolant Pressure Soundary Piping, is the NRC staff's revised acceptaole metnoas to reouce intergranular stress corrosion cracking in boiling water reactors. The responses to NRC Generic                                .
Letter 81-04 of the Power Authority of the State of New York concerning l            whether its James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant meets NUREG-0313, Rev.1 are evaluated by EG&G Idaho, Inc. in this report. Particular attention was given the leak detection systems described in Regulatory j            Guide 1.45, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection Systems, 4
referenced by Parts IV.8.1.a.(I) and (z) found on pages 7 and 8 of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.
,                  As may be observed in the following table, with the exception of i              IV.S.2.b., FitzPatrick does not meet any of the parts of NUREG-0313, Rev. I evaluated in this document.
Tne following table is a synopsis of the EG&G Idaho, Inc. evaluation of the Power Authority of the State of New York's response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04.
Additional Part of NUREG-0313,                                                                  Data Rev. 1 Evaluated                                Evaluation"            Required b        Discrepancy Section II.
II.C.                Does not meet NUREG-0313,                      Yes      Minor Rev. 1 J
        . Section III.
t        Section IV.
1 IV.S.I.a.(1)        Provides alternative to                        Yes        Major i                                                NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 IV.8.1.a.(2)        Does not meet NUREG-0313,                      Yes      Major i
Rev. 1 IV.8.1.b.            Does not meet NUREG-0313,                    No        Minor Rev. 1 IV.8.1.b.(3)          Did not provide data in                      Yes        Minor j                                                  response to NRC Generic
;                                                  Letter 81-04 I
IV.8.1.b.(4)          Did not provide data in                      Yes        Minor response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04
)
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                                                                                                                                                            ~
Additional Part of NUREG-0313,                                                                          Data a
Rev. 1 Evaluated                              Evaluation                        Required b      Discrepancy IV.8.2.a.        The comments for Parts IV.8.1.a.(1) and IV.8.1.a.(2) apply here.
IV.B.2.b.        Meets NUREG-0313, Rev. 1                                No            None IV.8.2.b.(6)    Did not provide data in                                  Yes            Minor response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 Section V.                                                                                                                            .
i aSee Tables 1 and 3 for additional information.
b See Tables 1 and 4 for additional information.
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                                - - _ . _          . . - _  , - , -  -,              -,--.,..-.,y          . . - . - - _
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              ,                                                                                        \
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CONTENTS A85 TRACT..............................................................                                                    11 1
 
==SUMMARY==
...............................................................                                                  iii 1.
I N TRO D UC T I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. . .
2.
EVALUATION .......................................................                                                      4
                                    .t1UREG-0313, Rev. 1 Guidelines ..............................
2.1                                                                                                                    4 2.2    Discussion of Tables .......................................                                                    4 2.J    D i s c rep a nc i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............
                                                                                                                        . . . . . . . .\            5 s
3.
C O NC L US I O N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6. . . . .
A.
R E F ERE NC E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33....
i TA8LES
: 1. Review of ' Licensee's Response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 ........                                                    7
: 2. Summaries of Evaluation of Licensee's Responses ..................                                                    23
: 3. Differences between NUREG-0313 R                        I and Licensee's Responses    ....................,..ev.  .
                                                                            .................................                                    25
: 4. Additional Data Required of Licensee .......................;.....                                                  30 i-1 I
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                -                                                                                                  l TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF INTEGRITY OF THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY PIPING SYSTEM '
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: 1. INTRODUCTION                            i Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of austenitic stainless steel (SS) ' piping has t'een observed in boiling water reactors (8WRs) since December 1965.I The NRC established a Pipe Crack Study Group (PCSG) in January 1975 to study the problem.2 The PCSG issued two documents, NUREG-75/067 Technical Report, Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactors 3 and an implementation dc.. sent, NUREG-0313, Rev. 0.2 After cracking in large-diameter piping was discovered for the first time in the Duane Arnold BWR in 1978, a new PCSG was formed. The new PCSG in turn issued two reports, NUREG-0531, I_nvestigation and Evaluation of Stress-Corrosion 4
Cracking in Piping of, Light Water Reactor Plants and            NUREG-0313, Rev. 1
                        ' Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Bcundary Piping." NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 is the implementing document of NUREG-0531 and discusses the augmented inservice inspection (ISI) and leak detection requirements "for plants that cannot comply with the material selection, testing, 'and processing guidelines" of.
NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.0 NRC Generic Letter 81-04 requested each licensee "to review all ASME C' ode Class 1 and 2 pressure boundary piping, safe ends, and fitting material, including weld metal to determine if (they) meet the material selection, testing and processing guidelines in" NUREG-0313, Rev.1.6 The generic letter offered the option of providing a description, schedule, and justification for alternative actions that would reduce the susceptibility of pressure boundary piping and safe ends to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) or increase the probability of early detection of leakage from pipe cracks.
i.
                              .          4 i
_ _ _ _ _ _      ___        _ _ - -          - '-~
* l In response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04, the Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY) submitted a letter on July 31, 1981.7 Additional requests for information from the NRC staff el'icited other letters from PASNY on September 28, 19818 and January 19, 1983.9 EG&G Idaho personnel evaluated these responses, and this report provices:
: 1. A brief sunnary of the licensee's response to each part of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.
: 2. A discussion of areas where the licensee does not meet the guidelines or requirements of NUREG-0313. Rev. 1.a
: 3. A brief discussion of the licensee's proposed alternatives to NUREG-0313, Rev. 1; however, no determination of acceptability is made on these alternatives.
4 An identification of all areas where the licensee has not provided sufficient information to judge the licensee's program.
There is an effort underway to revise NUREG-0313, Rev. I by NRC in light of research on IGSCC and recent instances of IGSCC at Nine Mile Point (March 1982) and Monticello (October 1982). Because of this coatemplated revision of NUREG-0313, Rev.1, the following issues will not be evaluated.
4
: 1. The licensee's proposed Technical Specifications to implement the requirements, with the exception of the leak detection requirements in NUREG-0313 Rev. 1. Sections IV.B.I.(a)(1) and IV.B.I.(a)(2).
: 2.      The acceptability of licensee-proposed augmented inservice inspection (ISI) sampling criteria.
: a. Part III of NUREG-0313. Rev. I contains guidelines; Part IV contains requirements.
2 c
: 3. Credit for past operating experience and inspection results.
: 4. The acceptability of induction heating stress improv'ement (IHSI), heat sink welding (HSW), and weld overlay as alternates to augmented ISI.
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                                *79                                'h              w "
 
                                                          ~
: 2. EVALUATION 2.1 NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 Guidelines The guidelines and requirements outlined in NUREG-0313, Rev. I form the basis of this evaluation. The NUREG-0313, Rev. I guidelines are found in Parts III and V and the requirements in Parts II and IV of that document. Part II discusses implementation of material selection, testing, and processing guidelines. Part III summarizes acceptable methods to            -
minimize IGSCC susceptibility with respect to the material selection, testing, and processing guidelines. Part IV deals with leak detection and inservice inspection requirements of nonconforming (i.e., not meeting the guidelines of Part III of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1) piping. Part V discusses general reconnendations.
2.2 Discussion of Tables Table I has the complete text Parts II through V of NUREG-0313, Rev.1 on the left side so that the reader may be able to refer to it as the topics are discussed. The right side summarizes the licensee's responses, lists the differences between the licensee's proposed implementation program and NUREG-0313 Rev.1, and identifies the adoitional data required to evaluate the licensee's response.
Many sections in Parts II through IV of NUREG-0313, Rev. I are not discussed in the right hand column. In these cases, one of the connents below will be used.
o Not applicable because the construction permit for this plant has been issued.
o Not applicable because the operating license for this plant has been issued.
o      Not applicable because the plant has been constructed.
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o    The licensee has not furnished data on this topic in his responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 o    No coment made because alternative plans were not evaluated.
      ,      Table 2 lists the summaries of the licensee's responses to NRC quest',ons on implementation of NUREG-0313, Rev. I guidelines. Therefore, in Table 2 the reader is able to read all the summaries in one table without having to search Table 1 for all the summaries. The same compilation applies to Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 lEts the differences between the licensee's proposed implementation program and that recomended in NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. Table 4 lists the areas where additional information is required to properly evaluate the licensee's proposed implementation program. All the items in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are listed in their respective tables in the order they appear in Table 1.
2.3 Discrepancies Any alternate proposal that did not meet a specific guidaline er requirement of NUREG-0313, Rev. I was considered a discrepancy. Evaluation or alternate proposals was outside the scope of this task, as inoicated in Section 1 of this report. Licensees have submitted definitions of "nonservice sensitive" and augmented ISI proposals that differ from NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.
These differences are considered minor because the NRC staff is considering major modifications to those requirements. An example of a minor discrepancy is the use of the stress rule index (SRI) to choose whicn welds would be subjected to augmented ISI.
If the alternate proposal to leak detection does not meet the requirements in NUREG-0313, Rev. I, it was considered a major discrepancy because NRC is not considering major modifications to those requirements.
An example of a major discrepancy is a licensee's not proposing Technical Specifications to implement leak detection requirements in NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.
Onij major discrepancies are listed in the Conclusions section.
\
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: 3. CONCLUSIONS PASNY's FitzPatrick plant has tne following major discrepancies:
Part IV.B.I.a.(1) Leak Detection and Monitoring Systems PASNY's description of FitzPatrick's leak detection methods is not detailed enough to determine whether they meet Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.45.
Part IV.B.I.a.(2) Leak Detection PASNY has not proposed a requirement for shutdown after a 2-gpm increase in unidentified leakage in 24 h into the Technical Specifications for FitzPatrick.
PASNY has not proposed a requirement for monitoring the sump level at 4-h intervals (or less). PASNY does not meet NUREG-0313, Rev.1 in this matter.
There are minor discrepancies as well as the major ones listed above.
These minor discrepancies are not listed here. However, while the licensee's alternate proposals tnat have been classified as minor discrepancies might be acceptable under the anticipated revision of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, it should not be inferred that approval of those alternate proposals has been given.
The licensee has not supplied sufficient information to evaluate his responses to topics II.C., IV.S.I.a.(1) and (2), IV.8.1.b.(3) and (4),
IV.8.2.a and IV.B.2.b.(6). Table 4 lists the required information for each topic.
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IAh l 1. NLVl[id Of LILLN51L*5 Rf5PU885t ID NitC GlhENIC tillfR 81-04 faccrpts frum htEth-UJIJ, Nev. 1 (GEG Idaho (valuation--flllPAlRil:K NUCLEAR
: 11. lHPttHtNIAll088 Of MAlf RIAL Self tll08ea IE5ilhG, AleD Mat 55th6 Lulutt thES II.A. fur plants under review, but for which a                A. Isot applicable 1,ccouse the construction permit for this construction permit has not been issued, all ASME              plant has been issued.
Code L. lass I, 7 and 3 lines shoulo conf orm to tue
          . guluelines stated in Part lit, 11.8. For plants that have been issued a construction        B.      Not applicable because the operating license for this permit but not an operating license, all A5ME Code            plant has been issued.
Class 1, 2, amt J lines should conform to the 9uldelines stated in Part til unless it can be demanestrated to the staf f that laplementing the guidelines of Part til would result in undue hardship. For cases in which the guidelines of Part til are not camisplied with, additional measures should be temen for Class I and 2 lines in accordance with tne guidelines stated in Part IV of this document.
al.C. for plants that have been issued an operating            C. Stee4AN f y            license. NHC designated " Service Sens8tive" lines (Part IV. 8) snould ne modified to conform to the              lhe Power Anthority of the State of New York's guedelines stated in Part lit, to tue eatent            (PASNf's) alternative plan proposes to replace some, but not practicaole, idesen *5ervice Sensitive
* and other      all, the nonconforming pipe at the fit 2 Patrick plant.
Class I and 2 lines do not meet tne guidelines of Part lit, adultional measures should be taken in              UlffEREnCE5 accordance with tne guidelines stated in Part IV of this docimaent. Lines triat experience cracking            :luhEG-0313. Rev. I requires that IIRC-designated during service and require replacement should be
* service-sensitive" lines be replaced with replaced witu piping that conforms to the              corrosion-resistant materials. Also, lines that esperience guidelines stated in Part lit.
cracking should be replaced with corrosion-resistant materials.
PASNY has proposed replacing rectrculation piping if        .
IGSCC is found and has replaced senpaints of the core spray piping. PASNV will replace the nonconfusming parts of the control rod drive hydraulic return piping. PASNY has not stated whether il plans to replace the nonconforming parts of the residual heat remawal and reactor water cleanup sa lpihg.
yl:WiAL DAIA RfylRED A
judicate if there are any plans to replace the residual locatin amt reactor water cleanup piping if evidence of iGSLC s found.
 
                                          . m      . _ -.      -
m . . _ . _ __      _    _  _.          _    _                    . _ _ . _.. .    , _ .
Ill. Sta9tMV Uf ALLtPI At$1[ M[IlluDS 10 MINIMllC CHACK 5UssTPIliieriff-Wff11IC5fiUIhs Tf5Tinll~Asio                                                                                                                ,
PA0J55filG GallDftW5                                                                                                                                        i Ill.A. Selei.siuss of Materials                                                A. The licensee taas siot furnished data on this paragregan in his responses to astC Generic letter 81-04. See only those materials described in Paragraphs I                        comument on Part II.C. above, and 2 below are acceptat le to tha istC for lustallat tua in theR ASMC Code Class I, 2, and 3 piping systems. Otner materials may be used when evaluated and accepted by tne letC.
Ill.A.I.        Lorrusiuse-kes tstant Materials                              I. The cuminents un lit. A. also apply neere.
                            . All pipe ased fitting material including safe ends, tneraal sleeves, and weld metal should be of a type and graele that has been                                                                                                          ,
deemsstrated to he seighly resistant to usygen-assisted stress corrosion in the
  '                          as-installed cosedition. Materials that have been so demuustrated incluue ferritic steels.
* Nuclear Grade" austenitic stainless steels.*
Iypes 304L and 3lbt austenttic stainless steels, lype CF-3 cast stainless steel, lypes 17-8 and CF-8N cast austenttic stataless m                            steel with at least 55 ferrite. Type 308L stainless steel weld metal, and othe" austettitlC stainless steel weld metrI with at least 55 ferrite content. Unstabillied wrougnt austenttic stainless steel without cuntrolled low carbon has not been so disemistrated except when the piping is in ti.e solution-asueealed condition. Ihe use of such                                                                                                    i material ti.e., regular grades of fypes 304 and 316 stainless steels) should be avoided If such material is used, tese as-installed piping including welds saiould be in the solution annealeis cosedition. Weecre regular grades ut types J04 and jib are used and welding or sneat treatment is required, special measures, sucsa as those descrlhed les Part til.L. Processing of Materials, shuuld be taaen tu ensure that Ib5t'C will not occur.
Such measures may include (a) suluttun asusealing subsequent to the weldsug or heat                                                                                                      ,
treatment, and (u) weld c14Jding of materials to be welded using procedures (Beat have beest desanistrated to reduce residual stresses asui sensitiration ci surface materials.
    *Inese materials nave contrulled low carbon (0.025 seas) anil nitrogen (0.11 man) contents and meet all requirements, including mecnanical proves ty requircinesets, of ASM[
specificatinn for regular geades of lype 304 or                                                                                                                          6
    $1b stainless steel pipe.
_ _ . ~ . ~ . . . _ . ,
 
ill.A.2. Corrossou Nesistant Safe inds and thermal        ?  Yae e unements on Ill.A. also apply here.
_51.E.__v.e s.
All unstacialsed wrought austenitic stainless steel materials used for safe ends ano taennal sleeves without controlled low carbues contents (L-grades and leuclear Grade) should be in the solution-annealed condition. If as a consequence of fabrication, welds joining these materials are not solution annealed, tsiey should ne made between cast (or meld overleid) austealtic stainless steel surf aces
($1 minimas ferrite) or other materials having hign resistence to oxygen-assisted stress corrosi.m. Ike jolet design mast be succi that any high-stress areas in unstabillied wrought austenitic stainless steel without controlled low carbon cositent, which may become sensillaed as a result of tne welding process, is esot esposed to the reactor coolant.
thermal sleeve attacaments that are welded to 2
tne pressure boundary and form crevices where
  '                      lageurities may accomulate should not be espused to a 16HR coulant envirorment.
e        111.B. festing of Materials                                  8. ihe licensee has not furnished data on this paragraph for new snstall.ation, tests should be anade on all                                                    ~
regular ge aJe stainless steels to be used in the A580[ Coue Class 1, 2, and J piping systees to dononstrate (nat.the material was properly asuecaled and is not susceptible to IGSCC. Tests tesat snave been used to determine the susceptibility of IGSCC include Pr3ctices A*
and E" of A5181 A-262,
* Recommended Practices for IJetecting husceptibility to intergranular Attack en Stainless Steels" and the electrochemical putentlotinetic reactivation (EPR) test. The.EPR test is not yet accepted by the 81RC. If the EPR
* test is used, the acceptance criteria applied must be evaluated and accepted by the INIC on a case-cy-case basis.
* Practice A--Osalic acid etch test for classification of
* etch structures of stainless steels.
    ** Practice E--Copper-cupper sulf ate-sulfuric acid test f or detecting susceptibility to intergranular attack in                                                                                -
stainless steels.
 
lit.C. Processi..g ue feitels                                        C. lhe licensee has not f urnisted .tata oss this p.iragraph in his responses to setC Generic Letter 81-04. See Corrnslan-resistant cladding with a duples                    comment on Part II.C. above.
microstructure ($1 minisua f errite) may be applied to the esmas of type 304 or lifi stefaless steel pipe for the purpose of avoiding IGSCC at use ldments . Such Claddisig, wenich is inteskled in (a) minlaisse ts.e itA2 arn the pipe inner surf ace, (n) ccwe the tMZ away f rom tne hignty stresse 1 region nest to the attaceaneret weld, asus (c) isolate tne eseldment frue tne envirremment, may ne applied under the following conditions:
III.L.I.      Fur initial co.estruction, provided that all of    I. Ine cumsments on t al.C. also apply 8aere.
the piping is solution asuaealed af ter cladding.
111.C.2. For repair welding and modification to                  2. leie coineents on Ill.C. also apply siere.
in-place systems in operating plants and plants innser construction. Wesen the repair welding or modification requires replace = nt of pipe, the replacement pip.e should De solution-asincaled af ter cladding.
Corroslun-resistant cladding applied in the "fleid" (i.e., witnout subsequent solution annealing of the pipe) is acceptable only on
,                      that portion of the pipe that has not beesi o                      removed f ree tne piping systee. Other "fleld" applications of corrosion-resistant claddlag are not acceptanle.
Other processes that nave been found by laboratory tests to min 6* size stresses and ICSCC in austenitic stainless steel welements luciude inductioso heating stress improvement (18851) and seest sink weltling (H5W). Althougse tne use of these processes as an alternate to suspeented laserviCe inspcClion is not yet attepted by the NitC, tnese processes may be perialssible and will ne considered on a case-Dy-case basis penvided acceptable supportive data are ',ubmitted to the NNC.
I V.
IN$tNVicE JN5 Pit. fluff Aleu liAK DEltCil0N Rf tfilREMEislS MEUsislitt VAltviss6'      DEQtif$ of 4:66Misikak.E'Io J
n ItAInt7Mi.IIdeiTri;5,iTaic74FatiPA6CrsissirdGTuf1iseE5 IV.A.      For plants wasose ASHt Code 4.1a55 3, 2, asus 3          A. Isae licesisce has anot furnistwo data oss this paragrapti pressure buundary piping meets taee guidelines of              in his responses to letC Generic Letter 81 04.
Part lil, no auspni:nted fuservice inspection or lean detection requirements beyund those specified in the 10 LfN 50.ha(g). " Inservice inspection liequiruments" and plant lecnnical Specifications f or leakage detection are necessary.
 
I V. II . A$sso Cude Class I and i' pressure buimulary piping      8. The licensee has not furnisheil data on this paragrapia inat does not meet guidelines of Part 111 is                in his resp =nses to lett Generic letter 81-04.
ues tpated *skuunsorming* asal must have aJJetlunal Inservice ipspection Jetd more stringent lean detections requiremesits. Isse degree of au.jecuted I.aservice inspectiun of such piping depends un wa.etner ts.e specific % conforming" piptug runs are classified as *5ervice Sensitive.' Ine *5ervice Sensitive
* lines were and will be designated by the letC and are defined
,                    as those tasat osare esperienced cracting of a generic nature, or that are cosesidered to be particularly susceptiale to cracting because of a condainatlun of silga local stress, material condition,' and high oxygen content in the relatively stagnant, intermittent, or low-flow coolanti Currently, for the nuncunforming A5ME Code Class J piping, no additional inservice inspection bevoeul the Section XI visual eammination is required.
Esaugales of piplug considered to be " Service Sena.itive* inclaie but are not limited to: ecre                                                        -
spr.y lines, recirculation riser llacs
* rer trculat tos, ejpass line:S (or pipe
  "                catansions/ stub tubes on pient s wn::re the bypass lines havereturn siyordnite    been removed)    control lines, Isolation  rud drive (0:0) candenser  lines, recirculation inlet lines at safe ends ednere crevices are formeu by the ucided tsiermal sleeve attacessents, and shutdown escat eacmanger li.nes.
If cracting should later us found in a particular pipl.ig run med consiocred to De generic, it will Le designated by the Init as " Service Sensitive."
* State no Itatt. esas been observed in the dunestic plants and in view of the possible hign radiation exposure to the inspect tun personnel, surveillan(e and munitoring memis other ts an ts ose specified in Sectiosi IV of this report for e ccerculatives riser lines will be conesidered on a case-by-case basis.
teas 49e sietection and augmented laservice inspection requirreents fur "Ilunconforming* lines and *hetonforming, Service Sensitive
* lines are spec 18 led beIus:
I V.ll.1,      "becusif ormin SeEIGiu* ~g Lines Ihat Are fiut *5ervice            I. The licensee has not furnistied data eri this paragraph la his responses to 88tC Gmeric letter 81-04.
 
i v .is . l . a . te.is 18etectio.a: the reactor coolasst        a. llee liteesseet has sont furssis. icd slate ame this par.ege stda le4kagt! iletectiusa systesis soeuuld be les tsis sessousases its 18(C Ekseeric tetter 81-04.
neersted under the lechnical Specificatiini requirriments to esuaance te.e disvavery of unidentifled leakage that may include                            ,
through-wall crad s Jeveloped in austPalit Bc stainless steel piping.
lW.B.I.4.(l)        the leaage detectica system provided          (I) 5_t99Wt f should include suf ficiently diverse leak detection meterods wits adequate                    PA531Y's lescriptiose of Fit: Patrick's leak detectiosa sens6tivity to detect and amasure small        melsunds is not detailed enouges to determine adiether they leans in a timely masweer anJ to identify      meet Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.45.
the leatage sources within (see practical limits. Acuptable leasage detectices and            Dif f fitfleCf 5 munitoring systems are described in Sectione L. Regulatory Posillon of          .
the nine subsections of Section C of Regulatory Regulatory Guide 1.45. " Reactor Cuolant        Guide 1.45 are discussed below.
Pressuru Boususary teatage Detection Systems."
C.I PA5ser has stated that leakage tu the primary Particular ettentlue senauld be given to                      reactor containment from identilled sources is collected such that upgrading ano calibrating those leat detectinn systems that will provide presept                  a.      the fluw rates are muoillusird separately f reme i.edication of asi increrase in leakage rate,                        unidentif ied leakage.9 and other equivalesit leakage detectiosa asui                    b.      the total
[                  collectiori systems will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
monitored, glow rate can be established and C.2 The Fit: Patrick Final Safety Assalysis Report (FStit) (Section 4.10.3) indicates that the reactor coolant leak detection systems (eacept for the continuous radioactivity mosaltoring system) are designed to have a sensitivity of 3 gpa ur bet t er.9 It is not knowa if the sensitivity of "3 gym or better" meets the rectsamendations in Regulatory Guide 1.45.
C.3 ihe primary cenitainment leak detection systems consist of the following.
: l. Drywell Equipment Drain Stamp teakage Kanitoring System.
: 7.      Drywell floor prain Samup teakage Monitoring System.
: 3. Drywell Cusitinuous Atmusphere Radioactivity Monitoring tudine ased(includes noble gasgross  particglate, a(Livities).
lhe three emelnuds recemmaesided by Subsection C.3 of Regulatury Guide 1.45 are present.
C.4    It is not clear whether provisituts have beeen m.ede in the fit: Patrick f 5AA tu amunitor systems cemenected to the RfPil for signs of intersystem It'ak at!
 
    . . .-- ~.      .                .            .-                      - .
C.S lhe fit: Patrick reactor coolant leatage systems (except for the cinitisivanas radioactivity mosaltorirg system) are designed to have a sensitivity of 3 gem or better (f 5AR Sectloei4.10.3).
C.h    it is not clear whetsier the Fit: Patrick alsborne particulate radioactivity munituring system remains f unctional when subjected to the 55t..
C.1 Indicators and alanes for the required leakage detectiosi system are provided in the males cuatrol rooms. Procedures f or converting vartuus indications to a cumsmus leakage equivalent ere availaute to the operators.
It is not knoems whether calibration of the indicators accounts for the seceded inelependent variables.
C.8 it is not known whether all the fit: Patrick Icak detection systems enianerated in Referiwe 9 can be calibrated or tested during operation.
C.9 Inc fit 2 Patrick lechnical Specificatlusas include W                      limiting conditions for ideatified and useidentified leakage. Iwo of the leak detection systems described in the Fit: Patrick lechnical Specifications (Section 3.6.0.2) are always operable.
It casumot be determined f rne the above whether fitaPatrick meets all the requirciments of Regulatory Eni4 1.45. Sectico C.
ApulilCalAt DATA littJulettu
: 1.      Indicate whether provist wis have been m.ule in the Fit: Patrick FSAit to anwiltor systems coeuiccted to the RCP8 for signs of intersystem leakage (Subsection C.4 of Regulatory Golde 1.45).
: 2. Ihe fit Patrick f 5 Alt (Section 4.10.3) imilcates that Lt.e reactor coolasit leak detection systems (except for the continuous radioactivity monitoring system) are designed to have a sensitivity of 3 geus or better. Please give, if possible, a musre precise tigure tisan "3 game or                e better". (Subsection C.5 of kegulatory Guide 1.45).
: 3. Indicate whether calibe'ation of tiee indicaturs acCouslts for the needed in.fcpendent variables          *
(Sid>section 0.1 of itegulatory Guide 1.45).
: 4. Indicate whether the F4taPatrick althorne particulate radioactivity moultoring system remains f unctional when sublected to SSE (Subsection C.6 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).
: 5. Indicate which led detect fun systems in Fit: Patrick can be calibrated or tested during operation (Subsection C.8 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).
: 6. Indicate if the ledage detection system i
sensitivity meets Regulatory Guide 1.45 (Subsection C.2 of Regulatury Guide 1.4h).
'          IV.W.I.e.(2) Plant snutdoms should be taltiated for              (2) StsMART taspection and carrective action unen any ledage detection systes ladicates, witmin              PA547 nas not proposed a requirement for shutdoun af ter a period of 24 hours or less, an increase a 2-gpe increase in unidentified ledage in 24 h into the in rate of unidentified ledage in escess        Technical Specifications for Fit: Patrick.
of 2 gallons per minuts or its equivalent, or when the total unidentified led age                  PA581T nas not proposed a requirement for munitoring the attains a rate of 5 gallons per minute or        sump level at 4-n intervals (or less). PAS 4Y does not acet
!                        Its equivalent, whichever occurs first.          histEG-0313. Rev. I in this matter.
For sump level monitoring systems with flaed-measurement laterval metnod, tne                  OlFFEREleCES level should be monitored at 4-hour latervals or less.                                      staEG-0313, Rev. I requires that reactor shutdoma he initiated when tiiere is a 2-gpa lacrease in unidentified ledaee in 24 h. For suno level monitoring systems with the
  -                                                                      fised-measurement laterval method, the level should be
  **                                                                    monitored every 4 h or less. IshC Generic Letter 81-04 requires that the above requirements be incorporated in the plant technical Specifications.
PA511Y has not incorporated a requirement la the Fit: Patrick Technical Specifications for shistdoun af ter a 2-gpo lacrease in leatage in 24 h. Also, the rq coolant ledage rata is established or.ca a day.'gter A00lilastAL DATA RfqulRED Indicate if there are plans to lacorporate the reconnendations        of Part IV.S.I.a.(2) into the Fit: Patrick Techatcal Specifications.
IV.u.l.a.(J) unidentitled ledage should include all            (3) PAS 4f's definition of unidentified ledage for leakage otner than; Fit: Patrick meets 4tafG-0313. Rev.1 (F5Ast Section 4.10 3).
it.B.I.a.(3)(a) tedage lato closed systans, such as pump seal or valve packing leds that    (a) The comments on IV.8.l.a.(3) also apply here.
are captured, flow metered, and conducted to a sump or collecting tana, or
 
                                ~_        _              _    _ _ . _. .                        ._.                                  _      __
iv.B.I.a.(3)(b) leakage into the contalument                    (b) Ihe causeents on IV.8.I.a.(3) also apply 1.cre, atusosphere f rom sources that are both specif scally located and known either not to interfere with the operations of unidentitled brasage munitoring systems or not to be frum a througn-wall crack in the piping within the reactor coolant pressure i
buundary.
If.ts.l.u.        Aupm:nted inservice luspections faservice        b. SUHMANV luspection of the "floncunfr -eing, e
86unservice Sensitive" lin . 5:w>uld be                PASNV's classification for the 22- and 28-in, conducted in accordance with the fullowing      recirculation piping,12-in. recirculatiusi riser piping, and program:*                                        seguents of the residual heat removal (Riet) and reactor water cleanup (RWCU) piping do not aseet Ntat[G-0313. Rev.1.
    *ints program is largely taken frima the requirements of A5ME                  Also, PASNV's augmented 151 plans for the above ASHL 160tler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, referenced in tese          Code Class I
* service sensitive' pipes do not miet paragrapn (b) of to Lf R $0.55a " Codes and Standards."                  leUREG-0113. Rev, l.
UlffDtfNrCS
                                                                                    'ItMFb-0313. Rev. I requires that all ASME Code Clau I
  -
* service sensitive' piping be subjected to an .nipmented 151
  '"                                                                        program. lhe inf tial inspectior.s seiould be carried out at outa                  Rev esch    successive classified              refuelin!lon R$.
the recircula          and IluufG-0]l)Ing RWCU pip      sy. I has stems as
                                                                            ' service sensitive".
PA588V has classified the above pipes as "nonservice sensitive" and has propoged inspection plans whirsi dif fer fross NUMEG-0313. Rev.1.
AlDill0NAL DAIA REljujkg)
Nanc.
IV.U.l.b.(l) for A5HE Code Class I cimiponents and                (I) The conoments on IV.B.I.b. also apply here, piping, each pressure-retaining dissimilar meetal weld siebject to inservice inspectiosa requirements of Section XI should be cuels.eil at least once in no more tasen 80 months (two-thirds of the time prescribed in the A5NE Boller and Pressure vess.el Code Section XI). Such examination shonid include all internal attacsunent welds that are not thrnugh-wall welds but are welded to of form part Of the pressure boundary.
I V. 8.1.u. ( 2) the tultuwing ASHf Code Llass I pipe welds        (2) Ihe cemements on IV.B. I.b. also apply here.
si.blect in inservice inspection requirisments of Section 31 shnnld be ca.miined at least susce in nu more than                                                          ,
80 an,esths -
 
iv.5.1.D.(2)[a) Ail welas at ter.inal ends of pipe          (a) Ine co ne-nts un IV.8.1.b. also apply here.
at vessel no22Ies;
* 8essinal ends are tee entrosities of piping runs that cosua<t to structor.*s, cumpunents (such as vessels, pumps, salves) or pipe ancrwrs, exh of which avis as rigid restraints or provides at least two degrees of restraint to piping thermal espansion.
IV.S.I b.(2)(c) All welds having a design comeilned          (b) the comments on IV.8.1.b. also apply here.
pr6sary plus secondary stress range of 2.45, or more; I V.8.1.b. ( 2)(c ) All welds having a design cumulative    (c) The casaments on IV.S.I.b. also apply here.
lat6gue usage factor of 0.4 or more; an.s I V.B. I .e. ( 2)(d) Sufficient aalitional welds with hign  (d) The comuments esa IV.8.1.b. also apply here.
potential for cracting to masLe the total equal to 251 of the welds in caca piping systems.
-    IV.8.1.0.(J)    Ihe following ASME Code Class 2 pipe        (3) SteemitY m                    welde, subject to enservice inspection requireinents of Sectiose XI, in residual            PAS 41Y has not identified thase nonconforming heat renoval systees, e e rayucy care        "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per cooling systeses, and cositainment heat reasoval syste as shuvid be emantned at      Part IV.8.1.b.(3) of Iltaf G-0313. Rev.1. Data are needed to determine wealch *nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 least once in no more than 80 mun.:e          pipes will be laspected and what inspection procedures will be used.
Olf f[itf asCES 88 Ult (G-0313, 8ev. I requires that noncunforming A5ML Code Class I and Class 2 piping 1.e subjected to an an9mmted 151 program. the augen=nted 151 program for A5MC code Class I piping dif fers tros that required on Class 2 piping. Also, augesented ISI requirceents differ inr ASME Code Class 2 pipes to be inspected per Parts IV.8.l.b ( J) and IV.8.1.b.(4) of IstattG-0313. Rev.1.
PA5sif has sulmoitted the au p ted 151 program for noncenforming *nnnservice sensitive
* piping, but has not distinguished etween the ASME Code Class I and Class /
piping, and between the A5ME Code Class 2 pipes which are lo be inspected per Parts IV.B.I.b.(3) and IV.S.I.b.(4) of IstatIG-0113, lley, 1. therefore, PA516V's program for ASM[      '
Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated.
A0011104AL D_AIAylpi,HED _
IJentif y which ASML Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.8.1.1..(3) and wenich layw-ct tun proce.hsres will lee uw l.
 
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                                )                                                                                                              shRti 3          3                J
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I          I          I          I e
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ip          ot eldtl aoos sca  et    s t ra                                                          )                                                                        m lap        A pc          )                                  )          i          )
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: b.                      S.                                  S.          8                    8                                V V          V            V                                                          S.                                          I I          I            I V          V          V          V I          I          I          I
(                                                                                            _
 
                                                                        . . - - - - _ _ . . _        c_-
                                                                                                                                                                  ~
PA5NV has sutmeitted tese ausammted ISI progran f or nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" piping, but has not Jistingelshed between the AM fuile t. lass I med Class 2 piping, and between the A5ML Code Class 2 pipes whicae are tu be inspected per Parts IV.R.I.b.(1) and IV.R.I.b.(4) of NIREG-0313. Rev. l. Itserclore, PAWY's program for A5ML Code Class 2 piping caunot be evaluated.
Atell10NAL DATA NiqulitED Identify e.hich A5ME Code Class ? pipe will be inspected per Part IV.S.I.b.(4) and wenich luspection praxedures will be used.
IV.S.I.b.(4)(a) All welds at locations unere the                            (a) Ihe camusents on IV.S.I.b.(4) also apply inere.
strernes under the loa-lings resulting from
* Normal
* and "15 set" plant coerlit lans including the operating basis eartsuguase (Oste) as calculated by the sum of Equations (g) and (10) in 80C-J652 esceed 0.8 (1.25, + SA );
IV.B.I.o.(4)(a) All welds at terminal ends of piping,                        (b) Ihe connents on IV.S.I.b.(4) also apply tiere.
includ6sig branch runs; g        IV.8.8.b.ltf(c) All dissiellar metal welds;                                  (c) Ihe comments on IV.S.I b.(4) also apply here.
IV.5.1.D.(4)(d) AJdstional welds wites higte potential                      (d) Ilee csmunents on IV.B.I.b.(4) also apely here.
for cracting at structural siiscontinuities* such that the total nued,er of welds selected for esamination equal to 255 of the circumferential welds in each piping system.
    *1truttural disruntinuities incliede pipe weld jolats to vessel noriles, valve nodies, piamp casings, pipe fittings (such as elbows, tees, relucers, f langes, etc., cewiforming to AN51 Standard S 16.9) med pipe branch connections and fittings.
I V.S. I.b. ( S)    Il esamination of (I), (?), (3), and                    (5) Ihe comments on IV.M.I.b.(1), (7), (3), and (4) also (4) above conducted durlug the fIrst                            apply tiere.
160 asunths reveal no incidence of stress corrosioes crau lng, the esasination f requency thereaf ter can revert to 120 munths as prescribed in Secteun XI of the ASME Soller asul Pressure Wessel Lode.
 
I V. U. ! .b.16)      S mpling plans other than those                    (6) No coussent made because alternative plans were not described in (2), (1), and (4) above                      evaluated.
will be reviewed on a case-by-case bests.
IV.B.2.    *8kmconforming* Lires Ihat are "Scrvice E ltive' IV.8.2.a.        teak Detection: The leakage detection                    4.
requirements, described in IV.B.I.a.                              The cosaments made in Parts IV.8.1.a.(l) and IV.S.s.a.(2) apply here.
above, should be laplemented.
IV.8.2.b.        Augmented Inservice inspection:                          b.      5tsetARV PASNT has identified the ASME Code Class I *servlCe sensitive
* piping and their inspectinse methods. Ihe classification and augmented ISI methods of the pipes identified by PAS 4V as " service sensitive" meet felREG-Oll),
Rev. I.
Diff EREastE S NimEG-0313. Rev. I requires that
* service sensitive
* pipe welds be subject to an augmented 151 program.
Selection methods for pipe welds are found in Part IV.S.2.b.
of IRNEG-0313. Rev.1.
to PAS 4Y has identified snee ASME cme Class I pipe to be inspected as " service sensitive
* pipe. The class and laspection intervals meet IRREG-0313. Rev. l.gfication However, some pipe welds identified as ASME Code Class I
                                                                              *nonservice sensitive
* pipe in Reference 9 should be classified as " service sensitive". these are discussed under Part IV.8.1.b.
A00l!!0 seat DAIA REllillR[u None.
IV.8.2.b.ll)        ,Ine welds and adjoining areas of                    (l) Ihe Consents on IV.B.2.b. also apply here.
bypass piping of the discharge valves in the main recirculation loops, and of the austenttic stainless steel reactor core spray piping up to and including the second isolation valve, should he examined at each reactor ref ueling outage or at other scheJuled plant outages. Successive esamination need not be closer than b muntns, if outages occur more freq acntly (nan 6 samths. This requirement applies to all welds in als bypass lines whether the 4-inch valve is kept open or closed during operation.
 
    . _                                      m              _        _ .            _            _
In the event these esaminattuus find the piping free of awaacceptable indicatlues f or three successive inspections, the examinatlose may be extended to eacsi M-munth period (plus or minus by as much as 12 mimths) colescident with a                                                                          i refueling outage, in inese cases, the successive examination may be limited to all welds in one bypass pipe rima and one reactor core spray piping run, it unacceptable flew indications are detected. the remaining piping runs in each group should be examined.                    .
In the event these 36-month period es.aminations reveal ao unacceptable Indicatluns for three successive inspections, tne welds and adjoining areas of these piping runs should be es.amined as described in IV.S.I.b(1) for dissimilar metal welds and in IV.B.I.b(2) for other welds.
N    I V. N. 2.b. ( 2)                            hoe dissimilar metal welds and            (2) Ihe licensee has not furnished data on this paragrapse o                                                adjoining areas of other A5ME Code              in Als responses to felC Generic tetter 88-04.
Class I Service Sensitive
* piping should be examined at each reactor refueling outage or at other scheduled plant outages. Successive examinations need not be closer than 6eanths, If outages occur more f requently than 6 eaunths. Such enaninetton should include all internal attachments that are not througse-wall welds but are welded to or form part of the pressure coundary.
I V.S. 2.b. ( 3)                            line welds and adjoining areas et          (3) The comments on IV.B.2.b. also apply here.
ottwr A$stE Code Class I
* Service Sensitive' piping should be examined using the sampling plan described in IV.S.I.b(2) except that the frequency of sucn esaminations should be at e.ach reactor refueling outage or at other scheduled plant outages.
Successive examinations need not be closer than 6 minaths, if outages occur aiure frequently tasan 6 munths.
 
2 IV.S.2.b.(4)          Ine adjoining areas of internal        (4) Ihe cumseents on IV.S.2.b. also apply here.
attaclament welJs in recirculation inlet lines at safe ends where crevices are formed by the welded thermal sleeve attachment should be i
esamined at each reactor refueling outate or at other scheduled plant outages. Successive esaminations need not ce closer than 6 months, if outages occur more frequently than 6 months.
I V. 8. 2.b. ( 5)    In Ene event the esaminations          (5) The Comments on IV.S.2.b. also apply here, described in (2), (3) and (4) above find the piping free of unacceptacle ludicattuns for (nree successive inspections, the examination may be estended to each 36-enonth period (plus or minus by as mucn as 12 months) coinciding with a refueling outage.
In the event these 36-month period esmalnattuns reveal no unacceptacle indications f or three successive m
inspections, the frequency of '
esamination may revert to 80-month periods (two-talrds the time prescribed in the ASME Code Section XI).
      . I V.S. 2.b. ( 6)    the area, extent, and frequency of      (6) 549etARY esamination af the augmented laservice inspection for ASME Code            PASNV has not identified those nonconforming " service Class 2 " Service Sensitive
* lines    sensitive
* pipes which are to be inspected per Part will be determined on a case-by-case    IV.8.2.b.(6) of NINtEG-0313. Rev. I.
nasts.
Data are needed to determine which " service sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.
Ulfff RENCES 1
NtatEG-0313, Rev. I requires that nonennf orming ASHL Code Clad. I and Class 2 piping be sun.iected to an augmente.1 ISI acagrad.. Ihe augmented ISI progras for ASME Code Class I piping differs from that required on Class 2 piping.
PASNY has sutasitted the augmented 151 program for nonconforming
* service sensitive" piping, let has not distinguished between the ASME Code Class I and Class 2 piping. iherefore, PASNY's program for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated utthout amire data.
 
AD0llllM6At Is".! A RfQUIRED
: 1. IJentely which A$Mf Code Class 2 pipe util be inspected per Part IV.S.2.b.(6).
: 2. IJentif y the inspection procedures for " service sensitive" A$Mf Code Class 2 pipe.
IV.B.J.        Isos6 destructive f aamination (Isat) Requirements  3. The licensee has not furnished data on this paragrape in his responses to If(C Generic tetter 88-04, the metamud of eaamination and volume of material to be esmanned, the allumaele Indicatium stanJards. anJ esamination procedures should ccesply utta flee requireme sts set forth in the applicaele Edition med AJJenda of the A$ME Code.
Sect eun II, specified in Paragraph (g).
                                                      " Inservice laspection itequirements.* of 10 LFR SU.hba. *Ludes ano Standards."
in sense cases, the code esamination procedures may saut tw effestive for detecting or evaluattag it.5LL and other ultrasumir (HI) proceJures or advanced aususestructive esamination techniques may be required to detect and evaluate stress corrostun cracating in austessitic stainless steel piptug. lepruveJ Ul procedures have been n                        developed by certain organisations. These
* to                      leproved UI detection anJ evaluation prucedures that have seen or case be dem)nstrated to ite felC to be effective la detecting 16500 should be used in the laservice inspectiuse.
* elecuummendations for the development anJ eventual lattementatiose of these leproved tectualques are included in Part V.
V.      Gillf mat af ttself mDA110el5                                  V. The licensee has not furnished data on this paragraph in has responses to IftC Generic letter 81-04, lhe m:asures outlined in Part til of this document provsde for positive acteines that are consistent with current technology. The implementatton of these actions snuuld massedly reduce the susceptlallity of stainless
* steel piping to stress corrostosi cractLing in Shels, it it rer.ugnised that addet tunal means coulo De used to limit tne eatent of stress corrusion cracting of kWR pressure boundary piping materials and to lepruve the overall system integrity. ihese include plant design and operattumal procedure consioeratluns to reduce system espusure to puteestially aggressive envirosneent, lasseveo maternal selection, special f aorication and melding Lets,niques, and provlstuns for volumetric inspecteun capanal.ty la tne oesign ut veld joints. Ine use of sucn amtmas to liest 1h500 or to emprove plant satees antegrity ulls ne revacued on a case-by<ase sesis.
 
TABLE 2 SUMMARIES OF EVALUATION OF LICENSEE'S RESPONSES II.C Material Selection, Testing, and Processing Guidelines for BWRs with an Operating License The Power Authority of the State of New York's (PASNY's) alternative plan proposes to replace some, but not all, the nonconforming pipe at the FitzPatrick plant.
IV.8.1.a.(1) Leak Detection and Monitoring Systems PASNY's description of FitzPatrick's leak detection methods is not detailed enough to detarmine whether they meet Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.45.
:            IV.B.I.a.(2) Leak Detection Requirements PASNY has not proposed a requirement for shutdown after a 2-gpm increase in unidentified leakage in 24 h into t!e Technical Specifications for FitzPatrick.
PASNY has not proposed a requirement for monitoring the sump level at 4-h intervals (or less). PASNY does not meet NUREG-0313, Rev.1 in this matter.
      . IV.B.1.b. Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" Pipe PASN7's classification for the 22- and 28-in, recirculation piping, 12-in. recirculation riser piping and segments of the residual- heat removal (RHR) and reactor water cleanup (RWCU) piping do not meet NUREG-0313. Rev. 1.
l 1
23
 
1 Also, PASNY's augmented ISI plans for the above ASME Code Class 1
              " service sensitive" pipes do not meet NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.
IV.B.I.b.(3) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe PASNY has not identified those nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" pipes wnich are to be inspected per Part IV.8.1.b.(3) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. Data are needed to detemine which "nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.
IV.B.I.b.(4) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe PASNY has not identified those nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per Part IV.B.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. Data are needed to detern.ine which "nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.
IV.B.2.b. Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" Pipe PASNY has identified the ASME Code Class 1 " service sensitive" piping and their inspection methods. The classification and augmented ISI methods of the pipes identified by PASNY as " service sensiti te" meet NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.
IV.S.2.b.(6) Augmented ISI of Nonconfoming " Service Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe PASNY has not identified those nonconforming " service sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per Part IV.B.2.b.(6) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.
Data are needed to determine which " service sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.
24
 
l l
1 TABLE 3 OIFFERENCES BETWEEN NUREG-0313, REV.1 AND LICENSEE'S RESPONSES II.C. Material Selection, Testing, and Processing Guidelines for BWRs with an Operating License NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that NRC-designated " service' sensitive" lines be replaced with corrosion-resistant materials. Also, lines that experience cracking should be replaced with corrosion-resistant materials.
PASNY has proposed' replacing recirculation piping if IGSCC is found 4
and has replaced segments of the core spray piping. PASNY will replace tne nonconforming parts of the control rod orive hydraulic return piping. PASNY has not stated whether it plans to replace the nonconforming parts of the residual heat removal and reactor water cleanup piping.
IV.B.I.a.(1) Leak Detection and Monitoring Systems The nine subsections of Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.45 are discussed below.
C.1    PASNY has stated that leakage to the primary reactor containment from identified sources is collected such that
  ,                  a. the flow rates are monitored separately from unidentified leakage,9 and
: b. the total flow rate can be established and monitored.9 i
1 1
25 n, nm-          "
 
I l
l l
C.2    Tne FitzPatrick Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
(Section 4.10.3) indicates that the reactor coolant leak detection systems (except for the continuous ra'dioactivity monitoring system) are designed to have a sensitivity of 3 gpm or better. It is not known if the sensitivity of "3 gpm or better" meets the recommendations in Regulatory Guide 1.45.
C.3  The primary containment leak detection systems consist of the following.
: 1.      Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Leakage Monitoring System.
: 2.      Drywell Floor Orain Sump Leakage Monitoring System.
: 3.      Drywell Continuous Atmosphere Radioactivity Monitoring (includes gross particulate, iodine and noble gas activities).9 The tnree methods recommended by Subsection C.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.45 are present.
C.4  It is not clear whether provisions have been made in the FitzPatrick FSAR to monitor systems connected to the RCPB for signs of intersystem leakage.
C.5  The FitzPatrick reactor coolant leakage systems (except for the continuous radioactivity monitoring system) are designed to have a sensitivity of 3 gpm or better (FSAR Section 4.10.3).
C.6  It is not clear whether the FitzPatrick airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system remains functional when subjected to the SSE.
l 1
26
 
l i
C.7    Indicators and alarms for the required leakage detection          'l system are provided in the main control room. Procedures for          i converting various indications to a common leak' age equivalent      i are available to the operators.
It is not known whether calibration of the indicators accounts for the needed independent variables.
C.8    It is not known whether all the FitzPatrick leak detection systems enumerated in Reference 9 can be calibrated or tested during operation.
C.9    The FitzPatrick Technical Specifications include limiting conditions for identified and unidentified leakage. Two of the leak detection systems described in the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications (Section 3.6.0.2) are always operable.
It cannot be determined from the above whether FitzPatrick meets all the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.45, Section C.
IV.8.1.a.(2) Leak Detection Requirements NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that reactor shutcown be initiated when there is a 2-gpm increase in unidentified leakage in 24 h. For sump level monitoring systems with the fixed-measurement interval method, the level should be monitored every 4 h or less. NRC Generic Letter 81-04 requires that the above requirements be incorporated in the plant Technical Specifications.
PASNY has not incorporated a requirement in the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications for shutdown af ter a 2-gpm increase in
:          leakage in 24 h. Also, tne reactor coolant leakage rate is established once a day.10 i
i 27
 
                                                          ^
j
                                                                                        ~
l
:  c s            IV.B.1.b.          Augmented ISI:of Monconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" Pipe NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that all ASME Code Class 'I " service sensitive" piping be subjected to an augmented ISI program. The initial inspections 'should be carried out at each successive refueling outage. NUREG-0313, Rev. I has classified the recirculation RHR and RKU piping systems as " service sensitive".
PASNY has classified the above pipes as "nonservice sensitive" and has proposed inspection plans which differ from NUREG-0313 Rev. 1.9                                                      ,
IV.B.I.b.(3) Augmented ISI of Nonconfonning "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that nonconfonning ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping be subjected to an augmented ISI program. The y                          augmented ISI program for ASME Code Class 1 piping differs from that '
required on Class 2 piping. Also, augmented ISI requirements differ for ASME Code Class 2 pipes to be inspected per Parts IV.B.I.b.(3) j                          and IV.8.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.
PASNY has sub:nitted the augmented ISI program for nonconforabg a
nonservice sensitive" piping, but has not distinguished betwee.' the ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping, and between the ASME Code Class 2 pipes which are to be inspected per Parts IV.B.I.b.(3) and -
IV.8.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev.1. Therefore, PASNY's program for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated.
IV.8.1.b.(4) Augmented ISIS for ASME Code Class 1 Pipe Welds with High              ,    ', s  ,
Potential for Cracking-                    '
S
            ,            NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that nonconforming ASME Code Class I and Class 2 piping be st.njected to an augmented ISI program. The '                      :
augmented ISI program for ASME Code Class I piping differs from that 2 '
S 3
                                                              - 28s "    ..
t '
 
I l
l l
I required on Class 2 piping. Also, augmented ISI requirements differ i
for ASME Code Class 2 pipes to be inspected per Parts IV.B.I.b.(3) and IV.8.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.
PASNY has submitted the augmented ISI program for nonconforming
      ~>
                    "nonservice sensitive" piping, but has not distinguished between the
    ',              ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping, and between the ASME Code Class 2 pipes which are to be inspected per Parts IV.8.1.b.(3) and IV.3.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev.1. Therefore, PASNY's program for ASME;. Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated.
IV.B.2.b. Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" Pipe NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that " service sensitive" pipe welds be subject to an augmented ISI program. Selection methods for pipe welds are found in Part IV.B.2.b. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.
PASNY has identified some ASME Code Class 1 pipe to be inspected as
                  " service sensitive" pipe. The classification and inspection intervals meet NUREG-0313, Rev. l.9 However, some pipe welds identified as ASME-Code Class 1 "nonservice sensitive" pipe in Reference 9 should be classified as " service sensitive". These are discussed under Part' IV.S. I.b.
IV.B.2.b.(6) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe                                                    '
NUREG-031.3, Rev. el requires that nonconforming ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping be subjected to an augmented ISI program. The augmented ISI proceam for ASME Code Class i piping differs from that
                " required on Class'2 piping.
il                                                            -
PASNY has submitted the augmented ISI program for nonconforming "s,ervice sensitive" piping, but has not distinguished between the  e ASME Code Class I and Class 2 piping. Therefore, PASNY's program -
for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated without more data.
29
 
TABLE 4 n.
ADDITIONAL DATA REQUIRED
          ,                                OF LICENSEE II.C Material Selection, Testing, and Processing Guidelines for BWRs with an Operating License                                                      '
Indicate if there are any plans to replace the residual heating and reactor water cleanup piping if evidence of IGSCC is found.
IV.8.1.a.(1) Leak Detection and Monitoring Systems
: 1. Indicate whether provisions have been made in the FitzPatrick FSAR to monitor systems connected to the RCPB for signs of intersystem leakage (Subsection C.4 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).
: 2. The FitzPatrick FSAR (Section 4.10.3) indicates that the reactor coolant leak detection systems (except for the continuous radioactivity monitoring system) are designed to have a sensitivity of 3 gpm or better. Please give, if possible, a more precise figure than "3 gpm or better".
i (Subsection C.5 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).
3.
Indicate whether calibration of the indicators accounts for the needed independent variables (Subsection C.7 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).
i 4      Indicate whether the FitzPatrick airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system remains functional when subjected to SSE (Subsection C.6 of Regulatory ' Guide 1.45).
ll s ;.
 
                                              ~
i 1
                                                                      ~
: 5. Indicate wnich leak detection systems in FitzPatrick can be calibrated or tested during operation (Subsection C.8 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).
: 6. Indica'te if the leakage detection system sensitivity meets Regulatory Guide 1.45 (Subsection C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).
IV.S.I.a.(2) Leak Detection Requirements Indicate if there are plans to incorporate the recommendations of Part IV.8.1.4.(2) into the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications.
IV.8.1.b. Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" Pipe None.
IV.8.1.b.(3) Augmented ISI for ASME Code Class 1 Pipe Welds Having a Design Cumulative Fatigue Usage Factor of 0.4 or More Identify which ASME Ccde Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.8.1.b.(3) and which inspection procedures will be used.
IV.B.I.b.(4) Augmented ISI of Nonconfonning "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe Identify wnich ASME Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.8.1.b.(4) and which inspection procedures will be used.
1 IV.8.2.b.      Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" Pipe l
None.
31-t
                                                            ,    _      .,    .-          ~ * ~ ,
 
IV.8.2.b.(6) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe
: 1. Identify which ASME Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.S.2.b.(6).                    ,
I,
: 2. Identify the inspection procedures for " service sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipe.        ,
I d
4 32
 
4
: 4. REFERENCES
: 1. E. D. Eason et al., The Cost Effectiveness of Countermeasures to Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking in SWR Picing, EPRI NP-1703, Feoruary 1901, p. A-04
: 2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Technical Recort on Material                                                  -
Selection and Processing EJidelines for SWR Coolant Pressure soundary
    ,          Piping, U5hdG Report NUdtu-udid, Ju ly 19//.
: 3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Technical Report, Investigation-and Evaluation of Cracking in Austen1 tic Stainless Steel Pioing of Boiling Water Reactor Plants, USNRC Report NUREG-15/067, Octooer 1975.
4      U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Investigation and Evaluation of Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Piping of Lignt water Reactor Plants,,
USNRC Report NUREG-0531, FeDruary 19/9.
: 5. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Technical Reoort on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for SWR Coolant Pressure Soundary Pioing, ushxL Report Nuktu-udlJ, Rev. I, Ju ly eveu.
: 6. D. G. Eisenhut letter to all BWR licensees (except Humboldt Bay and La Crosse), " Implementation of NUREG-0313. Rev.1, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for 8WR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping (Generic Task A-42)," Generic Letter 81-04, Feoruary 40, 6Mdi.
: 7. J. P. Bayne to T. A. Ippolito letter, July 31,1981 (NRC Accession No.: 8108050208).
: 8. J. P. Bayne to T. A. Ippoli'to letter, September 28,1981 (NRC Accession No.: 8110060252).
: 9. J. P. Bayne to D. B. Vassallo letter, January 19,1983 (NRC Accession No.: 8301250321).
: 10. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Final Safet/ Analysis Report.
: 11. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications.
                                                                                                                                \
33
_                m  -  --,w--- - ' - - - -' ' ' " ' *" ' ' ' - '~~ ' ' ' ~ ~
 
Ec soa= 335                                                                                              '      ""#
u.s. Nuct.E4R REGutatomy commesssion
              ..n                                                                                                              _,"#** '.'."g      ' ' " ' * * * ####
c SIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET                                                              "G d-C'*-
4 rarLE ANo suer rte                                                                                  i :. <c,          .,,,,
'              TECHtlICAL EVALUATI0tl 0F IllTEGRITY OF THE JAMES A.                                              l                                                                !
FITZCATRICK tiUCLEAR POWER PLAtiT REACTOR C00LAtiT                                                1 REci,iENr s AC:sssieN No.                                    I BOUT 40ARY PIPItlG SYSTEM                                                                                        '
7 Au rwo RISI
: 5. OArE REPORr COMPT.E TED                                      !
P. K. flagata -                                                                                              " c "''
I
                                                                                                                                                                    ~
August                      1983 9 PERFORMING ORGANA 2Ar8CN NAME ANO WAsLING ACORE55 Itactuar I,a CJoes                                          Cart REPORT IS3ut0 wo""                                I'''"
August                      1983 EG&G Idaho, Inc.                                                                                    , ,t, ,, ,,,,,
Idaho Falls, IO 83415
: 8. (Lenue a**r
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Revision as of 07:07, 19 May 2020

Technical Evaluation of Integrity of Ja Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Reactor Coolant Boundary Piping Sys
ML20090A133
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/31/1983
From: Nagata P
EG&G, INC.
To: Koo W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20090A086 List:
References
CON-FIN-A-6429, RTR-NUREG-0313, RTR-NUREG-313 EGG-FM-6259, GL-81-04, GL-81-4, TAC-46661, NUDOCS 8407110255
Download: ML20090A133 (40)


Text

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l EGG-FM-6259 August 1983 TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF INTEGRITY OF THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY PIPING SYSTEM i

.a Peter K. Nagata Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Operated by the U.S. Department of Energy s .

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~&h; This is an informal report intended for use as a preliminary or working document 8407110255 C40620 PDR ADOCK 05000333 P POR g

Pres.arEd U. for theUCLEAR REGULATORYYD Under 00E Contract No. OE-AC07-76;401570 COMFSSION EGEGidan

I EGG-FM-6259 TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF INTEGRITY OF THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY PIPING SYSTEM Published August 1983 Peter K. Nagata Materials Engineering Branch

' Materials Sciences Division

, EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Responsible NRC Individual and Division:

W. H. Koo/ Division of Engineering Occket No.: 50-333 TAC No.: 46661 i

4 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-761001570 FIN .No. A6429 i

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A8STRACT NUREG-0313, Rev.1, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for 8WR Coolant Pressure Sounoary Piping, is the NRC staff's revised acceptaole metnoas to reouce intergranular stress corrosion 1

cracking in boiling water reactors. The responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 of the Power Authority of the State of New York concerning whether its James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Flant meets NUREG-0313, i Rev. 1 are evaluated by EG&G Idaho, Inc. in this report. Particular attention was given the leak detection systems described in Regulatory 4

Guide 1.45, Reactor Coolant Pressure Soundary Leak Detection Systems, referenced by Parts li.5.1.a.ll) and (4) found on pages / and d of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

FOREWORD

i. This report is supplied as part of the Selected Operating Reactor Issues Program being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Licensing, by EG&G Idaho,

Inc., Materials Engineering Branch.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under the authorization, B&R 20 19 10 11.

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SUMMARY

j NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, Technical Report on Material Selection and  !

{ Processing Guidelines for B'aR Coolant Pressure Soundary Piping, is the NRC staff's revised acceptaole metnoas to reouce intergranular stress corrosion cracking in boiling water reactors. The responses to NRC Generic .

Letter 81-04 of the Power Authority of the State of New York concerning l whether its James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant meets NUREG-0313, Rev.1 are evaluated by EG&G Idaho, Inc. in this report. Particular attention was given the leak detection systems described in Regulatory j Guide 1.45, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection Systems, 4

referenced by Parts IV.8.1.a.(I) and (z) found on pages 7 and 8 of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

, As may be observed in the following table, with the exception of i IV.S.2.b., FitzPatrick does not meet any of the parts of NUREG-0313, Rev. I evaluated in this document.

Tne following table is a synopsis of the EG&G Idaho, Inc. evaluation of the Power Authority of the State of New York's response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04.

Additional Part of NUREG-0313, Data Rev. 1 Evaluated Evaluation" Required b Discrepancy Section II.

II.C. Does not meet NUREG-0313, Yes Minor Rev. 1 J

.Section III.

t Section IV.

1 IV.S.I.a.(1) Provides alternative to Yes Major i NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 IV.8.1.a.(2) Does not meet NUREG-0313, Yes Major i

Rev. 1 IV.8.1.b. Does not meet NUREG-0313, No Minor Rev. 1 IV.8.1.b.(3) Did not provide data in Yes Minor j response to NRC Generic

Letter 81-04 I

IV.8.1.b.(4) Did not provide data in Yes Minor response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04

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Additional Part of NUREG-0313, Data a

Rev. 1 Evaluated Evaluation Required b Discrepancy IV.8.2.a. The comments for Parts IV.8.1.a.(1) and IV.8.1.a.(2) apply here.

IV.B.2.b. Meets NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 No None IV.8.2.b.(6) Did not provide data in Yes Minor response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 Section V. .

i aSee Tables 1 and 3 for additional information.

b See Tables 1 and 4 for additional information.

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CONTENTS A85 TRACT.............................................................. 11 1

SUMMARY

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I N TRO D UC T I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. . .

2.

EVALUATION ....................................................... 4

.t1UREG-0313, Rev. 1 Guidelines ..............................

2.1 4 2.2 Discussion of Tables ....................................... 4 2.J D i s c rep a nc i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............

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C O NC L US I O N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6. . . . .

A.

R E F ERE NC E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33....

i TA8LES

1. Review of ' Licensee's Response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 ........ 7
2. Summaries of Evaluation of Licensee's Responses .................. 23
3. Differences between NUREG-0313 R I and Licensee's Responses ....................,..ev. .

................................. 25

4. Additional Data Required of Licensee .......................;..... 30 i-1 I

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- l TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF INTEGRITY OF THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY PIPING SYSTEM '

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1. INTRODUCTION i Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of austenitic stainless steel (SS) ' piping has t'een observed in boiling water reactors (8WRs) since December 1965.I The NRC established a Pipe Crack Study Group (PCSG) in January 1975 to study the problem.2 The PCSG issued two documents, NUREG-75/067 Technical Report, Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactors 3 and an implementation dc.. sent, NUREG-0313, Rev. 0.2 After cracking in large-diameter piping was discovered for the first time in the Duane Arnold BWR in 1978, a new PCSG was formed. The new PCSG in turn issued two reports, NUREG-0531, I_nvestigation and Evaluation of Stress-Corrosion 4

Cracking in Piping of, Light Water Reactor Plants and NUREG-0313, Rev. 1

' Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Bcundary Piping." NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 is the implementing document of NUREG-0531 and discusses the augmented inservice inspection (ISI) and leak detection requirements "for plants that cannot comply with the material selection, testing, 'and processing guidelines" of.

NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.0 NRC Generic Letter 81-04 requested each licensee "to review all ASME C' ode Class 1 and 2 pressure boundary piping, safe ends, and fitting material, including weld metal to determine if (they) meet the material selection, testing and processing guidelines in" NUREG-0313, Rev.1.6 The generic letter offered the option of providing a description, schedule, and justification for alternative actions that would reduce the susceptibility of pressure boundary piping and safe ends to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) or increase the probability of early detection of leakage from pipe cracks.

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  • l In response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04, the Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY) submitted a letter on July 31, 1981.7 Additional requests for information from the NRC staff el'icited other letters from PASNY on September 28, 19818 and January 19, 1983.9 EG&G Idaho personnel evaluated these responses, and this report provices:
1. A brief sunnary of the licensee's response to each part of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.
2. A discussion of areas where the licensee does not meet the guidelines or requirements of NUREG-0313. Rev. 1.a
3. A brief discussion of the licensee's proposed alternatives to NUREG-0313, Rev. 1; however, no determination of acceptability is made on these alternatives.

4 An identification of all areas where the licensee has not provided sufficient information to judge the licensee's program.

There is an effort underway to revise NUREG-0313, Rev. I by NRC in light of research on IGSCC and recent instances of IGSCC at Nine Mile Point (March 1982) and Monticello (October 1982). Because of this coatemplated revision of NUREG-0313, Rev.1, the following issues will not be evaluated.

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1. The licensee's proposed Technical Specifications to implement the requirements, with the exception of the leak detection requirements in NUREG-0313 Rev. 1. Sections IV.B.I.(a)(1) and IV.B.I.(a)(2).
2. The acceptability of licensee-proposed augmented inservice inspection (ISI) sampling criteria.
a. Part III of NUREG-0313. Rev. I contains guidelines; Part IV contains requirements.

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3. Credit for past operating experience and inspection results.
4. The acceptability of induction heating stress improv'ement (IHSI), heat sink welding (HSW), and weld overlay as alternates to augmented ISI.

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2. EVALUATION 2.1 NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 Guidelines The guidelines and requirements outlined in NUREG-0313, Rev. I form the basis of this evaluation. The NUREG-0313, Rev. I guidelines are found in Parts III and V and the requirements in Parts II and IV of that document. Part II discusses implementation of material selection, testing, and processing guidelines. Part III summarizes acceptable methods to -

minimize IGSCC susceptibility with respect to the material selection, testing, and processing guidelines. Part IV deals with leak detection and inservice inspection requirements of nonconforming (i.e., not meeting the guidelines of Part III of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1) piping. Part V discusses general reconnendations.

2.2 Discussion of Tables Table I has the complete text Parts II through V of NUREG-0313, Rev.1 on the left side so that the reader may be able to refer to it as the topics are discussed. The right side summarizes the licensee's responses, lists the differences between the licensee's proposed implementation program and NUREG-0313 Rev.1, and identifies the adoitional data required to evaluate the licensee's response.

Many sections in Parts II through IV of NUREG-0313, Rev. I are not discussed in the right hand column. In these cases, one of the connents below will be used.

o Not applicable because the construction permit for this plant has been issued.

o Not applicable because the operating license for this plant has been issued.

o Not applicable because the plant has been constructed.

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o The licensee has not furnished data on this topic in his responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 o No coment made because alternative plans were not evaluated.

, Table 2 lists the summaries of the licensee's responses to NRC quest',ons on implementation of NUREG-0313, Rev. I guidelines. Therefore, in Table 2 the reader is able to read all the summaries in one table without having to search Table 1 for all the summaries. The same compilation applies to Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 lEts the differences between the licensee's proposed implementation program and that recomended in NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. Table 4 lists the areas where additional information is required to properly evaluate the licensee's proposed implementation program. All the items in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are listed in their respective tables in the order they appear in Table 1.

2.3 Discrepancies Any alternate proposal that did not meet a specific guidaline er requirement of NUREG-0313, Rev. I was considered a discrepancy. Evaluation or alternate proposals was outside the scope of this task, as inoicated in Section 1 of this report. Licensees have submitted definitions of "nonservice sensitive" and augmented ISI proposals that differ from NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

These differences are considered minor because the NRC staff is considering major modifications to those requirements. An example of a minor discrepancy is the use of the stress rule index (SRI) to choose whicn welds would be subjected to augmented ISI.

If the alternate proposal to leak detection does not meet the requirements in NUREG-0313, Rev. I, it was considered a major discrepancy because NRC is not considering major modifications to those requirements.

An example of a major discrepancy is a licensee's not proposing Technical Specifications to implement leak detection requirements in NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

Onij major discrepancies are listed in the Conclusions section.

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3. CONCLUSIONS PASNY's FitzPatrick plant has tne following major discrepancies:

Part IV.B.I.a.(1) Leak Detection and Monitoring Systems PASNY's description of FitzPatrick's leak detection methods is not detailed enough to determine whether they meet Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.45.

Part IV.B.I.a.(2) Leak Detection PASNY has not proposed a requirement for shutdown after a 2-gpm increase in unidentified leakage in 24 h into the Technical Specifications for FitzPatrick.

PASNY has not proposed a requirement for monitoring the sump level at 4-h intervals (or less). PASNY does not meet NUREG-0313, Rev.1 in this matter.

There are minor discrepancies as well as the major ones listed above.

These minor discrepancies are not listed here. However, while the licensee's alternate proposals tnat have been classified as minor discrepancies might be acceptable under the anticipated revision of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, it should not be inferred that approval of those alternate proposals has been given.

The licensee has not supplied sufficient information to evaluate his responses to topics II.C., IV.S.I.a.(1) and (2), IV.8.1.b.(3) and (4),

IV.8.2.a and IV.B.2.b.(6). Table 4 lists the required information for each topic.

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IAh l 1. NLVl[id Of LILLN51L*5 Rf5PU885t ID NitC GlhENIC tillfR 81-04 faccrpts frum htEth-UJIJ, Nev. 1 (GEG Idaho (valuation--flllPAlRil:K NUCLEAR

11. lHPttHtNIAll088 Of MAlf RIAL Self tll08ea IE5ilhG, AleD Mat 55th6 Lulutt thES II.A. fur plants under review, but for which a A. Isot applicable 1,ccouse the construction permit for this construction permit has not been issued, all ASME plant has been issued.

Code L. lass I, 7 and 3 lines shoulo conf orm to tue

. guluelines stated in Part lit, 11.8. For plants that have been issued a construction B. Not applicable because the operating license for this permit but not an operating license, all A5ME Code plant has been issued.

Class 1, 2, amt J lines should conform to the 9uldelines stated in Part til unless it can be demanestrated to the staf f that laplementing the guidelines of Part til would result in undue hardship. For cases in which the guidelines of Part til are not camisplied with, additional measures should be temen for Class I and 2 lines in accordance with tne guidelines stated in Part IV of this document.

al.C. for plants that have been issued an operating C. Stee4AN f y license. NHC designated " Service Sens8tive" lines (Part IV. 8) snould ne modified to conform to the lhe Power Anthority of the State of New York's guedelines stated in Part lit, to tue eatent (PASNf's) alternative plan proposes to replace some, but not practicaole, idesen *5ervice Sensitive

  • and other all, the nonconforming pipe at the fit 2 Patrick plant.

Class I and 2 lines do not meet tne guidelines of Part lit, adultional measures should be taken in UlffEREnCE5 accordance with tne guidelines stated in Part IV of this docimaent. Lines triat experience cracking :luhEG-0313. Rev. I requires that IIRC-designated during service and require replacement should be

  • service-sensitive" lines be replaced with replaced witu piping that conforms to the corrosion-resistant materials. Also, lines that esperience guidelines stated in Part lit.

cracking should be replaced with corrosion-resistant materials.

PASNY has proposed replacing rectrculation piping if .

IGSCC is found and has replaced senpaints of the core spray piping. PASNV will replace the nonconfusming parts of the control rod drive hydraulic return piping. PASNY has not stated whether il plans to replace the nonconforming parts of the residual heat remawal and reactor water cleanup sa lpihg.

yl:WiAL DAIA RfylRED A

judicate if there are any plans to replace the residual locatin amt reactor water cleanup piping if evidence of iGSLC s found.

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Ill. Sta9tMV Uf ALLtPI At$1[ M[IlluDS 10 MINIMllC CHACK 5UssTPIliieriff-Wff11IC5fiUIhs Tf5Tinll~Asio ,

PA0J55filG GallDftW5 i Ill.A. Selei.siuss of Materials A. The licensee taas siot furnished data on this paragregan in his responses to astC Generic letter 81-04. See only those materials described in Paragraphs I comument on Part II.C. above, and 2 below are acceptat le to tha istC for lustallat tua in theR ASMC Code Class I, 2, and 3 piping systems. Otner materials may be used when evaluated and accepted by tne letC.

Ill.A.I. Lorrusiuse-kes tstant Materials I. The cuminents un lit. A. also apply neere.

. All pipe ased fitting material including safe ends, tneraal sleeves, and weld metal should be of a type and graele that has been ,

deemsstrated to he seighly resistant to usygen-assisted stress corrosion in the

' as-installed cosedition. Materials that have been so demuustrated incluue ferritic steels.

  • Nuclear Grade" austenitic stainless steels.*

Iypes 304L and 3lbt austenttic stainless steels, lype CF-3 cast stainless steel, lypes 17-8 and CF-8N cast austenttic stataless m steel with at least 55 ferrite. Type 308L stainless steel weld metal, and othe" austettitlC stainless steel weld metrI with at least 55 ferrite content. Unstabillied wrougnt austenttic stainless steel without cuntrolled low carbon has not been so disemistrated except when the piping is in ti.e solution-asueealed condition. Ihe use of such i material ti.e., regular grades of fypes 304 and 316 stainless steels) should be avoided If such material is used, tese as-installed piping including welds saiould be in the solution annealeis cosedition. Weecre regular grades ut types J04 and jib are used and welding or sneat treatment is required, special measures, sucsa as those descrlhed les Part til.L. Processing of Materials, shuuld be taaen tu ensure that Ib5t'C will not occur.

Such measures may include (a) suluttun asusealing subsequent to the weldsug or heat ,

treatment, and (u) weld c14Jding of materials to be welded using procedures (Beat have beest desanistrated to reduce residual stresses asui sensitiration ci surface materials.

  • Inese materials nave contrulled low carbon (0.025 seas) anil nitrogen (0.11 man) contents and meet all requirements, including mecnanical proves ty requircinesets, of ASM[

specificatinn for regular geades of lype 304 or 6

$1b stainless steel pipe.

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ill.A.2. Corrossou Nesistant Safe inds and thermal  ? Yae e unements on Ill.A. also apply here.

_51.E.__v.e s.

All unstacialsed wrought austenitic stainless steel materials used for safe ends ano taennal sleeves without controlled low carbues contents (L-grades and leuclear Grade) should be in the solution-annealed condition. If as a consequence of fabrication, welds joining these materials are not solution annealed, tsiey should ne made between cast (or meld overleid) austealtic stainless steel surf aces

($1 minimas ferrite) or other materials having hign resistence to oxygen-assisted stress corrosi.m. Ike jolet design mast be succi that any high-stress areas in unstabillied wrought austenitic stainless steel without controlled low carbon cositent, which may become sensillaed as a result of tne welding process, is esot esposed to the reactor coolant.

thermal sleeve attacaments that are welded to 2

tne pressure boundary and form crevices where

' lageurities may accomulate should not be espused to a 16HR coulant envirorment.

e 111.B. festing of Materials 8. ihe licensee has not furnished data on this paragraph for new snstall.ation, tests should be anade on all ~

regular ge aJe stainless steels to be used in the A580[ Coue Class 1, 2, and J piping systees to dononstrate (nat.the material was properly asuecaled and is not susceptible to IGSCC. Tests tesat snave been used to determine the susceptibility of IGSCC include Pr3ctices A*

and E" of A5181 A-262,

  • Recommended Practices for IJetecting husceptibility to intergranular Attack en Stainless Steels" and the electrochemical putentlotinetic reactivation (EPR) test. The.EPR test is not yet accepted by the 81RC. If the EPR
  • test is used, the acceptance criteria applied must be evaluated and accepted by the INIC on a case-cy-case basis.
  • Practice A--Osalic acid etch test for classification of
  • etch structures of stainless steels.
    • Practice E--Copper-cupper sulf ate-sulfuric acid test f or detecting susceptibility to intergranular attack in -

stainless steels.

lit.C. Processi..g ue feitels C. lhe licensee has not f urnisted .tata oss this p.iragraph in his responses to setC Generic Letter 81-04. See Corrnslan-resistant cladding with a duples comment on Part II.C. above.

microstructure ($1 minisua f errite) may be applied to the esmas of type 304 or lifi stefaless steel pipe for the purpose of avoiding IGSCC at use ldments . Such Claddisig, wenich is inteskled in (a) minlaisse ts.e itA2 arn the pipe inner surf ace, (n) ccwe the tMZ away f rom tne hignty stresse 1 region nest to the attaceaneret weld, asus (c) isolate tne eseldment frue tne envirremment, may ne applied under the following conditions:

III.L.I. Fur initial co.estruction, provided that all of I. Ine cumsments on t al.C. also apply 8aere.

the piping is solution asuaealed af ter cladding.

111.C.2. For repair welding and modification to 2. leie coineents on Ill.C. also apply siere.

in-place systems in operating plants and plants innser construction. Wesen the repair welding or modification requires replace = nt of pipe, the replacement pip.e should De solution-asincaled af ter cladding.

Corroslun-resistant cladding applied in the "fleid" (i.e., witnout subsequent solution annealing of the pipe) is acceptable only on

, that portion of the pipe that has not beesi o removed f ree tne piping systee. Other "fleld" applications of corrosion-resistant claddlag are not acceptanle.

Other processes that nave been found by laboratory tests to min 6* size stresses and ICSCC in austenitic stainless steel welements luciude inductioso heating stress improvement (18851) and seest sink weltling (H5W). Althougse tne use of these processes as an alternate to suspeented laserviCe inspcClion is not yet attepted by the NitC, tnese processes may be perialssible and will ne considered on a case-Dy-case basis penvided acceptable supportive data are ',ubmitted to the NNC.

I V.

IN$tNVicE JN5 Pit. fluff Aleu liAK DEltCil0N Rf tfilREMEislS MEUsislitt VAltviss6' DEQtif$ of 4:66Misikak.E'Io J

n ItAInt7Mi.IIdeiTri;5,iTaic74FatiPA6CrsissirdGTuf1iseE5 IV.A. For plants wasose ASHt Code 4.1a55 3, 2, asus 3 A. Isae licesisce has anot furnistwo data oss this paragrapti pressure buundary piping meets taee guidelines of in his responses to letC Generic Letter 81 04.

Part lil, no auspni:nted fuservice inspection or lean detection requirements beyund those specified in the 10 LfN 50.ha(g). " Inservice inspection liequiruments" and plant lecnnical Specifications f or leakage detection are necessary.

I V. II . A$sso Cude Class I and i' pressure buimulary piping 8. The licensee has not furnisheil data on this paragrapia inat does not meet guidelines of Part 111 is in his resp =nses to lett Generic letter 81-04.

ues tpated *skuunsorming* asal must have aJJetlunal Inservice ipspection Jetd more stringent lean detections requiremesits. Isse degree of au.jecuted I.aservice inspectiun of such piping depends un wa.etner ts.e specific % conforming" piptug runs are classified as *5ervice Sensitive.' Ine *5ervice Sensitive

  • lines were and will be designated by the letC and are defined

, as those tasat osare esperienced cracting of a generic nature, or that are cosesidered to be particularly susceptiale to cracting because of a condainatlun of silga local stress, material condition,' and high oxygen content in the relatively stagnant, intermittent, or low-flow coolanti Currently, for the nuncunforming A5ME Code Class J piping, no additional inservice inspection bevoeul the Section XI visual eammination is required.

Esaugales of piplug considered to be " Service Sena.itive* inclaie but are not limited to: ecre -

spr.y lines, recirculation riser llacs

  • rer trculat tos, ejpass line:S (or pipe

" catansions/ stub tubes on pient s wn::re the bypass lines havereturn siyordnite been removed) control lines, Isolation rud drive (0:0) candenser lines, recirculation inlet lines at safe ends ednere crevices are formeu by the ucided tsiermal sleeve attacessents, and shutdown escat eacmanger li.nes.

If cracting should later us found in a particular pipl.ig run med consiocred to De generic, it will Le designated by the Init as " Service Sensitive."

  • State no Itatt. esas been observed in the dunestic plants and in view of the possible hign radiation exposure to the inspect tun personnel, surveillan(e and munitoring memis other ts an ts ose specified in Sectiosi IV of this report for e ccerculatives riser lines will be conesidered on a case-by-case basis.

teas 49e sietection and augmented laservice inspection requirreents fur "Ilunconforming* lines and *hetonforming, Service Sensitive

  • lines are spec 18 led beIus:

I V.ll.1, "becusif ormin SeEIGiu* ~g Lines Ihat Are fiut *5ervice I. The licensee has not furnistied data eri this paragraph la his responses to 88tC Gmeric letter 81-04.

i v .is . l . a . te.is 18etectio.a: the reactor coolasst a. llee liteesseet has sont furssis. icd slate ame this par.ege stda le4kagt! iletectiusa systesis soeuuld be les tsis sessousases its 18(C Ekseeric tetter 81-04.

neersted under the lechnical Specificatiini requirriments to esuaance te.e disvavery of unidentifled leakage that may include ,

through-wall crad s Jeveloped in austPalit Bc stainless steel piping.

lW.B.I.4.(l) the leaage detectica system provided (I) 5_t99Wt f should include suf ficiently diverse leak detection meterods wits adequate PA531Y's lescriptiose of Fit: Patrick's leak detectiosa sens6tivity to detect and amasure small melsunds is not detailed enouges to determine adiether they leans in a timely masweer anJ to identify meet Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.45.

the leatage sources within (see practical limits. Acuptable leasage detectices and Dif f fitfleCf 5 munitoring systems are described in Sectione L. Regulatory Posillon of .

the nine subsections of Section C of Regulatory Regulatory Guide 1.45. " Reactor Cuolant Guide 1.45 are discussed below.

Pressuru Boususary teatage Detection Systems."

C.I PA5ser has stated that leakage tu the primary Particular ettentlue senauld be given to reactor containment from identilled sources is collected such that upgrading ano calibrating those leat detectinn systems that will provide presept a. the fluw rates are muoillusird separately f reme i.edication of asi increrase in leakage rate, unidentif ied leakage.9 and other equivalesit leakage detectiosa asui b. the total

[ collectiori systems will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

monitored, glow rate can be established and C.2 The Fit: Patrick Final Safety Assalysis Report (FStit) (Section 4.10.3) indicates that the reactor coolant leak detection systems (eacept for the continuous radioactivity mosaltoring system) are designed to have a sensitivity of 3 gpa ur bet t er.9 It is not knowa if the sensitivity of "3 gym or better" meets the rectsamendations in Regulatory Guide 1.45.

C.3 ihe primary cenitainment leak detection systems consist of the following.

l. Drywell Equipment Drain Stamp teakage Kanitoring System.
7. Drywell floor prain Samup teakage Monitoring System.
3. Drywell Cusitinuous Atmusphere Radioactivity Monitoring tudine ased(includes noble gasgross particglate, a(Livities).

lhe three emelnuds recemmaesided by Subsection C.3 of Regulatury Guide 1.45 are present.

C.4 It is not clear whether provisituts have beeen m.ede in the fit: Patrick f 5AA tu amunitor systems cemenected to the RfPil for signs of intersystem It'ak at!

. . .-- ~. . . .- - .

C.S lhe fit: Patrick reactor coolant leatage systems (except for the cinitisivanas radioactivity mosaltorirg system) are designed to have a sensitivity of 3 gem or better (f 5AR Sectloei4.10.3).

C.h it is not clear whetsier the Fit: Patrick alsborne particulate radioactivity munituring system remains f unctional when subjected to the 55t..

C.1 Indicators and alanes for the required leakage detectiosi system are provided in the males cuatrol rooms. Procedures f or converting vartuus indications to a cumsmus leakage equivalent ere availaute to the operators.

It is not knoems whether calibration of the indicators accounts for the seceded inelependent variables.

C.8 it is not known whether all the fit: Patrick Icak detection systems enianerated in Referiwe 9 can be calibrated or tested during operation.

C.9 Inc fit 2 Patrick lechnical Specificatlusas include W limiting conditions for ideatified and useidentified leakage. Iwo of the leak detection systems described in the Fit: Patrick lechnical Specifications (Section 3.6.0.2) are always operable.

It casumot be determined f rne the above whether fitaPatrick meets all the requirciments of Regulatory Eni4 1.45. Sectico C.

ApulilCalAt DATA littJulettu

1. Indicate whether provist wis have been m.ule in the Fit: Patrick FSAit to anwiltor systems coeuiccted to the RCP8 for signs of intersystem leakage (Subsection C.4 of Regulatory Golde 1.45).
2. Ihe fit Patrick f 5 Alt (Section 4.10.3) imilcates that Lt.e reactor coolasit leak detection systems (except for the continuous radioactivity monitoring system) are designed to have a sensitivity of 3 geus or better. Please give, if possible, a musre precise tigure tisan "3 game or e better". (Subsection C.5 of kegulatory Guide 1.45).
3. Indicate whether calibe'ation of tiee indicaturs acCouslts for the needed in.fcpendent variables *

(Sid>section 0.1 of itegulatory Guide 1.45).

4. Indicate whether the F4taPatrick althorne particulate radioactivity moultoring system remains f unctional when sublected to SSE (Subsection C.6 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).
5. Indicate which led detect fun systems in Fit: Patrick can be calibrated or tested during operation (Subsection C.8 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).
6. Indicate if the ledage detection system i

sensitivity meets Regulatory Guide 1.45 (Subsection C.2 of Regulatury Guide 1.4h).

' IV.W.I.e.(2) Plant snutdoms should be taltiated for (2) StsMART taspection and carrective action unen any ledage detection systes ladicates, witmin PA547 nas not proposed a requirement for shutdoun af ter a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or less, an increase a 2-gpe increase in unidentified ledage in 24 h into the in rate of unidentified ledage in escess Technical Specifications for Fit: Patrick.

of 2 gallons per minuts or its equivalent, or when the total unidentified led age PA581T nas not proposed a requirement for munitoring the attains a rate of 5 gallons per minute or sump level at 4-n intervals (or less). PAS 4Y does not acet

! Its equivalent, whichever occurs first. histEG-0313. Rev. I in this matter.

For sump level monitoring systems with flaed-measurement laterval metnod, tne OlFFEREleCES level should be monitored at 4-hour latervals or less. staEG-0313, Rev. I requires that reactor shutdoma he initiated when tiiere is a 2-gpa lacrease in unidentified ledaee in 24 h. For suno level monitoring systems with the

- fised-measurement laterval method, the level should be

    • monitored every 4 h or less. IshC Generic Letter 81-04 requires that the above requirements be incorporated in the plant technical Specifications.

PA511Y has not incorporated a requirement la the Fit: Patrick Technical Specifications for shistdoun af ter a 2-gpo lacrease in leatage in 24 h. Also, the rq coolant ledage rata is established or.ca a day.'gter A00lilastAL DATA RfqulRED Indicate if there are plans to lacorporate the reconnendations of Part IV.S.I.a.(2) into the Fit: Patrick Techatcal Specifications.

IV.u.l.a.(J) unidentitled ledage should include all (3) PAS 4f's definition of unidentified ledage for leakage otner than; Fit: Patrick meets 4tafG-0313. Rev.1 (F5Ast Section 4.10 3).

it.B.I.a.(3)(a) tedage lato closed systans, such as pump seal or valve packing leds that (a) The comments on IV.8.l.a.(3) also apply here.

are captured, flow metered, and conducted to a sump or collecting tana, or

~_ _ _ _ _ . _. . ._. _ __

iv.B.I.a.(3)(b) leakage into the contalument (b) Ihe causeents on IV.8.I.a.(3) also apply 1.cre, atusosphere f rom sources that are both specif scally located and known either not to interfere with the operations of unidentitled brasage munitoring systems or not to be frum a througn-wall crack in the piping within the reactor coolant pressure i

buundary.

If.ts.l.u. Aupm:nted inservice luspections faservice b. SUHMANV luspection of the "floncunfr -eing, e

86unservice Sensitive" lin . 5:w>uld be PASNV's classification for the 22- and 28-in, conducted in accordance with the fullowing recirculation piping,12-in. recirculatiusi riser piping, and program:* seguents of the residual heat removal (Riet) and reactor water cleanup (RWCU) piping do not aseet Ntat[G-0313. Rev.1.

  • ints program is largely taken frima the requirements of A5ME Also, PASNV's augmented 151 plans for the above ASHL 160tler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, referenced in tese Code Class I
  • service sensitive' pipes do not miet paragrapn (b) of to Lf R $0.55a " Codes and Standards." leUREG-0113. Rev, l.

UlffDtfNrCS

'ItMFb-0313. Rev. I requires that all ASME Code Clau I

-

  • service sensitive' piping be subjected to an .nipmented 151

'" program. lhe inf tial inspectior.s seiould be carried out at outa Rev esch successive classified refuelin!lon R$.

the recircula and IluufG-0]l)Ing RWCU pip sy. I has stems as

' service sensitive".

PA588V has classified the above pipes as "nonservice sensitive" and has propoged inspection plans whirsi dif fer fross NUMEG-0313. Rev.1.

AlDill0NAL DAIA REljujkg)

Nanc.

IV.U.l.b.(l) for A5HE Code Class I cimiponents and (I) The conoments on IV.B.I.b. also apply here, piping, each pressure-retaining dissimilar meetal weld siebject to inservice inspectiosa requirements of Section XI should be cuels.eil at least once in no more tasen 80 months (two-thirds of the time prescribed in the A5NE Boller and Pressure vess.el Code Section XI). Such examination shonid include all internal attacsunent welds that are not thrnugh-wall welds but are welded to of form part Of the pressure boundary.

I V. 8.1.u. ( 2) the tultuwing ASHf Code Llass I pipe welds (2) Ihe cemements on IV.B. I.b. also apply here.

si.blect in inservice inspection requirisments of Section 31 shnnld be ca.miined at least susce in nu more than ,

80 an,esths -

iv.5.1.D.(2)[a) Ail welas at ter.inal ends of pipe (a) Ine co ne-nts un IV.8.1.b. also apply here.

at vessel no22Ies;

  • 8essinal ends are tee entrosities of piping runs that cosua<t to structor.*s, cumpunents (such as vessels, pumps, salves) or pipe ancrwrs, exh of which avis as rigid restraints or provides at least two degrees of restraint to piping thermal espansion.

IV.S.I b.(2)(c) All welds having a design comeilned (b) the comments on IV.8.1.b. also apply here.

pr6sary plus secondary stress range of 2.45, or more; I V.8.1.b. ( 2)(c ) All welds having a design cumulative (c) The casaments on IV.S.I.b. also apply here.

lat6gue usage factor of 0.4 or more; an.s I V.B. I .e. ( 2)(d) Sufficient aalitional welds with hign (d) The comuments esa IV.8.1.b. also apply here.

potential for cracting to masLe the total equal to 251 of the welds in caca piping systems.

- IV.8.1.0.(J) Ihe following ASME Code Class 2 pipe (3) SteemitY m welde, subject to enservice inspection requireinents of Sectiose XI, in residual PAS 41Y has not identified thase nonconforming heat renoval systees, e e rayucy care "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per cooling systeses, and cositainment heat reasoval syste as shuvid be emantned at Part IV.8.1.b.(3) of Iltaf G-0313. Rev.1. Data are needed to determine wealch *nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 least once in no more than 80 mun.:e pipes will be laspected and what inspection procedures will be used.

Olf f[itf asCES 88 Ult (G-0313, 8ev. I requires that noncunforming A5ML Code Class I and Class 2 piping 1.e subjected to an an9mmted 151 program. the augen=nted 151 program for A5MC code Class I piping dif fers tros that required on Class 2 piping. Also, augesented ISI requirceents differ inr ASME Code Class 2 pipes to be inspected per Parts IV.8.l.b ( J) and IV.8.1.b.(4) of IstattG-0313. Rev.1.

PA5sif has sulmoitted the au p ted 151 program for noncenforming *nnnservice sensitive

  • piping, but has not distinguished etween the ASME Code Class I and Class /

piping, and between the A5ME Code Class 2 pipes which are lo be inspected per Parts IV.B.I.b.(3) and IV.S.I.b.(4) of IstatIG-0113, lley, 1. therefore, PA516V's program for ASM[ '

Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated.

A0011104AL D_AIAylpi,HED _

IJentif y which ASML Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.8.1.1..(3) and wenich layw-ct tun proce.hsres will lee uw l.

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PA5NV has sutmeitted tese ausammted ISI progran f or nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" piping, but has not Jistingelshed between the AM fuile t. lass I med Class 2 piping, and between the A5ML Code Class 2 pipes whicae are tu be inspected per Parts IV.R.I.b.(1) and IV.R.I.b.(4) of NIREG-0313. Rev. l. Itserclore, PAWY's program for A5ML Code Class 2 piping caunot be evaluated.

Atell10NAL DATA NiqulitED Identify e.hich A5ME Code Class ? pipe will be inspected per Part IV.S.I.b.(4) and wenich luspection praxedures will be used.

IV.S.I.b.(4)(a) All welds at locations unere the (a) Ihe camusents on IV.S.I.b.(4) also apply inere.

strernes under the loa-lings resulting from

  • Normal
  • and "15 set" plant coerlit lans including the operating basis eartsuguase (Oste) as calculated by the sum of Equations (g) and (10) in 80C-J652 esceed 0.8 (1.25, + SA );

IV.B.I.o.(4)(a) All welds at terminal ends of piping, (b) Ihe connents on IV.S.I.b.(4) also apply tiere.

includ6sig branch runs; g IV.8.8.b.ltf(c) All dissiellar metal welds; (c) Ihe comments on IV.S.I b.(4) also apply here.

IV.5.1.D.(4)(d) AJdstional welds wites higte potential (d) Ilee csmunents on IV.B.I.b.(4) also apely here.

for cracting at structural siiscontinuities* such that the total nued,er of welds selected for esamination equal to 255 of the circumferential welds in each piping system.

  • 1truttural disruntinuities incliede pipe weld jolats to vessel noriles, valve nodies, piamp casings, pipe fittings (such as elbows, tees, relucers, f langes, etc., cewiforming to AN51 Standard S 16.9) med pipe branch connections and fittings.

I V.S. I.b. ( S) Il esamination of (I), (?), (3), and (5) Ihe comments on IV.M.I.b.(1), (7), (3), and (4) also (4) above conducted durlug the fIrst apply tiere.

160 asunths reveal no incidence of stress corrosioes crau lng, the esasination f requency thereaf ter can revert to 120 munths as prescribed in Secteun XI of the ASME Soller asul Pressure Wessel Lode.

I V. U. ! .b.16) S mpling plans other than those (6) No coussent made because alternative plans were not described in (2), (1), and (4) above evaluated.

will be reviewed on a case-by-case bests.

IV.B.2. *8kmconforming* Lires Ihat are "Scrvice E ltive' IV.8.2.a. teak Detection: The leakage detection 4.

requirements, described in IV.B.I.a. The cosaments made in Parts IV.8.1.a.(l) and IV.S.s.a.(2) apply here.

above, should be laplemented.

IV.8.2.b. Augmented Inservice inspection: b. 5tsetARV PASNT has identified the ASME Code Class I *servlCe sensitive

  • piping and their inspectinse methods. Ihe classification and augmented ISI methods of the pipes identified by PAS 4V as " service sensitive" meet felREG-Oll),

Rev. I.

Diff EREastE S NimEG-0313. Rev. I requires that

  • service sensitive
  • pipe welds be subject to an augmented 151 program.

Selection methods for pipe welds are found in Part IV.S.2.b.

of IRNEG-0313. Rev.1.

to PAS 4Y has identified snee ASME cme Class I pipe to be inspected as " service sensitive

  • pipe. The class and laspection intervals meet IRREG-0313. Rev. l.gfication However, some pipe welds identified as ASME Code Class I
  • nonservice sensitive
  • pipe in Reference 9 should be classified as " service sensitive". these are discussed under Part IV.8.1.b.

A00l!!0 seat DAIA REllillR[u None.

IV.8.2.b.ll) ,Ine welds and adjoining areas of (l) Ihe Consents on IV.B.2.b. also apply here.

bypass piping of the discharge valves in the main recirculation loops, and of the austenttic stainless steel reactor core spray piping up to and including the second isolation valve, should he examined at each reactor ref ueling outage or at other scheJuled plant outages. Successive esamination need not be closer than b muntns, if outages occur more freq acntly (nan 6 samths. This requirement applies to all welds in als bypass lines whether the 4-inch valve is kept open or closed during operation.

. _ m _ _ . _ _

In the event these esaminattuus find the piping free of awaacceptable indicatlues f or three successive inspections, the examinatlose may be extended to eacsi M-munth period (plus or minus by as much as 12 mimths) colescident with a i refueling outage, in inese cases, the successive examination may be limited to all welds in one bypass pipe rima and one reactor core spray piping run, it unacceptable flew indications are detected. the remaining piping runs in each group should be examined. .

In the event these 36-month period es.aminations reveal ao unacceptable Indicatluns for three successive inspections, tne welds and adjoining areas of these piping runs should be es.amined as described in IV.S.I.b(1) for dissimilar metal welds and in IV.B.I.b(2) for other welds.

N I V. N. 2.b. ( 2) hoe dissimilar metal welds and (2) Ihe licensee has not furnished data on this paragrapse o adjoining areas of other A5ME Code in Als responses to felC Generic tetter 88-04.

Class I Service Sensitive

  • piping should be examined at each reactor refueling outage or at other scheduled plant outages. Successive examinations need not be closer than 6eanths, If outages occur more f requently than 6 eaunths. Such enaninetton should include all internal attachments that are not througse-wall welds but are welded to or form part of the pressure coundary.

I V.S. 2.b. ( 3) line welds and adjoining areas et (3) The comments on IV.B.2.b. also apply here.

ottwr A$stE Code Class I

  • Service Sensitive' piping should be examined using the sampling plan described in IV.S.I.b(2) except that the frequency of sucn esaminations should be at e.ach reactor refueling outage or at other scheduled plant outages.

Successive examinations need not be closer than 6 minaths, if outages occur aiure frequently tasan 6 munths.

2 IV.S.2.b.(4) Ine adjoining areas of internal (4) Ihe cumseents on IV.S.2.b. also apply here.

attaclament welJs in recirculation inlet lines at safe ends where crevices are formed by the welded thermal sleeve attachment should be i

esamined at each reactor refueling outate or at other scheduled plant outages. Successive esaminations need not ce closer than 6 months, if outages occur more frequently than 6 months.

I V. 8. 2.b. ( 5) In Ene event the esaminations (5) The Comments on IV.S.2.b. also apply here, described in (2), (3) and (4) above find the piping free of unacceptacle ludicattuns for (nree successive inspections, the examination may be estended to each 36-enonth period (plus or minus by as mucn as 12 months) coinciding with a refueling outage.

In the event these 36-month period esmalnattuns reveal no unacceptacle indications f or three successive m

inspections, the frequency of '

esamination may revert to 80-month periods (two-talrds the time prescribed in the ASME Code Section XI).

. I V.S. 2.b. ( 6) the area, extent, and frequency of (6) 549etARY esamination af the augmented laservice inspection for ASME Code PASNV has not identified those nonconforming " service Class 2 " Service Sensitive

  • lines sensitive
  • pipes which are to be inspected per Part will be determined on a case-by-case IV.8.2.b.(6) of NINtEG-0313. Rev. I.

nasts.

Data are needed to determine which " service sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.

Ulfff RENCES 1

NtatEG-0313, Rev. I requires that nonennf orming ASHL Code Clad. I and Class 2 piping be sun.iected to an augmente.1 ISI acagrad.. Ihe augmented ISI progras for ASME Code Class I piping differs from that required on Class 2 piping.

PASNY has sutasitted the augmented 151 program for nonconforming

  • service sensitive" piping, let has not distinguished between the ASME Code Class I and Class 2 piping. iherefore, PASNY's program for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated utthout amire data.

AD0llllM6At Is".! A RfQUIRED

1. IJentely which A$Mf Code Class 2 pipe util be inspected per Part IV.S.2.b.(6).
2. IJentif y the inspection procedures for " service sensitive" A$Mf Code Class 2 pipe.

IV.B.J. Isos6 destructive f aamination (Isat) Requirements 3. The licensee has not furnished data on this paragrape in his responses to If(C Generic tetter 88-04, the metamud of eaamination and volume of material to be esmanned, the allumaele Indicatium stanJards. anJ esamination procedures should ccesply utta flee requireme sts set forth in the applicaele Edition med AJJenda of the A$ME Code.

Sect eun II, specified in Paragraph (g).

" Inservice laspection itequirements.* of 10 LFR SU.hba. *Ludes ano Standards."

in sense cases, the code esamination procedures may saut tw effestive for detecting or evaluattag it.5LL and other ultrasumir (HI) proceJures or advanced aususestructive esamination techniques may be required to detect and evaluate stress corrostun cracating in austessitic stainless steel piptug. lepruveJ Ul procedures have been n developed by certain organisations. These

  • to leproved UI detection anJ evaluation prucedures that have seen or case be dem)nstrated to ite felC to be effective la detecting 16500 should be used in the laservice inspectiuse.
  • elecuummendations for the development anJ eventual lattementatiose of these leproved tectualques are included in Part V.

V. Gillf mat af ttself mDA110el5 V. The licensee has not furnished data on this paragraph in has responses to IftC Generic letter 81-04, lhe m:asures outlined in Part til of this document provsde for positive acteines that are consistent with current technology. The implementatton of these actions snuuld massedly reduce the susceptlallity of stainless

  • steel piping to stress corrostosi cractLing in Shels, it it rer.ugnised that addet tunal means coulo De used to limit tne eatent of stress corrusion cracting of kWR pressure boundary piping materials and to lepruve the overall system integrity. ihese include plant design and operattumal procedure consioeratluns to reduce system espusure to puteestially aggressive envirosneent, lasseveo maternal selection, special f aorication and melding Lets,niques, and provlstuns for volumetric inspecteun capanal.ty la tne oesign ut veld joints. Ine use of sucn amtmas to liest 1h500 or to emprove plant satees antegrity ulls ne revacued on a case-by<ase sesis.

TABLE 2 SUMMARIES OF EVALUATION OF LICENSEE'S RESPONSES II.C Material Selection, Testing, and Processing Guidelines for BWRs with an Operating License The Power Authority of the State of New York's (PASNY's) alternative plan proposes to replace some, but not all, the nonconforming pipe at the FitzPatrick plant.

IV.8.1.a.(1) Leak Detection and Monitoring Systems PASNY's description of FitzPatrick's leak detection methods is not detailed enough to detarmine whether they meet Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.45.

IV.B.I.a.(2) Leak Detection Requirements PASNY has not proposed a requirement for shutdown after a 2-gpm increase in unidentified leakage in 24 h into t!e Technical Specifications for FitzPatrick.

PASNY has not proposed a requirement for monitoring the sump level at 4-h intervals (or less). PASNY does not meet NUREG-0313, Rev.1 in this matter.

. IV.B.1.b. Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" Pipe PASN7's classification for the 22- and 28-in, recirculation piping, 12-in. recirculation riser piping and segments of the residual- heat removal (RHR) and reactor water cleanup (RWCU) piping do not meet NUREG-0313. Rev. 1.

l 1

23

1 Also, PASNY's augmented ISI plans for the above ASME Code Class 1

" service sensitive" pipes do not meet NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

IV.B.I.b.(3) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe PASNY has not identified those nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" pipes wnich are to be inspected per Part IV.8.1.b.(3) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. Data are needed to detemine which "nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.

IV.B.I.b.(4) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe PASNY has not identified those nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per Part IV.B.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. Data are needed to detern.ine which "nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.

IV.B.2.b. Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" Pipe PASNY has identified the ASME Code Class 1 " service sensitive" piping and their inspection methods. The classification and augmented ISI methods of the pipes identified by PASNY as " service sensiti te" meet NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

IV.S.2.b.(6) Augmented ISI of Nonconfoming " Service Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe PASNY has not identified those nonconforming " service sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per Part IV.B.2.b.(6) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

Data are needed to determine which " service sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used.

24

l l

1 TABLE 3 OIFFERENCES BETWEEN NUREG-0313, REV.1 AND LICENSEE'S RESPONSES II.C. Material Selection, Testing, and Processing Guidelines for BWRs with an Operating License NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that NRC-designated " service' sensitive" lines be replaced with corrosion-resistant materials. Also, lines that experience cracking should be replaced with corrosion-resistant materials.

PASNY has proposed' replacing recirculation piping if IGSCC is found 4

and has replaced segments of the core spray piping. PASNY will replace tne nonconforming parts of the control rod orive hydraulic return piping. PASNY has not stated whether it plans to replace the nonconforming parts of the residual heat removal and reactor water cleanup piping.

IV.B.I.a.(1) Leak Detection and Monitoring Systems The nine subsections of Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.45 are discussed below.

C.1 PASNY has stated that leakage to the primary reactor containment from identified sources is collected such that

, a. the flow rates are monitored separately from unidentified leakage,9 and

b. the total flow rate can be established and monitored.9 i

1 1

25 n, nm- "

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C.2 Tne FitzPatrick Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

(Section 4.10.3) indicates that the reactor coolant leak detection systems (except for the continuous ra'dioactivity monitoring system) are designed to have a sensitivity of 3 gpm or better. It is not known if the sensitivity of "3 gpm or better" meets the recommendations in Regulatory Guide 1.45.

C.3 The primary containment leak detection systems consist of the following.

1. Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Leakage Monitoring System.
2. Drywell Floor Orain Sump Leakage Monitoring System.
3. Drywell Continuous Atmosphere Radioactivity Monitoring (includes gross particulate, iodine and noble gas activities).9 The tnree methods recommended by Subsection C.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.45 are present.

C.4 It is not clear whether provisions have been made in the FitzPatrick FSAR to monitor systems connected to the RCPB for signs of intersystem leakage.

C.5 The FitzPatrick reactor coolant leakage systems (except for the continuous radioactivity monitoring system) are designed to have a sensitivity of 3 gpm or better (FSAR Section 4.10.3).

C.6 It is not clear whether the FitzPatrick airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system remains functional when subjected to the SSE.

l 1

26

l i

C.7 Indicators and alarms for the required leakage detection 'l system are provided in the main control room. Procedures for i converting various indications to a common leak' age equivalent i are available to the operators.

It is not known whether calibration of the indicators accounts for the needed independent variables.

C.8 It is not known whether all the FitzPatrick leak detection systems enumerated in Reference 9 can be calibrated or tested during operation.

C.9 The FitzPatrick Technical Specifications include limiting conditions for identified and unidentified leakage. Two of the leak detection systems described in the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications (Section 3.6.0.2) are always operable.

It cannot be determined from the above whether FitzPatrick meets all the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.45, Section C.

IV.8.1.a.(2) Leak Detection Requirements NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that reactor shutcown be initiated when there is a 2-gpm increase in unidentified leakage in 24 h. For sump level monitoring systems with the fixed-measurement interval method, the level should be monitored every 4 h or less. NRC Generic Letter 81-04 requires that the above requirements be incorporated in the plant Technical Specifications.

PASNY has not incorporated a requirement in the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications for shutdown af ter a 2-gpm increase in

leakage in 24 h. Also, tne reactor coolant leakage rate is established once a day.10 i

i 27

^

j

~

l

c s IV.B.1.b. Augmented ISI:of Monconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" Pipe NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that all ASME Code Class 'I " service sensitive" piping be subjected to an augmented ISI program. The initial inspections 'should be carried out at each successive refueling outage. NUREG-0313, Rev. I has classified the recirculation RHR and RKU piping systems as " service sensitive".

PASNY has classified the above pipes as "nonservice sensitive" and has proposed inspection plans which differ from NUREG-0313 Rev. 1.9 ,

IV.B.I.b.(3) Augmented ISI of Nonconfonning "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that nonconfonning ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping be subjected to an augmented ISI program. The y augmented ISI program for ASME Code Class 1 piping differs from that '

required on Class 2 piping. Also, augmented ISI requirements differ for ASME Code Class 2 pipes to be inspected per Parts IV.B.I.b.(3) j and IV.8.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

PASNY has sub:nitted the augmented ISI program for nonconforabg a

nonservice sensitive" piping, but has not distinguished betwee.' the ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping, and between the ASME Code Class 2 pipes which are to be inspected per Parts IV.B.I.b.(3) and -

IV.8.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev.1. Therefore, PASNY's program for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated.

IV.8.1.b.(4) Augmented ISIS for ASME Code Class 1 Pipe Welds with High , ', s ,

Potential for Cracking- '

S

, NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that nonconforming ASME Code Class I and Class 2 piping be st.njected to an augmented ISI program. The '  :

augmented ISI program for ASME Code Class I piping differs from that 2 '

S 3

- 28s " ..

t '

I l

l l

I required on Class 2 piping. Also, augmented ISI requirements differ i

for ASME Code Class 2 pipes to be inspected per Parts IV.B.I.b.(3) and IV.8.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

PASNY has submitted the augmented ISI program for nonconforming

~>

"nonservice sensitive" piping, but has not distinguished between the

', ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping, and between the ASME Code Class 2 pipes which are to be inspected per Parts IV.8.1.b.(3) and IV.3.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev.1. Therefore, PASNY's program for ASME;. Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated.

IV.B.2.b. Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" Pipe NUREG-0313, Rev. I requires that " service sensitive" pipe welds be subject to an augmented ISI program. Selection methods for pipe welds are found in Part IV.B.2.b. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

PASNY has identified some ASME Code Class 1 pipe to be inspected as

" service sensitive" pipe. The classification and inspection intervals meet NUREG-0313, Rev. l.9 However, some pipe welds identified as ASME-Code Class 1 "nonservice sensitive" pipe in Reference 9 should be classified as " service sensitive". These are discussed under Part' IV.S. I.b.

IV.B.2.b.(6) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe '

NUREG-031.3, Rev. el requires that nonconforming ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping be subjected to an augmented ISI program. The augmented ISI proceam for ASME Code Class i piping differs from that

" required on Class'2 piping.

il -

PASNY has submitted the augmented ISI program for nonconforming "s,ervice sensitive" piping, but has not distinguished between the e ASME Code Class I and Class 2 piping. Therefore, PASNY's program -

for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated without more data.

29

TABLE 4 n.

ADDITIONAL DATA REQUIRED

, OF LICENSEE II.C Material Selection, Testing, and Processing Guidelines for BWRs with an Operating License '

Indicate if there are any plans to replace the residual heating and reactor water cleanup piping if evidence of IGSCC is found.

IV.8.1.a.(1) Leak Detection and Monitoring Systems

1. Indicate whether provisions have been made in the FitzPatrick FSAR to monitor systems connected to the RCPB for signs of intersystem leakage (Subsection C.4 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).
2. The FitzPatrick FSAR (Section 4.10.3) indicates that the reactor coolant leak detection systems (except for the continuous radioactivity monitoring system) are designed to have a sensitivity of 3 gpm or better. Please give, if possible, a more precise figure than "3 gpm or better".

i (Subsection C.5 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).

3.

Indicate whether calibration of the indicators accounts for the needed independent variables (Subsection C.7 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).

i 4 Indicate whether the FitzPatrick airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system remains functional when subjected to SSE (Subsection C.6 of Regulatory ' Guide 1.45).

ll s ;.

~

i 1

~

5. Indicate wnich leak detection systems in FitzPatrick can be calibrated or tested during operation (Subsection C.8 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).
6. Indica'te if the leakage detection system sensitivity meets Regulatory Guide 1.45 (Subsection C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).

IV.S.I.a.(2) Leak Detection Requirements Indicate if there are plans to incorporate the recommendations of Part IV.8.1.4.(2) into the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications.

IV.8.1.b. Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" Pipe None.

IV.8.1.b.(3) Augmented ISI for ASME Code Class 1 Pipe Welds Having a Design Cumulative Fatigue Usage Factor of 0.4 or More Identify which ASME Ccde Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.8.1.b.(3) and which inspection procedures will be used.

IV.B.I.b.(4) Augmented ISI of Nonconfonning "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe Identify wnich ASME Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.8.1.b.(4) and which inspection procedures will be used.

1 IV.8.2.b. Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" Pipe l

None.

31-t

, _ ., .- ~ * ~ ,

IV.8.2.b.(6) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming " Service Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe

1. Identify which ASME Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.S.2.b.(6). ,

I,

2. Identify the inspection procedures for " service sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipe. ,

I d

4 32

4

4. REFERENCES
1. E. D. Eason et al., The Cost Effectiveness of Countermeasures to Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking in SWR Picing, EPRI NP-1703, Feoruary 1901, p. A-04
2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Technical Recort on Material -

Selection and Processing EJidelines for SWR Coolant Pressure soundary

, Piping, U5hdG Report NUdtu-udid, Ju ly 19//.

3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Technical Report, Investigation-and Evaluation of Cracking in Austen1 tic Stainless Steel Pioing of Boiling Water Reactor Plants, USNRC Report NUREG-15/067, Octooer 1975.

4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Investigation and Evaluation of Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Piping of Lignt water Reactor Plants,,

USNRC Report NUREG-0531, FeDruary 19/9.

5. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Technical Reoort on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for SWR Coolant Pressure Soundary Pioing, ushxL Report Nuktu-udlJ, Rev. I, Ju ly eveu.
6. D. G. Eisenhut letter to all BWR licensees (except Humboldt Bay and La Crosse), " Implementation of NUREG-0313. Rev.1, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for 8WR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping (Generic Task A-42)," Generic Letter 81-04, Feoruary 40, 6Mdi.
7. J. P. Bayne to T. A. Ippolito letter, July 31,1981 (NRC Accession No.: 8108050208).
8. J. P. Bayne to T. A. Ippoli'to letter, September 28,1981 (NRC Accession No.: 8110060252).
9. J. P. Bayne to D. B. Vassallo letter, January 19,1983 (NRC Accession No.: 8301250321).
10. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Final Safet/ Analysis Report.
11. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications.

\

33

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Idaho Falls, IO 83415

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16. ASSTR ACT /200 we,es or sessJ j

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