ML20112B218

Control of Heavy Loads,James a Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20112B218
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	11/27/1984
From:	Bomberger C FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	Singh A NRC
Shared Package
ML20107M797	List: ML20112B218
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-07990, TAC-7990, TER-C5506-355, NUDOCS 8501100262
Download: ML20112B218 (25)

Text

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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF. HEAVY LOADS NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY -

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRC DOCKET NO. 50-333 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRCTACNO. 07990 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81 130 FRC TASK 355 t

Preparedby Frank!!n Research Center Author: C. Bomberger 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia,PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: I. H. Sargent Preparedfor Nuclear Regulatory Commission

. Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: A..Singh November 27, 1984 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.

Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by:

InsN AY '

A f $1 &4 Principal AuM Ghasp Leahr Department Direchr (

Date- # /4 /8! Date: "k F' Date: 6 't 7 - T4-FRANKLIN RESEARCH CENTER DIVISION OF ARVIN/ CAL 5 PAN 20th and Race Streets. Phila., Pa. 19103 (21g44a.inno 35o s too 21oM

TER-C5506-355 CONTENTS Section Title Page 1 INTRODUC'"lON. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 1 1.1 Purpose of Review . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Generic Background . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.3 Pfant-Specific Background . . . . .

. . . . 2 1

2 EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 16 i

3 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.1 General Provisions for Load Handlirig . . ..

. . . 19

, 3.2 Interim Protection . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4 REFEREISCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 1

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TER-C5506-355 FOREWORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract w'ith the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical assistance in support of NBC operating reactor licensing actions. The technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by the NBC. ,

Mr. C. Bomberger and Mr. I. H. Sargent contributed to the technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with MESTEC Services, Inc.

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TER-C5506-355 1.

INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW

• I This technical evaluation report documents an independent review of general load handling policy and procedures at the New York Power Authority's (NYPA) James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. This evaluation was performed with the following objectives:

o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1],

Section 5.1.1 .

o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of .

NUREG-0612, Section 5.3. ,

1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power

, plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loids and to recommend necessary changes in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation tas that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads,at operating ,

plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load handling accidents and should be ,

i upgraded.

In order to upgrade measures provided to control the handling of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first part of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their

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probability c5 failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second part of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are l

provided, in addition to those required for all load handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indica'te that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident. consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.

A defense-in-depth approach was used to develop the staff guidelines to ensure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that their probabilities of failure are appropriately small. The intent of the guide-

. lines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the following:

o define safe load travel paths, through procedures and operator training, so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or' safe shutdown equipment o provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity to equipment '

associated with redundant shutdown paths.

1 Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 cf NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.

1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter 13] to EYPA, the Licensee for Fit 2 Patrick Nuclear Power Plant, requesting that the Licensee review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at the FitzPatrick plant, cvaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines. On October 15, 1981, NYPA 9

TER-C5506-355 made an initial response [4] to this request, followed by subsequent responses on June 2, 1983 [5), January 31, 1984 [6), October 5, 1984 [7), and December

• 13, 1984 [13]: and a telephone conference call between NYPA, NBC, and FRC representatives on May 30, 1984 [8), which have been incorporated into this final technical evaluation.

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2. EVALQATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS p

This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling at the FitzPatrick plant with respect to NBC staff guidelines provided in NUREG-0612.

These categories deal separately with the general guidelines of Section 5.1.1 and the recosamende'd interim measures of Section 5.3 of NUREG-0612. In each case, the guideline or interim measure is presented, Licensee.-provided information is summarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the extent of compliance, including recommended additional action where appropriate, is presented. These conclusions are summarized in Table 2.1.

2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES .

i The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in ceder to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads. These guidelines consist of the following criteria from section 5.1.1 Cf NUREG-0612:

Guideline 1 - Safe Load Paths

. Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures '

Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training ,

Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices

,- Guideline 5 - Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) l Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance)

• l Guideline 7 - Crane Design. .

l These seven guidelines should be satisfied by all overhead handling systems and procedures used to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The Licensee's verification of the extent to which these guidelines have been satisfied,.<nd an evaluation of this verification is contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

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i 2.1.1 overhead Heavy Load Handling Systems

a. Summary of Licensee statements and conclusions The Licensee's review of overhead handling systems identified the reactor building crane as the only crane subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612.

trumorous other handling' devices identified by the Licensee have been excluded from compliance with NUREG-0612.

The following handling systems were excluded on the basis that no safety-related equipment or irradiated fuel is located in close proximity:

o screenwall and water treatment building crane o radweste bridge crane o pallet filter element handling hoist o centrifuge hoists -

o TFE hoists o turbine room crane o screenwell and tempering gate hoist o torus monorail o condenser booster pump hoist o es' cape hatch removal hoist o RFP rotor removal hoists o turbine oil tank pumps hoist o RFP turbine case and gear hoists o turbine oil tank crane <

o condenser waterbox hoists o CRD service room crane i

o , drain. cooler hoists .

o drain cooler and heater' hoists

o. refueling service hoists. *

! The following handling systems were excluded on the basis that they are sole-purpose systems and are used only when the related equipment is out of i services o screenwell auxiliary crane o diesel generator monorails and hoists o enorail over the RRR and emergency service water pump strainers

o motor generator set crane i

o recirculation pump monorail.

The following handling systems were excluded on the basis that they do not carry loads that satisfy the weight requirement for a heavy load:

. o jib cranes.

TER-C5506-355

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b. Evaluation and Conclusions.

. The Licensee's exclusion of all cranes and hoists, with the exception of

• the reactor building crane, from compliance with NUREG-0612 is acceptable on the basis of the Licensee's justification that either (1) physical separation exists, (2) the systems.are sole-purpose systems and used only when the equipment is out of service, or (3) heavy loads are not carried by the excluded systems.

2.1.2 Safe Load Paths (Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(1)1

. " Safe load paths khould be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.

. Deviations from defined load paths should require written altrsrnative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions

. TheLicenseestatedthatloadpathshavebeendevelopedforthemajor loads in the containment and that load supervisors will be present to ensure ,

that these paths will be followed. To allow flexibility in managing load handling operations, load handling procedures will also specify load path options where applicable.

For smaller maintenance loads, the load path will be visually verified to be clear prior to load movement. Special attention will be taken to identify special hazards which may exists in the event that a hazard is identified, an evaluation will be performed to determine any precautions necessary to assure a safe lift.

b. Evaluation Measures taken by the Licensee to develop safe lead paths are consistent trith the intent of this guideline. Provisions that the Licensee has made for

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predeveloped and approved options also satisfy the guideline and, reduce the need for approval of deviations from a single load path. The Licensee's approach to selecting load paths for non-major loads is also acceptable since the loads are usually much smaller and are moved infrequently during maintenance. The use of a load supervisor to direct load movements is an acceptable alterna'tive to permanent markings, as it provides a suitable visual cid for the crane operator to ensure that predetermined load patihs are followed.

c. Conclusion ,

Development of safe load paths at the FitzPatrick plant is performed in a' manner consistent with Guideline 1. '

2.1.3 Load Handling Procedures (Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Section 5.l.1(2)1

" Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to

. irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.

These procedures should include identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defininq

!~ the safe path; and other special precautions."

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Sumary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that heavy load handling procedures will be modified to require that either a load handling supervisor be present or that safe load paths be identified by floor markings prior to making a lift. To allow flexibility, procedures will specify safe load path options. All procedures will comply with Guideline 2 requirements as applicable to the FitzPatrick plant,

b. Evaluation and Conclusions Procedures as modified by the Licensee will satisfy this guideline on the basis that required information will be incorporated.

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, 2.1.4 Crane operator Training iGuideline 3, NUREG-0611, Section 5.1.1(3)) '

" Crane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in .

accordante with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [9]."

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c. Suasary of Lichnsee Statements and Conclusions

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The Licensee stated that operators of the reactor building crane will be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976, trith one exception crane operators are not formally examined, as required by the ANSI standard; however, operators are required to demonstrate knowledge of training material, operating procedures, and profici2ncy with the crane,

measures which the Licensee feels are equivalent to those in the standard. *

b. Evaluation i

Programs for crane operators at the FitzPatrick plant satisfy the

! requirements of this guideline on the basis of the Licensee's verification

. that existing programs comply with ANSI B30.2-1976, except as noted. For the -

i. cxception noted, it is agreed that measures taken to qualify crane operators satisfy the intent of this guideline.

i e. Conclusions and Recommendat' ions .

Training and qualification of crane operators at the FitzPatrick plant satisfy requirements of Guideline 3.

2.1.5 Special Lifting Devices (Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(4))

"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of' ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [10).

] This standard should apply to all special lif ting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants, certain inspections and lead tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard.- In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined

- maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling I

device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device [NUREG-0612, Guideline 5.1.1(4)] ."

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TER-C5506-355

a. Summary of Licensee Statendnts and Conclusions The Licensee stated that the following lifting devices have been ev'aluated -

with respect to the criteria of A:.3I N14.6-1978:

o head strongback o dryer / separator lifting sling assembly.

The only other lifting device of interest is the lifting yoke for the CNS 4-45 cask. The Licensee stated that the manufacturer will be required to demonstrate, prior to use of this device, that the lifting yoke meets the requirements of ANSI N,14.6-1978 or that the manufacturer must provide justifi-cation for alternative' measures.

• Two other special lifting devices, the lifting rigs for the head thermal insulation (TILR, 10 tons) and the stud tensioner (STLR, 6 tons) , were excluded from evaluation since these devices carry loads over the reactor vessel only when the vessel head is in place. Because these devices carry relatively light loads (less than 10,000 lb), loads are moved only when the head is installed, and administrative measures exist to prevent movement when

, the head is removed, further detailed analysis is not deemed necessary.

Faarthermore, the design of the STLR was evaluatedt and found to comply with ANSI N14.6-1978, whereas the TILR design was found to satisfy criteria of ANSI 330.9-1971.

The two special lifting devices of concern at the FitzPatrick plant were designed and manufactured prior to the existence of ANSI N14.6-1978. The Licensee, following review of ANSI N14.6-1978, indicated that Sections 3.4,

, 3.5, and 3.6 are not pertinent to load handling reliability and therefore did t

not address those sections. Sections 3.1, 3.3, and 4 are difficult to apply in retrospect, and documentation is not available to assure that all cpplicable requirements of these sections were met; however, review of c.vailable designer information indicates that sound engineering practices were used and the designer's intent was accomplished during fabrication. Section 6 cf ANSI N14.6-1978 does not apply to the special lifting devices identified by the Licensee since the loads to be lifted by these devices have not yet been cnalyzed to be " critical loads."

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Based upon the above discussion, detailed comparison of the two lifting '

devices (the dryer / separator sling assembly and the head strongback) was limited to sections 3.2 and 5 of ANSI N14.6-1978. Both lifting devices were '

evaluated using classical stress analysis methods in accordance with the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978 and the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC). A dynamic

• load factor of 1.15 was incorporated into these analysis.

Analysis results indicate that the head strongback exceeds all standards requirements, while the dryer / separator sling satisfies all requirements with l

the exception of*four socket pins. These, pins are within 34 of yield and i

ultimate strength values which is considered to be an insignificant margin.

Therefore, design of both devices is considered to meet the intent of ANSI

{ .U14.6-1978.

Following initial fabrication, proof load tests were performed for each j device. The head strongback was load tested to 1254, while the dryer / separator sling was tested to 2004 of rated load. All load-bearing

! welds were nondestructively tested prior to and following the load test.

Regarding inspections to assure continuing compliance, the Licensee "

ctated that current practices for inspection, testing, and maintenance will be '

rcvised to satisfy the inspection requirements of ANSI N14.6, Section 5.3.1.

I l b. Evaluation Although not originally designed and constructed in accordance with the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978, it is apparent, from the Licensee's response and analyses that have been performed, that these devices possess a degree of load h ;ndling reliability consistent with that specified by this guideline.

Although no original design information is available, design adequacy of both devices is demonstrated based upon satisfactory stress analyses which have been performed by the Licensee for each device. Proof load tests performed by the Licensee document satisfactory fabrication of each device; although not t::sted to 150% of rated load, the 125% test of the head strongback is a cufficient overload to document proof of workmanship. Lastly, continuing compliance of these devices is demonstrated by the Licensee's commitment to comply with the continuing testing requirements of Section 5.3.1 of ANSI N14.6-1978.

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c. Conclusion"

• Design of special lifting devices and programs which provide assurances .

of continuing compliance is consistent with criteria of Guideline 4 for special lifting devices at FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

2.1.6 Lifting Devices (Not' Specially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, i Section 5.1.l(5)]

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" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B10.9-1971, ' Slings'

[11]. Bowever, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sua of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on .

the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' that produces the maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on .

only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they any be used."

c. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that new siings will be purchased in compliance with ANSI 330.9-1971. Existing slings used with the reactor building crane to carry heavy loads over spent fuel or safe shutdown equipment will comply with A.dSI requirements for marking, storage, inspection, repair, proper use, working load limits, and safe operating practices. To account for dynamic .

load considerations, the Licensee stated that either the effects of dynamic .

loading are negligible or the lifting devices have suitable design margins to accommodate the dynamic loads.

i l b. Evaluation and Conclusion l

Selection and use of slings at the FitzPatrick plant is performed in a I

sanner consistent with Guideline 5.

2.1.7 Jranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) (Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(611 "The crane should be inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the i- exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use e

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TER-C5506-355 when it is not practical t,o meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane ,

inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or, monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, tests, ar.d maintenance should be performed prior to their use).*

c. Summary of L'icensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that, following review and comparisen with ANSI B30.2-1976, procedures for inspection, testing, and maintenance of the reactor building crane (Maintenance Procedure MP 17.1) will be revised to satisfy the criteria of the ANSI standard, with no exceptions.

b. Evaluation and Conclusion The requirements of this guideline are satisfied at the FitzPatrick plant on the basis of the Licensee's commitment to inspect and maintain cranes in accordance with criteria of ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2.

9 2.1.8 Crane Design [ Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(7)1 "The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and "

guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry .

Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes' [12). An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."

c. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions NYPA stated that the reactor building crane, built prior to the issuance Cf ANSI B30.2-1976 and CMAA-70, was designed and fabricated by Barnishfeger P6H in accordance with a Stone & Nebster procurement specification which addressed only certain criteria of these standards. The Licensee performed

.o detailed point-by-point comparison of the reactor building crane with the criteria of these standards, considering only those components which are load

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bearing or necessary to prevent; conditions that could lead to a load drop. In performing this analysis, it was necessary to calculate stress levels in i

various components, moments of inertia, gear ratings, dimensional proportions, -

factors of safety, and other mechanical characteristics in order to verify ,

compliance. Based upon,this comparison, NYPA stated that reactor building j crane design cosyl'ies with ANSI B30.2-1976 and CMAA-70 with the exception of j

t welding standards used and bumper deceleration rates. Further, equivalency I with current standards is justified as follows:

j 1. Welding codes specified in the two standards (ANS D14.1 for CMAA-70

) and ANS D14.l',for ANSI B30.2-1976) were not in existence when the crane was fabricated; however, fabrication was performed using the standard current at that time (ANS D2.0-1966), which the Licensee .

stated is equivalent when A-36 steel is used.

2. CMhA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976 require bridge and trolley bumpers with specified maximum deceleration rates when the bridge / trolley is traveling at a certain speed. When this crane was built, the standards did not specify deceleration rates, and bumpers were

• selected on the basis of manufacturer's experience.' Acceptability has been demonstrated by satisfactory performance in use. ,

b. Evaluation and Conclusion '

Information provided by NYPA indicated that the p ocurement specifications ,

for the reactor building crane were compared in detail with CMAA Specification ,

70 (CMhA-70) and ANSI B30.2-1976 to identify any differences that could affect the safe handling of heavy loads. The Licensee evaluation identified two differences; justifications presented for differences between the standards are acceptable.

Design of the reactor building crane at the FitzPatrick plant is consistent with Guideline 7 on the basis of the Licensee's detailed comparison of procurement standards, CMAA-70, and ANSI B30.2-1976, and their justification of differences noted.

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.2.2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented et operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy

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TER-C5506-355

loads will be handled over the , spent fuel pool and that measures exist.to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core ce spent fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the report consist of ~

Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The'two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:

1. Heavy load technical specifications

2. Special, review for heavy loads handled over the core.

Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection measures are contained'in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

2.2.1 Technical Specifications [ Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (1)]

" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to ' Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,

' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BNR's, to prohibit

, handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementa-tion of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1,[of NUREG-0612]."

o. Evaluation l

l The Licensee stated that plant technical specifications will be modified I to prohibit handling of heavy loads over irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool until measures are taken to satisfy the general guidelines of NUREG-0612.

b. Evaluation and Conclusions l

l. Requirements of this interim measure are satisfied based on the j Licensee's commitment to implement the required technical specification.

l 2.2.2 Administrative Controls [ Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, l . NUREG-0612, Sections 5.3 (2)-5.3 (5) ]

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" Procedural or administrative measures (including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection]...

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TER-C5506-355 can be accomplished in a short, time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of <

Section 5.1 [of NUREG-0612) ." .

a. Evaluation The specific requirements for load handling administrative controls are contained in NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1, Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6. The Licensee's compliance with these guidelines has been evaluated in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7, respectively, of this report.

b. Conclusions and Recommendations Conclusions and recommendations concerning the Licensee's compliance eith these administrative controls are contained in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1".4', and 2.1.7 of this report.

2.2.3 Special Review for Heavy Loads Handled Over the Core (Interia Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3(6)]

. "...special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and -

personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools . This.special review should include the follow *.ng for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation

. of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and .

conciser (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operation, and content of procedures."

c. Evaluation and Conclusion -

It is apparent from the Licensee's compliance with the general guidelines that necessary reviews have been performed and programs implemented to meet the intent of this interim measure.

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TER-C5506-355

3. CONCLUSION This summary is provided to consolidate the results of the evaluation contained in Section 2 concerning individual NRC staff guidelines into an overall evaluation of heavy load handling at NYPA's James P. FitzPatrick Cuclear Power Plant. Overall conclusions and recommended Licensee actions, where appropriate, are provided with respect to both coetal provisions for load handling (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of the staff recommendations 'for interin. protection (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) .

t 3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR LOAD SANDLING ,

The NRC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for "

handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The intent of these guidelines is twofold. A plant conforming to these guidelines will have developed and implemented, through procedures and operator training, safe load 4

'. travel paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. A plant conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system. As detailed in Section 2, it has been found that load handling operations st FitzPatrick Euclear Power Plant can be expected to be conducted in a highly reliable manner consistent with the staff's objectives as expressed in these guidelines.

3.2 INTERIM PROTECTION The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) certain measures that should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of

.the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is complete. Specified measures include: the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit

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TER-C5506-355 the handling of heavy loads ovec fuel in the storage pools compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure. The evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant complies with the staff's measures for interim protection.

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4. REFERENCES i 1. NRC

" Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" July 1980' NUREG-0612

2. V. Stello, Jr'. (NBC)

Letter to all Licensees.

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel.

May 17, 1978

3. D. G. Eisenhut (NBC)

Letter to all operating reactors.

Subject:

Contro). of Heavy Loads .

December 22, 1980'. ,

4. J. P. Bayne (PASNY)

Letter to T. A. Ippolito (NBC).

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads October 15, 1981 5- J. P. Bayne (NYPA)

Letter to D. B. Vassallo (NRC',

Subject:

Control of Beavy Te P2 s

• June 2, 1983

6. J. P. Bayne (NYPA)

Letter to D. B. Vassallo (NRC) "

Subject:

Control of Heavy Lrads January 31, 1984

7. J; P. Bayne (NYPA)

Letter to D. B. Vassallo (NBC) -

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads October 5, 1984

4. Telephone Conference Call between NYPA, NRC and FRC representatives May 30, 1984 S. American National Standards Institute

" Overhead and Gantry Cranes" -

- New York 1976 ANSI B30.2-1976

10. American National Standards Institute

" Standard for Lif ting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" ANSI N14.6-1978

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11. American National Standards Institute

" Slings" -

ANSI B30.9-1971

12. Crane Manufacturves Association of America

" Specifications for Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes" Pittsburgh, PA CMAA-70

13. C. A. McNeill, Jr. (NYPA)

Letter to D. B. Vassallo (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads December 13, 1984 t

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