ML12181A303

Fenoc'S Answer Opposing Intervenors' Motion to Amend and Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking)

ML12181A303
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	06/29/2012
From:	Burdick S, Jenkins D, Matthews T, Sutton K FirstEnergy Corp, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co, Morgan, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
RAS 22863, 50-346-LR, ASLBP 11-907-01-LR-BD01
Download: ML12181A303 (93)

Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-346-LR FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY )

)

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) ) June 29, 2012

)

FENOCS ANSWER OPPOSING INTERVENORS MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT PROPOSED CONTENTION NO. 5 (SHIELD BUILDING CRACKING)

Timothy P. Matthews Kathryn M. Sutton Stephen J. Burdick Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 Phone: 202-739-5527 E-mail: tmatthews@morganlewis.com David W. Jenkins Senior Corporate Counsel II FirstEnergy Service Company Mailstop: A-GO-15 76 South Main Street Akron, OH 44308 Phone: 330-384-5037 E-mail: djenkins@firstenergycorp.com COUNSEL FOR FENOC

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 2 A. Procedural Background .......................................................................................... 2 B. Davis-Besse Shield Building Cracking.................................................................. 4 III. LEGAL STANDARDS ................................................................................................... 10 A. Timeliness ............................................................................................................ 11 B. Contention Admissibility ..................................................................................... 12 IV. THE SUPPLEMENTED CONTENTION SHOULD BE REJECTED ........................... 14 A. The Supplemented Contention Must Be Summarily Dismissed Because Intervenors Did Not Consult with FENOC .......................................................... 14 B. Parts of the Supplemented Contention Should Be Rejected as Untimely ........... 15 C. Intervenors Supplemented Contention Does Not Satisfy the NRCs Contention Admissibility Requirements in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1) ................... 20

1. Intervenors Claims that FENOCs Credibility Is Increasingly Suspect Do Not Support an Admissible Contention ................................ 20

2. Intervenors Argument that FENOC Does Not Have a Plan to Address Shield Building Aging Does Not Support an Admissible Contention ................................................................................................ 26

3. Intervenors Argument that FENOCs Root Cause Evaluation Is Incomplete Does Not Support an Admissible Contention ....................... 30

4. Intervenors Argument that FENOCs Root Cause Evaluation Does Not Consider Other Damage to the Shield Building Exterior Does Not Support an Admissible Contention ................................................... 33

5. Intervenors Argument that FENOCs Root Cause Evaluation Does Not Consider Exposure of the Shield Building Interior to the Elements Does Not Support an Admissible Contention .......................... 35

6. Intervenors Argument that FENOC Has Not Sufficiently Investigated the Laminar Cracking Does Not Support an Admissible Contention............................................................................. 37 D. The Supplemented Contention Does Not Cure the Original Contentions Deficiencies.......................................................................................................... 38 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 41

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-346-LR FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY )

)

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) ) June 29, 2012

)

FENOCS ANSWER OPPOSING INTERVENORS MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT PROPOSED CONTENTION NO. 5 (SHIELD BUILDING CRACKING)

I. INTRODUCTION On January 10, 2012, Beyond Nuclear, Citizens Environment Alliance of Southwestern Ontario, Dont Waste Michigan, and the Green Party of Ohio (Intervenors) moved for the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) to admit proposed Contention 5 (Original Contention) regarding Shield Building cracking.1 On June 4, 2012, Intervenors filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking)

(Supplemented Contention).2 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) files this timely Answer in opposition to the Supplemented Contention, pursuant to 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.309(h)(1) and the Boards June 15, 2011 Initial Scheduling Order (ISO).3 As demonstrated below, the Board should deny the Supplemented Contention for several reasons. Specifically, the Supplemented Contention is procedurally-defective because Intervenors failed to consult with FENOC as required by 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(b). Additionally, 1

Motion for Admission of Contention No. 5 on Shield Building Cracking (Jan. 10, 2012).

2 Intervenors Motion to Amend and Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking) (June 4, 2012). Although this document filed by Intervenors is considered both a motion and a supplemented contention, for convenience this document is referred to herein just as the Supplemented Contention.

3 Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(h)(1), an applicant may file an answer to a proffered contention within 25 days of the service of the contention. The ISO in this proceeding reiterates that FENOC may file an answer to a motion for leave to file a new contention and a proposed contention within 25 days after service of those pleadings.

Initial Scheduling Order, at 13 (June 15, 2011) (unpublished).

parts of the Supplemented Contention are untimely under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2) because, contrary to the ISO, Intervenors filed them more than 60 days after the public availability of the information upon which these arguments are based. Moreover, Intervenors have failed to discuss, much less demonstrate, good cause under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1) justifying the late filing of these arguments.

In addition, and as fully explained below, the Supplemented Contention fails to satisfy the contention admissibility requirements specified in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1) as the claims it raises fall outside the scope of this proceeding; fail to challenge any specific sections of the Davis-Besse License Renewal Application (LRA), including the Environmental Report; and lack adequate factual support. Perhaps the most glaring deficiency in the Supplemented Contention is its failure to directly challenge the new Shield Building Aging Management Program (AMP) submitted by FENOC to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in response to the newly-identified laminar cracking. This failure to challenge the very means by which FENOC addresses the Shield Building cracking for purposes of license renewal renders the Supplemented Contention fatally defective. As a result, the Supplemented Contention not only consistently fails to cure the deficiencies in the Original Contention, which remains mooted by the Shield Building AMP, but itself is defective and should be rejected in its entirety by the Board.

II. BACKGROUND A. Procedural Background Davis-Besse is located in Ohio, and generates 908 MWe of baseload electrical power.4 The current operating license for Davis-Besse expires at midnight on April 22, 2017.5 On 4

Applicants Environmental Report, Operating License Renewal Stage, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, at 3.1-1, 7.2-1 (Aug. 2010) (ER), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML102450568.

5 Id. at 1.1-1, available at ADAMS Accession No. ML102450563.

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August 27, 2010, FENOC submitted its LRA,6 requesting that the NRC renew the Davis-Besse operating license for an additional 20 years (i.e., until April 22, 2037).7 The NRC accepted the LRA for docketing, and published a Hearing Notice in the Federal Register on October 25, 2010.8 On December 27 and 28, 2010, Intervenors filed a Request for Public Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene. In LBP-11-13, dated April 26, 2011, the Board admitted Intervenors as parties to the proceeding and admitted two contentions regarding alternative energy sources and Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMAs).9 FENOC appealed that ruling to the Commission.10 Subsequently, on April 14, 2011, Intervenors submitted a request to suspend the proceeding based on publication of the Fukushima Task Force Report.11 This request was rejected by the Commission on September 9, 2011.12 On August 11 and 12, 2011, Intervenors submitted a motion and a proposed contention also related to the Fukushima Task Force Report.13 The Board rejected that proposed contention on November 23, 2011.14 6

Notice of Acceptance for Docketing of the Application, Notice of Opportunity for Hearing for Facility Operating License No. NPF-003 for an Additional 20-Year Period; FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,528, 65,529 (Oct. 25, 2010) (Hearing Notice).

7 ER at 1.1-1.

8 See Hearing Notice, 75 Fed. Reg. at 65,528-529.

9 See FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-11-13, 73 NRC __,

slip op. at 64-65 (Apr. 26, 2011).

10 FirstEnergys Brief in Support of the Appeal of LBP-11-13 (May 6, 2011).

11 Emergency Petition to Suspend All Pending Reactor Licensing Decisions and Related Rulemaking Decisions Pending Investigation of Lessons Learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident (dated Apr. 14-18, 2011, served Apr. 14, 2011); Amendment and Errata to Emergency Petition to Suspend All Pending Reactor Licensing Decisions and Related Rulemaking Decisions Pending Investigation of Lessons Learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident (Apr. 21, 2011); Letter from T. Lodge, Counsel for Intervenors, to the NRC (dated Mar. 21, 2011, served Apr. 21, 2011).

12 See Union Elec. Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 2), CLI-11-05, 74 NRC __, slip op. at 3, 41-42 (Sept. 9, 2011).

13 Motion to Admit New Contention Regarding the Safety and Environmental Implications of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Task Force Report on the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (Aug. 11, 2011); Contention in Support of Motion to Admit New Contention Regarding the Safety and Environmental Implications of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Task Force Report on the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (Aug. 12, 2011).

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In CLI-12-08, dated March 27, 2012, the Commission ruled on FENOCs appeal.15 The Commission rejected the admitted contention regarding alternative energy sources and two of three parts of the admitted SAMA contention.16 The only part of the SAMA contention that remains in this proceeding relates to the MAAP code.17 B. Davis-Besse Shield Building Cracking On October 1, 2011, Davis-Besse shut down for a scheduled outage to complete maintenance activities.18 During hydro-demolition activities on October 10, 2011, workers identified indications of laminar cracking below the exterior surface of the Shield Building.19 As stated in the LRA:

The Shield Building is a concrete structure surrounding the Containment Vessel. It is designed to provide biological shielding during normal operation and from hypothetical accident conditions. The building provides a means for collection and filtration of fission product leakage from the Containment Vessel following a hypothetical accident through the Emergency Ventilation System, an engineered safety feature designed for that purpose. In addition, the building provides environmental protection for the Containment Vessel from adverse atmospheric conditions and external missiles.20 14 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-11-34, 74 NRC __, slip op. at 2, 18 (Nov. 23, 2011).

15 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-12-08, 75 NRC __, slip op. at 1-2 (Mar. 27, 2012).

16 Id. at 5-34.

17 Id. at 20-21.

18 Additional details on the background of the Shield Building cracking are provided in FENOCs February 6, 2012 Answer opposing the Original Contention. See FENOCs Answer Opposing Intervenors Motion for Admission of Contention No. 5 on Shield Building Cracking, at 4-7 (Feb. 6, 2012) (FENOCs Original Contention Answer).

19 See Letter from R. Seeholzer, FirstEnergy, to the Investment Community, at 1 (Oct. 31, 2011) (Investment Community Letter) (provided as Attachment 1 to FENOCs Original Contention Answer); see also FENOC Presentation Slides, NRC Public Meeting, at 19 (Jan. 5, 2012) (FENOC Slides) (provided as Attachment 2 to FENOCs Original Contention Answer).

20 License Renewal Application, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, at 2.4-3 (Aug. 2010), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML102450572. The Shield Building is a reinforced concrete structure with 2 1/2-foot thick walls that surrounds the 1 1/2-inch carbon steel containment vessel. Investment Community Letter at 1; FENOC Slides at 15. There is a 4 1/2-foot annulus (i.e., air space) between the Shield Building walls and the containment vessel. Investment Community Letter at 1; FENOC Slides at 15. The outer surface of the Shield 4

Upon the initial identification of the cracking, FENOC promptly notified the NRC Resident Inspector, placed the issue into the Corrective Action Program, and mobilized a team of experts to investigate,21 including extensive visual inspections, electronic testing, and concrete sampling of the buildings walls in addition to its architectural elements.22 FENOCs assessments demonstrated that the Shield Building is structurally sound, meets all applicable strength requirements, and is capable of performing its safety functions.23 The cracking is tight and located outside of the outer reinforcing rebar mat, generally in the flute shoulder regions, top 20 feet of the Shield Building wall, and in small regions adjacent to the Main Steam Line penetrations.24 On December 2, 2011, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter that documented FENOCs commitments to provide its Root Cause Evaluation to the NRC and to perform future examinations of the cracking.25 Following issuance of the Confirmatory Action Letter, Davis-Besse restarted on December 5, 2011.

On January 10, 2012, Intervenors filed a motion for admission of the Original Contention challenging various purported environmental and aging management issues associated with newly-identified laminar cracking of the Davis-Besse Shield Building.26 Intervenors claimed Building includes flute shoulders, which are non-structural, architectural elements on the façade of the Shield Building. FENOC Slides at 16-17; see also Investment Community Letter at 1.

21 FENOC Slides at 20.

22 Id. at 22-29.

23 Id. at 31-38.

24 Id. at 30; see also Investment Community Letter at 1-2.

25 Letter from NRC to FENOC, Confirmatory Action Letter - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, at 1-3 (Dec. 2, 2011) (provided as Attachment 4 to FENOCs Original Contention Answer).

26 See generally Original Contention.

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therein that the cracking should be considered as an aging feature at Davis-Besse, which requires explicit plans for remediation and management.27 Both FENOC and the NRC Staff filed answers to the Original Contention on February 6, 2012.28 FENOCs Original Contention Answer demonstrated that the Original Contention is untimely and does not satisfy the contention admissibility requirements of Section 2.309(f), and therefore should be rejected in its entirety.29 The Staffs Original Contention Answer also concluded that much of the Original Contention is inadmissible, but did not object to admission of a limited portion of the Original Contention, stating: To the extent Contention 5 identifies FENOCs failure to describe how the Structures AMP will account for the shield building cracks during the period of extended operation, Contention 5 is an admissible contention of omission.30 Intervenors filed a Combined Reply on February 13, 2012.31 The parties subsequently filed pleadings related to FENOCs motion to strike portions of the Reply32 and Intervenors motion to amend the Original Contention based on a February 8, 2012, press release and a January 31, 2012, NRC inspection report.33 27 Id. at 2.

28 FENOCs Original Contention Answer; NRC Staffs Answer to Motion to Admit New Contention Regarding the Safety Implications of Newly Discovered Shield Building Cracking (Feb. 6, 2012) (Staffs Original Contention Answer).

29 See FENOCs Original Contention Answer at 1-3.

30 Staffs Original Contention Answer at 1-2, 16.

31 Intervenors Combined Reply in Support of Motion for Admission of Contention No. 5 (Feb. 13, 2012).

32 FENOCs Motion to Strike Portions of Intervenors Reply for the Proposed Contention 5 on Shield Building Cracking (Feb. 23, 2012) (FENOCs Motion to Strike); Intervenors Answer to FENOC Motion to Strike (Feb. 27, 2012); NRC Staffs Answer to FENOCs Motion to Strike Portions of Intervenors Reply for the Proposed Contention 5 on Shield Building Cracking (Mar. 5, 2012). This motion remains pending before the Board.

33 Intervenors Motion to Amend Motion for Admission of Contention No. 5 (Feb. 27, 2012); FENOCs Answer Opposing Intervenors Motion to Amend Proposed Contention 5 on Shield Building Cracking (Mar. 8, 2012); NRC Staffs Answer to Intervenors Motion to Amend Motion for Admission of Contention No. 5 (Mar. 8, 2012). This motion remains pending before the Board.

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In the interim, on February 29, 2012, FENOC notified the Board and Parties to this proceeding that it had submitted the Root Cause Evaluation for Shield Building cracking to the NRC on February 27, 2012.34 The Root Cause Evaluation concludes that the direct cause of the laminar cracking is the integrated affect of moisture content, wind speed, temperature, and duration from the blizzard of 1978, and the root cause was due to the design specification for construction of the shield building (C-038) that did not specify application of an exterior sealant from moisture.35 Of note, the Root Cause Evaluation concludes that [t]here was no evidence of typical concrete time-dependent aging failure modes.36 Stated more simply, the Root Cause Evaluation conclusively demonstrates that the laminar cracking phenomenon is not the result of aging effects.37 On April 5, 2012, FENOC notified the Board38 of a letter it had submitted to the NRC to (1) respond to RAI B.2.39-13, which was issued to FENOC on December 27, 2011, related to the Shield Building cracking (RAI Response)39; and (2) revise the Davis-Besse LRA to include, among other things, a new AMP in Section B.2.43, Shield Building Monitoring Program (Shield Building AMP).40 34 See Submittal of Shield Building Root Cause Evaluation (Feb 27, 2012) (Root Cause Evaluation) (submitted as an enclosure to Letter from T. Matthews, FENOC Counsel, to Board, Notification of Filing Related to Proposed Shield Building Cracking Contention (Feb. 29, 2012)).

35 Id. at 59.

36 Id. at 6.

37 See id. at 25 (There was no evidence of typical concrete time-dependent aging failure modes such as chemical attack including reinforcing steel corrosion, physical attack, chronic freeze/thaw, and vibration /fatigue.).

38 Letter from T. Matthews, FENOC Counsel, to the Board, Notification of Filing Related to Proposed Shield Building Cracking Contention (Apr. 5, 2012) (Board Notification for RAI Response).

39 See Letter from D. Imlay, FENOC, to NRC, Reply to Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, License Renewal Application (TAC No. ME4640) and License Renewal Application Amendment No. 25, Attachment L-12-028 (Apr. 5, 2012) (RAI Response)

(provided as an enclosure to the Board Notification for RAI Response).

40 Amendment No. 25 to the DBNPS License Renewal Application, at 10-15 (Apr. 5, 2012) (Shield Building AMP) (provided as an enclosure to the RAI Response).

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The FENOC RAI Response responds to four NRC Staff requests related to Shield Building laminar cracking: (1) summarize the shield building degradation, the root cause, and the expected corrective actions; (2) explain how the cracking experience impacts the Shield Buildings ability to perform its intended functions during the period of extended operation; (3) explain how the cracking experience will be incorporated into the existing Structures Monitoring AMP, and whether this existing AMP will be sufficient to manage aging of the Shield Building; and (4) identify any planned changes to the LRA based on the Shield Building cracking.41 Of note, the RAI Response reiterates the Root Cause Evaluation conclusion that there are no direct aging effects associated with the identified laminar cracks.42 Nonetheless, the RAI Response explains that the Shield Building AMP is provided to periodically inspect the structure to confirm that there are no changes in the nature of the identified laminar cracks.43 The Shield Building AMP is a plant-specific prevention and condition monitoring program for Davis-Besse that supplements the Structures Monitoring AMP to ensure that the intended functions of the Shield Building are maintained during the period of extended operation.44 The Shield Building AMP consists of inspections, testing, and chemical analyses of the Shield Building concrete and reinforcing steel to monitor the newly-identified laminar cracking, change of material properties, and loss of material.45 The Shield Building AMP also will inspect or test the Shield Building exterior concrete sealant or coating for evidence of loss of its effectiveness.46 The AMP concludes: Implementation of the Shield Building Monitoring 41 RAI Response at 1-2.

42 Id. at 5.

43 Id.

44 Shield Building AMP at 10.

45 Id.

46 Id.

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Program will provide reasonable assurance that the existing environmental conditions will not cause aging effects that could result in a loss of component intended function.47 Based on the new Shield Building AMP, FENOC filed an unopposed motion to supplement its Original Contention Answer.48 As explained in that motion, the new AMP moots both: (1) the Original Contentions challenges to whether FENOC specifically addressed aging management of the newly-identified Shield Building laminar cracking; and (2) the alternative contention of omission generously postulated by the NRC Staff.49 The Board granted FENOCs motion to supplement FENOCs Original Contention Answer.50 Thereafter, on May 17, 2012, FENOC notified the Board and Parties to this proceeding that it had submitted Revision 1 of the Root Cause Evaluation to the NRC on May 16, 2012.51 The Revised Root Cause Evaluation includes additional clarifying information in response to observations made during a recent NRC Staff inspection regarding the evaluation.52 For example, the Revised Root Cause Evaluation provided additional background information regarding the lack of a protective sealant in the Shield Building design.53 The revisions did not invalidate the methodology, assessment and analysis, or conclusions of the evaluation.54 Intervenors subsequently filed their Supplemented Contention on June 4, 2012, to which this Answer responds.

47 Id. at 15.

48 FENOCs Unopposed Motion for Leave to Supplement Its Answer to the Proposed Shield Building Cracking Contention (Apr. 16, 2012) (FENOC Supplemental Answer).

49 Id. at 6-9.

50 Order (Granting FENOCs Unopposed Motion for Leave to Supplement Its Answer) at 3 (Apr. 17, 2012)

(unpublished). Neither Intervenors nor Staff responded to the motion to supplement.

51 See Submittal of Revision 1 of Shield Building Root Cause Evaluation (May 16, 2012) (Revised Root Cause Evaluation) (submitted as an enclosure to Letter from T. Matthews, FENOC Counsel, to Board, Notification of Filing Related to Proposed Shield Building Cracking Contention (May 17, 2012)).

52 See Revised Root Cause Evaluation at 5-7.

53 See id.

54 See id. at 5.

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Finally, on June 21, 2012, following submission of the Supplemented Contention, the NRC Staff issued an Inspection Report describing its review of FENOCs Root Cause Evaluation and the associated corrective actions.55 A team of NRC regional inspectors conducted the review over the course of a 5-month period.56 Regarding causes, the NRC Inspection Report states that FENOC established a sufficient basis for the causes of the shield building laminar cracking related to: the environmental factors associated with the 1978 blizzard, the lack of an exterior moisture barrier, and the structural design elements of the shield building.57 Regarding corrective actions, the NRC Inspection Report states: Overall, the team concluded that your corrective and preventative actions for the causes of the shield building laminar cracking, if adequately implemented, would prevent recurrence, and provide reasonable assurance for maintaining the shield building safety functions.58 III. LEGAL STANDARDS As discussed below, Intervenors must satisfy the requirements in: (1) 10 C.F.R.

§§ 2.309(f)(2) and (c) governing timeliness of late-filed contentions; and (2) 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.309(f)(1) to demonstrate contention admissibility. Failure to satisfy any of these requirements compels the rejection of the Supplemented Contention.59 55 Inspection Report 05000346/2012009, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - Inspection to Evaluate the Root Cause Evaluation and Corrective Actions for Cracking in the Reinforced Concrete Shield Building of the Containment System (June 21, 2012) (NRC Inspection Report), available at ADAMS Accession No. ML12173A023 (provided as FENOC Attachment 1).

56 Id., Enclosure, at 1.

57 Id. at 1.

58 Id. at 2.

59 See, e.g., Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-12-15, 75 NRC __, slip op. at 6-7 (June 7, 2012) (stating that contentions must meet the strict contention standards under 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.309(f), including the admissibility and timeliness standards); see also ISO at 12.

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A. Timeliness Pursuant to the Hearing Notice and 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(b)(3), the deadline for timely petitions to intervene in this proceeding expired on December 27, 2010, over a year and a half ago. Therefore, the Supplemented Contention must satisfy 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2) and 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.309(c), which govern nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions.60 Intervenors bear the burden of successfully addressing the stringent late-filing criteria.61 Under the Boards ISO,62 a new or amended contention must meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(i) through (iii), which provide that a petitioner may submit a new or amended contention only with leave of the presiding officer upon a showing that:

(i) The information upon which the amended or new contention is based was not previously available; (ii) The information upon which the amended or new contention is based is materially different than information previously available; and (iii) The amended or new contention has been submitted in a timely fashion based on the availability of the subsequent information.

The Board specified a definitive period for determining timeliness. The ISO provides that a motion and proposed new contention shall be deemed timely under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(iii) if it is filed within sixty (60) days of the date when the material information on 60 The Commission has indicated that for new contentions filed by an admitted party, the timeliness standard is 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2), not 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c). See Paina Hawaii, LLC (Materials License Application),

CLI-10-18, 72 NRC 56, 86 n.171 (2010) (discussing the applicability of Section 2.309(f)(2) versus Section 2.309(c), and stating: To be clear, in the circumstances presented here, where [the intervenor] was admitted to this case as a party at the time it filed [the new contention], consideration of the contentions admissibility is governed by the provisions of § 2.309(f)(2), as well as the general contention admissibility requirements of § 2.309(f)(1).). Therefore, because the Supplemented Contention does not meet the timeliness requirements of Section 2.309(f)(2), the analysis should end. To be conservative and consistent with the ISO, however, FENOC also evaluates the timeliness requirements of Section 2.309(c).

61 AmerGen Energy Co., LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-09-7, 69 NRC 235, 260-61 (2009); see also Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, slip op. at 13 (At the threshold contention admission stage, the burden for providing support for a contention is on the petitioner.); Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC (Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-11-02, 73 NRC __, slip op. at 5 & n.19 (Mar. 10, 2011).

62 See ISO at 12.

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which it is based first becomes available.63 The ISO further states that if a motion and amended contention are filed after the 60 day time period, then they shall be deemed nontimely under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c).64 Section 2.309(c) sets forth an eight-factor balancing test for nontimely filings.65 The burden is on Intervenors to demonstrate that a balancing of these factors weighs in favor of granting the petition.66 The eight factors in Section 2.309(c)(1) are not of equal importance.

The first factor, whether good cause exists for the failure to file on time, is entitled to the most weight.67 B. Contention Admissibility In addition to satisfying the late-filing criteria set forth above, a newly-proposed contention also must meet the fundamental admissibility requirements set forth in 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.309(f)(1)(i) to (vi) applicable to all contentions.68 Specifically, under 10 C.F.R.

63 Id. (emphasis added). This Board has strictly interpreted timeliness requirements that are based on information availability, as exhibited in its January 10, 2012 Order. See Memorandum and Order (Denying Motion to Dismiss Contention 1), at 3-7 (Jan. 10, 2012) (denying a Motion to Dismiss because it was submitted more than 10 days after the event triggering the motion).

64 ISO at 12.

65 These factors are: (i) Good cause, if any, for the failure to file on time; (ii) The nature of the requestors/petitioners right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (iii) The nature and extent of the requestors/petitioners property, financial or other interest in the proceeding; (iv) The possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the requestors/petitioners interest; (v) The availability of other means whereby the requestors/petitioners interest will be protected; (vi) The extent to which the requestors/petitioners interests will be represented by existing parties; (vii) The extent to which the requestors/petitioners participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding; and (viii) The extent to which the requestors/petitioners participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record.

66 Tex. Utils. Elec. Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Elec. Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-88-12, 28 NRC 605, 609 (1988).

67 Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, slip op. at 25 n.96 (The standard for new or amended contentions involves a balancing of eight factors set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309. The factor given the most weight is whether there is good cause for the failure to file on time.); see also Dominion Nuclear Conn., Inc. (Millstone Power Station, Unit 3),

CLI-09-5, 69 NRC 115, 125-26 (2009).

68 See Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, slip op. at 6-7 (explaining that late-filed contentions must meet the standards under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f), including the admissibility factors in Section 2.309(f)(1) and the timeliness factors in Section 2.309(f)(2)). These requirements are discussed in detail in FENOCs January 21, 2011 answer opposing Intervenors petition to intervene.

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§ 2.309(f)(1), Intervenors must set forth with particularity the contentions sought to be raised.

The regulation specifies that each contention must:

(1) provide a specific statement of the legal or factual issue sought to be raised; (2) provide a brief explanation of the basis for the contention; (3) demonstrate that the issue raised is within the scope of the proceeding; (4) demonstrate that the issue raised is material to the findings the NRC must make to support the action that is involved in the proceeding; (5) provide a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinions, including references to specific sources and documents that support the petitioners position and upon which the petitioner intends to rely; and (6) provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with regard to a material issue of law or fact.69 As the Commission recently explained in several proceedings, including this one, failure to comply with any one of the six admissibility criteria is grounds for rejection.70 The Commission explained that its strict contention rule is designed to avoid resource-intensive hearings where petitioners have not provided sufficient support for their technical claims, and do not demonstrate a potential to meaningfully participate and inform a hearing.71 The NRC revised the admissibility rules in 1989 to prevent the admission of poorly defined or supported contentions, or those based on little more than speculation.72 The Commission further 69 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(i)-(vi).

70 See Davis-Besse, CLI-12-08, slip op. at 3 (stating that proposed contentions must satisfy all six of the

[admissibility] requirements); see also Final Rule, Changes to Adjudicatory Process, 69 Fed. Reg. 2182, 2221 (Jan. 14, 2004).

71 Davis-Besse, CLI-12-08, slip op. at 31; Dominion Nuclear Conn., Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-01-24, 54 NRC 349, 358 (2001) (explaining that the Commissions rules on contention admissibility are strict by design).

72 Davis-Besse, CLI-12-08, slip op. at 3-4 (citations omitted) (quoting Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), CLI-99-11, 49 NRC 328, 334 (1999)).

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explained that it properly reserve[s] our hearing process for genuine, material controversies between knowledgeable litigants.73 IV. THE SUPPLEMENTED CONTENTION SHOULD BE REJECTED A. The Supplemented Contention Must Be Summarily Dismissed Because Intervenors Did Not Consult with FENOC The Supplemented Contention is procedurally-defective because Intervenors failed to adequately consult with FENOC before filing it. Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(b), [a] motion must be rejected if it does not include a certification by the attorney or representative of the moving party that the movant has made a sincere effort to contact other parties in the proceeding and resolve the issue(s) raised in the motion, and that the movants efforts to resolve the issue(s) have been unsuccessful.74 In this proceeding, the Board itself has mandated in ISO Section G.1 that motions will be summarily rejected if they do not include the certification specified in 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.323(b) that a sincere attempt to resolve the issues has been made.75 Contrary to the NRC regulations and the Boards ISO, Intervenors made no attempt to contact FENOC or its counsel and resolve the issues raised in the Supplemented Contention.76 Because Intervenors did not consult with FENOC and the Supplemented Contention does not include the mandatory certification, it must be rejected.77 73 Davis-Besse, CLI-12-08, slip op. at 4 (quoting Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), CLI-03-14, 58 NRC 207, 219 (2003)).

74 Emphasis added.

75 Emphasis added.

76 Although FENOC was aware that Intervenors requested that the Board vacate and reschedule oral argument on the Original Contention because Intervenors planned to amend the Original Contention based on the Shield Building AMP, it was still incumbent on Intervenors to consult with FENOC before filing the Supplemented Contention. Any prior communications occurred weeks before the Supplemented Contention and did not in any way address the arguments that Intervenors planned to raise in the Supplemented Contention or the relief sought therein. These earlier activities do not represent a sincere effort to resolve the issues raised by the motion. The Parties could not resolve any issues if they did not discuss them and if FENOC and the NRC Staff were not even aware of the issues.

77 The Commission and licensing boards have supported this outcome in the past. See, e.g., Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 2 and 3), CLI-08-29, 68 NRC 899, 902 n.12 (2008) (rejecting a motion for failing to comply with consultation requirements of Section 2.323(b)); see also Entergy Nuclear 14

This is not Intervenors first failure to comply with the Section 2.323(b) consultation requirements. Specifically, Intervenors failed to consult or provide the required certification when they submitted a proposed contention related to the Fukushima accident.78 The Board ruled that the proposed contention was hopelessly flawed and must be denied for failure to consult with FENOC or provide the requisite certification.79 The Board concluded that the proposed contention can therefore be rejected on this ground alone.80 Intervenors have repeated this same fatal deficiency with the Supplemented Contention. Therefore, the Supplemented Contention should be summarily rejected, as required by the NRC regulations, the ISO, and precedent.81 B. Parts of the Supplemented Contention Should Be Rejected as Untimely As discussed above, and acknowledged by Intervenors,82 the Supplemented Contention is subject to the 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2) timeliness requirements. The ISO requires the Supplemented Contention to be filed within sixty (60) days of the date when the material information on which it is based first becomes available in order to satisfy Section 2.309(f)(2)(iii).83 As the Board recently explained in its January 10, 2012 Order, these regulatory requirements are strict by design and must be applied rigorously.84 Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 2 & 3), Order (Denying New York States Motion to Supplement), at 3-5 (June 7, 2012) (unpublished) (denying an intervenors request to supplement the record because the intervenor failed to provide a sufficient Section 2.323(b) consultation).

78 See Davis-Besse, LBP-11-34, slip op. at 12.

79 Id.

80 Id.

81 The NRC Staff also has noted past failures by Intervenors to comply with 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(b). Specifically, the Staff argued that Intervenors February 27, 2012 motion to amend the Original Contention should be rejected because it did not include the required certification and Intervenors consultation under Section 2.323(b) was inadequate. See NRC Staffs Answer to Intervenors Motion to Amend Motion for Admission of Contention No. 5, at 8-9. The Board has not yet ruled on this motion to amend.

82 Supplemented Contention at 13.

83 ISO at 12.

84 Memorandum and Order (Denying Motion to Dismiss Contention 1), at 5 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

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The Supplemented Contention was filed on June 4, 2012. Therefore, only information that first became available within 60 days before June 4, 2012 (i.e., on or after April 5, 2012) can support a timely Supplemented Contention under Section 2.309(f)(2). This includes the April 5, 2012 RAI Response, April 5, 2012 Shield Building AMP, and any new or materially-different information in the May 16, 2012 Revised Root Cause Evaluation.85 This does not include information available before April 5, 2012, including the February 27, 2012 Root Cause Evaluation.86 Intervenors incorrectly attempt to base the timeliness of the Supplemented Contention entirely on the timing of submission of the RAI Response, even though many of their arguments are based on earlier information, such as the original Root Cause Evaluation.87 As a result, many of Intervenors arguments in the Supplemented Contention are untimely, as they are based on information pre-dating April 5, 2012. The untimely information, presented in the order it appears in the Supplemented Contention, follows:

• Supplemented Contention Section B.1 - Intervenors reference an engineering paper on water penetration into concrete through cracks and question the Root Cause Evaluation conclusion that the direct cause of the laminar cracking was the 1978 blizzard.88 The engineering paper is dated 2008 and the Root Cause Evaluation conclusion regarding the 1978 blizzard was provided in the original Root Cause Evaluation dated February 27, 2012.89

• Supplemented Contention Section B.2 - Intervenors quote the Root Cause Evaluations direct cause regarding the 1978 blizzard and the plan to add a protective sealant to the Shield Building, and conclude that the application of the sealant comes 40 years 85 See 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2).

86 The issuance of the Revised Root Cause Evaluation on May 16, 2012 does not reopen the timeliness of identical information in the February 27, 2012 Root Cause Evaluation. The unchanged information in the Revised Root Cause Evaluation is not new or materially different than the identical information in the Root Cause Evaluation, contrary to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(i) and (ii). The Commission has reiterated that the publication of a new document, standing alone, does not meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2) unless the facts in that document are new and materially-different from what was previously available. See, e.g., Vt. Yankee, CLI-11-02, slip op. at 13; see also N. States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-10-27, 72 NRC __, slip op. at 13-18 (Sept. 30, 2010).

87 See Supplemented Contention at 13-14.

88 Id. at 6.

89 Id.; Root Cause Evaluation at 59.

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overdue.90 Additionally, Intervenors provide various quotations from the Root Cause Evaluation and state that examination of the entire Shield Building has not taken place.91 These arguments rely entirely on information from the original February 27, 2012 Root Cause Evaluation.92

• Supplemented Contention Section B.3 - Intervenors question the extent of the investigation of the laminar cracking conducted to date, including alleged failure to examine surface cracking and one of the flute shoulders.93 These arguments rely entirely on information from the February 27, 2012 Root Cause Evaluation.94

• Supplemented Contention Section B.4 - Intervenors refer to FENOCs August 2011 response to an NRC RAI regarding concrete spalling identified earlier and compares it to the Root Cause Evaluation discussion of a lack of exterior sealant for the Shield Building.95 The RAI response is from August 2011 and the Root Cause Evaluation is from February 27, 2012.

• Supplemented Contention Section B.5 - Intervenors discuss the construction of the Shield Building, replacement of the reactor vessel head, and ground water infiltration with respect to whether the interior of the Shield Building may be problematic.96 This information was based on RAI responses dated May 24, 2011 and the Root Cause Evaluation dated February 27, 2012.97

• Supplemented Contention Section B.6 - Intervenors refer to information regarding design-related failure modes from 40 years ago, and the need to completely investigate the Shield Building laminar cracking.98 These arguments rely entirely on information from the February 27, 2012 Root Cause Evaluation.99 All of the information above was more than 60 days old at the time Intervenors filed the Supplemented Contention. This encompasses the information in part of Sections B.1, B.2, and B.4 and all of Sections B.3, B.5, and B.6. Section 2.309(f)(2) requires that an amended contention be based on previously unavailable and materially-different information. Therefore, 90 Supplemented Contention at 6-7.

91 Id. at 7-8.

92 See id. at 6-8; Root Cause Evaluation at 7, 41, 54, 57.

93 Supplemented Contention at 9.

94 See id.; Root Cause Evaluation at 18, 26.

95 Supplemented Contention at 10.

96 Id. at 11-12.

97 See id.

98 Id. at 12-13.

99 See id.; Root Cause Evaluation at 24, 46-47, 54, 56.

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the arguments in the Supplemented Contention that are based on the above information should be rejected as untimely under Section 2.309(f)(2) and the ISO, and cannot support an admissible contention.100 As a result, these arguments are considered nontimely, and they must satisfy the late-filing criteria in Section 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii).101 Yet again, Intervenors entirely ignore the requirements of Section 2.309(c), even though these requirements are identified in the ISO and acknowledged by Intervenors in the Original Contention.102 This failure to address the requirements of Section 2.309(c) is alone a sufficient basis to reject the late arguments, as the Commission has affirmed rejection of late-filed contentions for failure to address late-filing criteria.103 Nonetheless, even if the Section 2.309(c)(1) factors are considered, the late arguments should be dismissed as untimely. Intervenors have not demonstrated the necessary good cause under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1)(i) for filing these arguments late. To show good cause, Intervenors must show that they raised these arguments in a timely manner, following the availability of new information.104 The Commission has explained that to demonstrate good 100 See, e.g., Crow Butte Resources, Inc. (North Trend Expansion Project), LBP-08-6, 67 NRC 241, 255-60 (2008)

(considering the timeliness of individual documents under 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.309(c) and (f)(2) to determine whether the documents should be considered with respect to admissibility of a proposed contention), affd in relevant part, CLI-09-12, 69 NRC 535, 549 (2009) (stating that the Commission agrees that a late-filed document that allegedly supports or provides a basis for a proposed contention should be considered under [10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c) and (f)(2)).

101 See supra Section III.A; see also ISO at 12; 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(2) (The requestor/petitioner shall address the factors in paragraphs (c)(1)(i) through (c)(1)(viii) of this section in its nontimely filing.).

102 See FENOCs Original Contention Answer at 17; ISO at 12; Original Contention at 7-8.

103 See, e.g., Millstone, CLI-09-5, 69 NRC at 126 (The Board correctly found that failure to address the requirements [of 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.309(c) and (f)(2)] was reason enough to reject the proposed new contentions.); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-98-25, 48 NRC 325, 347 & n.9 (1998) (Indeed, the Commission has itself summarily dismissed petitioners who failed to address the . . . factors for a late-filed petition.).

104 See Exelon Generation Co. (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-05-19, 62 NRC 134, 162-63 (2005)

(finding that the requirements for a good cause showing under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1)(i) are analogous to the requirements of Sections 2.309(f)(2)(i) (information not previously available) and (f)(2)(iii) (submitted in a 18

cause, a petitioner must show not only that it acted promptly after learning of the new information, but the information itself must be new information, not information already in the public domain.105 Intervenors have provided no explanation for raising these arguments late.

Thus, for the same reasons that Intervenors have not satisfied the timeliness requirements in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2), discussed above, they have not demonstrated good cause under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1)(i).106 Further, Intervenors have made no compelling showing as to the remaining factors to outweigh the lack of good cause.107 The late arguments, if included as part of an admitted contention, would broaden the scope of or delay the current proceeding (factor seven) by raising challenges to the original Root Cause Evaluations evaluation of the Shield Building cracking and the causes identified therein. Furthermore, Intervenors provide no indication that their participation would contribute to the development of a sound record (factor eight).

Contrary to the Commissions requirements, Intervenors have not specified the precise issues they plan to cover, have not identified their prospective witnesses, and have not summarized their proposed testimony.108 Accordingly, the balance of the factors under 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.309(c)(1) demands rejection of the late arguments.109 timely fashion)), review denied, CLI-05-29, 62 NRC 801 (2005), affd sub nom. Envtl. Law & Policy Ctr. v.

NRC, 470 F.3d 676 (2006).

105 Tex. Utils. Elec. Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Elec. Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC at 62, 70 (1992)

(emphasis added).

106 See Clinton ESP, LBP-05-19, 62 NRC at 162-63.

107 Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, slip op. at 26 n.96 (A failure to demonstrate good cause for a late-filed contention requires a compelling showing on the remaining factors.); see also Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241, 244 (1986).

108 See Braidwood, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC at 246.

109 The other factors in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1) are less important and do not outweigh Intervenors failure to demonstrate good cause or meet factors seven and eight. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Indep. Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-08-1, 67 NRC 1, 8 (2008); Tex. Utils. Elec. Co.

(Comanche Peak Steam Elec. Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-4, 37 NRC 156, 165 (1993). Factors two through four speak towards standing; therefore, their applicability is limited here because Intervenors are already parties to this proceeding and are seeking admission of nontimely contentions, rather than nontimely intervention.

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In summary, parts of the Supplemented Contention were filed more than 60 days after the information upon which they are based was available, and Intervenors have not demonstrated good cause for the late filing of these arguments. Therefore, the Board should not consider the untimely information or corresponding arguments when determining the admissibility of the Supplemented Contention. Nonetheless, as discussed in the next section, none of the arguments in the Supplemented Contention, whether timely or untimely, support admission of this proposed contention.

C. Intervenors Supplemented Contention Does Not Satisfy the NRCs Contention Admissibility Requirements in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)

Each of the arguments raised in the Supplemented Contention is addressed below. None of the arguments, separately or collectively, supports admission of the Supplemented Contention.

As such, it should be rejected by the Board.

1. Intervenors Claims that FENOCs Credibility Is Increasingly Suspect Do Not Support an Admissible Contention In Section B.1 of the Supplemented Contention, Intervenorsyet againraise questions about FENOCs integrity, claiming that [a] growing body of facts undermines confidence in management arrangements for the shield building, while public concerns about the physical integrity of the building as a containment structure snowball.110 For many reasons, these claims do not support admission of the Supplemented Contention.

a. Intervenors Claims Are Outside of Scope Intervenors attacks on FENOCs integrity are contrary to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(iii), as they are plainly outside the scope of this proceeding. Intervenors liberally continue to voice unsupported allegations attacking FENOCs credibility, confidence in management, Factors five (availability of other means) and six (interests represented by other parties) are entitled to the least weight. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Indep. Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-8, 51 NRC 146, 154 (2000) (citing Braidwood, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC at 244-45).

110 Supplemented Contention at 2-6.

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FENOCs alleged need to be alternately coddled and pressured for facts and explanations, and a purported history of misleads and reluctance on FENOCs part to be candid with the public.111 This is a continuation of the offensive, baseless allegations that Intervenors have repeatedly raised and were the subject of FENOCs earlier motion to strike now pending before the Board.112 As discussed in FENOCs Original Contention Answer, these claims do not satisfy Section 2.309(f)(1)(iii), and fall outside the scope of license renewal, as demonstrated by the Commissions rejection of similar challenges in the Prairie Island and Diablo Canyon license renewal proceedings.113 The Commission clearly ruled:

We stated unambiguously in our License Renewal Rule that license renewal should not include a new, broad-scoped inquiry into compliance that is separate from and parallel to [our] ongoing compliance oversight activity. We specifically indicated that other broad-based issues akin to safety culture - such as operational history, quality assurance, quality control, management competence, and human factors - were beyond the bounds of a license renewal proceeding. This is because these conceptual issues fall outside the bounds of the passive, safety-related physical systems, structures and components that form the scope of our license renewal review.114 For these same reasons, Intervenors attacks on FENOCs integrity and credibility should be rejected by the Board in this proceeding.

Intervenors complaints about the Shield Building not being sealed in the past are likewise outside of scope.115 The Commission has stated that [a]djudicatory hearings in 111 Id.

112 See FENOCs Motion to Strike at 7-9.

113 See FENOCs Original Contention Answer at 36-38. The continued advancement of unsupported allegations outside the scope of this proceeding demonstrates Intervenors fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose and seriousness of the process NRC affords them in this proceeding. Aside from the contention pleading requirements, Intervenors continue to ignore nearly every standard applicable to parties before the Board including comity, consultation, and timeliness. These actions should be rejected.

114 Prairie Island, CLI-10-27, slip op. at 10-11 (citations omitted).

115 See Supplemented Contention at 3-6 (raising complaints about decisions not to apply a protective coating, the decision to coat the dome parapet, and February 28, 2012 statements by a FENOC spokesperson).

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individual license renewal proceedings will share the same scope of issues as our NRC Staff review, for our hearing process (like our Staffs review) necessarily examines only the questions our safety rules make pertinent.116 In this regard, the Commission has specifically limited its license renewal safety review to the matters specified in 10 C.F.R. §§ 54.21 and 54.29, which focus on the management of aging of certain systems, structures, and components during the period of extended operation, and the review of time-limited aging analyses.117 Thus, the potential detrimental effects of aging that are not routinely addressed by ongoing regulatory oversight programs are the issues that define the scope of the safety review in license renewal proceedings.118 Intervenors retrospective complaints about whether FENOC has adequately explained why exterior protective sealant was not applied to the Shield Building in the 1970s are simply beyond the scope of this proceeding.

b. Intervenors Attacks Are Unsupported Intervenors attacks on FENOCs credibility are not only outside the scope of the proceeding, but also are unsupported, contrary to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(v). Intervenors attempt to rely on a May 25, 2012, letter from the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) to the NRC Staff, which alleges that the Shield Building cracking Root Cause Evaluation was not complete and accurate under 10 C.F.R. § 50.9 because FENOC later amended it based on NRC feedback.119 This allegation is based on the faulty conclusion that any change to a document submitted to the NRC shows prima facie evidence that FENOC violated §50.9, which requires 116 Fla. Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 & 4), CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 10 (2001);

see also Final Rule, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal; Revisions, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,461, 22,482 n.2 (May 8, 1995).

117 See Turkey Point, CLI-01-17, 54 NRC at 7-8; Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2),

CLI-02-26, 56 NRC 358, 363 (2002).

118 Turkey Point, CLI-01-17, 54 NRC at 7. Detrimental aging effects can result from, for example, metal fatigue, erosion, corrosion, thermal and radiation embrittlement, microbiologically induced effects, creep, and shrinkage. See id. at 7-8.

119 See Letter from D. Lochbaum, UCS, to C. Casto, NRC, FENOC Violating Federal Regulations (Again), at 1-3 (May 25, 2012) (UCS Letter) (submitted by Intervenors with the Supplemented Contention).

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that information submitted to the Commission be complete and accurate in all material respects.120 During its inspection of FENOCs Root Cause Evaluation, the NRC observed several minor weaknesses which are resolved by documentation added or clarified in revision 1. The observations do not invalidate the methodology, assessment and analysis, or conclusions of the root cause analysis report, but do identify areas for improvement.121 There is no basis to suggest that FENOC submitted incomplete or inaccurate information to the NRC Staff; rather, FENOC simply clarified and supplemented information in the Root Cause Evaluation at the request of the NRC Staff, as discussed in Section II.B above. These actions are consistent with the Commissions expectations regarding Section 50.9:

[T]he Commission intends to apply a rule of reason in assessing completeness of a communication. For example, in the context of reviewing an initial application or a renewal application for a license, it is not uncommon for an NRC reviewer to seek additional information to clarify his or her understanding of the information already provided. This type of inquiry by the NRC does not necessarily mean that incomplete information which would violate this rule has been submitted.122 FENOCs revisions to the Root Cause Evaluation constitute these types of clarifications, as requested by the NRC Staff. Indeed, FENOC did not change the direct cause, root cause, or 120 Id. at 2; 10 C.F.R. § 50.9(a). 10 C.F.R. § 50.9 obligates Part 50 licensees to assure completeness and accuracy of information in communications with the NRC. Specifically, 10 C.F.R. § 50.9(a) requires that all information provided to the NRC by a licensee, or required by statute or by NRC rule, regulation, standard, order or other condition to be maintained by a licensee, shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.

121 Revised Root Cause Evaluation at 5.

122 Completeness and Accuracy of Information, 52 Fed. Reg. 49,362, 49,366 (Dec. 31, 1987). Additionally, a key element in examining a potential violation of Section 50.9 is whether the matter involves material information. Material information is information which has the ability to influence the agency in the conduct of its regulatory responsibilities. Id. Intervenors have not claimed, much less demonstrated, that the alleged information omitted from the Root Cause Evaluation, and supplied in the Revised Root Cause Evaluation, had the ability to influence the NRC in the conduct of its regulatory responsibilities, particularly under the rule of reason standard identified by the Commission for Section 50.9 evaluations. Id.

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contributing causes in the Root Cause Evaluation.123 Intervenors also appear to claim that the UCS Letter shows why the Shield Building AMP should be held suspect, but they identify no purported issues or problems with the AMP itself.124 For these reasons, the UCS Letter provides no support for the Supplemented Contention, as required by Section 2.309(f)(1)(v).

The lack of support for the Supplemented Contention is further highlighted by the recent NRC Inspection Report on the Root Cause Evaluation. The NRC Inspection Report discusses the NRC Staffs observations and comments that gave rise to the revisions to the Root Cause Evaluation.125 For example, the NRC Inspection Report explains that the Staff identified minor weaknesses in the Root Cause Evaluation generally associated with the level of detail in the documentation recorded, but these weaknesses did not constitute performance deficiencies or findings because they did not adversely affect the outcome (e.g., conclusions) of the root cause process.126 These are the very issues that Intervenors reference to support their conclusion regarding a purported Section 50.9 violation.127 These unsupported assertions run contrary to the NRC Inspection Report.

Intervenors also purport that the Revised Root Cause Evaluation does not explain why Davis-Besse does not have an exterior protective sealant.128 This is simply incorrect. The language from the Revised Root Cause Evaluation, quoted by Intervenors, provides the requested explanation.129 It states that those attending a 1969 Bechtel project meeting decided not to add 123 See Revised Root Cause Evaluation at 64-65. The only new corrective action was addition of an extent of condition corrective action for a confirmatory examination of a safety-related structure with waterproof coating. See id. at 66-71.

124 See Supplemented Contention at 3.

125 See, e.g., NRC Inspection Report, Enclosure, at 16-17.

126 Id., Enclosure, at 16.

127 See UCS Letter; Root Cause Evaluation Revision; NRC Inspection Report, Enclosure, at 16-17.

128 See Supplemented Contention at 3-6.

129 See id. at 4.

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the sealant to the Shield Building walls and a requirement for this sealant was not identified in industry standards.130 Yet again, Intervenors claims are without factual support and do not support contention admissibility per Section 2.309(f)(1)(v).

Finally, Intervenors claim that a referenced article shows the possibility that much less than the drama of the Blizzard might have produced the damage.131 The quoted language from the article discusses the ability of water to penetrate through cracks in the surface of concrete.132 Intervenors do not explain how this controverts the Root Cause Evaluation conclusions. FENOC has not disputed that water can penetrate into concrete; in fact, FENOC cites water penetration, combined with wind speed, temperature, and duration, in concluding that the direct cause of the Shield Building laminar cracking was the 1978 blizzard.133 The information identified by Intervenors does not contradict, but rather is consistent with, this conclusion. As such, Intervenors again have failed to support their Supplemented Contention.

c. Intervenors Fail to Raise a Genuine Dispute Finally, Intervenors general attacks on FENOCs credibility do not demonstrate a genuine dispute with the LRA, contrary to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(vi). To raise a genuine dispute admissible under Section 2.309(f)(1)(vi), a petitioner must read the pertinent portions of the license application . . . state the applicants position and the petitioners opposing view, and explain why it disagrees with the applicant.134 If a petitioner believes the license application fails to adequately address a relevant issue, then the petitioner is to explain why the application is 130 See id. (quoting Revised Root Cause Evaluation at 33).

131 Id. at 6.

132 See id.

133 See Revised Root Cause Evaluation at 64.

134 Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings - Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54 Fed.

Reg. 33,168, 33,170 (Aug. 11, 1989); see also Millstone, CLI-01-24, 54 NRC at 358.

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deficient.135 A contention that does not directly controvert a position taken by the applicant in the applicationsuch as the Supplemented Contention before the Board in this proceedingis subject to dismissal.136 Section 2.309(f)(1)(vi) also requires that a proposed contention include references to specific portions of the application (including the applicants environmental report and safety report) that the petitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each dispute.

Here, Intervenors have not done this. Although they clearly acknowledge that FENOC submitted a new Shield Building AMP on April 5, 2012, Intervenors do not reference it or challenge it.137 Instead, they simply pronounce that the AMP has already been rendered suspect, without providing any explanation or basis for that suspicion.138 As such, Intervenors claims amount to nothing but bald assertions and speculation. The Commission has stated that a contention will be ruled inadmissible if the petitioner has offered no tangible information, no experts, no substantive affidavits, but instead only bare assertions and speculation.139 Therefore, the Supplemented Contention is inadmissible for this additional reason.

2. Intervenors Argument that FENOC Does Not Have a Plan to Address Shield Building Aging Does Not Support an Admissible Contention Section B.2 of the Supplemented Contention primarily raises complaints about the conclusions in the original Root Cause Evaluation, but also asserts that FENOC is without a 135 Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings - Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54 Fed.

Reg. at 33,170; see also Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 & 3),

CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149, 155-56 (1991).

136 See S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-10-1, 71 NRC 1, 21-22 (2010).

137 Supplemented Contention at 2.

138 Id.

139 Fansteel, Inc. (Muskogee, Okla. Site), CLI-03-13, 58 NRC 195, 203 (2003); see also Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, slip op. at 13 (Bare assertions and speculation, even by an expert, are insufficient to trigger a full adjudicatory proceeding. (quoting AmerGen Energy Co. LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-08-28, 68 NRC 658, 674 (2008)).

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present, articulated plan for the management of the aging shield building.140 For the following reasons, this argument does not support admission of the Supplemented Contention.

a. Intervenors Raise Issues Outside of Scope This argument is outside the scope of this proceeding, contrary to 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.309(f)(1)(iii). Intervenors quote FENOCs Shield Building RAI Response (not the Shield Building AMP itself), which states: FENOC is developing a comprehensive engineering plan to re-establish the design and licensing basis conformance of the Shield Building. The plan is scheduled to be completed and issued by December 1, 2012. The plan will include a detailed structural analysis of the Shield Building and consider applicable effects.141 The plan discussed in this quotation is the engineering plan to reestablish the current licensing basis to be completed and issued by December 1, 2012not the Shield Building AMP to be implemented during the period of extended operation. The plans about which Intervenors complain, therefore, relate to the current operating term and are outside the scope of license renewal.

The NRCs license renewal regulations deliberately and sensibly reflect the distinction between aging management issues, on the one hand, and the ongoing regulatory process on the other.142 The NRCs license renewal framework is premised upon the notion that, with the exception of aging management issues, the NRCs ongoing regulatory process is adequate to ensure that the current licensing basis (CLB) of operating plants provides and maintains an acceptable level of safety.143 As discussed above, the engineering plan will re-establish the 140 Supplemented Contention at 6-9.

141 Id. at 8; RAI Response at 7.

142 Specifically, in developing Part 54, the NRC sought to develop a process that would be both efficient, avoiding duplicative assessments where possible, and effective, allowing the NRC Staff to focus its resources on the most significant safety concerns at issue during the renewal term. Turkey Point, CLI-01-17, 54 NRC at 7.

143 See Final Rule, Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal; Revisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,943, 64,946 (Dec. 13, 1991). The term current licensing basis is defined in 10 C.F.R. § 54.3. See also 10 C.F.R. §§ 54.29, 54.30.

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design and licensing basis conformance of the Shield Building, which by definition must be part of the CLB because it relates to the present Shield Building licensing basis. This is not a future aging management issue for the period of extended operation. Therefore, a challenge to this engineering plan is outside the scope of this proceeding.

b. Intervenors Fail to Raise a Genuine Dispute This argument also fails to raise a genuine dispute with the LRA, contrary to 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.309(f)(1)(vi). As noted above, Section 2.309(f)(1)(vi) requires that a proposed contention include references to specific portions of the application (including the applicants environmental report and safety report) that the petitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each dispute. Intervenors have not done this.

Although Intervenors generally refer to the Shield Building AMP, they do not challenge any aspect of its adequacy with the requisite basis and specificity to support a valid contention.144 Instead, Intervenors only reference and quote from the RAI Response on Shield Building laminar cracking, in which FENOC responded to an NRC Staff question about structural analysis of the cracking.145 Intervenors have identified no problems with the Shield Building AMP; rather, they simply make generalized allegations that the AMP foresees scant planned testing to be done during infrequent inspections over the coming decades, as, for example, a mere handful of core bores.146 These complaints about future actions are misplaced and do not support admission of the Supplemented Contention. The NRCs license renewal regulations in 10 C.F.R. Part 54 144 See Supplemented Contention at 6-9. The Commission has held that it is not sufficient for intervenors to state that an application is simply deficient; rather, they must indicate what is wrong with the challenged analysis.

Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 2 & 3), CLI-10-9, 71 NRC 245, 270 (2010).

145 See Supplemented Contention at 8; RAI Response at 7.

146 Supplemented Contention at 8-9.

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specifically authorize licensees to demonstrate compliance with their requirements via prospective actions to be taken in the future, after the NRC issues the renewed license. For example, 10 C.F.R. § 54.29 states that the Commission bases its determination to issue a renewed license on whether [a]ctions have been identified and have been or will be taken with respect to managing the effects of aging and time-limited aging analyses.147 These principles date back to the original license renewal rule in 1991, when the Commission accepted the use of new commitments to monitor, manage, and correct age-related degradation unique to license renewal. It stated:

The licensing basis for a nuclear power plant during the renewal term will consist of the current licensing basis and new commitments to monitor, manage, and correct age-related degradation unique to license renewal, as appropriate. The current licensing basis includes all applicable NRC requirements and licensee commitments, as defined in the rule.148 The Commission recently reiterated this important principle in the Vermont Yankee license renewal proceeding:

We also disagree with the Boards conclusion that Entergys future-oriented interpretation would avoid the whole point of the license renewal process - to demonstrate that aging will be properly managed. Section 54.29(a) of our regulations speaks of both past and future actions, referring specifically to those that have been or will be taken with respect to . . . managing the effects of aging . . . and . . . time-limited aging analyses. . . .

Moreover, in Oyster Creek, we expressly interpreted section 54.21(c)(1) to permit a demonstration after the issuance of a renewed license: an applicants use of an aging management program identified in the GALL Report [i.e. NUREG-1801]

147 See also Turkey Point, CLI-01-17, 54 NRC at 8 (Part 54 requires renewal applicants to demonstrate how their programs will be effective in managing the effects of aging during the proposed period of extended operation. .

. . Applicants must identify any additional actions, i.e., maintenance, replacement of parts, etc., that will need to be taken to manage adequately the detrimental effects of aging. (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).

148 Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,946 (emphasis added).

29

constitutes reasonable assurance that it will manage the targeted aging effect during the renewal period.).149 As discussed above, future actions are acceptable means for addressing aging management. Intervenors have advanced no technical basis for how or why the periodic sampling program described in the AMP is insufficient for its purpose. For these reasons, this argument should be denied because it simply does not demonstrate a genuine dispute with the Davis-Besse LRA, contrary to Section 2.309(f)(1)(vi).

3. Intervenors Argument that FENOCs Root Cause Evaluation Is Incomplete Does Not Support an Admissible Contention Section B.3 of the Supplemented Contention raises vague complaints about the limited scope of the investigation of the cracking which has taken place to date, including examination of surface cracking and flute shoulders.150 For the following reasons, this argument also fails to support admission of the Supplemented Contention.

First, this argument yet again raises issues outside of the scope of this proceeding, contrary to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(iii). Intervenors cite to FENOCs purported indifference to safety and state: The absurd theme that runs throughout FENOCs management decisions over the years is constantly that convenience outweighs safety concerns.151 As discussed in Section IV.C.1 above, these types of unsupported allegations are outside the scope of license renewal, as demonstrated by the Commissions rejection of similar challenges in the Prairie Island and Diablo Canyon license renewal proceedings.152 Next, contrary to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(v), Intervenors boldly state, without authority or support, that [t]here was no examination of cracks during the 2011-2012 investigation if they 149 Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee (Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-17, 72 NRC __, slip op. at 44 (July 8, 2010) (citations omitted).

150 Supplemented Contention at 9.

151 Id.

152 See FENOCs Original Contention Answer at 36-38.

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were less than 1/16 in width.153 This statement is false. Intervenors seem to misinterpret statements in the Root Cause Evaluation that refer to cracks less than 1/16 in width.154 These cracks relate to surface examination under the Maintenance Rule procedure, which is different than the examination of the internal Shield Building cracking identified in October 2011.155 Indeed, Intervenors claim that FENOC did not examine cracks less than 1/16 in width is contradicted by their own reference to the RAI Response that the widest crack was .013.156 A crack that is 0.013 (approximately 1/75) wide is much smaller than 1/16 (0.0625).

FENOC examined many cracks less than 1/16 as part of the Shield Building laminar cracking investigation.157 Additionally, the cracks referenced by Intervenors as less than 1/16 in width are surface cracks, not the internal Shield Building cracking identified in October 2011 that is the subject of the Root Cause Evaluation.158 The Maintenance Rule examinations for surface cracks are separate from the Shield Building internal cracking examinations.

Intervenors also complain about FENOCs purported failure to evaluate cracking in Shield Building Shoulder 14.159 As stated in the Root Cause Evaluation, Impulse Response testing and core bores taken using man-lifts from the ground and scaffold from building roofs across 15 of the 16 architectural flute shoulders confirmed that a similar concrete crack phenomenon in the architectural flute shoulders exists in other regions around the perimeter of 153 Supplemented Contention at 9.

154 See Root Cause Evaluation at 26 (Concrete cracks less than 1/16 inch width need not be evaluated unless they have developed through the entire thickness. . . . The Maintenance Rule Structure Evaluation from June 1999 and November 2005 identified surface cracks, but since they were all less than 1/16 inch, the cracks were found to be acceptable.).

155 See id.

156 Supplemented Contention at 9.

157 See, e.g., Root Cause Evaluation, Attachment 3 (Shield Building Core Bore Summary).

158 See, e.g., id. at 5, 26-27.

159 Supplemented Contention at 9.

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the shield building.160 This section explains that Shoulder 14 was not accessible from the ground due to interference with a start-up transformer.161 Intervenors have identified no problems with the evaluation or the conclusions for the Shield Building cracking due to the inaccessibility of Shoulder 14.162 Indeed, Intervenors have identified absolutely no alleged facts even remotely related to Shoulder 14 that would support an argument that FENOCs Root Cause Evaluation is incomplete or that aging management during the period of extended operation will be deficient.163 In fact, the Root Cause Evaluation explains that FENOCs calculation regarding whether the Shield Building can perform its intended design function analyzed the shield building with the vertical outer face of structural reinforcing steel considered ineffective in the sixteen architectural flute shoulder regions.164 This included Shoulder 14. The Commission has rejected bare assertions and speculation, such as these, as support for proposed contentions.165 Therefore, this argument is unsupported and should be rejected.

Finally, this argument does not demonstrate a genuine dispute with the LRA, contrary to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(vi). As noted above, this regulation requires that a proposed contention include references to specific portions of the application (including the applicants 160 Root Cause Evaluation at 18.

161 Id.

162 See Supplemented Contention at 9.

163 See id. The lack of support for Intervenors arguments about Shoulder 14 is particularly stark given the Staffs conclusions in its inspection of the Shield Building laminar cracking that the IR testing mapping and confirmatory core borings provided sufficient characterization of the extent of cracking. Inspection Report 05000346/2012007 (DRS), Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Reactor Vessel Head Replacement and Shield Building Cracking Inspection Report, Enclosure, at 9 (May 7, 2012) (provided by Letter from B. Harris, Staff counsel, to Board (May 10, 2012)). Intervenors have an obligation to search the public record related to the Supplemented Contention. See Shaw Areva MOX Servs., LLC (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), CLI-09-2, 69 NRC 55, 65 n.47 (2009) (referring to intervenors ironclad obligation . . . to diligently search publicly available NRC or Applicant documents for information relevant to their [c]ontention (internal quotation marks omitted)).

164 Root Cause Evaluation at 30.

165 Fansteel, CLI-03-13, 58 NRC at 203; see also Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, slip op. at 13.

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environmental report and safety report) that the petitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each dispute. Intervenors have not done this. The only vague reference in this argument to the AMP is the statement: The RAI AMP states that the widest crack was .013. RAI AMP at 2 (of 8).166 This is not even actually a reference to the AMP, however, but is actually a reference to FENOCs summary of Shield Building degradation in its RAI Response on Shield Building laminar cracking.167 For these reasons, this argument should be denied because it simply does not demonstrate a genuine dispute with the Davis-Besse LRA.

4. Intervenors Argument that FENOCs Root Cause Evaluation Does Not Consider Other Damage to the Shield Building Exterior Does Not Support an Admissible Contention Section B.4 of the Supplemented Contention raises complaints about the concrete spalling on the Shield Building, alleged exposed rebar, and cracks on the Shield Building dome.168 For the following reasons, this argument does not support admission of the Supplemented Contention.

First, Intervenors refer to information in an August 2011 FENOC RAI response regarding spalling on the Shield Building surface.169 However, they provide no information as to, nor even discuss, why this surface spalling impacts the evaluation of the Shield Building subsurface laminar cracking identified in October 2011. Even more confounding, the spalling discussed in the August 2011 RAI response is identified in the Root Cause Evaluation,170 plainly contradicting the claim trumpeted in the section heading that Other Damage To Shield Building 166 Supplemented Contention at 9.

167 See RAI Response at 2.

168 See Supplemented Contention at 10-11.

169 Id. at 10.

170 See Root Cause Evaluation at 26, 80.

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Exterior Goes Unconsidered In RCA.171 It is important to note that Intervenors have identified no deficiencies in the Root Cause Evaluations treatment of this spalling with respect to the internal Shield Building cracking, and therefore have again failed to support the admission of the Supplemented Contention.

Intervenors next question the statement in the August 2011 RAI response that the method of repair is based on the actual size, depth and amount of rebar exposed in the area to be repaired.172 Intervenors, however, appear to misunderstand this statement. This is a general statement about the methods used to restore concrete, not, as Intervenors appear to believe, a statement that the spalling exposed rebar within the Shield Building.

Intervenors also reference a statement in the Revised Root Cause Evaluation regarding a cracked and broken architectural flute corner during inspection of the Shield Building dome parapet.173 Again, Intervenors provide absolutely no explanation or support for why or how this cracked corner affects the evaluation of internal Shield Building cracking. Intervenors further state that [e]ven without reinforcing steel, the dome has a history of cracking.174 This too reflects a misunderstanding of the facts.

The Root Cause Evaluation clearly states that reinforcing steel is placed in the . . .

dome.175 The statement about the dome referenced by Intervenors relates to the lack of high density reinforcing steel in the dome, not the lack of any reinforcing steel.176 Intervenors have not explained how the existence or lack of reinforcing steel in the dome affects the evaluation of the Shield Building laminar cracking. As noted above, the Commission has soundly rejected 171 Supplemented Contention at 10.

172 Id.

173 Id.

174 Id. at 11.

175 Root Cause Evaluation at 29.

176 Supplemented Contention at 11.

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bare assertions and speculation, such as those presented by Intervenors, as support for proposed contentions.177 The same result is called for here pursuant to 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.309(f)(1)(v).

Finally, this argument similarly fails to demonstrate a genuine dispute with the LRA, contrary to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(vi). Section 2.309(f)(1)(vi) requires that a proposed contention include references to specific portions of the application (including the applicants environmental report and safety report) that the petitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each dispute. Intervenors have not done this. There is absolutely no mention of the Shield Building AMP or any other part of the LRA in this argument. For these reasons, this argument should be denied because it simply does not demonstrate a genuine dispute with the Davis-Besse LRA.

5. Intervenors Argument that FENOCs Root Cause Evaluation Does Not Consider Exposure of the Shield Building Interior to the Elements Does Not Support an Admissible Contention Section B.5 of the Supplemented Contention alleges that [w]hile focus of the RCA has been solely on exterior cracking, the status of the interior of the shield building may be problematic, also.178 For the following reasons, this argument does not support admission of the Supplemented Contention.

Intervenors merely speculate about past instances in which the interior of the Shield Building may have been open to the environment and unimpeded, repeated moisture, such as the time between construction of the walls and construction of the dome or the time during which the Shield Building was open for the reactor vessel head replacement.179 Based on this conjecture, they then leap to the further hypothesis that the status of the interior of the shield 177 Fansteel, CLI-03-13, 58 NRC at 203; see also Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, slip op. at 13.

178 Supplemented Contention at 11 (Emphasis added).

179 Id. at 11-12.

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building may be problematic.180 Intervenors provide absolutely no support for this speculative exercise. The absence of the requisite support is particularly compelling when the laminar cracking has only been identified on the rebar layer closest to the exterior, not the interior, of the Shield Building.181 As a result, there is no indication that the laminar cracking was caused by mechanisms from the interior of the Shield Building, and Intervenors have not identified any.182 The Commission has rejected such bare assertions and speculation as support for proposed contentions.183 The Board should do so here as well.184 Similarly, Intervenors simply point to quotations from the NRC Staff in various RAIs regarding water in the region between the interior of the Shield Building and the steel containment.185 Intervenors, however, provide absolutely no explanation or allegations of how this water relates to Shield Building laminar cracking, or otherwise affects the evaluation of the cracking for purposes of license renewal. Moreover, they inappropriately rely upon statements in RAIs alone as support for admission of the Supplemented Contention. It is a long-standing NRC adjudicatory principle that RAIs are a common and expected feature of the licensing review process and do not alone form the basis for admissible contentions.186 180 Id. at 11.

181 See Root Cause Evaluation at 5.

182 See id.

183 Fansteel, CLI-03-13, 58 NRC at 203; see also Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, slip op. at 13.

184 This lack of support is further highlighted by Intervenors failure to challenge FENOCs identification of the failure modes for the laminar cracking. See, e.g., Root Cause Evaluation at 45-47. The NRC Staff has concluded that the [FENOC Root Cause Team] had considered and appropriately applied relevant site and external [operating experience] to identify a comprehensive scope of potential failure modes that could contribute to or cause the SB laminar cracking. NRC Inspection Report, Enclosure, at 6.

185 See Supplemented Contention at 12 (referencing FENOCs May 24, 2011 responses to NRC Staff RAIs).

186 See Dominion Nuclear Conn., Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-08-17, 68 NRC 231, 242 (2008) (The mere issuance of RAIs does not mean an application is incomplete for docketing.); Nuclear Mgmt. Co., LLC (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant), CLI-06-6, 63 NRC 161, 164 (2006) ([W]e have held repeatedly that the mere issuance of a staff RAI does not establish grounds for a litigable contention.);

Oconee, CLI-99-11, 49 NRC at 336-37 (stating that RAIs are a standard part of NRC licensing reviews and do not suggest that the application is incomplete, and petitioners must do more than rest on the mere existence of RAIs as a basis for contentions).

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Finally, this argument also fails to demonstrate a genuine dispute with the LRA, contrary to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(vi), as it does not include the required references to specific portions of the application . . . that the petitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each dispute.

Intervenors have omitted any mention of the Shield Building AMP or any other part of the LRA in this argument. The two cursory references to the RAI AMP are errors,187 that are actually references to the Root Cause Evaluation.188 For these many reasons, this argument also should be denied in its entirety.

6. Intervenors Argument that FENOC Has Not Sufficiently Investigated the Laminar Cracking Does Not Support an Admissible Contention Section B.6 of the Supplemented Contention posits that [p]recisely because FENOC purportedly did not have QA assurance control over the shield buildings construction 40 years ago, it is incumbent upon Applicant to completely investigate and identify all cracking which might be present in the structure, and to authoritatively rule out connections between interior and exterior concrete surficial damage or defects, both in the concrete above, and below, the surface.189 Intervenors further allege: What is missing is an analysis which considers and if warranted, refutes, any connection between the cracking, and spalling or the placement of too-dense rebar or the potential for moisture-caused damage to the interior of the shield building from moisture which even now may be wicking into interior concrete.190 The potential for concrete damage emanating outward from inside the shield building has not been addressed at all by FENOC.191 187 These errors may be typographical.

188 See Supplemented Contention at 11.

189 Id. at 12-13.

190 Id. at 13.

191 Id.

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In proffering this argument, Intervenors provide no support for these statements and their speculation that concrete damage could be coming from the interior of the Shield Building walls.

Intervenors have failed to satisfy their burden of identifying a specific problem with the evaluation of the Shield Building laminar cracking, including the identification of potential failure modes; instead, they ignore their burden to proffer an admissible contention and attempt to rest on the assertion that it is FENOC who has failed to authoritatively consider every possible deficiency.192 The Commission has rejected bare assertions and speculation as support for proposed contentions.193 Finally, this argument does not demonstrate a genuine dispute with the LRA, contrary to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(vi), because it again fails to provide the requisite references to specific portions of the application . . . that the petitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each dispute. There is absolutely no mention of the Shield Building AMP or any other part of the LRA in this argument. For these reasons, this argument should be denied because it simply does not demonstrate a genuine dispute with the Davis-Besse LRA.

D. The Supplemented Contention Does Not Cure the Original Contentions Deficiencies Not only is the Supplemented Contention itself deficient, for the many and compelling reasons discussed above, it also does not cure the deficiencies plaguing the Original Contention, and therefore should be rejected for this additional reason. The Supplemented Contention states that Intervenors move the Board to supplement and amend their proposed Contention No. 5.194 192 See Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, slip op. at 13 (At the threshold contention admission stage, the burden for providing support for a contention is on the petitioner.); see also Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings, CLI-98-12, 48 NRC 18, 22 (1998) (A contentions proponent, not the licensing board, is responsible for formulating the contention and providing the necessary information to satisfy [the contention admissibility requirements].).

193 Fansteel, CLI-03-13, 58 NRC at 203; see also Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, slip op. at 13.

194 Supplemented Contention at 1.

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Intervenors, however, do not set forth, describe, or otherwise present any actual amendment to the Original Contention. Instead, they simply regurgitate the wording of the Original Contention, which states:195 Contention 5: Cracked Shield Building/Secondary Reactor Radiological Containment Structure Interveners contend that FirstEnergys recently-discovered, extensive cracking of unknown origin in the Davis-Besse shield building/secondary reactor radiological containment structure is an aging-related feature of the plant, the condition of which precludes safe operation of the atomic reactor beyond 2017 for any period of time, let alone the proposed 20-year license period.196 Therefore, Intervenors only appear to be attempting to supplement the bases of the Original Contention with new arguments rather than cure the deficiencies inherent in the originally-proposed contention.

As explained in FENOCs Original Contention Answer, the Original Contention sets forth both environmental and non-environmental (or safety) arguments.197 As explained in Section IV.B.1 of FENOCs Original Contention Answer, the environmental arguments are inadmissible because they: (1) are outside the scope of this proceeding because they impermissibly challenge NRC regulations; (2) fail to challenge the Davis-Besse LRA; and (3) lack adequate (i.e., any) factual support.198 As further explained in Section IV.B.2 of FENOCs Original Contention Answer, the safety arguments similarly are inadmissible because they: (1) are outside the scope of this proceeding; (2) fail to challenge the LRA; and, again, (3) lack adequate factual support.199 195 Id. at 1-2.

196 Original Contention at 10-11; Supplemented Contention at 1-2.

197 FENOCs Original Contention Answer at 23.

198 See id. at 24-32.

199 See id. at 32-47.

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Intervenors fail to link any supplemental information in the Supplemented Contention to their earlier arguments or the Original Contentionleaving FENOC and the NRC Staff to respond to a phantom nexus. Moreover, the Supplemented Contention leaves these earlier-identified deficiencies unaddressed. It is Intervenors burden to make the arguments; this is not the role of the Board or other Parties.200 More importantly, following FENOCs docketing of the LRA amendment providing the new Shield Building AMP, FENOC supplemented FENOCs Original Contention Answer, demonstrating that the AMP moots Intervenors unsupported challenges about aging management due to the newly-identified Shield Building laminar cracking.201 In other words, FENOC has addressed the Original Contention, head on, and it was therefore incumbent on Intervenors to amend their Original Contention to address the information contributing to the record in this proceeding, including the Shield Building AMP.202 Intervenors Supplemented Contention acknowledges the AMP, but does nothing more; a fatal defect. Although Intervenors complain about the Root Cause Evaluation, the Revised Root Cause Evaluation, and the RAI Response, they never directly reference or challenge the revision to the LRA that incorporated the Shield Building AMP into the underlying application at issue in this proceeding. For this reason, the Original Contention remains mooteven as supplemented on June 4, 2012and the Supplemented Contention should be rejected by the Board.

200 See Pilgrim, CLI-12-15, slip op. at 13 (At the threshold contention admission stage, the burden for providing support for a contention is on the petitioner.); see also Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings, CLI-98-12, 48 NRC at 22 (A contentions proponent, not the licensing board, is responsible for formulating the contention and providing the necessary information to satisfy [the contention admissibility requirements].).

201 See FENOC Supplemental Answer at 6-7.

202 A contention that does not directly controvert a position taken by the applicant in the application is subject to dismissal. See, e.g., Summer, CLI-10-1, 71 NRC at 21-22. Additionally, the Commission has stated that intervenors have an ironclad obligation to review the Application thoroughly and to base their challenges on its contents. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-12-05, 75 NRC __, slip op. at 14 (Mar. 8, 2012) (citing Shaw, CLI-09-2, 69 NRC at 65 n.47 (referring to intervenors ironclad obligation . . .

to diligently search publicly available NRC or Applicant documents for information relevant to their

[c]ontention (internal quotation marks ))).

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V. CONCLUSION As demonstrated above, the Supplemented Contention should be summarily dismissed because Intervenors failed to consult with FENOC as required by 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(b).

Additionally, parts of the Supplemented Contention are untimely under 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.309(f)(2) and (c)(1). In particular, these parts are untimely under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2) because, contrary to the ISO, Intervenors filed them more than 60 days after the public availability of material information allegedly supporting the Supplemented Contention, and Intervenors have not demonstrated good cause for their late filing. Furthermore, the Supplemented Contention utterly fails to satisfy the contention admissibility requirements specified in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1): the arguments in the Supplemented Contention should be rejected because they are outside the scope of this proceeding, fail to challenge the Davis-Besse LRA, and lack adequate factual support.

Finally, the Supplemented Contention does not cure the deficiencies in the Original Contention, which remains mooted by the Shield Building AMP. For these many and manifest reasons, the Supplemented Contention should be rejected in its entirety.

41

Respectfully submitted, Executed in Accord with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d)

Signed (electronically) by Timothy P. Matthews Timothy P. Matthews Kathryn M. Sutton Stephen J. Burdick Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004 Phone: 202-739-5527 E-mail: tmatthews@morganlewis.com David W. Jenkins Senior Corporate Counsel II FirstEnergy Service Company Mailstop: A-GO-15 76 South Main Street Akron, OH 44308 Phone: 330-384-5037 E-mail: djenkins@firstenergycorp.com COUNSEL FOR FENOC Dated in Washington, DC this 29th day of June 2012 42

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-346-LR FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY )

)

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) ) June 29, 2012

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that, on this date, a copy of FENOCs Answer Opposing Intervenors Motion to Amend and Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking) was filed with the Electronic Information Exchange in the above-captioned proceeding on the following recipients.

Administrative Judge Administrative Judge William J. Froehlich, Chair Nicholas G. Trikouros Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: wjf1@nrc.gov E-mail: nicholas.trikouros@nrc.gov Administrative Judge Office of the General Counsel Dr. William E. Kastenberg U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop O-15D21 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Brian G. Harris E-mail: wek1@nrc.gov Megan Wright Emily L. Monteith Catherine E. Kanatas Office of the Secretary E-mail: Brian.Harris@nrc.gov; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Megan.Wright@nrc.gov; Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff Emily.Monteith@nrc.gov; Washington, DC 20555-0001 Catherine.Kanatas@nrc.gov E-mail: hearingdocket@nrc.gov

Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Michael Keegan U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dont Waste Michigan Mail Stop: O-16C1 811 Harrison Street Washington, DC 20555-0001 Monroe, MI 48161 E-mail: ocaamail@nrc.gov E-mail: mkeeganj@comcast.net Kevin Kamps Terry J. Lodge Paul Gunter 316 N. Michigan St., Ste. 520 Beyond Nuclear Toledo, OH 43604 6930 Carroll Avenue, Suite 400 E-mail: tjlodge50@yahoo.com Takoma Park, MD 20912 E-mail: kevin@beyondnuclear.org; paul@beyondnuclear.org Signed (electronically) by Stephen J. Burdick Stephen J. Burdick Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20004 Phone: 202-739-5059 E-mail: sburdick@morganlewis.com COUNSEL FOR FENOC DB1/ 69995609.5 FENOC Attachment 1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210 LISLE, IL 60532-4352 June 21, 2012 Mr. Barry Allen Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 5501 North State Route 2, Mail Stop A-DB-3080 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT:

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INSPECTION TO EVALUATE THE ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR CRACKING IN THE REINFORCED CONCRETE SHIELD BUILDING OF THE CONTAINMENT SYSTEM 05000346/2012009(DRS)

Dear Mr. Allen:

On May 9, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection to evaluate your root cause evaluation and corrective actions associated with discovery of laminar subsurface cracks, in the reinforced concrete shield building at the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station. These cracks were discovered on October 10, 2011, by your staff while performing hydrodemolition operations in support of reactor vessel head replacement. The NRC had previously initiated an inspection in accordance with the special and infrequently performed inspection procedure (IP) 71007 Reactor Vessel Head Replacement and confirmed adequate restoration of the containment system to assure functional integrity (NRC inspection reports (IR) 05000346/2011-005 and 05000346/2012-007). In addition, the later report discussed your assessment and the associated NRC review, that the shield building remained capable of performing its safety functions despite the cracking.

During the current inspection, the NRC inspection team reviewed your Root Cause Analysis Report - Concrete Crack Within Shield Building Temporary Access Opening, observed supporting vendor tests, and interviewed your personnel assigned to the root cause investigation to determine if you had adequately determined the causes for the laminar cracking identified in the shield building exterior wall. The NRC team confirmed that your Rout Cause Analysis Team as augmented with vendor subject matter experts was appropriately trained, followed site procedures for root cause investigations, and had considered relevant site and external operating experience. The NRC team concluded that your staff established a sufficient basis for the causes of the shield building laminar cracking related to: the environmental factors associated with the 1978 blizzard, the lack of an exterior moisture barrier, and the structural design elements of the shield building. Specifically, the weather records, core boring sample results, impulse response testing, and shield building analytical modeling provided a sufficient basis to support the causes of the laminar cracking. The NRC team identified minor weaknesses in the Root Cause Analysis Report associated with the level of detail in the documentation provided. These weaknesses did not constitute performance deficiencies or findings because they did not adversely affect the outcome of the root cause process.

B. Allen The NRC team also reviewed your corrective actions to address the causes of the shield building laminar cracking. The team identified two examples where the scope of your corrective actions to address the causes of the shield building cracking was too narrow.

x You had not proposed examinations to confirm a lack of subsurface cracking in other safety-related building structures with installed moisture barriers to further substantiate the Direct Cause.

x Your corrective action for the Root Cause included updating a site procedure for inspections of only the shield building exterior sealant system instead of a broader action to inspect all safety-related buildings with moisture barriers.

Your staff has entered the teams observations into the corrective action system, and we understand that you are considering actions to expand the scope of these corrective actions.

Additionally, the NRC has ongoing reviews as part of your Davis-Besse License Renewal Application that will evaluate your proposed program for monitoring of the shield building cracking. Overall, the team concluded that your corrective and preventative actions for the causes of the shield building laminar cracking, if adequately implemented, would prevent recurrence, and provide reasonable assurance for maintaining the shield building safety functions. The attached inspection report documents the inspection results for our review of your root cause evaluation activities and proposed corrective actions associated with your root cause report submitted to the NRC on February 28, 2012, (Reference ADAMS Accession No. ML120600056), and which were discussed with you and your staff at the exit meeting held on May 9, 2012.

Additionally, we have received and will review changes contained in Revision 1 of your root cause report (Reference ADAMS Accession ML12142A053) as part of our follow-up inspections planned for the shield building issue. As discussed with your staff, a public meeting will be scheduled in the near future to allow the opportunity for FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company to describe its root cause activities and planned actions going forward and NRC staff to discuss the related NRC inspection described in the enclosed report.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Steven A. Reynolds, Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-346 License Nos. NPF-3

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000346/2012009(DRS) : Supplemental Information : Photos and Diagrams cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ'

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Docket No: 50-346 License No: NPF-3 Report No: 05000346/2012009 Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)

Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Location: Oak Harbor, OH Dates: December 1, 2011 through May 9, 2012 Inspectors: M. Holmberg, Team Lead J. Neurauter, Inspector E. Sanchez Santiago, Inspector A. Shaikh, Inspector Approved by: D. E. Hills, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS......................................................................................................... 1 REPORT DETAILS .................................................................................................................... 2 SHIELD BUILDING DESCRIPTION ........................................................................................ 2 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW .......................................................................................... 2 4 OTHER ACTIVITIES .............................................................................................. 3 4OA5 Other Activities....................................................................................................... 3

a. Inspection Scope ................................................................................................... 3

b. Observations and Conclusions .............................................................................. 4 b.1 Licensee OE Review and Potential Causes ................................................. 4 b.2 NRC Team Conclusions on OE and Potential Causes ................................. 6 b.3 Licensee Identified Causes of SB Laminar Cracking...................................11 b.4 NRC Team Conclusions on Causes of SB Laminar Cracking .....................11 b.5 Licensee CAs for Causes of SB Laminar Cracking .....................................17 b.6 NRC Team Conclusions on CAs for the Causes of SB Cracking ................18

c. Findings ................................................................................................................22 4OA6 Meetings ..............................................................................................................22

.1 Exit Meeting ..........................................................................................................22 ATTACHMENT 1 - SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION .............................................................. 1 KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................. 1 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED......................................................... 1 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED....................................................................................... 2 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED .................................................................................................. 6 ATTACHMENT 2 - PHOTOS AND DIAGRAMS ......................................................................... 1 Picture No. 1 - Davis-Besse Shield Building .......................................................................... 1 Picture No. 2 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Flute and Shoulder Details ................................ 2 Picture No. 3 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Laminar Subsurface Cracking ........................... 3 Picture No. 4 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Impulse Response Testing Mobility Plot ............ 4 Picture No. 5 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Impulse Response Mobility Plot (Shoulder 9) .... 5 Picture No. 6 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Core Bore Location S7-667-25-2....................... 6 Picture No. 7 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Core Bore Location S11-663.75-30-10 .............. 7 Picture No. 8 - Davis-Besse Shield Building - Core Boring Sample ....................................... 8 Picture No. 9 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Root Cause Analysis Report - Fault Tree .......... 9 Picture No. 10 - Davis-Besse Shield Building - Water Migration ...........................................10 Picture No. 11 - Davis-Besse Shield Building - Location/Progression of Ice Formation ........11 Picture No. 12 - Davis-Besse Shield Building - Subsurface Radial Tensile Stress ...............12 i

SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS IR 05000346/2012-009(DRS); 12/01/2011 - 5/09/2012, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station; Inspection to Evaluate the Root Cause and Corrective Actions for Cracking in the Reinforced Concrete Shield Building of the Containment System.

This report covers a 5-month period of inspection by a team of NRC regional inspectors. No findings were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be "Green" or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings No findings were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations No violations were identified.

1 Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS SHIELD BUILDING DESCRIPTION The containment system for the Davis-Besse site consists of three basic structures: a steel containment vessel (CV), a reinforced concrete shield building (SB), and the internal structures.

The CV is a cylindrical steel pressure vessel with hemispherical dome and ellipsoidal bottom which houses the reactor vessel, reactor coolant piping, and other safety-systems. The CV is completely enclosed by a reinforced concrete SB (Attachment 2, Picture 1) having a cylindrical shape with a shallow dome roof. An annular space is provided between the steel CV and the interior face of the concrete SB of approximately 4.5 feet (ft) to permit construction operations and periodic visual inspection of the steel containment vessel. The SB has an inside radius of 69.5 ft and a height of 279.5 ft measured from the top of the foundation ring to the top of the dome. The thicknesses of the SB wall and the dome are approximately 2.5 ft and 2 ft, respectively, and the exterior SB wall has eight vertical cutouts (called flutes) spaced 45 degrees apart. These flutes consist of shoulders that extend another 1.5 ft outward and gradually taper back to the outer cylindrical wall of the SB while reaching a point of tangency 17 ft 11 inches from the centerline of the flute (Attachment 2, Picture 2). The CV and SB are supported on a concrete foundation founded on a firm rock structure. With the exception of the concrete under the CV, there are no structural ties between the CV and the SB above the foundation slab. The CV provides the primary means to contain the post accident environment and is designed to withstand and hold against accident induced pressure. The identified cracking does not involve the CV. The design of the SB provides for: shielding from radiation sources within the SB, controlled release of annulus atmosphere under an accident condition, and environmental protection of the CV.

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW The Davis-Besse CV and SB lacked an access opening of sufficient size to permit removal of the old reactor vessel head and reinstallation of the replacement vessel head. Therefore, during the 17-mid-cycle outage, the licensee cut a temporary access opening in the SB and CV of sufficient size to support head replacement. The licensee reused and re-installed by welding the original plate section cut from the CV, to restore the temporary construction opening in the CV. The licensee installed new reinforcing steel (i.e., rebar) to replace the original steel reinforcement and poured new concrete from an on-site batch plant, to restore the temporary construction opening in the SB. The inspectors reviewed the licensee activities associated with the restoration of the CV and SB access openings as documented in NRC inspection reports 05000346/2011005 and 05000346/2012007.

During construction of the SB access opening in the 17-mid-cycle outage, the licensee discovered subsurface cracking located near the outer rebar mat, which extended into areas of the SB that not been modified since original construction. The licensee attempted to remove the cracks discovered during the hydrodemolition process (Attachment 2, Picture 3) using a manual chipping process. Using this method, the crack indications along the left and bottom edges essentially disappeared, but the crack at the top of the opening did not disappear. The licensee investigated and confirmed the extent of subsurface laminar cracking through the use of impulse response (IR) testing and core boring samples (CBS) taken from the SB.

Specifically, laminar subsurface concrete cracks were identified along the outer rebar mat in the SB flute shoulders, at the top of SB near the junction with the roof, and at the SB penetration openings. The licensee was able to demonstrate that the SB remained structurally adequate for the controlling load cases and remained capable of performing its safety functions. However, 2 Enclosure

the SB areas with the laminar subsurface cracking were non-conforming with respect to the SB design and licensing bases. The licensees analysis and associated NRC review are discussed in NRC inspection report 05000346/2012007.

The NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) No. 3-11-001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11336A355) to document the licensee actions required to demonstrate long-term confidence in the SB integrity. These actions included providing the NRC with the results of the root cause evaluation and corrective actions for the SB cracking.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness 4OA5 OTHER ACTIVITIES

.1 Reactor Vessel Head Replacement (Inspection Procedure 71007) - Containment Restoration- Shield Building Laminar Cracking Root Cause Evaluation and Corrective Action (CA) Review

a. Inspection Scope The licensee chartered a root cause analysis team (RCT) supported by vendor subject matter experts knowledgeable in concrete construction, design, examination, and modeling to review evidence associated with the discovery of subsurface concrete cracking in the flute region of a temporary access opening in the SB wall. The laminar cracking was primarily associated with the shoulder regions, although some cracking was identified outside the shoulder regions near the main steam lines and near the top of the SB cylinder. The cracks were very tight (meaning the gap between the crack surfaces was extremely small). No cracking was identified inboard of the outer rebar mat (deeper toward the inner wall surface) around either the equipment access opening or in the core borings. The cracking was interior to the wall surface and was not visually discernable until the licensee cut into the wall to create the access opening. The licensees RCT was tasked with determining how, when, and why the concrete cracking occurred in the SB wall. The results of the licensees root cause evaluation and proposed CAs were submitted to the NRC on February 28, 2012, as documented in a Root Cause Analysis Report (RCR) - Concrete Crack within Shield Building Temporary Access Opening (Reference ADAMS Accession No. ML120600056).

From December 1, 2011 through May 9, 2012, the NRC team reviewed the licensees investigation of the causes for the SB laminar cracking as discussed below to determine if: (1) the scope of the operating experience (OE) review considered relevant Davis-Besse SB degradation history and related industry experiences to develop an adequate scope of potential causes; (2) the causes for the SB cracking were adequately ascertained using a scrutable process; and (3) the CAs proposed for the identified causes were sufficient to prevent recurrence and ensure the continued capability of the SB to perform the design basis functions.

3 Enclosure

The activities reviewed by the NRC team included:

x Observation of the equipment and review of the process followed by one of the three laboratories performing the petrographic examinations on the SB concrete core boring samples (CBS),

x Observation of vendor tests conducted at offsite laboratories on concrete CBS removed from the SB. Specifically, the team observed portions of the concrete compression test, splitting tensile strength test, accelerated creep test, and a freeze-thaw test, x Observation of the SB exterior concrete surfaces accessible from the auxiliary building roof level and at three CBS locations (S7-667.0-25, S7-666.0-7 and S6-665-47) utilizing a boroscope, x Review of the RCR, the supporting vendor report (Performance Improvement International - Root Cause Assessment Davis-Besse Shield Building Laminar Cracking), technical specifications for the SB, condition reports (CRs),

nonconformance reports (NCRs) and the SB related drawings for construction, design and IR testing results, x Review of the inputs and assumptions for the licensees vendor analysis and modeling applied in support of (or to refute) the potential SB failure modes, and x Interviews of licensee RCT members and supporting vendor staff.

b. Observations and Conclusions b.1 Licensee OE Review and Potential Causes The licensee discovered subsurface laminar cracking in the SB located near the outer rebar mat which extended into areas that had not been modified since original construction. To determine the extent of cracking, the licensee applied an acoustic sounding technique (hereafter referred to as IR testing) on the SB exterior wall to identify areas with laminar cracking (Attachment 2, Pictures 4 and 5). Confirmation of the IR test results was achieved by visual inspection of 70 CBS (Attachment 2, Pictures 6 and 7).

The licensees initial condition assessment determined that the SB concrete wall contained tight width laminar cracking near the outer face of structural reinforcing steel and the majority of the laminar cracking occurred in the concrete at the outer face of structural reinforcing steel located behind the flute shoulder regions. Some laminar cracking occurred beyond the flute shoulder region as evident across the top 20 feet of the SB and in localized areas adjacent to one side of each mainsteam line penetration blockout. The southwestern exposure of the SB wall was observed with the most extensive laminar concrete cracking. The licensee contracted vendors to examine 36 SB concrete CBS (Attachment 2, Picture 8) to identify possible failure modes for the laminar cracking, or quantify material properties of the concrete in support of computer modeling and analysis.

The RCT identified that a majority of the nuclear power stations which have constructed temporary access openings in containment systems are either post-tensioned or reinforced concrete cylinders with a steel liner (both designs differ from the Davis-Besse 4 Enclosure

SB, which is a reinforced concrete structure without post-tension system and/or a liner).

The RCT identified that the only previous OE of concrete delamination at a nuclear power plant occurred at Crystal River Unit 3 and was discovered while creating a temporary access opening in the containment structure. The root cause of the Crystal River Unit 3 containment concrete delamination was the design of the structure in combination with the type of concrete used, and the acts of de-tensioning and opening the containment structure.

The RCT also identified a study of the deterioration of concrete water storage tanks in the province of Ontario Canada where damage was identified that ranged from heavy surface spalling and cracking to delamination and eventual failure of some structures.

This study concluded the prime factors for determining the rate of concrete structure deterioration were the number of freeze /thaw cycles, temperature amplitudes and frequencies, concrete permeability, hydrostatic pressure, location, the effect of reinforcing steel, and internal ice formation.

The RCT developed a fault tree of 45 possible failure modes that could potentially contribute to the laminar cracking, either individually or in concert based upon characteristics of the SB laminar cracking and other OEs with concrete issues. The 45 failure modes were grouped into three major categories consisting of Design, Construction and Fabrication, and Operational (Attachment 2, Picture 9) and each of these failure modes was evaluated during the root cause investigation. In general, each failure mode was either refuted or supported by laboratory tests and examinations or analysis. Some failure modes were refuted by deductive reasoning based on existing evidence to either support or refute their mode of failure. Potential failure modes were not eliminated without evidence to refute the postulated failure mode.

The licensees vendor analyzed the SB for the loading conditions that could not be refuted in the Failure Modes Analysis, such as seismic, snow/ice, or dead weight of the dome. Additionally, the licensees vendor applied concrete stress and fracture analysis modeling techniques originally developed as part of the Crystal River Unit 3 containment concrete delamination/cracking root cause investigation. The vendor modeling and analysis was updated to reflect the design characteristics of the Davis-Besse SB. The material properties and failure criteria used in the analysis and modeling were based upon the results of the SB concrete laboratory tests and examinations. The five vendor analyses supporting the RCT investigation were the:

x Freezing Failure and Rebar Spacing Sensitivity Study; x Structural and Thermal Analysis Investigation; x Stress State Environmental Conditions During the 1977 and 1978 Blizzards; x Stress Analysis Due to 105 MPH Wind Load; and x Laminar Cracking Due to Environmental Conditions during the 1978 Blizzard.

The RCT also considered information available in industry documents related to concrete degradation for the development of potential failure modes and CAs.

Specifically, the documents reviewed by the RCT included: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Primer on Durability of Nuclear Power Plant Reinforced Concrete 5 Enclosure

Structures - A Review of Pertinent Factors, NUREG/CR-6927, American Concrete Institute (ACI) 349.3R-02, Evaluation of Existing Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures, Electric Power Research Institute, Program on Technology Innovation:

Concrete Civil Infrastructure in United States Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, 1020932, International Atomic Energy Agency, Assessment and Management of Aging of Major Nuclear Power Plant Components Important to Safety - Concrete Containment Buildings, IAEA-TECDOC-1025, ACI 224.1R-07, Causes, Evaluation, and Repair of Cracks in Concrete Structures, and ACI 515.1R-79, A Guide for the Use of Waterproofing, Damp Proofing, Protective, and Decorative Barrier Systems for Concrete.

b.2 NRC Team Conclusions on OE and Potential Causes The NRC team evaluated if the RCT had made appropriate use of OE to develop a sufficiently comprehensive list of potential causes for the SB laminar cracking. To perform this evaluation, the NRC team completed a walkdown of the SB exterior concrete surfaces accessible from the auxiliary building roof level and at three core bore locations (S7-667.0-25, S7-666.0-7 and S6-665-47) utilizing a boroscope, and observed vendor tests/exams conducted at offsite laboratories on CBS removed from the SB. The NRC team also reviewed the RCR, supporting vendor reports, the SB technical specifications, CA records, drawings of IR mapping results, SB construction/design drawings and OEs documented in two NRC technical reports (NUREGs) associated with reinforced concrete structures used in nuclear power plants. Based upon this review, the NRC team concluded that the RCT had considered and appropriately applied relevant site and external OE to identify a comprehensive scope of potential failure modes that could contribute to or cause the SB laminar cracking.

The NRC team also concluded that the RCT had established a sufficient basis to refute/exclude 39 of the 45 failure modes as potential causes for the SB cracking with one exception. The NRC team identified that the RCR had not recorded a sufficient basis to eliminate slipform induced laminar cracking in the Failure Mode Analysis process. Subsequently, the RCT provided sufficient explanation to confirm that slipform induced cracking was not a possible cause for the SB laminar cracking and the NRC team concluded that this issue was an example of a minor documentation weakness in the RCR. The remaining six failure modes (e.g., not refuted) were determined to be associated with the direct, root or contributing causes of the SB laminar cracking.

Additional details of the NRC teams review of this area are provided in Sections b.2.1 and b.2.2 below.

b.2.1 NRC Team Evaluation of RCT Use of OE The NRC team examined three core bore locations (S7-667.0-25, S7-666.0-7, and S6-665-47) with the aid of a boroscope and performed a direct visual examination of exterior SB concrete surfaces accessible from the auxiliary building roof level to evaluate the condition of the SB and confirm the location of laminar cracking recorded in the RCR. Based upon these examinations, the NRC team did not identify any discrepancies with the location or characterization of cracking recorded in the licensees RCR. Further, the exterior concrete surfaces and interior concrete conditions within SB bore holes were consistent with that recorded in the licensees CRs with one minor exception.

6 Enclosure

The NRC team identified a brown deposit located near the bottom of a core bore at location S7-667.0-25, which had not been recorded on a licensee CR. The licensee staff believed this deposit was rust related stain and documented this condition in CR-2012-03889. The NRC team reviewed photographs from other SB core bore locations and noted a similar condition in the first core bore location (S15-645.5-3). The licensee staff believed this stain/deposit could be the results of minor rebar corrosion caused by water introduced during the core bore drilling operation. The licensees corrective action associated with the identified corrosion is subject to future NRC inspection.

The licensee identified previous OE related to degradation of concrete water tanks in Ontario damaged by delamination and spalling due to a similar set of conditions that affected the SB. The only previous nuclear related OE with subsurface delamination identified by the licensee RCT was the Crystal River 3 containment delamination event.

The causes for the Crystal River 3 cracking event were related to the design of the structure in combination with the type of concrete used, and the act of de-tensioning and opening the containment structure. Therefore, the NRC team agreed with the RCT that the causes for the Crystal River 3 event differed from the causes of the SB cracking.

The NRC team reviewed relevant site and external OE data pertaining to concrete cracking issues experienced by concrete structures used in nuclear power plants to assess the scope and thoroughness of the RCT review. Specifically, the NRC team reviewed the licensees CRs and NCRs. Additionally, the team reviewed external OE available on the internet (e.g., public open source literature) and non-public internal OE data bases available to the NRC staff. The NRC team did not identify any other similar examples of industry OE beyond what the RCT identified and based upon this review, the NRC team concluded that the RCT had considered relevant site and external OE necessary to identify a list of potential causes for the SB laminar cracking.

The NRC team also confirmed that the licensee had issued OE reports to alert the nuclear community to the Davis-Besse SB cracking phenomena. The team did not identify any issues of concern with the scope and content of these reports.

b.2.2 NRC Team Evaluation of the Potential Causes for SB Cracking The RCT identified a list of 45 failure modes that could potentially contribute to the laminar cracking, either individually or in concert. The NRC team compared the potential causes for concrete cracking identified by the RCT to failure modes and environmental factors affecting concrete structures at nuclear power plants as discussed in two technical reports (NUREGs) produced by national laboratories for the NRC. Specifically, the NRC team reviewed the work performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory as documented in NUREG/CR-6927, Primer on Durability of Nuclear Power Plant Reinforced Concrete Structures - A Review of Pertinent Factors. The objective of this report was to provide a primer on the environmental effects that can affect the durability of nuclear power plant concrete structures. The team also reviewed NUREG/CR-6424, Report on Aging of Nuclear Power Plant Reinforced Concrete Structures, developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory that included information related to aging factors and environmental stressors that can impact the performance of reinforced concrete structures. Based upon this review, the NRC team determined that the scope of potential failure modes affecting the SB as identified by the RCT was consistent with failure modes identified in these two NUREGs. Therefore, the NRC team concluded that 7 Enclosure

the RCT had appropriately applied OE to identify a comprehensive scope for potential failure modes that could contribute to or cause the SB laminar cracking.

The licensee contracted with vendors to perform examinations and tests of concrete CBS removed from the SB to gather information used to support or refute the 45 potential failure modes for the cracking. The NRC team observed or reviewed the results of these vendor tests/examinations conducted at offsite laboratories including:

petrographic examinations, compression testing, splitting tensile strength testing, accelerated creep testing, and freeze-thaw testing. Specifically, the team observed the off-site vendor testing equipment and reviewed the process followed by:

x Vendor - (Photometrics) at the laboratory in California which performed petrographic examinations of the CBS from the SB in accordance with American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) C856, Standard Practice for Petrographic Examination of Hardened Concrete, and ASTM C457, Standard Test Method for Microscopical Determination of Parameters of the Air-Void System in Hardened Concrete. The results of these examinations were used by the licensee to refute the potential failure mechanisms related to long term thermal stress cycles (e.g., freeze-thaw). Specifically, Photometrics examined 22 CBS using a scanning electron microscope for characteristics such as aggregate size, void fraction, concrete-to-reinforcing steel interaction, carbonation, and fracture analysis. The results of this testing determined that:

the SB concrete was in good condition and consistent with the original mix design with no microcracks present on the fractured surfaces (e.g., no evidence of typical concrete time dependant thermal cycle failure modes), and the exposed concrete had carbonation typical for a concrete structure of 40 years.

Additionally, the vendor confirmed that the outer surface of the CBS was not water-repellant and determined that the evidence suggested long term exposure to moisture which had migrating through the concrete.

x Vendor - (Performance Improvement International) at the University of Colorado Boulder Laboratory, which performed testing for internal relative humidity, compressive strength, splitting tensile strength, accelerated creep testing, and freeze-thaw testing. The NRC team noted the following:

a. The internal relative humidity concrete tests measured (with embedded sensors) the distribution of internal moisture adsorbed in the CBS and no ASTM standard existed for this testing. The results from this testing was used to assess the potential for moisture intrusion into the SB wall.

b. The compression testing of CBS was conducted in accordance with ASTM C-39 and was used to measure the compressive strength of the SB concrete. All concrete CBS tested had measured compressive strengths greater than the SB minimum design strength (4000 pounds per square inch (psi));

c. Splitting tensile testing was conducted in accordance with ASTM C-496 to measure the SB concretes tensile strength and all CBS tested had measured tensile strength higher than the minimum design (424 psi);

d. The accelerated creep testing was conducted in accordance with ASTM C-512 to determine the susceptibility of the CBS to creep induced failures. Specifically, three types of creep behavior were evaluated under 8 Enclosure

this testing: 1) Basic creep - The long-term strain of concrete due to loading without drying and heating; 2) Drying shrinkage - The long-term strain of concrete due to drying without loading and heating; and

3) Drying creep - The long-term strain of concrete due to loading and drying without heating. Based on the results of this testing, the licensees vendor subject matter experts confirmed that the effects of creep on the SB concrete was small and thus did not cause the SB laminar cracking; and

e. The freeze-thaw testing of concrete core samples was initiated and conducted in accordance with ASTM C-666. However, after the first day of testing, the temperature controller of the test machine failed and the test was halted until a new controller could be procured. The licensee decided not to continue or re-start the test, because the freeze-thaw testing was an extended long-term test, which would not have been completed in time to support the root cause investigation. Further, the RCT had relied on petrography examination results (e.g., lack of microcracks) to eliminate freeze-thaw as a potential cause for the laminar cracking.

The licensee contracted with vendor- Department of Interior (DOI) United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) - to perform measurements of CBS concrete thermal diffusivity, thermal conductivity, specific heat, and coefficient of linear thermal expansion. These tests were performed in accordance with the DOI standards USBR 4909-02, Thermal Diffusivity of Concrete, USBR 4907-92, Specific Heat of Aggregates, Concrete, and Other Materials, and USBR 4910-92, Coefficient of Linear Thermal Expansion. The measured coefficient of thermal expansion was used as a material property in the analytical modeling performed by the licensees vendor to validate the direct cause of the laminar cracking.

The licensee also contracted with vendors to perform analysis and modeling to support or refute failure modes such as, seismic; snow/ice; or dead weight of dome. The NRC team reviewed inputs, assumptions, and applications for analysis and modeling that supported the RCT conclusions as discussed below:

x The licensees vendor developed a detailed three dimensional Finite Element Analysis (FEA) model using the Abaqus software for the structural analysis of the SB. The model included the SB shoulders so that an accurate representation and analysis of this SB feature of interest could be completed. This model was used to evaluate various loadings on the structure as described in the supporting vendor report. The vendor also developed a three dimensional finite element model using the Fluent Software. The model included the major structures adjacent to the SB to allow for the accurate assessment of their affects on this structure. This model was developed for computational fluid dynamics analyses, and it was used to evaluate various wind and thermal conditions acting on the SB. This model was used in several of the FENOC vendors (Performance Improvement International) analysis exhibits. The NASTRAN analysis software was used to develop a three dimensional finite element model of the SB. This finite element model was used to evaluate transient thermal temperatures for the various environmental conditions.

9 Enclosure

x The vendor performed FEA to validate the three contributing causes of laminar cracking related to the configuration of the SB structural reinforcement (e.g.,

density and spacing of rebar, and the lack of radial reinforcement in flute shoulders). The vendor also performed FEA to refute three possible causes for the SB laminar cracking: (1) tornado wind; (2) long term thermal stress cycles; and (3) rebar creep. The results predicted insufficient radial stress to initiate or propagate laminar cracks. The NRC team confirmed that the vendor FEA model inputs used for these applications were adequately justified. The vendor identified five conditions necessary for SB laminar cracking. Two of the necessary conditions were: a significant amount of water has diffused into the concrete; and the environment temperature drops well below the freezing point of water so the temperature near the outer rebar mat behind the shoulders will drop below the freezing point of water. The vendor developed these inputs based on a documented evaluation of actual degradation of concrete water tanks, Deterioration and Repair of above Ground Concrete Water Tanks in Ontario, Canada. The team reviewed this report and concluded that the FEA inputs postulated by environmental conditions during the blizzard of 1978 were credible.

The NRC team reviewed the RCR and supporting vendor report (Performance Improvement International - Root Cause Assessment Davis-Besse Shield Building Laminar Cracking) to evaluate if the RCT had sufficient evidence to refute all but six of the 45 potential failure modes. The six remaining unrefuted failure modes were used by the RCT to support the final identification of the direct, root or contributing causes of the SB laminar cracking (report Section b.4). The NRC team concluded that the RCT had established a sufficient basis to refute/exclude 39 of the 45 failure modes as potential causes for the SB cracking with one exception. The NRC team identified that the RCT had not recorded a sufficient basis in the RCR to eliminate slipform induced laminar cracking in the Failure Mode Analysis process. It is possible for concrete slipforming construction techniques to create subsurface cracking near the reinforcement material.

This type of cracking is caused by excessive friction at the concrete surface in contact with the slipforms and can result in cracks not visible from the surface. (Reference -,

"Slipforming of Vertical Concrete Structures - Friction between Concrete and Slipform Panel," by Kjell Tore Fossa - Department of Structural Engineering, The Norwegian University of Science and Technology N-7491 Trondheim Norway, June 2001).

Excessive friction at the slipform/concrete interface can be attributed to a number of factors including speed (slow speed) and out-of-plumb conditions on the formwork.

During original construction the licensee had identified an out-of-plumb condition associated with the slipform construction process. In response to the NRC teams questions, the licensee stated that information available on the out-of-plumb condition was limited to the original construction records which did not include information on the method of correcting the problem or if it caused excessive friction. However, the licensee determined that it was not probable that slipforming friction contributed to the observed cracking because the out-of-plumb condition peaked at three distinct elevations that did not correspond to the observed laminar cracking identified; the construction project specifications included considerations that reduce friction and the rate of slipforming (average about 4 ft per shift) was expected to be fast enough to minimize friction problems, and the observed cracking went through aggregate materials which indicated that the laminar cracking occurred after the concrete reached sufficient maturity and not during placement. The NRC team agreed with the licensees explanation for why slipform induced cracking was not a possible cause for this event 10 Enclosure

and considered the licensees failure to document this basis in the RCR as a minor documentation weakness (see report Section b.4).

b.3 Licensee Identified Causes of SB Laminar Cracking The RCT members were supplemented by vendors (VATIC Associates, MPR, and Performance Improvement International) and utilized a collegial process with these vendors to arrive at conclusions documented in the RCR.

The RCT concluded that the Direct Cause for the SB concrete laminar cracking was the integrated affect of moisture content, wind speed, temperature, and the duration of these conditions created during the blizzard of 1978. The environmental conditions created by the blizzard of 1978 enabled moisture to penetrate the SB concrete, freeze and expand, which created radial stresses that exceeded the tensile strength of the concrete and initiated the subsurface laminar cracking (Attachment 2, Picture 11).

The RCT concluded that the Root Cause for the SB concrete laminar cracking was due to the design specification for construction of the SB (Davis-Besse Specification No. C-038, Shield Building, Revision 1) that did not specify application of an exterior sealant from moisture. The other nuclear safety-related structures on-site had a protective sealant as a barrier against moisture migration into the concrete.

The RCT identified three Contributing Causes for the SB concrete laminar cracking:

x Stress concentration at the outer face of structural reinforcing steel behind the thickest section of the flute shoulder. The stress concentration behind the thickest section of the flute shoulder magnified the radial stress due to freezing/expansion of the moisture inside the SB wall creating a radial stress that exceed the tensile strength of the concrete and initiated a crack, x Design did not include radial reinforcing steel ties or stirrups at intermediate spacing which enabled the laminar crack created by freezing moisture to propagate to the end connections, and x Density of the structural reinforcing steel was less than or equal to six inch spacing in specific areas. Once a crack originated in the shoulder region, it continued to propagate into adjacent areas if a higher density of reinforcing steel was present such as at the top 20 feet of the SB and the mainsteam line penetration blockouts. The greater density of structural reinforcing steel enabled the laminar crack created by freezing moisture to propagate into these areas.

b.4 NRC Team Conclusions on Causes of SB Laminar Cracking The NRC team evaluated the key factors and evidence developed in support of the causes identified by the RCT for the SB laminar cracking. The NRC team concluded that the licensees RCT developed a sufficient basis to support the causes of the SB laminar cracking related to: the environmental factors created during the 1978 blizzard, the lack of an exterior moisture barrier, and the structural design elements of the SB.

Specifically, the weather records, CBS results, IR testing and SB analytical modeling provided a sufficient basis to support the causes of the laminar cracking.

11 Enclosure

The NRC team reviewed the RCR, site root cause investigation procedures and interviewed licensee staff to evaluate if the causes for the SB cracking were adequately ascertained. The team concluded that the RCT was staffed with qualified and experienced staff supplemented by vendor subject matter experts with extensive experience related to concrete examination, testing and/or failure analysis. The NRC team confirmed that the RCT followed an approved site procedure and applied a scrutable process in conducting the root cause investigation.

The NRC team identified minor weaknesses in the RCR generally associated with the level of detail in the documentation recorded, but these weaknesses did not constitute performance deficiencies or findings because they did not adversely affect the outcome of the root cause process.

Additional details of the NRC teams review of this area are provided in Sections b.4.1 and b.4.2 below.

b.4.1 NRC Team Evaluation of Causes The NRC team evaluated key factors that supported the Direct Cause - The integrated effect (on the SB) of moisture content, wind speed, temperature, and duration of these effects during the blizzard of 1978.

x The NRC team confirmed that weather records existed which supported the Direct Cause related to the extreme environmental conditions associated with the blizzard of 1978. This blizzard occurred from January 25 - 27, 1978, and produced rain with sustained winds, followed by rapid temperature drop and significant snowfall. Specifically, snowfall amounts ranging from 12 inches in Toledo to 22 inches at Saginaw, Michigan were recorded with wind speeds of 45 miles per hour (mph) and gusts to 105 mph west of Toledo, Ohio. This blizzard was preceded by a rapid drop in temperature beginning at 12 noon on January 25, 1978, and ending at midnight January 27, 1978. The vendor report included temperature maps that record a temperature drop from 40 degrees Fahrenheit (°F) at about 6:00 pm on January 25, 1978, to about -5° F by midnight. Daily temperatures were below 20° F by noon on January 26, 1978, and surface temperature continued to drop to near 0° F by midnight on January 27, 1978. These environmental conditions enabled moisture to penetrate the SB concrete, freeze and expand, which created a radial stress that exceeded the tensile strength of the concrete triggering the subsurface laminar cracking (Attachment 2, Pictures 10, 11 and 12).

x To confirm the Direct Cause, the RCT relied on a vendor developed finite element model to evaluate the thermal stress developed for a portion of the SB near the flute shoulders subject to moisture intrusion and freezing. The vendor model results confirmed that the radial stresses developed within the SB exterior wall were of sufficient magnitude to initiate the subsurface laminar cracking (Attachment 2, Pictures 11 and 12). A necessary component of this cracking process was the effect of wind-driven rain, which served to provide a constant source of moisture for penetration into the outer surface of the SB concrete wall (Attachment 2, Picture 10). The moisture at the exterior surface, saturated the pores in the outer layer of concrete with liquid water, and for some depth beyond created a high water vapor content within the concrete pores. The NRC team 12 Enclosure

reviewed the results of a moisture penetration test to evaluate the reasonableness of the licensees assumptions on moisture intrusion into the SB wall. Specifically, a ponding test was conducted on a SB CBS concrete cylinder by the licensees vendor at the University of Colorado Boulder. In this test, the concrete CBS cylinder was placed in an upright position with the outer surface facing up and moisture sensors were embedded in the concrete cylinder at different depths from the surface. A column of water was placed on top of the cylinder, and the depth of moisture penetration was measured to evaluate the resistance of the SB concrete to water and moisture penetration. Based upon this test, the depth of moisture penetration was about 2 to 3 inches after a few days of continuous exposure to water and this test was intended to simulate the continuous moisture presented by the wind driven rain that preceded the blizzard of 1978. Additionally, because the shoulder areas allow moisture to penetrate from two directions, a higher overall depth of moisture penetration would exist in the SB shoulder regions. The results of these moisture penetration tests supported the key assumptions applied by the vendors in the stress models developed to simulate the conditions that resulted in the SB laminar cracking.

Therefore, the NRC team concluded that the RCT had developed a sufficient basis for the direct cause of the SB cracking.

The NRC team evaluated evidence that supported the Contributing Causes, the inherent stress concentration at the outer face of structural reinforcing steel behind the thickest section of the flute, the lack of reinforcing steel ties or stirrups at an intermediate spacing between each end of the flute reinforcing steel connection with the structural reinforcing steel, and adjacent areas such as at the top 20 feet of the SB with higher density of reinforcing steel that enabled the laminar crack created by freezing to propagate outside the flute shoulder area.

x The NRC team reviewed the IR mapping results (Attachment 2, Pictures 4 and 5) and SB drawings identifying the location and configuration of structural reinforcement (e.g., rebar) to determine if the extent of laminar cracking identified was consistent with the RCT conclusions that SB reinforcement design features contributed to the extent of cracking observed. The NRC team confirmed that the extent of cracking identified by IR testing results was consistent with the RCT identified Contributing Causes. However, the NRC team identified areas of laminar crack indications between SB shoulders 6 and 7 and above the mainsteam line penetrations which did not include sufficient IR test locations to link this area directly with cracked areas in the adjacent SB shoulder regions.

The NRC teams observation related to a lack of IR coverage did not invalidate the theory for the Direct Cause of the cracking or the Contributing Causes because the extensive computer modeling and vendor CBS testing provided a sufficient basis to validate these causes. Specifically, five analyses were completed in support of the SB laminar cracking causes Freezing Failure and Rebar Spacing Sensitivity Study, Structural and Thermal Analysis Investigation, Stress State During 1978 and 1977 Blizzards, Stress Analysis Due to 105 mph Wind Load, and Laminar Cracking Due to 1978 Blizzard. Therefore, the NRC team concluded that the RCT had developed a sufficient basis for the Contributing Causes.

13 Enclosure

The NRC team evaluated the evidence which supported the Root Cause. Specifically, Davis-Besse Specification No. C-038, the design specification for construction of the SB, did not specify application of an exterior sealant from moisture.

x The NRC team reviewed design specification No. C-038, examined records for the CBS removed from the SB wall, and performed walkdowns of the SB exterior wall. Based upon this review, the team confirmed that the SB specification did not require a moisture barrier, no moisture barrier currently existed on the SB exterior surface and that the design standards and Code applicable to the SB construction (ACI-307, Design and Construction of Reinforced Concrete Chimneys, and ACI-318, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete) did not require installation of a moisture barrier. Because the Direct Cause of this event required moisture intrusion, the NRC team concluded that the RCT had identified a sufficient basis for the Root Cause involving the lack of a moisture barrier in the original SB construction specification.

x Because the SB did not contain a moisture barrier, the NRC team evaluated if the SB design was consistent with ACI-201.2R-01, Guide to Durable Concrete.

Specifically, for concrete that will be exposed to a combination of moisture and cyclic freezing ACI-201.2R-01 recommends design of the structure to minimize exposure to moisture, a low water to cement ratio, appropriate air entrainment, quality materials, adequate curing before first freezing cycle, and special attention to construction practices. For minimizing exposure to moisture, this ACI standard stated, Because the vulnerability of concrete to cyclic freezing is greatly influenced by the degree of saturation of the concrete, precautions should be taken to minimize water uptake in the initial design of the structure. The geometry of the structure should promote good drainage. Tops of walls and all outer surfaces should be sloped. Low spots conducive to the formation of puddles should be avoided. Weep holes should not discharge over the face of exposed concrete. Drainage from higher ground should not flow over the top or faces of concrete walls. In this case, the SB design provided for a design that minimized uptake of moisture into the SB wall, but these measures were not effective at precluding the moisture intrusion associated with the 1978 blizzard event. Based upon the review of the SB design and the RCT investigation of original construction practices, the NRC team concluded that the original SB design was consistent with the recommendations for minimizing moisture intrusion as discussed in this ACI standard.

The NRC team determined that the lack of a SB moisture barrier was not a licensee performance deficiency and hence not an NRC finding or violation. Specifically, Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 defines a performance deficiency as, An issue that is the result of a licensee not meeting a requirement or standard where the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct, and therefore should have been prevented. In this case, the licensee had met applicable standards (ACI-307, ACI-318) and regulatory requirements for construction of the SB without a moisture barrier. Further, the licensee could not have been expected to foresee (e.g., no prior nuclear industry OE) the unique combination of SB design elements and environmental conditions associated with the blizzard of 1978 that caused the subsurface cracking within the SB wall.

14 Enclosure

b.4.2 NRC Team Evaluation of the Root Cause Process The NRC team evaluated the RCT investigation for adherence to the mandatory requirements identified in the licensees root cause analyses procedure NOBP-LP-2011, FENOC Cause Analysis. Specifically, the NRC team confirmed that the RCT had complied with the following mandatory aspects of this procedure:

Generic Implications - The evaluation of generic implications must include experience reviews and address extent of condition and extent of cause. The RCT documented their reviews in this area in the RCR with sufficient information to reach a conclusion regarding the potential for the Root Cause to affect other structures and processes.

x Qualified Root Cause Evaluator - The RCT must include a qualified root cause evaluator, and all the necessary resources and information must be provided in order for the RCT to complete the root cause evaluation and reach the appropriate conclusion. The NRC team confirmed that the RCT was staffed with a qualified root cause evaluator, qualified in accordance with: NOP-LP-2001, Corrective Action Program, and CAP-JFGRCE-FEN, Root Cause Evaluator Job Familiarization Guideline. The NRC team also interviewed RCT members to confirm sufficient resources were provided to support an adequate root cause investigation and evaluation.

x Root Cause Investigation Method - The root cause investigation was required to be performed using techniques defined in the procedure. As documented in the RCR, the RCT had applied the TapRoot Methodology, Problem Solving and Decision Making, Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation, Event and Causal Factors Charting, Barrier Analysis, Change Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis. These methods and techniques applied in the root cause investigation were approved for use in the licensees Procedure NOBP-LP-2011.

x CA Plan - A CA plan was required to be established and documented in the RCR that addressed the identified causes and included actions to prevent recurrence.

The RCT documented a CA Plan in the RCR and in the associated CR-2011-03346 which accomplished these requirements including due dates and CA owners.

Additionally, the root cause evaluation CAs were reviewed and approved by members of licensee management as a part of the Corrective Action Review Board process as defined in procedure NOBP-LP-2008, FENOC Corrective Action Review Board.

x Peer Review - The cause evaluation report was required to be peer reviewed by a cause evaluator qualified to the same level as the cause evaluation or higher. In this case, the peer reviewer for the SB RCR was required to be qualified at the root cause level, and the NRC team confirmed that the assigned peer reviewer was qualified as a root cause evaluator in accordance with: NOP-LP-2008, Corrective Action Program and CAP-JFGRCE-FEN, Root Cause Evaluator Job Familiarization Guideline.

Based upon this review, the NRC team confirmed that the RCT followed an approved procedure and applied a scrutable process in conducting the root cause investigation and that the RCT methodologies applied TapRoot Methodology, Problem Solving and Decision Making, Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation, Event and Causal Factors 15 Enclosure

Charting, Barrier Analysis, Change Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis were successful in identification of the causes for the SB laminar cracking.

The licensees four member RCT was supplemented by three vendors with subject matter experts knowledgeable in concrete structure design, construction, examination, and modeling. The primary vendor, Performance Improvement International, produced a separate proprietary vendor report to document its investigation results titled, Root Cause Assessment Davis-Besse SB Laminar Cracking. To confirm that sufficient expertise was applied to the root cause investigation, the NRC team conducted interviews and reviewed records of the education and experience possessed by the licensees RCT and supporting vendor staff. These records confirmed that the licensee and vendor staff possessed advanced graduate degrees and had experience in concrete engineering, metallurgy, materials science, civil engineering, structural engineering, nuclear engineering, and construction engineering, respectively. Several members of the RCT also had many years of experience performing root cause evaluations related to nuclear power plant events including experience with the root cause evaluation for Crystal River Unit 3 delamination cracking event. Additionally, the vendor supporting the RCT had previously developed and applied sophisticated finite element models used to support the investigation and evaluation of the delamination related cracking experienced at Crystal River 3. Based upon this review, the NRC team concluded that the RCT composition was staffed with appropriately qualified licensee personnel supplemented by vendors staffed with leading experts in numerous engineering fields and with extensive experience in concrete examination, testing and failure analysis.

The NRC team identified minor weaknesses in the RCR generally associated with the level of detail in the documentation recorded, but these weaknesses did not constitute performance deficiencies or findings because they did not adversely affect the outcome (e.g., conclusions) of the root cause process. Specifically, the RCR did not include:

x A review to determine why the SB specification did not include a requirement for coating as was included in other SR buildings.

x An explanation for why six CBS existed with two laminar cracks at slightly different depths. These cracks were closely spaced at depths which correspond to the outer rebar mat area and the licensee vendor experts considered that this crack pattern may be the result of two different cracks overlapping (e.g.,

overlapped because two cracks came from different directions and did not link up).

x An explanation that weather had prevented measuring crack depths/widths at one CBS location and did not explain the cause of radial cracks identified in four CBS. The licensee believed the radial cracks were caused by shrinkage in some cases and by the core bore drilling process in other cases.

x An explanation that additional investigations and analysis had been completed by the vendor in support of failure Modes 1.5 and 2.11 associated with the density of rebar.

x A documented basis to eliminate slipform induced laminar cracking as a potential failure mode. Subsequent discussions with the licensee confirmed that this 16 Enclosure

failure mode was not a possible contributor for the SB cracking (see Report Section b.2).

x Sufficient IR test results to positively confirm that the SB shoulder configuration (e.g., structural discontinuity) was a necessary factor to exist for all areas exhibiting laminar cracking. Specifically, laminar crack indications existed between SB shoulders 6 and 7 and above the mainsteam line penetrations which did not have IR test results that definitively connected to areas of cracking identified at the SB shoulder regions (see Report Section b.4).

x The results of the RCTs walkdown to confirm that other site safety-related buildings were coated and the results of the RCT reviews of the Structures Monitoring Program records for other site safety-related buildings.

x A more complete basis for excluding the SB roof dome in the extent of cause review for the laminar cracking. The RCT had excluded the SB roof dome based upon the contributing causes associated with the unique design elements of the SB exterior wall. Because the SB dome was coated with a latex based coating, the presence of this moisture resistant coating could have provided a more complete basis for exclusion than just the contributing causes.

x The specific depths within the SB CBS where ettringite (crystal formation from sulfate reaction with calcium aluminates) was detected in the concrete pores.

This examination confirmed that the outer surface of the cores was not water repellant, because the concrete air voids were lined with secondary deposits of ettringite and calcium hydroxide suggesting long-term exposure to moisture migrating through the concrete. The lack of detailed records recording depth from the SB surface that this mineral was detected did not affect the results associated with moisture penetration. Specifically, the vendor did not rely on this test alone to determine the depth of water penetration into the SB. Instead, other vendor tests were conducted to directly measure the depth of water penetration into concrete samples removed from the DB SB (see report Section b.4).

The licensee entered these NRC team observations into the CA system (Reference CR-2012-04177) and initiated a revision to the RCR and the supporting vendor report, Performance Improvement International - Root Cause Assessment Davis-Besse Shield Building Laminar Cracking, to correct these issues.

b.5 Licensee CAs for Causes of SB Laminar Cracking The licensee defined a Problem Statement - On October 10, 2011, a concrete crack was observed at the flute region of a temporary access opening in the SB wall.

In response to this Problem Statement and to address the extent of laminar subsurface cracking discovered, the licensee RCT developed the following CAs and preventative actions as documented in the RCR and identified below.

Extent of Condition x CA No. 1 - Additional examinations (specific locations not yet defined) of the SB exterior wall.

17 Enclosure

x CA No. 2 - Issue engineering change package for additional SB CBS (specific locations not yet selected).

Direct Cause - Integrated effect of moisture content, wind speed, temperature, and duration from the blizzard of 1978.

x Direct Cause CA No. 1 - Testing program to investigate the steel reinforcement capacity adjacent to structural discontinuities.

x Direct Cause CA No. 2 - Engineering plan to re-establish design and licensing basis for SB.

x Direct Cause CA No. 3 - Issue site specific procedure for long-term monitoring of the SB laminar cracking (RCR defines a schedule).

Root Cause - Design specification for construction of the SB did not specify application of an exterior sealant from moisture.

x Root Cause Preventive Action No.1 - Issue engineering change package for SB exterior sealant system.

x Root Cause Preventive Action No. 2 - Implement engineering change package for SB exterior sealant system.

x Root Cause CA No. 3 - Update inspection procedure to include SB exterior sealant system.

Contributing Cause No. 1 - Inherent stress concentration in outer face of structural reinforcing steel behind the thickest section of the flute shoulder.

x No CA required because root cause preventive actions nullify impact.

Contributing Cause No. 2 - Design did not include radial reinforcing steel ties or stirrups at intermediate spacing between each end of the flute shoulder reinforcing steel connection with the structural reinforcing steel.

x No CA required because root cause preventive actions nullify impact.

Contributing Cause No. 3 - Density of structural reinforcing steel less than or equal to six inch spacing at the top 20 feet of the SB and at openings and penetrations.

x No CA required because root cause preventive actions nullify impact.

b.6 NRC Team Conclusions on CAs for the Causes of SB Cracking The NRC team evaluated the CAs to address the causes of the SB cracking to determine if they were sufficient to prevent recurrence, and ensure the continued capability of the SB to perform the design safety functions (biological shielding, controlled release of annulus atmosphere under an accident condition, and 18 Enclosure

environmental protection of the CV). Specifically, the NRC team reviewed the CAs as documented in the RCR for the causes identified to determine if they would eliminate and/or mitigate the conditions that caused the laminar cracking or which could lead to growth of the existing laminar cracking. Based upon this review, the NRC team concluded that the CAs and preventative actions, if adequately implemented, would prevent recurrence of the laminar cracking in the SB.

The NRC review of the CAs to address the Direct Cause are ongoing as part of the Davis-Besse license renewal application (LRA) process. Based upon the RCT proposed CAs and ongoing NRC reviews of the Davis-Besse LRA, the NRC team concluded that the capability of the SB to perform the design safety functions would be assured. In particular, the NRC LRA reviews will include an evaluation of the proposed program for monitoring of the SB cracking.

The NRC team identified two examples where the scope of CAs to address the causes of the SB cracking was too narrow. The licensee had not proposed examinations to confirm a lack of subsurface cracking in other safety-related building structures with installed moisture barriers as a means to further substantiate the Direct Cause. A CA proposed for the Root Cause included updating a site procedure for periodic inspections of only the SB exterior sealant system instead of a broader action to include inspection of other safety-related buildings with moisture barriers. The licensee entered the NRC teams observations into the CA system and was considering actions to expand the scope of these CAs.

Additional details of the NRC teams review of this area are provided in Sections b.6.1, b.6.2 and b.6.3 below.

b.6.1 NRC Team Evaluation of the Extent of Condition Related CAs The RCT had identified CAs that were limited to only the SB, because it was the only above-grade nuclear safety-related structure on-site designed by Bechtel during original construction that did not have a white cement Thoroseal finish for sealing exterior concrete surfaces. Further, the RCT determined that a waterproofing membrane was installed below-grade on the SB exterior and the SB dome lacked factors found in the flute shoulders such as the discontinuity stress concentration factor and high density reinforcing steel necessary for crack initiation and propagation. However, the effectiveness or durability of the moisture barriers applied to other safety-related building structures was not evaluated by the RCT. Given the importance placed upon the moisture barrier in preventing this type of laminar cracking, the NRC team considered the proposed scope of the licensees CAs too narrow. Specifically, no actions were proposed to examine other safety-related building structures with installed moisture barriers to demonstrate a lack of subsurface cracking. Doing so, would provide additional substantiation of the Direct Cause. In response to the NRC teams observation, the licensee entered this condition into the CA system (Reference CR-2012-04178) and discussed development of additional IR testing and CBS of other safety-related buildings to confirm a lack of laminar subsurface cracking.

The NRC team performed a review to determine if the RCT had complied with the procedural aspects of NOBP-LP-2011, FENOC Cause Analysis, for CAs to address extent of cause. Specifically, this procedure required an extent of cause evaluation for each identified Root Cause and the Direct Cause. The licensee performed an extent of 19 Enclosure

cause review as described in Section 6.3 of the RCR and concluded that the accessible exterior concrete surfaces of the SB should be sealed to prevent moisture penetration like the other nuclear safety-related structures on-site, and that the exterior of other nuclear safety-related structures should be examined to ensure the protective coating remains acceptable. Because the RCT had considered all the identified causes including the Contributing and Direct causes in arriving at this conclusion, they had complied with the procedure. The NRC team also confirmed that the licensee had assigned site staff (e.g., owners) to each extent of condition CA with reasonable due dates.

b.6.2 NRC Team Evaluation of CAs for the Direct Cause The RCT proposed three CAs for the Direct Cause of the SB cracking (e.g., Integrated effect of moisture content, wind speed, temperature, and duration of these conditions during the blizzard of 1978). Specifically, the RCT proposed a testing program to investigate the steel reinforcement capacity adjacent to structural discontinuities, an engineering plan to re-establish design and licensing basis for SB, and to issue a site specific procedure for long-term monitoring of the SB laminar cracking.

To provide qualitative insights on the licensees proposed methods for monitoring the SB, the NRC team applied the process for condition assessment described in Section 4 of NUREG-6424. Specifically, in Section 4 of NUREG-6424, Report on Aging of Nuclear Power Plant Reinforced Concrete Structures, ORNL stated, Condition assessment and management of aging in NPP concrete structures require a more systematic approach than simple reliance on existing code margins. What is required is the integration of structural component function, potential degradation mechanisms, and appropriate control programs into a quantitative evaluation procedure. Further, ORNL stated, Four criteria are considered to be of importance in assessing the significance of various degradation factors to which nuclear power plant reinforced concrete structures can be subjected: (1) rate of deterioration; (2) capability for inspection and early detection of degradation; (3) repairability of the sub-element affected; and (4) ultimate impact of the degradation factor(s). Based upon application of this process to the DB shield building degradation (cracks), the NRC team did not identify any additional inspection methods that should have been considered beyond what the licensee had proposed for monitoring of the SB laminar cracking.

The licensees program for monitoring of the SB laminar cracking will be the subject of further NRC review as part of the Davis-Besse LRA process. Specifically, the NRC issued a request for additional information (RAI) No. B.2.39-13) (ADAMS Accession No. ML11333A3960), and the licensee provided site specific information related to the SB cracking including: plans to monitor the extent and thickness of SB cracks, and corrosion of the SB rebars over the long term, and the details of tests to determine the long term effect of the concrete cracks on the ability of the rebar to carry design loads.

Therefore, the scope of the NRC review for this RAI will assess and evaluate the results from the licensees Direct Cause CA No. 1 - Testing program to investigate the steel reinforcement capacity adjacent to structural discontinuities and Direct Cause CA No. 3 - Issue site specific procedure for long-term monitoring of the SB laminar cracking. For the Direct Cause CA No. 2, the licensee will develop an engineering plan to re-establish design and licensing basis for the SB. Hence, the licensee will meet their procedure requirements for addressing the Direct Cause (Reference NOBP-LP-2011, FENOC Cause Analysis). Based upon the proposed actions and ongoing NRC 20 Enclosure

reviews for this area, the NRC team concluded that the continued capability of the SB to perform the design safety functions would be assured. In particular, the NRC LRA reviews will include an evaluation of the program for monitoring of the shield building cracking. The NRC team also confirmed that that licensee had assigned site staff (e.g.,

owners) to each Direct Cause CA with reasonable due dates.

b.6.3 NRC Team Evaluation of CAs for the Root Cause The RCT proposed two preventative actions and one CA for the Root Cause of the SB cracking (e.g., the design specification for construction of the SB did not specify application of an exterior sealant from moisture). Specifically, the licensee planned to issue and implement an engineering change package for SB exterior sealant system and to update an inspection procedure to include examination of the SB exterior sealant system.

The licensees procedure NOBP-LP-2011, FENOC Cause Analysis, required that these CAs be able to restore the condition to acceptable standards. The preventative actions proposed included development and implementation of an engineering change package for installation of an exterior sealant system for the SB. The engineering change process would result in an update for the SB specifications to include an external moisture barrier, and this action would restore the SB to an acceptable condition to prevent additional cracking created by moisture intrusion. Additionally, the licensee CA No. 3 provided for an inspection procedure for the SB exterior sealant system to ensure the continued effectiveness of the moisture barrier. Therefore, the NRC team concluded that these preventative and CAs, if properly implemented would preclude moisture intrusion and hence preclude recurrence of the conditions that caused the SB laminar cracking. The NRC team also confirmed that that the licensee had assigned site staff (e.g., owners) to each CA with reasonable due dates.

The NRC team identified that the CA No. 3 for the Root Cause - Update inspection procedure to include SB exterior sealant system was too narrow. For this CA, the licensee identified a need to update ENDP- 0511, Design Guidelines for Maintenance Rule Evaluation of Structures, for periodic inspection of only the SB exterior sealant system instead of a broader action to inspect all safety-related buildings with moisture barriers. The licensee stated that they had intended this CA to include inspection of all safety-related buildings and not just the SB. To ensure this CA was properly implemented, the licensee recorded this NRC observation in CR-2012-04177.

b.6.4 NRC Team Evaluation of CAs for the Contributing Causes The RCT identified that no CAs were necessary for the three contributing causes related to SB structural design elements because the Root Cause preventive action to install an exterior sealant system established a barrier against moisture intrusion and nullified the need for any CAs. Specifically, the RCT determined that the acute freezing and expansion of moisture in the SB concrete was the only scenario capable of producing radial stresses large enough to enable the laminar crack initiation. Based upon computer modeling of the SB loads without the moisture intrusion, the extreme combinations of temperature and wind were insufficient to result in laminar cracking of the concrete. Therefore, the RCT concluded that the Root Cause CAs nullified the impact of the contributing causes. The NRC team agreed with this conclusion, but believed a stronger basis could have been established by referencing/crediting the CA 21 Enclosure

for the Direct Cause CA No. 2 - Engineering Plan to Re-Establish the Design and Licensing Basis for the SB. Specifically, the scope of this CA would include an evaluation to determine what (if any) design changes to the SB are required to re-establish the design and licensee basis for the SB. The NRC team also confirmed that that licensee had assigned site staff (e.g., owners) to each CA with reasonable due dates.

The licensee assigned CAs for the Root and Direct Causes but not the Contributing Causes. The NRC team performed a review to determine if the lack of CAs assigned to the contributing causes complied with the licensees procedure NOBP-LP-2011; FENOC Cause Analysis. This procedure required that CAs shall be identified for all identified causes which are, needed to restore the condition to acceptable standards.

The licensee identified that no actions were, needed for the contributing cause because the root cause preventive actions nullified the impact of contributing cause.

Because no CAs were identified as, needed to restore the Contributing Cause conditions to acceptable standards, it complied with the site procedure.

c. Findings No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting On May 9, 2012, the NRC team presented the inspection results to Mr. Barry Allen and members of the licensee staff at the exit meeting. The team reviewed proprietary documents during this inspection and asked the licensee to identify any report input material that was considered proprietary. : Supplemental Information : Photos and Diagrams 22 Enclosure

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee B. Allen, Site Vice President B. Boles, Director, Site Operations K. Browning, Root Cause Evaluator K. Byrd, Director, Site Engineering J. Hook, Manager, Design Engineering D. Pace, Senior Vice President, Engineering G. Wolf, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance Nuclear Regulatory Commission D. Kimble, Senior Resident Inspector LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Opened, Closed, and Discussed None.

1 Attachment 1

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the team reviewed the documents in their entirety but rather that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

Calculations and Evaluations Corrective Action Records and Nonconformance Reports CR-2011-03346; Fractured Concrete Found at 17M Shield Building Construction Opening; dated October 10, 2011 CR-2012-03889; Shield Building Core Bore S7-665-47; dated March 13, 2012 CR-2012-04177; Observations from NRC Inspection Shield Building Root Cause Report; dated March 19, 2012 CR-2012-04178; Observations from NRC Inspection Shield Building Root Cause Report; dated March 19, 2012 CR-2011-03232; Shield Building Reinforcement Bar Concrete Cover Less Than Drawing Requirement; October 8, 2011 CR-2011-01540; Exterior Shield Building Inspection Findings; September 2, 2011.

CR-G201-2009-68900; EVS Train 2 Failed Timed Drawdown Test Per DB-SC-03255; December 11, 2009 CR-2011-029663; 17M Annulus Sand Pocket Walkdown Results; October 4, 2011 CR-G201-2006-02932; Degraded Drain Piping Joint on Shield Building; August 3, 2006 CR-G201-2007-29203; CTMT Shield Building Exterior Surface Showing Evidence of Minor Degradation; October 25, 2007 CR-G201-2007-29204; CTMT Vessel Shield building Roof Drain Clogged; October 25, 2007 CR-G201-2008-33710; Groundwater In-seepage Identified in the Annulus Sandpocket; January 18, 2008 CR-G201-2009-68960; 50 percent of Containment Annulus Heaters Out of Service for an Extended Period; December 14, 2009 CR-G201-2010-72660; Groundwater Identified in the Annulus Sandpocket; March 4, 2010 CR-G201-2003-06445; Expansion Anchor Drilled Into Unsound Concrete; August 11, 2003 CR-G201-2002-07671; Cement Mortar Mix for Void Repair Material; October 4, 2002 2 Attachment 1

CR-G201-2002-07472; Voids in the Containment Shield Building Annulus Side; September 24, 2002 CR-G201-2002-07080; Shield Building Concrete Voids; September 30, 2002 CR-G201-2002-04713; Shield Building Vertical Rebar Spacing Do Not Meet Specification; August 21, 2002 CR-G201-2002-04253; Shield Building Rebar Cover Tolerance Below Specification Limit; August 14, 2002 CR-G201-2002-03375; Areas of Interest Identified During Shield Building Inspections; July 19, 2002 CR-G201-2001-1269; Containment Building Concrete Spalling; May 14, 2001 NCR 57; Containment Concrete Placement, Pour No. 2; April 11, 1972 NCR 359; Concrete Keyway Poured in Inverted Position; June 25, 1973 NCR 382; Electrical Blockouts not insulated; August 6, 1973 NCR 407; Rebar Placement - Dowels omitted or broken off; October 17, 1973 NCR 415; Embedded Plates for Station Vent Stack Supports Not Placed According to Drawing; November 5, 1973 NCR 451; Pipe Sleeve Flanges for Penetration No. 40 Not Aligned; February 1, 1974 NCR 457; Pipe Sleeve Flanges for Penetration No. 39 Not Aligned; February 15, 1974 NCR 474; Penetration No. 40 and No. 33 Flange Placement; March 22, 1974 NCR 479; Penetration No. 40 Pipe Sleeve Flange Not Aligned; March 26, 1974 NCR 602; Reglet in Shield Building Not Placed According to Drawing; November 18, 1974 NCR 743; Two Dowels from Shield Building Penetration No. 80 Missing; August 11, 1975 NCR 772; Drawing Conflict for Shield Building Reinforcement Placement; September 19, 1975 Drawings C-109; Shield Building Roof Plan and Details; Revision 6 C-110; Shield Building Roof Plan Wall Section and Details; Revision 6 C-111; Shield Building Wall Development; Revision 11 C-111A; Shield Building Exterior Developed Elevation; Revision 2 C-112; Shield Building Details; Revision 10 3 Attachment 1

C-113; Shield Building Details; Revision 11 C-114; Shield Building Dome Framing Plan and Details; Revision 3 C-115; Shield Building Blockout Details; Revision 4.

CTL No. 262600; Impulse Response Mobility Plot; November 23, 2011 Other Documents Bechtel Power and Industrial Division Technical Specification No. 7749-C-25; March 12, 1970 Contract No. 7749-FSC-21; Original Construction Concrete Surface Finish Requirements; September 7, 1976 Corrective Action Review Board Minutes; February 24, 2012 Corrective Action Review Board Minutes; February 21, 2012 CTL Group Report; Impulse-Response (IR) Test Data for Shield Building Wall at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant, Oak Harbor, Ohio; November 3, 2011 CTL Group Report; Impulse-Response (IR) Test Data and Core Log Sheets for Shield Building Wall at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant, Oak Harbor, Ohio; November 22, 2011 CTL Group Report; Impulse-Response (IR) Test Data and Core Log Sheets for Shield Building Wall at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant, Oak Harbor, Ohio; November 23, 2011 DB 0179-0; Davis-Besse Design Criteria Manual Pages III.A.4-1 and III. A.4-2; Revision 4 DBNPS Specification C-025, Central Concrete Mix Plant, Revision 1 DBNPS Specification C-026, Forming, Placing, Finishing and Curing of Concrete, Revision 3 DBNPS Specification C-027, Construction, Revision 7 DBNPS Specification C-038, Shield Building, Revision 1 File C-38; Intra-Company Memorandum;

Subject:

Shield Building Parapet Wall; August 15, 1976 FITS Qualification Matrices; Corrective Action Program; Root Cause Evaluator DB; Root Cause Evaluator Certification FSK-C-799; Concrete Repair on Parapet Wall of Shield Building; July 7, 1976 Golder Associates and W. M. Slater and Associates Inc. - Report to Ontario Ministry of the Environment; Deterioration and Repair of Above Ground Concrete Water Tanks in Ontario, Canada; September 1987 Interim Field Report No. 1; Shield Building Slipform Concrete Mix Design C2-SF-4; April 26, 1971 Interim Field Report No. 3; Shield Building Concrete Placement Contract; July 14, 1971 4 Attachment 1

Interim Field Report No. 5; Containment Shield Building Out of Plumbness; July 26, 1971 LER 1978-017; Loss of Meteorological System; February 23, 1978 Material Rejection Report; Shield Building Concrete Mix C2-SF-1 Rejected; January 25, 1971 Material Rejection Report; 6 Cubic Yards of Shield Building Concrete Mix Rejected; January 26, 1971 NUREG/CR-6927; Primer on Durability of Nuclear Power Plant Reinforced Concrete Structures - A Review of Pertinent Factors; published February 2007 NUREG/CR-6424, Report on Aging of Nuclear Power Plant Reinforced Concrete Structures; March 1996 Performance Improvement International - Root Cause Assessment Davis-Besse Shield Building Laminar Cracking, February 27, 2012 Performance Improvement International Report - Retensioning Analysis, Crystal River Unit 3 Containment; February 1, 2011 University of California, Berkeley Report No. UCB/SEMM-90/14; Finite Element Analysis of Reinforced Concrete Structures under Monotonic Loads; November 1990 R. Malm; Predicting Shear Type Crack Initiation and Growth in Concrete with Non-Linear Finite Element Method, TRITA-BKN. Bulletin 97, 2009, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH),

Stockholm, Sweden; April 2009 Root Cause Analysis Report-Concrete Cracking within Shield Building Temporary Access Opening; February 27, 2012 Slipforming of Vertical Concrete Structures -Friction between Concrete and Slipform Panel; by Kjell Tore Fossa - Department of Structural Engineering The Norwegian University of Science and Technology N-7491 Trondheim Norway published June 2001 WO 200366176; Work Order to Replace Breaker BE6301 for Annulus Heaters; October 25, 2010 Procedures CAP-TP9903; FENOC Training Plan; Root Cause Evaluator; Revision 6 CAP-JFGRCE_FEN; Root Cause Evaluator Job Familiarization Guideline; Revision 4 NOBP-LP-2011; FENOC Cause Analysis; Revision 13 NOBP-LP-2008; FENOC Corrective Action Review Board; Revision 10 NOP-LP-2001: Corrective Action Program; Revision 29 EN-DP-01511; Design Guidelines for Maintenance Rule Evaluations of Structures; Revision 0 NOP-LP-2006; Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB); Revision 8 5 Attachment 1

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ACI American Concrete Institute ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials CA Corrective Action CAL Confirmatory Action Letter CBS Core Boring Samples CR Condition Report CV Containment Vessel DOI Department of Interior

°F Degrees Fahrenheit FEA Finite Element Analysis ft Foot IMC Inspection Manual Chapter IR Impulse Response LRA License Renewal Application mph Miles per Hour NCR Nonconformance Report NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission OE Operating Experience psi Pounds per Square Inch RAI Request for Additional Information RCR Root Cause Analysis Report RCT Root Cause Analysis Team SB Shield Building SDP Significance Determination Process USBR United States Bureau of Reclamation 6 Attachment 1

Photos and Diagrams ATTACHMENT 2 - PHOTOS AND DIAGRAMS Picture No. 1 - Davis-Besse Shield Building 1 Attachment 2

Photos and Diagrams Picture No. 2 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Flute and Shoulder Details 2 Attachment 2

Photos and Diagrams Picture No. 3 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Laminar Subsurface Cracking (Note- initial condition after hydrodemolition to create an opening in the shield building and is included to show the relative location of subsurface laminar cracking. Based upon core bore samples, the crack condition (e.g., crack width) shown does not represent the laminar crack conditions in the sections of the shield building unaffected by the hydrodemolition process.)

3 Attachment 2

Photos and Diagrams Picture No. 4 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Impulse Response Testing Mobility Plot 4 Attachment 2

Photos and Diagrams Picture No. 5 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Impulse Response Mobility Plot (Shoulder 9) 5 Attachment 2

Photos and Diagrams Picture No. 6 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Core Bore Location S7-667-25-2 6 Attachment 2

Photos and Diagrams Picture No. 7 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Core Bore Location S11-663.75-30-10 7 Attachment 2

Photos and Diagrams Picture No. 8 - Davis-Besse Shield Building - Core Boring Sample 8 Attachment 2

Photos and Diagrams Picture No. 9 - Davis-Besse Shield Building Root Cause Analysis Report - Fault Tree 9 Attachment 2

Photos and Diagrams Picture No. 10 - Davis-Besse Shield Building - Water Migration 10 Attachment 2

Photos and Diagrams Picture No. 11 - Davis-Besse Shield Building - Location/Progression of Ice Formation 11 Attachment 2

Photos and Diagrams Picture No. 12 - Davis-Besse Shield Building - Subsurface Radial Tensile Stress 12 Attachment 2

ML120600056), and which were discussed with you and your staff at the exit meeting held on May 9, 2012.

Additionally, we have received and will review changes contained in Revision 1 of your root cause report (Reference ADAMS Accession ML12142A053) as part of our follow-up inspections planned for the shield building issue. As discussed with your staff, a public meeting will be scheduled in the near future to allow the opportunity for FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company to describe its root cause activities and planned actions going forward and NRC staff to discuss the related NRC inspection described in the enclosed report.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Steven A. Reynolds, Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-346 License Nos. NPF-3

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000346/2012009(DRS) : Supplemental Information : Photos and Diagrams cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ' DISTRIBUTION:

See next page DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRSIII\DRS\Work in Progress\-DAV-BESSE 2012-009 SHD BLD RCR MSH.docx

     -Publicly Available   -Sensitive To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy OFFICE RIII RIII NAME MHolmberg:ls DEHills Via email MMarshall SAReynolds DATE 06/07/12 06/07/12 06/07/12 06/21/12 Letter to Mr. Barry Allen from Mr. Steven A. Reynolds dated June 21, 2012.

SUBJECT:

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - INSPECTION TO EVALUATE THE ROOT CAUSE EVALUATION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR CRACKING IN THE REINFORCED CONCRETE SHIELD BUILDING OF THE CONTAINMENT SYSTEM 05000346/2012009(DRS)

DISTRIBUTION:

RidsNrrDorlLpl3-2 Resource Mike McCoppin RidsNrrPMDavisBesse Resource RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource Chuck Casto Cynthia Pederson Steven Orth Jared Heck Allan Barker Carole Ariano Linda Linn DRPIII DRSIII Patricia Buckley Tammy Tomczak ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov