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| issue date = 02/14/2005
| issue date = 02/14/2005
| title = Single-Failure and Fire Vulnerability of Redundant Electrical Safety Buses
| title = Single-Failure and Fire Vulnerability of Redundant Electrical Safety Buses
| author name = Hiland P L
| author name = Hiland P
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DIPM/IROB
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DIPM/IROB
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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| document type = NRC Information Notice
| document type = NRC Information Notice
| page count = 4
| page count = 4
| revision = 0
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
[[Issue date::February 14, 2005]]


NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2005-04:SINGLE-FAILURE AND FIRE VULNERABILITYOF REDUNDANT ELECTRICAL SAFETY BUSES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 14, 2005 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2005-04:               SINGLE-FAILURE AND FIRE VULNERABILITY
 
OF REDUNDANT ELECTRICAL SAFETY BUSES


==ADDRESSEES==
==ADDRESSEES==
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear reactors, except those who have permanentlyceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear reactors, except those who have permanently
 
ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor
 
vessel.


==PURPOSE==
==PURPOSE==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to informaddressees of a potential single-failure and fire vulnerability whereby a circuit failure couldresult in bus lockouts and prevent the reenergization of the redundant electrical safety buse It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities andconsider appropriate actions to avoid similar problem However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written responseis required.DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES On January 27, 2005, during a triennial fire protection inspection of the Crystal River nuclearstation, NRC inspectors discovered an electrical protection and metering circuit which ifdamaged, could electrically lock out redundant safety buses and prevent reenergization of the buses both from offsite power sources and emergency diesel generators (EDGs).The power sources for the safety buses generally consist of two offsite power supplies, both ofwhich are designed to supply power to each of the safety buse The normal bus alignment has one offsite power supply selected as the source for each safety bu Each safety bus also has one EDG as a standby power sourc The electrical protection and metering system usescurrent transformers (CTs) for measuring power consumption and sensing overloads and faulted condition At Crystal River, the electrical protection and metering circuit for each offsite power supply included three CTs at the feeder breaker to each safety bus, phase overcurrent relays, and ground overcurrent relays, all connected in a basic residual schem The circuit also included one watt-hour meter which would sum the power to both safety busse This interconnection of a protection and metering circuit between two safety busses was identified by the inspectors as a common-mode failure vulnerabilit A failure on this interconnected circuit(e.g., a fire-induced cable fault or watt-hour meter failure) would be interpreted by the protection system as an electrical bus fault on both safety busse Consequently, the relay logic wouldlock out both redundant safety buses and prevent reenergization from any power source. The licensee has modified the wiring in the overcurrent protection circuits to align eachmonitoring circuit to one safety bus and to disconnect the watt-hour meter In this corrected configuration, each circuit is contained within one switchgear, a single fault will affect only onesafety bus, and a fire in any area (e.g., at the watt-hour meters in the main control room) will notaffect safety busses that are relied upon for safe shutdown.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform
 
addressees of a potential single-failure and fire vulnerability whereby a circuit failure could
 
result in bus lockouts and prevent the reenergization of the redundant electrical safety buses. It
 
is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and
 
consider appropriate actions to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this
 
information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response
 
is required.
 
==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
On January 27, 2005, during a triennial fire protection inspection of the Crystal River nuclear
 
station, NRC inspectors discovered an electrical protection and metering circuit which if
 
damaged, could electrically lock out redundant safety buses and prevent reenergization of the
 
buses both from offsite power sources and emergency diesel generators (EDGs).
 
The power sources for the safety buses generally consist of two offsite power supplies, both of
 
which are designed to supply power to each of the safety buses. The normal bus alignment
 
has one offsite power supply selected as the source for each safety bus. Each safety bus also
 
has one EDG as a standby power source. The electrical protection and metering system uses
 
current transformers (CTs) for measuring power consumption and sensing overloads and
 
faulted conditions. At Crystal River, the electrical protection and metering circuit for each offsite
 
power supply included three CTs at the feeder breaker to each safety bus, phase overcurrent
 
relays, and ground overcurrent relays, all connected in a basic residual scheme. The circuit
 
also included one watt-hour meter which would sum the power to both safety busses. This
 
interconnection of a protection and metering circuit between two safety busses was identified by
 
the inspectors as a common-mode failure vulnerability. A failure on this interconnected circuit
 
(e.g., a fire-induced cable fault or watt-hour meter failure) would be interpreted by the protection
 
system as an electrical bus fault on both safety busses. Consequently, the relay logic would
 
lock out both redundant safety buses and prevent reenergization from any power source.
 
The licensee has modified the wiring in the overcurrent protection circuits to align each
 
monitoring circuit to one safety bus and to disconnect the watt-hour meters. In this corrected
 
configuration, each circuit is contained within one switchgear, a single fault will affect only one
 
safety bus, and a fire in any area (e.g., at the watt-hour meters in the main control room) will not
 
affect safety busses that are relied upon for safe shutdown.


==BACKGROUND==
==BACKGROUND==
The design function (to prevent single- failure vulnerabilities) is implemented through train-specific metering, monitoring, and protection systems to limit the probability of worst casefailures to a trai Whenever a signal is needed to the redundant train, the signal is electrically isolated (i.e., any potential failure or its deleterious effects cannot be transmitted to the redundant train). The redundant safety buses are expected to be fully independent (i.e., neither componentfailure, degradation of equipment, or electrical faults could disable both trains). NRC regulations in Title 10, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50.55a(h)(2), requiresprotection systems to meet IEEE Std 279 -1971 "Criteria for Protection Systems for NuclearPower Generating Stations." This standard requires all electric and mechanical components (e.g., from sensors to actuation devices) to be free from single failure vulnerability. That is, no single failure in the protection system shall prevent proper protective actions at the systemlevel.General Design Criterion (GDC)17, of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, states that "The onsiteelectric power supplies...and the onsite electric distribution system... shall have sufficientindependence [and] redundancy ....to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure."
The design function (to prevent single- failure vulnerabilities) is implemented through train- specific metering, monitoring, and protection systems to limit the probability of worst case
 
failures to a train. Whenever a signal is needed to the redundant train, the signal is electrically
 
isolated (i.e., any potential failure or its deleterious effects cannot be transmitted to the
 
redundant train).
 
The redundant safety buses are expected to be fully independent (i.e., neither component
 
failure, degradation of equipment, or electrical faults could disable both trains). NRC
 
regulations in Title 10, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50.55a(h)(2), requires
 
protection systems to meet IEEE Std 279 -1971 Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear
 
Power Generating Stations. This standard requires all electric and mechanical components
 
(e.g., from sensors to actuation devices) to be free from single failure vulnerability. That is, no
 
single failure in the protection system shall prevent proper protective actions at the system
 
level.
 
General Design Criterion (GDC)17, of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, states that The onsite
 
electric power supplies...and the onsite electric distribution system... shall have sufficient
 
independence [and] redundancy ....to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure.
 
There may be other plant-specific commitments for keeping the plant configuration free of
 
single-failure vulnerability.
 
==DISCUSSION==
The design deficiency identified at Crystal River had a protection scheme that used CTs for
 
monitoring and metering power flow. The CTs installed on power feeders to redundant safety
 
buses were electrically connected to generate a selective tripping scheme to isolate overcurrent
 
and ground fault conditions on the bus. This design is economical but results in a common- mode failure vulnerability disabling two redundant trains of safety buses. Further, the CT
 
outputs from redundant safety buses were also connected to the same watt-hour meter, resulting in the same vulnerability to common-mode failure.
 
The significance of such a vulnerability is that the failure of redundant buses generally disables
 
most of the accident mitigation/emergency core cooling systems, except the steam-driven
 
systems actuated by DC power. Such electrical failures cannot be isolated with a reasonable
 
chance of system recovery without expert help because of the interdependent electrical
 
protection system. In most cases, manually closing the breaker will result in a prompt trip. This
 
is because the logic is designed to prevent such operations when actual fault conditions persist. Similar problems could exist in the buses that supply related plant pumping systems (e.g.,
reactor coolant pumps, circulating water pumps, service water pumps), where a single failure
 
could disable the full system of pumps connected to different buses.
 
Similar common-mode failure vulnerabilities were identified at Quad Cities, Dresden, LaSalle, Prairie Island, and Monticello.
 
===GENERIC IMPLICATIONS===
After reviewing the events at the six sites (10 units), the staff concludes that such deficiencies
 
are potentially wide-spread with varying levels of risk significance depending on plant-specific, unique design configurations.
 
==CONTACT==
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any
 
questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of
 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
 
/RA/
                                              Patrick L. Hiland, Chief
 
Reactor Operations Branch
 
Division of Inspection Program Management
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
===Technical Contact:===
Thomas Koshy, NRR/EEIB
 
301-415-1176 E-mail: txk@nrc.gov
 
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Website, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
 
ML050400090
DOCUMENT NAME: E:\Filenet\ML050400090.wpd
 
OFFICE    OES:IROB:DIPM  TECH EDITOR    EEIB:DE              RII                      RIII
 
NAME      RSchmitt        Pkleene        TKoshy              R. Schin (via e-mail)    T. Kozak
 
DATE      02/09/2005      02/08/2005      02/09/2005          02/09/2005              02/09/2005 OFFICE    SC:EEIB:DE      SPLB:DSSA      BC:SPLB:DSSA      SC:OES:IROB:DIPM        C:IROB:DIPM
 
NAME      RJenkins        SDWeerakkody    JNHannon          TReis                  PLHiland


There may be other plant-specific commitments for keeping the plant configuration free ofsingle-failure vulnerability.DISCUSSIONThe design deficiency identified at Crystal River had a protection scheme that used CTs formonitoring and metering power flow. The CTs installed on power feeders to redundant safety buses were electrically connected to generate a selective tripping scheme to isolate overcurrent and ground fault conditions on the bu This design is economical but results in a common- mode failure vulnerability disabling two redundant trains of safety buse Further, the CToutputs from redundant safety buses were also connected to the same watt-hour meter, resulting in the same vulnerability to common-mode failur The significance of such a vulnerability is that the failure of redundant buses generally disablesmost of the accident mitigation/emergency core cooling systems, except the steam-drivensystems actuated by DC powe Such electrical failures cannot be isolated with a reasonablechance of system recovery without expert help because of the interdependent electricalprotection syste In most cases, manually closing the breaker will result in a prompt trip. Thisis because the logic is designed to prevent such operations when actual fault conditions persis IN 2005-04 }}
DATE      02/09/2005      02/10/2005      02/10/2005        02/14/2005              02/14/2005}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 01:41, 24 November 2019

Single-Failure and Fire Vulnerability of Redundant Electrical Safety Buses
ML050400090
Person / Time
Issue date: 02/14/2005
From: Hiland P
NRC/NRR/DIPM/IROB
To:
Koshy T, NRR/DE/EEIB, 415-1176
References
IN-05-004
Download: ML050400090 (4)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 14, 2005 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2005-04: SINGLE-FAILURE AND FIRE VULNERABILITY

OF REDUNDANT ELECTRICAL SAFETY BUSES

ADDRESSEES

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear reactors, except those who have permanently

ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor

vessel.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform

addressees of a potential single-failure and fire vulnerability whereby a circuit failure could

result in bus lockouts and prevent the reenergization of the redundant electrical safety buses. It

is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and

consider appropriate actions to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this

information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response

is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

On January 27, 2005, during a triennial fire protection inspection of the Crystal River nuclear

station, NRC inspectors discovered an electrical protection and metering circuit which if

damaged, could electrically lock out redundant safety buses and prevent reenergization of the

buses both from offsite power sources and emergency diesel generators (EDGs).

The power sources for the safety buses generally consist of two offsite power supplies, both of

which are designed to supply power to each of the safety buses. The normal bus alignment

has one offsite power supply selected as the source for each safety bus. Each safety bus also

has one EDG as a standby power source. The electrical protection and metering system uses

current transformers (CTs) for measuring power consumption and sensing overloads and

faulted conditions. At Crystal River, the electrical protection and metering circuit for each offsite

power supply included three CTs at the feeder breaker to each safety bus, phase overcurrent

relays, and ground overcurrent relays, all connected in a basic residual scheme. The circuit

also included one watt-hour meter which would sum the power to both safety busses. This

interconnection of a protection and metering circuit between two safety busses was identified by

the inspectors as a common-mode failure vulnerability. A failure on this interconnected circuit

(e.g., a fire-induced cable fault or watt-hour meter failure) would be interpreted by the protection

system as an electrical bus fault on both safety busses. Consequently, the relay logic would

lock out both redundant safety buses and prevent reenergization from any power source.

The licensee has modified the wiring in the overcurrent protection circuits to align each

monitoring circuit to one safety bus and to disconnect the watt-hour meters. In this corrected

configuration, each circuit is contained within one switchgear, a single fault will affect only one

safety bus, and a fire in any area (e.g., at the watt-hour meters in the main control room) will not

affect safety busses that are relied upon for safe shutdown.

BACKGROUND

The design function (to prevent single- failure vulnerabilities) is implemented through train- specific metering, monitoring, and protection systems to limit the probability of worst case

failures to a train. Whenever a signal is needed to the redundant train, the signal is electrically

isolated (i.e., any potential failure or its deleterious effects cannot be transmitted to the

redundant train).

The redundant safety buses are expected to be fully independent (i.e., neither component

failure, degradation of equipment, or electrical faults could disable both trains). NRC

regulations in Title 10, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50.55a(h)(2), requires

protection systems to meet IEEE Std 279 -1971 Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear

Power Generating Stations. This standard requires all electric and mechanical components

(e.g., from sensors to actuation devices) to be free from single failure vulnerability. That is, no

single failure in the protection system shall prevent proper protective actions at the system

level.

General Design Criterion (GDC)17, of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, states that The onsite

electric power supplies...and the onsite electric distribution system... shall have sufficient

independence [and] redundancy ....to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure.

There may be other plant-specific commitments for keeping the plant configuration free of

single-failure vulnerability.

DISCUSSION

The design deficiency identified at Crystal River had a protection scheme that used CTs for

monitoring and metering power flow. The CTs installed on power feeders to redundant safety

buses were electrically connected to generate a selective tripping scheme to isolate overcurrent

and ground fault conditions on the bus. This design is economical but results in a common- mode failure vulnerability disabling two redundant trains of safety buses. Further, the CT

outputs from redundant safety buses were also connected to the same watt-hour meter, resulting in the same vulnerability to common-mode failure.

The significance of such a vulnerability is that the failure of redundant buses generally disables

most of the accident mitigation/emergency core cooling systems, except the steam-driven

systems actuated by DC power. Such electrical failures cannot be isolated with a reasonable

chance of system recovery without expert help because of the interdependent electrical

protection system. In most cases, manually closing the breaker will result in a prompt trip. This

is because the logic is designed to prevent such operations when actual fault conditions persist. Similar problems could exist in the buses that supply related plant pumping systems (e.g.,

reactor coolant pumps, circulating water pumps, service water pumps), where a single failure

could disable the full system of pumps connected to different buses.

Similar common-mode failure vulnerabilities were identified at Quad Cities, Dresden, LaSalle, Prairie Island, and Monticello.

GENERIC IMPLICATIONS

After reviewing the events at the six sites (10 units), the staff concludes that such deficiencies

are potentially wide-spread with varying levels of risk significance depending on plant-specific, unique design configurations.

CONTACT

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any

questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

/RA/

Patrick L. Hiland, Chief

Reactor Operations Branch

Division of Inspection Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Thomas Koshy, NRR/EEIB

301-415-1176 E-mail: txk@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Website, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

ML050400090

DOCUMENT NAME: E:\Filenet\ML050400090.wpd

OFFICE OES:IROB:DIPM TECH EDITOR EEIB:DE RII RIII

NAME RSchmitt Pkleene TKoshy R. Schin (via e-mail) T. Kozak

DATE 02/09/2005 02/08/2005 02/09/2005 02/09/2005 02/09/2005 OFFICE SC:EEIB:DE SPLB:DSSA BC:SPLB:DSSA SC:OES:IROB:DIPM C:IROB:DIPM

NAME RJenkins SDWeerakkody JNHannon TReis PLHiland

DATE 02/09/2005 02/10/2005 02/10/2005 02/14/2005 02/14/2005