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| issue date = 11/17/2010
| issue date = 11/17/2010
| title = Inadequate Electrical Connections
| title = Inadequate Electrical Connections
| author name = McGinty T J
| author name = Mcginty T
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DPR
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DPR
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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| document type = NRC Information Notice
| document type = NRC Information Notice
| page count = 6
| page count = 6
| revision = 0
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:ML102530012 November 17, 2010 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2010-25: INADEQUATE ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS  
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
 
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 November 17, 2010
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2010-25:                 INADEQUATE ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS


==ADDRESSEES==
==ADDRESSEES==
All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor issued under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," except those who have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vesse
All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor issued
 
under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of
 
Production and Utilization Facilities, except those who have permanently ceased operations
 
and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.


==PURPOSE==
==PURPOSE==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform addressees about operating experience involving loose electrical connection The NRC expects recipients to review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problem The suggestions that appear in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is require DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation reviewed operating experience related to inadequate electrical connections and found that the following issues often caused connection problems:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform
* lack of work order documentation indicating that connections had been loosened or removed
 
* failure to follow vendor- or industry-recommended torque requirements
addressees about operating experience involving loose electrical connections. The NRC
* inadequate quality control verification of connection torque and resistance measurement
 
* incomplete or inappropriate maintenance practices
expects recipients to review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider
* improper washer installation
 
* lack of resistance verification to verify adequate torque
actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. The suggestions that appear in this IN are
* inadequate tightening of connection after the removal of test leads
 
* failure to crimp and inspect the tightness of a lug connection* marginal electrical connection during installation
not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
* loose fuse holder retaining clips
 
* thermal cycling of electrical connections over time
==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
* electrical connectors that are not fully seated
The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation reviewed operating experience related to inadequate
* worn or high-resistance electrical connector pins and sockets The events described below are examples of recent electrical connection problem Columbia Generating Station On August 5, 2009, an electrical fault occurred on a 6.9-kilovolt (kV) nonsegregated bus at Columbia Generating Station while the plant was operating at 100-percent powe The fault caused a main generator differential lockout, which resulted in a main turbine trip and the subsequent actuation of the automatic reactor protection syste The nonsegregated bus experienced a catastrophic failure, and the associated fire generated enough smoke in the turbine building to require the declaration of a notification of an unusual even Although the extent of damage to the bus made it impossible for plant personnel to substantiate a direct cause, the licensee postulated that the most probable cause was the failure of a link assembly that allowed a short circuit between phase conductor The failure of the link was attributed to thermal cycling that caused the bolted connections on the central flexible link to loose The licensee omitted steps in its preventive maintenance procedure for torque verification and high-potential testing without evaluating the scope and implications of these omission The licensee could have prevented the bus failure by performing these step (See Licensee Evaluation Report (LER) 397/2009-004-00, "6.9 kV Non-Segregated Electrical Bus Failure," issued 2009, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML092870468.) Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 In May 2008, workers at Waterford Steam Electric Station (Waterford), Unit 3, replaced a cell in a safety related battery ban The licensee failed to ensure that the scope of work was adequat Specifically, the electricians did not (1) torque all of the affected intercell connections as recommended by the vendor, (2) obtain the required quality control inspector verification for every connection torque, (3) ensure that all the resistance measurements for the electrical connections were performed, and (4) ensure that the quality control verification for resistance checks met technical specification (TS) limit These errors resulted in an undetected loose electrical connection that rendered the Train B battery inoperabl On September 3, 2008, Waterford operations declared the station battery 3B-S inoperable because of low voltage and entered TS 3.8. Licensee personnel discovered loose bolts on an intercell connector between two battery cells and immediately corrected the condition by tightening and verifying intercell resistanc The licensee declared the battery operable on the same da (See LER 382/2008-004-01, "Loose Intercell Connecting Bolts on 125 vdc Station Battery (Revised)," issued 2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML101800330.) San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 On March 25, 2008, plant personnel at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, were performing TS Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.1 of a Class 1E battery while the unit was operating at 100-percent power and discovered that its voltage was below the required valu Subsequently, the licensee observed signs of a loose connection on the breaker that provides charging current for the battery in its normal configuratio The licensee declared the battery inoperable, as required by TS Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4, Action The licensee torqued the loose connection bolts and completed the required TS surveillance requirements with satisfactory result The licensee concluded in its root cause evaluation that it had most likely not fully torqued the connection bolts on March 17, 2004, when it last replaced the breake The bolts were not torqued because of an incomplete work plan and the lack of an effective second check of the critical step (See LER 361/2008-006-00, "Loose Connection Bolting Results in Inoperable Battery and TS Violation," issued 2008, ADAMS Accession No. ML082660036.)
 
electrical connections and found that the following issues often caused connection problems:
*       lack of work order documentation indicating that connections had been loosened or
 
removed
 
*       failure to follow vendor- or industry-recommended torque requirements
 
*       inadequate quality control verification of connection torque and resistance measurement
 
*       incomplete or inappropriate maintenance practices
 
*       improper washer installation
 
*       lack of resistance verification to verify adequate torque
 
*       inadequate tightening of connection after the removal of test leads
 
*       failure to crimp and inspect the tightness of a lug connection
 
*       marginal electrical connection during installation
 
*       loose fuse holder retaining clips
 
*       thermal cycling of electrical connections over time
 
*       electrical connectors that are not fully seated
 
*       worn or high-resistance electrical connector pins and sockets
 
The events described below are examples of recent electrical connection problems.
 
===Columbia Generating Station===
On August 5, 2009, an electrical fault occurred on a 6.9-kilovolt (kV) nonsegregated bus at
 
Columbia Generating Station while the plant was operating at 100-percent power. The fault
 
caused a main generator differential lockout, which resulted in a main turbine trip and the
 
subsequent actuation of the automatic reactor protection system. The nonsegregated bus
 
experienced a catastrophic failure, and the associated fire generated enough smoke in the
 
turbine building to require the declaration of a notification of an unusual event. Although the
 
extent of damage to the bus made it impossible for plant personnel to substantiate a direct
 
cause, the licensee postulated that the most probable cause was the failure of a link assembly
 
that allowed a short circuit between phase conductors. The failure of the link was attributed to
 
thermal cycling that caused the bolted connections on the central flexible link to loosen. The


Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 On October 29, 2008, with Unit 3 at approximately 85 percent power, licensee personnel at Dresden Nuclear Power Station identified that the open indication light for the normally open primary containment isolation valve was flickerin Troubleshooting on November 1, 2008, led to the discovery of an intermittent high-resistance electrical connection for control power to the valv The intermittent electrical connection caused the indicator light to flicker, and the intermittent connection would have prevented valve closure from the control roo The licensee declared valve 3-3702 inoperable and took actions in accordance with the requirements of TS 3.6. The licensee restored the valve to operable status on the same da The most probable cause of the high resistance connection was a marginal electrical connection during original installation and equipment vibration over time causing the intermittent connectio Additionally, the cause of not entering TS 3.6.1.3 on October 29, 2008, was a lack of proper procedural guidance that led operations personnel to assume the problem was simply a faulty light socke (See LER 249/2008-002-00, "Unit 3 Primary Containment Isolation Valve Declared Inoperable," issued 2008, ADAMS Accession No. ML090060879.)  
licensee omitted steps in its preventive maintenance procedure for torque verification and high- potential testing without evaluating the scope and implications of these omissions. The licensee
 
could have prevented the bus failure by performing these steps. (See Licensee Evaluation
 
Report (LER) 397/2009-004-00, 6.9 kV Non-Segregated Electrical Bus Failure, issued 2009, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No.
 
ML092870468.)
 
===Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3===
In May 2008, workers at Waterford Steam Electric Station (Waterford), Unit 3, replaced a cell in
 
a safety related battery bank. The licensee failed to ensure that the scope of work was
 
adequate. Specifically, the electricians did not (1) torque all of the affected intercell connections
 
as recommended by the vendor, (2) obtain the required quality control inspector verification for
 
every connection torque, (3) ensure that all the resistance measurements for the electrical
 
connections were performed, and (4) ensure that the quality control verification for resistance
 
checks met technical specification (TS) limits. These errors resulted in an undetected loose
 
electrical connection that rendered the Train B battery inoperable. On September 3, 2008, Waterford operations declared the station battery 3B-S inoperable because of low voltage and
 
entered TS 3.8.2.1. Licensee personnel discovered loose bolts on an intercell connector
 
between two battery cells and immediately corrected the condition by tightening and verifying
 
intercell resistance. The licensee declared the battery operable on the same day. (See LER
 
382/2008-004-01, Loose Intercell Connecting Bolts on 125 vdc Station Battery (Revised),
issued 2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML101800330.) San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 On March 25, 2008, plant personnel at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, were
 
performing TS Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.1 of a Class 1E battery while the unit was
 
operating at 100-percent power and discovered that its voltage was below the required value.
 
Subsequently, the licensee observed signs of a loose connection on the breaker that provides
 
charging current for the battery in its normal configuration. The licensee declared the battery
 
inoperable, as required by TS Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4, Action A. The licensee torqued
 
the loose connection bolts and completed the required TS surveillance requirements with
 
satisfactory results. The licensee concluded in its root cause evaluation that it had most likely
 
not fully torqued the connection bolts on March 17, 2004, when it last replaced the breaker. The
 
bolts were not torqued because of an incomplete work plan and the lack of an effective second
 
check of the critical steps. (See LER 361/2008-006-00, Loose Connection Bolting Results in
 
Inoperable Battery and TS Violation, issued 2008, ADAMS Accession No. ML082660036.)
 
===Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3===
On October 29, 2008, with Unit 3 at approximately 85 percent power, licensee personnel at
 
Dresden Nuclear Power Station identified that the open indication light for the normally open
 
primary containment isolation valve was flickering. Troubleshooting on November 1, 2008, led
 
to the discovery of an intermittent high-resistance electrical connection for control power to the
 
valve. The intermittent electrical connection caused the indicator light to flicker, and the
 
intermittent connection would have prevented valve closure from the control room. The licensee
 
declared valve 3-3702 inoperable and took actions in accordance with the requirements of
 
TS 3.6.1.3. The licensee restored the valve to operable status on the same day. The most
 
probable cause of the high resistance connection was a marginal electrical connection during
 
original installation and equipment vibration over time causing the intermittent connection.
 
Additionally, the cause of not entering TS 3.6.1.3 on October 29, 2008, was a lack of proper
 
procedural guidance that led operations personnel to assume the problem was simply a faulty
 
light socket. (See LER 249/2008-002-00, Unit 3 Primary Containment Isolation Valve Declared
 
Inoperable, issued 2008, ADAMS Accession No. ML090060879.)


==BACKGROUND==
==BACKGROUND==
Related Generic Communications
* IN 2008-18, "Loss of a Safety-Related Motor Control Center Caused by a Bus Fault," dated December 1, 2008
* IN 89-64, "Electrical Bus Bar Failures," dated September 7, 1989
* IN 88-11, "Potential Loss of Motor Control Center and/or Switchboard Function Due to Faulty Tie Bolts," dated April 7, 1988 Related Operating Experience Smart Samples
* FY 2009-01, "Inspection of Electrical Connections for Motor Control Center, Circuit Breakers, and Interfaces," issued 2009 DISCUSSION Inadequate electrical connections can lead to unanticipated plant transients and the failure or unavailability of safety related equipmen They can also affect equipment important to safety or can potentially challenge safety related equipmen A recent review of operating experience has determined that the following items are important to ensuring the integrity of electrical connections:


* Torque verification
===Related Generic Communications===
* Visual inspections
*        IN 2008-18, Loss of a Safety-Related Motor Control Center Caused by a Bus Fault, dated December 1, 2008
* Periodic thermography measurements
*        IN 89-64, Electrical Bus Bar Failures, dated September 7, 1989
* Resistance measurements
*        IN 88-11, Potential Loss of Motor Control Center and/or Switchboard Function Due to
* Adherence to vendor recommendations
 
* Use of proper lubricants for switch contact surfaces
Faulty Tie Bolts, dated April 7, 1988 Related Operating Experience Smart Samples
* Identification of single point connection vulnerabilities IN 2010-25  }}
 
*      FY 2009-01, Inspection of Electrical Connections for Motor Control Center, Circuit
 
Breakers, and Interfaces, issued 2009
 
==DISCUSSION==
Inadequate electrical connections can lead to unanticipated plant transients and the failure or
 
unavailability of safety related equipment. They can also affect equipment important to safety or
 
can potentially challenge safety related equipment. A recent review of operating experience has
 
determined that the following items are important to ensuring the integrity of electrical
 
connections:
  *   Torque verification
 
*   Visual inspections
 
*   Periodic thermography measurements
 
*   Resistance measurements
 
*   Adherence to vendor recommendations
 
*   Use of proper lubricants for switch contact surfaces
 
*   Identification of single point connection vulnerabilities
 
==CONTACT==
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
 
matter to the technical contacts listed below.
 
/RA/
                                              Timothy McGinty, Director
 
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical Contacts: Joseph Giantelli, DIRS/IOEB            Matthew McConnell, DE/EEEB
 
301-415-0504                          301-415-1597 E-mail: Joseph.Giantelli@nrc.gov E-mail: Matthew McConnell@nrc.gov
 
Jesse Robles, DIRS/IOEB
 
301-415-2940
                    E-mail: Jesse.Robles@nrc.gov
 
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
 
==CONTACT==
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
 
matter to the technical contacts listed below.
 
/RA/
                                                      Timothy McGinty, Director
 
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical Contacts: Joseph Giantelli, DIRS/IOEB            Matthew McConnell, DE/EEEB
 
301-415-0504                      301-415-1597 E-mail: Joseph.Giantelli@nrc.gov E-mail: Matthew.McConnell@nrc.gov
 
Jesse Robles, DIRS/IOEB
 
301-415-2940
                                E-mail: Jesse.Robles@nrc.gov
 
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
 
ADAMS Accession Number: ML102530012                                                  TAC ME4481 OFFICE    NRR/DIRS/IOEB          BC/NRR/DIRS/IOEB  D/NRR/DIRS    Tech Editor    NRR/DLR/RASB    BC/DE/EEEB
 
NAME      JGiantelli              JThorp            FBrown        KAzariah-Kribbs CDoutt          RMathew
 
DATE      10/26/10                10/28/10          11 /12 /10    09/16/10 e-mail 11/03/10        10/27/10
OFFICE    D/DE/EEEB              DPR/PGCB          DPR/PGCB      DPR/PGCB        BC/DPR/PGCB      D/NRR/DPR
 
NAME      PHiland (GWilson for)  ARussell          CHawes        TAlexion        SRosenberg      TMcGinty
 
DATE      11/04/10                11/15 /10          11/15/10      11/16 /10      11/17/10        11/17/10
                                            OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 14:28, 13 November 2019

Inadequate Electrical Connections
ML102530012
Person / Time
Issue date: 11/17/2010
From: Mcginty T
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To:
Russell Andrea, 415-8553
References
IN-10-025
Download: ML102530012 (6)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 November 17, 2010

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2010-25: INADEQUATE ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS

ADDRESSEES

All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor issued

under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of

Production and Utilization Facilities, except those who have permanently ceased operations

and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform

addressees about operating experience involving loose electrical connections. The NRC

expects recipients to review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider

actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. The suggestions that appear in this IN are

not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation reviewed operating experience related to inadequate

electrical connections and found that the following issues often caused connection problems:

  • lack of work order documentation indicating that connections had been loosened or

removed

  • failure to follow vendor- or industry-recommended torque requirements
  • inadequate quality control verification of connection torque and resistance measurement
  • incomplete or inappropriate maintenance practices
  • improper washer installation
  • lack of resistance verification to verify adequate torque
  • inadequate tightening of connection after the removal of test leads
  • failure to crimp and inspect the tightness of a lug connection
  • marginal electrical connection during installation
  • loose fuse holder retaining clips
  • thermal cycling of electrical connections over time
  • electrical connectors that are not fully seated
  • worn or high-resistance electrical connector pins and sockets

The events described below are examples of recent electrical connection problems.

Columbia Generating Station

On August 5, 2009, an electrical fault occurred on a 6.9-kilovolt (kV) nonsegregated bus at

Columbia Generating Station while the plant was operating at 100-percent power. The fault

caused a main generator differential lockout, which resulted in a main turbine trip and the

subsequent actuation of the automatic reactor protection system. The nonsegregated bus

experienced a catastrophic failure, and the associated fire generated enough smoke in the

turbine building to require the declaration of a notification of an unusual event. Although the

extent of damage to the bus made it impossible for plant personnel to substantiate a direct

cause, the licensee postulated that the most probable cause was the failure of a link assembly

that allowed a short circuit between phase conductors. The failure of the link was attributed to

thermal cycling that caused the bolted connections on the central flexible link to loosen. The

licensee omitted steps in its preventive maintenance procedure for torque verification and high- potential testing without evaluating the scope and implications of these omissions. The licensee

could have prevented the bus failure by performing these steps. (See Licensee Evaluation

Report (LER) 397/2009-004-00, 6.9 kV Non-Segregated Electrical Bus Failure, issued 2009, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No.

ML092870468.)

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

In May 2008, workers at Waterford Steam Electric Station (Waterford), Unit 3, replaced a cell in

a safety related battery bank. The licensee failed to ensure that the scope of work was

adequate. Specifically, the electricians did not (1) torque all of the affected intercell connections

as recommended by the vendor, (2) obtain the required quality control inspector verification for

every connection torque, (3) ensure that all the resistance measurements for the electrical

connections were performed, and (4) ensure that the quality control verification for resistance

checks met technical specification (TS) limits. These errors resulted in an undetected loose

electrical connection that rendered the Train B battery inoperable. On September 3, 2008, Waterford operations declared the station battery 3B-S inoperable because of low voltage and

entered TS 3.8.2.1. Licensee personnel discovered loose bolts on an intercell connector

between two battery cells and immediately corrected the condition by tightening and verifying

intercell resistance. The licensee declared the battery operable on the same day. (See LER 382/2008-004-01, Loose Intercell Connecting Bolts on 125 vdc Station Battery (Revised),

issued 2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML101800330.) San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 On March 25, 2008, plant personnel at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, were

performing TS Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4.1 of a Class 1E battery while the unit was

operating at 100-percent power and discovered that its voltage was below the required value.

Subsequently, the licensee observed signs of a loose connection on the breaker that provides

charging current for the battery in its normal configuration. The licensee declared the battery

inoperable, as required by TS Surveillance Requirement 3.8.4, Action A. The licensee torqued

the loose connection bolts and completed the required TS surveillance requirements with

satisfactory results. The licensee concluded in its root cause evaluation that it had most likely

not fully torqued the connection bolts on March 17, 2004, when it last replaced the breaker. The

bolts were not torqued because of an incomplete work plan and the lack of an effective second

check of the critical steps. (See LER 361/2008-006-00, Loose Connection Bolting Results in

Inoperable Battery and TS Violation, issued 2008, ADAMS Accession No. ML082660036.)

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3

On October 29, 2008, with Unit 3 at approximately 85 percent power, licensee personnel at

Dresden Nuclear Power Station identified that the open indication light for the normally open

primary containment isolation valve was flickering. Troubleshooting on November 1, 2008, led

to the discovery of an intermittent high-resistance electrical connection for control power to the

valve. The intermittent electrical connection caused the indicator light to flicker, and the

intermittent connection would have prevented valve closure from the control room. The licensee

declared valve 3-3702 inoperable and took actions in accordance with the requirements of

TS 3.6.1.3. The licensee restored the valve to operable status on the same day. The most

probable cause of the high resistance connection was a marginal electrical connection during

original installation and equipment vibration over time causing the intermittent connection.

Additionally, the cause of not entering TS 3.6.1.3 on October 29, 2008, was a lack of proper

procedural guidance that led operations personnel to assume the problem was simply a faulty

light socket. (See LER 249/2008-002-00, Unit 3 Primary Containment Isolation Valve Declared

Inoperable, issued 2008, ADAMS Accession No. ML090060879.)

BACKGROUND

Related Generic Communications

  • IN 2008-18, Loss of a Safety-Related Motor Control Center Caused by a Bus Fault, dated December 1, 2008
  • IN 89-64, Electrical Bus Bar Failures, dated September 7, 1989
  • IN 88-11, Potential Loss of Motor Control Center and/or Switchboard Function Due to

Faulty Tie Bolts, dated April 7, 1988 Related Operating Experience Smart Samples

  • FY 2009-01, Inspection of Electrical Connections for Motor Control Center, Circuit

Breakers, and Interfaces, issued 2009

DISCUSSION

Inadequate electrical connections can lead to unanticipated plant transients and the failure or

unavailability of safety related equipment. They can also affect equipment important to safety or

can potentially challenge safety related equipment. A recent review of operating experience has

determined that the following items are important to ensuring the integrity of electrical

connections:

  • Visual inspections
  • Resistance measurements
  • Adherence to vendor recommendations
  • Use of proper lubricants for switch contact surfaces
  • Identification of single point connection vulnerabilities

CONTACT

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contacts listed below.

/RA/

Timothy McGinty, Director

Division of Policy and Rulemaking

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Joseph Giantelli, DIRS/IOEB Matthew McConnell, DE/EEEB

301-415-0504 301-415-1597 E-mail: Joseph.Giantelli@nrc.gov E-mail: Matthew McConnell@nrc.gov

Jesse Robles, DIRS/IOEB

301-415-2940

E-mail: Jesse.Robles@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

CONTACT

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contacts listed below.

/RA/

Timothy McGinty, Director

Division of Policy and Rulemaking

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Joseph Giantelli, DIRS/IOEB Matthew McConnell, DE/EEEB

301-415-0504 301-415-1597 E-mail: Joseph.Giantelli@nrc.gov E-mail: Matthew.McConnell@nrc.gov

Jesse Robles, DIRS/IOEB

301-415-2940

E-mail: Jesse.Robles@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML102530012 TAC ME4481 OFFICE NRR/DIRS/IOEB BC/NRR/DIRS/IOEB D/NRR/DIRS Tech Editor NRR/DLR/RASB BC/DE/EEEB

NAME JGiantelli JThorp FBrown KAzariah-Kribbs CDoutt RMathew

DATE 10/26/10 10/28/10 11 /12 /10 09/16/10 e-mail 11/03/10 10/27/10

OFFICE D/DE/EEEB DPR/PGCB DPR/PGCB DPR/PGCB BC/DPR/PGCB D/NRR/DPR

NAME PHiland (GWilson for) ARussell CHawes TAlexion SRosenberg TMcGinty

DATE 11/04/10 11/15 /10 11/15/10 11/16 /10 11/17/10 11/17/10

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


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