ML14245A656

Intervenors' Motion for Admission of Contention No. 7 on Worsening Shield Building Cracking and Inadequate Amps in Shield Building Monitoring Program

ML14245A656
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	09/02/2014
From:	Lodge T J Beyond Nuclear, Citizens Environmental Alliance of Southwestern Ontario, Don't Waste Michigan, Green Party of Ohio
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
50-346-LR, ASLBP 11-907-01-LR-BD01, RAS 26437
Download: ML14245A656 (37)

Text

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA NUCLEAR REG ULATORY COMMISSION I n the Matter of

)Docke t No. 50-346-L FirstEne rg y Nuclea r Ope rating Company)September 2, 2014 Davis-B esse Nuc lear Power Station, Unit 1

))INTERV ENORS' MOTION FOR ADMIS SION OF CONTENTION NO. 7 ON WORSENING SHIE LD BUILDING CRACKI NG AND INADEQUATE AMPS IN S HIELD BUILDING MONITORING PROGRAM Now come Be y ond Nuclea r, Citiz ens Environment Allianc e of Southwester n Ontario (CEA), Don' t Waste Michiga n, and the Gr een Par ty of Ohio (c ollectively , I nterve nors), by and throug h counsel, a nd move for the admission of a new Contention No. 7 conce rning rec ent FirstEne rg y Nuclea r Ope rating Company ("F ENOC") modifications to its Aging Manag ement Plans ("AMPs") w ithin it s Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram a ssociated with wor sening cra cking in the rea ctor Shield Building at the Da vis-Be sse Nucle ar Powe r Station, Unit 1

("D avis-B esse"). I nterve nors furthe r move for inclusion of appropr iate seve re a ccide nt mitigation ca ndidates in the Supplemental Environmenta l I mpact Statement being prepa red by the NRC Staff for this L icense Renewa l proce eding./s/ Terry J. L odg e Terr y J. L odg e (O hio Ba r #0029271) 316 N. Michig an St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 Phone/fax (419) 255-7552 tjlodge50@

y ahoo.com Counsel for I nterve nors MEMORAN DUM A. Procedural Backgroun d This Motion addresses the be lated eme rg ence and admission by FirstEne rg y Nuclea r Oper ating Company ("F ENOC"), which owns a nd opera tes the Da vis-Be sse Nucle ar Powe r Station, that there is an unconta ined, continuing , and possibly sprea ding pr oblem of var ious forms of c oncre te cr acking throug hout portions of the walls of the Shield B uilding which house s the re actor at the plant site.

I n Fe bruar y 2014, during hy dro-de moliti on activities for c rea tion of a construc tion opening in the shield building to support a sche duled steam g ener ator re place ment outag e, FEN OC learne d that at least 26 sec tions of steel reinf orce ment (re bar) had bee n broken a nd/or cra cked in the 2011 (and 2014) c onstruction opening are a, ea ch bre ak or c rac k appar ently located close to the mec hanica l splice coupling used to rec onnect the r ebar during the re actor head repla ceme nt outag e in 2011. I nterve nors ar g ue, in support of their pr oposed Contention 6 in April 2014, that FEN OC may be inca pable of manag ing D avis-B esse sa fely and succ essfully throug h the proposed lice nse extension period of 2017-2037 be cause of the re peate d problems with voids in the concr ete, a nd a see mingly open-e nded proble m with the spreading of laminar a nd other cra cks throug hout the Shield Building. I nterve nors soug ht then, and see k now, to litigate the adequa cy of F ENOC's anticipa ted modifications to Davis-B esse's Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram a nd the Structures Monitoring Prog ram Ag ing Ma nag ement Plans ("A MPs") in light of their re cent dr amatic c hang e of position, wher ein the compa ny admits the ag ing-rela ted nature of the cr acking phenomena - a position advoca ted by I nterve nors since the cra cks we re f irst publicized by the company in 2011.

B. Hist ory of Cracking at Davis-Besse The Da vis-Be sse Reac tor Shield Building ha s a troubling history of multiple laminar and other c oncre te cr acks. I nterve nors in 2012 proff ere d multipl e filing s following the observa tion of cra cking in the shield building conc rete in 2011 during a re actor head r eplac ement proje ct at Davis-B esse. I nterve nors documente d conce rns that the prolife ration of diff ere nt ty pes of c rac ks may have c ommenced in the 1970' s befor e the plant ha d even ope ned, and tha t their sprea ding and fr equenc y of occ urre nce ma y be incr easing with the passag e of time.

See, ge nerally ,"I nterve nors' Motion for Admission of Contention No. 5 on Shield Building Cra cking ," and succe ssive amendments a nd supplements: "I nterve nors' Motion to Amend 'Motion for Admission of Contention No. 5'" (F eb. 27, 2012) ([hereinaf ter F irst Motion t o Amend);"I nterve nors' Motion to Amend and Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield B uilding Cracking)" (J une 4, 2012) (here inafter Second Motion to Amend); "I nterve nors' Third Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cra cking)" (J uly 16, 2012) (he reina fter T hird Motion to Amend); "I nterve nors' Motion to Amend and Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking)" (J uly 23, 2012) (he reina fter F ourth Motion to Amend); "I nterve nors' F ifth Motion To Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cra cking)" (Aug. 16, 2012) (he reina fter F ifth Motion to Amend). I nterve nors incorpor ate these filings a nd their ac company ing e x hibits fully here in as though r ewr itten.The ASL B f latly reje cted I nterve nors' Contention No. 5. "Me morandum and O rder (De ny ing Motions to Admit, to Amend, and to Supplement Proposed Contention 5)," L BP-12-27 (De cembe r 28, 2012). B ut in September 2013, additional conc rete cra cking which had not hitherto bee n identified wa s discovere d in the shield building. On Septembe r 20, 2013, a Preliminary Notification of Eve nt appea red in the N RC's ADAMS cac he which sta ted as follows: On Aug ust 26, 2013, the licensee was pe rfor ming e x aminations of cor e bore s in the shield building in ac corda nce w ith the commitments First Energ y Nuclea r Ope rating Company (F ENOC) made to the NRC. The commitment is for long te rm monitoring of the shield building whic h was doc umented in the NRC's Confirmatory Action L etter dated De cembe r 2, 2011 (AD AMS ML 11336A355). The examinations performed in 2011 and 2012 showe d no additional cra cks. This year, using new instrumentation w ith enhance d capabilities, plant w orkers identified a crac k that had not been se en before. To date, the core bore ex aminations revealed se ven pre viously unidentified crack

s. FEN OC has take n steps to ree valuate 43 c ore bor es and w ill be looking at the r emaining 39 g oing forwa rd.(Emphasis supplied). PNO, Exhibi t 6. I n a for mal Request for A dditional I nformation ("

RAI") da ted April 15, 2014 (AD AMS No. ML 14097A454), the N RC S taff sa id that "during a subseque nt routine baseline inspe ction in Aug ust/S eptember 2013, FEN OC discovere d sever al (a bout 15) cra cks on the Da vis-Be sse shield building that we re not identified pr eviously." The Staff continued:

Fur ther, the N RC st aff understands tha t in the ongoing Fe bruar y 2014 ref ueling outag e, during hy dro-de moliti on activities for c rea tion of a construc tion opening in the Davis-B esse shield building to support the schedule d steam g ener ator re place ment, FEN OC learne d that sever al (a t least 26) sec tions of steel reinf orce ment (re bar) had bee n broken a nd/or cra cked in the c onstruction opening are a. Ea ch sec tion was appa rently broken ve ry close to the mec hanica l splice coupling used to splice the r ebar during the head r eplac ement outag e in 2011.

I n this striki ng understate ment, the NRC Staff admitted that when the shield building wa s sealed shut following r eac tor hea d repla ceme nt in 2011, a stretch of the shield building wa ll which was 26-re bar-sections in leng th was not anc hored to the r est of the r ebar skeleton. The splice s which joined the iron re bar r ods toge ther in the a rea of the shield building w here the skeleta l structure of the building was pa tched shut we re c rac ked or br oken at the time the c oncre te was pour ed to complete the r e-c losure. Af ter the 2011 r esea ling of the shield building, Da vis-Be sse oper ated a t full power f or over two y ear s. Whi le the informa tion on the concr ete voids is sparse and a bit unclea r so fa r, it is legitimate to wonde r if ther e is any rela tionship between the void, whic h appar ently was loca ted along the top of the 2011 c onstruction opening , and the c rac ked and broken r ebar , also locate d inside the perimete r of the 2011 c onstruction opening. Acc ording to the April 2014 RAI , FEN OC has taken a dditional core sa mples of shield building conc rete and is perf orming evalua tions and testing to dete rmine the root c ause of the cra cks and the ir appa rent prog ression. A root c ause a naly sis was perf ormed in F ebrua ry 2012; a second, r evised a naly sis was completed in Apr il 2012. The 2014 ana ly sis is t he third root ca use analy sis. I nterve nors alleg ed in 2012 when the y initially filed Contention 5 over c rac king tha t FEN OC must describe how it will manag e the shield building cra cking during the license rene wal ter m, while the NRC Staff must consider the implications of the shield building cra cking in its Draft Supplemental Environmenta l I mpact Statement (D SEI S). I nterve nors moved into evidence considera ble documenta tion, such as the interna l NRC calculations of two eng ineer s who had de termined that a minor ear thquake or rea ctor ther mal event c ould cause the collapse of very signific ant portions of the shield building w alls, up to 90%. But it all ca me to naug ht; the contention was summarily reje cted.I n 2012, FEN OC arg ued (note d by the ASL B a t p. 20, fn 99 of L BP-12-27) that I nter-venors' insistence that the shield building cra cking must be addre ssed in the then-a nticipated Dra ft Supplemental Environmental I mpact Statement (D SEI S) did not cure the c laimed untimeliness of I nterve nors' Contention 5 motion. The 2014 DSEI S contains zero mention of the shield cra cking phenomena at all, eve n as a subjec t for Sever e Ac cident Mitiga tion Analy sis ("SAMA"). De spite the NRC St aff's DSEI S ex planation that the "pur pose of [SAMA analy sis]is to ensure that plant c hang es (i.e., hardw are , proce dures, a nd training) with the potential for improving se vere acc ident safe ty perf ormanc e ar e identified a nd evalua ted" (DSEI S p. 5-3), there is no mention of the chang es in the Da vis-Be sse shield building, a lthough it is surely a "har dwar e" struc ture within the swee p of SAMA re view. Given the late st (belated) admissions 1 by FEN OC that the cra cking phenomena are ag ing-rela ted, the F inal Supplemental Environ-mental I mpact Statement must itself be supplemented to include thoroug h SAMA rec og nition and ana ly sis of the cra cking damag e to the Shield Building. I t is ongoing

the stated root ca use ("B liz zard of '78" moisture penetr ation and fr eezing) no long er holds, we ll, water. F irstEnerg y has enunc iated a ne w theory of "ic e we dg ing" even a s it admits t hat painting the Shield Building in 2012 seems not to have stemmed the prese nce of water within the concr ete of the structure

, nor its conseque nt damag ing e ffe cts.I n L BP-12-27 (De cembe r 28, 2012), the A tomic Safety and L icensing Boa rd re fused to consider w idesprea d cra cking of the Shield Building as an a g ing-rela ted problem whic h would fall within the permissible par ameter s of this license re newa l proce eding: T he Da vis-Bess e r eac tor shi el d bu il din g const it ute s a "s ystem [or] s tr uct ure . . . as 1 del ine at ed i n [10 C.F.R.] §54.4. . . sub j ect to an aging m ana gem ent re view" b eca use it"pe rf orm[s] an int end ed f unc ti on . . . wi tho ut m oving par ts . . . [a nd i ncl ude s] th e c ont ai nm ent[a nd] con ta inment li ner. . . ." 10 C.F.R. §54.2 1(a)(1). T he s hie ld bui ldi ng and t he s te el li ner wit hin it ar e a m ong tho se "[p]l ant syste m s, s tr uct ure s, a nd c om pone nts" whi ch a re "[s]af et y-re la te d syst ems [an d] st ruc tur es . . . wh ic h ar e . . . r el ie d up on t o r emain f unc ti ona l d uri ng and fol lowi ng desi gn-bas is event s (as def ine d i n 10 CFR 50.49 (b)(1)) to ens ure th e f oll owin g fun ct ion s - (I) T he i nte grit y of t he r eac tor coo la nt pre ssu re bou nda ry; (ii) T he c apa bil it y to sh ut down t he r eac tor and m ai nta in it in a s af e s hut down c ondi ti on; or (i ii) T he c apa bil it y to pr event or m it igate th e c ons equ enc es of acc ide nts whi ch c oul d r esu lt in pot ent ia l o ff si te exp osu re s compara ble to th ose re fe rr ed t o i n §5 0.34 (a)(1), §50.67(b) (2), or §10 0.11 of th is cha pte r, a s app li cab le." 1 0 C.F.R. §54.4(a)(1).

. . . I nterve nors must point t o the spec ific wa y s in which the Shield Building Monitoring AMP is wrong or inade quate to ra ise a g enuine dispute with F ENOC's L RA.This they have f ailed to do.

Intervenors have provided no support for th eir argum ent that t he cracking (1) is aging-related , and (2) preve nts safe ope ration of the pla nt. These claims amount to bare asser tions, which the Commis sion has made c lear "ar e insuffic ient to support a contention." We do not intend to imply that I nterve nors must prove their c ase at this stage , as the Commission has made clea r that petitioners be ar no suc h burden.Howeve r, a pe titioner "'must prese nt sufficient infor mation to show a g enuine dispute' and re asonably 'indicating that a fur ther inquiry is appropria te.'"(Emphasis adde d). Id., L BP-12-27 at 30 (32 of .pdf

). The A SL B the n castig ated I nterve nors for"spec ulating" about the incipient and g rowing problem of c rac king of the Shield Building

. . . Contention 5 is based, in larg e par t, on pure speculation. For example, I nterve nors state that "

there is a likelihood that the risks presente d by the cur rent c rac ks will only incre ase in the ne x t few y ear s." I nterve nors note that Da vis-Be sse will underg o a stea m ge nera tor repla ceme nt in 2014, and arg ue that this fac t supports their claim reg arding incre ased r isk. I nterve nors provide no suppor t for their a rg ument that the 2014 steam g ener ator re place ment will increa se the risk of c rac king, a nd as such, their arg ument is m ere spe culation. I n addition, I nterve nors state that "

it is conceivable that FEN OC very well may need to r eplac e its steam g ener ators y et ag ain af ter 2014 . . .

risking f urther c ontributions to t he cr acking." Whether F ENOC will need to per form another steam g ener ator re place ment afte r 2014 is m ere spe culation , on top of th e mere speculation that such a pr ocedur e mig ht contribute to the cr acking. L BP-12-27 at pp. 34-35 (36-36 of .pdf). But a las, history has ca ug ht up with Davis-B esse. Af ter Contention 5 was unc ere m-oniously dismiss ed, F ENOC ac knowledg ed in September 2013, as stated in the introduc tory section of this Motion, that there is worse ning shie ld building cr acking. And on J uly 3, 2014, FirstEne rg y Nuclea r Ope rating Company formally admitted to the NRC that the cra cking problems in Davis-B esse's Shield Building pe rsist, and are worsening. Nea rly at the end of this L RA adjudicatory proce eding , FEN OC has finally admitted, quietly , what has be come quite c lear to I nterve nors since 2011: the c alculations of NRC staff eng ineer s predicting the Shield Building to be per meated by cra cking which thre atens the c ontinued usefulness a nd stability of the structure itself, and the bur g eoning evidenc e of inc rea sing c rac king, c all into serious question the basis for g iving Da vis-Be sse a ne w lease on its operating life. LEGAL STANDAR DS On J uly 25, 2014, the Atomic Safe ty and L icensing Boa rd ("ASL B") pane l oversee ing this procee ding w rote: To the extent that I nterve nors have proff ere d Contention 6 in advance of future modifications to the rele vant AMPs that they assume will occur as a r esult of the re cently identified structura l problems, it is premature. The Boa rd notes that the modifica tions to Davis-B esse's Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram, a nticipated by the I nterve nors, wer e provided on July 3, 2014 in Amendment No. 51 to the Da vis-Be sse L RA. Specific intervenor conce rns re g arding specific portions of L RA Amendment No. 51 may be submitt ed to the B oard in a timely manner for its consider ation as spec ified by our I nitial Scheduling Orde r.2 The July 3, 2014 "modifica tions to Davis-Be sse's Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram"to which the ASL B r efe rre d are contained in F ENOC's "Re ply to Request for Additional I nform-ation for the Re view of the Davis-B esse Nuc lear Power Station, Unit No. 1, L icense Renewa l Application (TAC No. ME4640) and L icense Renewa l Application Amendment No. 51" sent by FEN OC to the attention of the Doc ument Control Desk at the Commission on J uly 3, 2014 and labeled L-14-224, pe r 10 C.F.R. Part 54.

3 Under the ASL B pa nel's I nitial Scheduling Or der ("I SO") in this proce eding , a new contention must meet the re quirements of the former (that is, pre-Aug ust 2012) 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(I) throug h (iii), which provide d that I nterve nors may submit a new conte ntion only MEM ORANDUM AND ORDER (Denying I nte rvenor s' Mo ti on f or Adm is si on o f Co nte nti on 2 No. 6 o n Shi el d Bui ldi ng Concr et e V oid , Cra cking and Br oken Reb ar Pro ble m s), Fir st Ener gy Nucl ear Oper ati ng Co mpany (Da vis-Bess e Nuc le ar Power Sta ti on, Un it 1), Docket No. 50-346-LR, ASLBP No. 11-907-01-LR-BD01, J uly 25, 2014 , Page 16 , in te rna l c it at ion s omitt ed.NRC ADAMS Ac ces si on No. ML 1418 4B184.3 with leave of the pre siding off icer upon a showing that: (I) The inf ormation upon which the a mended or new c ontention is based was not previously available

(ii) The infor mation upon which the ame nded or ne w contention is based is mate rially differ ent than informa tion previously available

(iii) The a mended or new c ontention has bee n submitt ed in a timely fashion base d on the availability of the subseque nt information.

4 The I SO provides that "a motion and proposed new contention shall be de emed timely under [the pre-Aug ust 2012] 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)

(2)(iii) if it is filed within six ty (60) da y s of the date whe n the mater ial information on which it is based f irst becomes a vailable."

5 I nterve nors addr ess ea ch timeliness require ment in turn.

1) Information not previously available The infor mation upon which I nterve nors' ne w contention is based w as not ava ilable befor e Jul y 3. As the ASL B pa nel itself pointed out, above, F ENOC's "modific ations to Davis-Be sse's Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram - we re pr ovided on J uly 3, 2014 in Amendment No. 51 to the Davis-B esse L RA." (See also fn. 1, infra). J ust as I nterve nors could not file c rac king c ontentions by the initial intervention and contention filing deadline of Dec ember 27, 2010, since the c rac king w as not reve aled until late 2011, I nterve nors could not file this contention re g arding "modifica tions to Davis-Be sse's Shield Lic ens ing Boar d Or der (Initi al Sch edu li ng Order) a t 1 2 (J une 15, 2011) (unpu bli she d)4[he re ina ft er I SO]. Id.5 Building Monitoring Prog ram" until they wer e published, less than sixt y (60) da y s ag o. FEN OC made the "

modifications" to its Ag ing Ma nag ement Prog rams (A MP) in its Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram ba sed on re velations of pre viously undetec ted cr acking , and "pr opag ating" -worsening - of the c rac king, w hich was not de tected until Aug ust-September, 2013.

6 2) Materially different information The infor mation upon which this new conte ntion is based is materially differ ent than information pre viously available. The ASL B pa nel itself indicated a s much in its own J uly 25, 2014 ruling , as mentioned a bove, by pointing out this opportunity for I nterve nors to file a ne w contention.

Additionally , with the J uly 3, 2014 "modifica tions to Davis-Be sse's Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram," FEN OC saw it as nec essar y to modify its moni toring prog ram due to the discovery in Aug ust-September, 2013 of previously undetec ted cr acking , and wor sening cra cking. FEN OC's cra cking-re lated AMP modifications to its moni toring prog ram re prese nt signific ant, new, ma terial infor mation.3) Timeliness of the amended or ne w contention This new conte ntion has been submitted in a timely fashion, within six ty (60) da y s of the See I nte rvenor s' MOT I ON FOR ADMISSI ON OF CONT ENT I ON NO. 6 ON SHI ELD 6 BUI LDI NG CONCRET E V OI D, CRACK I NG AND BROKE N REBAR PROBLEM S, Fir st Ener gy Nu cl ear Oper ati ng Co mpany , Davis-Besse Nucl ear Power Sta ti on, Un it 1, Doc ket No. 50-346-LR, Apri l 2 1, 20 14, P age 6, Ex hib it s 6 and 7 (ML1 4112 A007). Exh ibi t 6 is Pre li m ina ry Noti ce of Event o r Oc cur re nce , PNO-I I I-13-007, DAV I S-BESSE SHI ELD BUI LDI NG LAMIN AR CRACKS , Sep te m ber 20, 2013 , ADAMS Acce ssi on No.ML1 3263 A410. Exhi bit 7 i s REQUEST FOR ADDI T I ONAL I NFORMAT I ON FOR T HE REV I EW OF T HE DAV I S-BESSE NUCLEAR POW ER ST AT I ON LI CENSE RENEW AL APPLI CAT I ON (T AC NO. ME 4640), J uan Uri be, Pro j ect Ma nager, Pro j ect s Br anc h 1, Divisi on of Lic ens e Re newa l, Of fi ce of Nucl ear Rea ct or Regulat ion , NRC, t o M r. Ra ym ond A. Li eb, V ic e-Pre si den t, Da vis-Bess e Nuc le ar Power Sta ti on, F ir st Ener gy Nucl ear Oper at ing Company, Apri l 1 5, 20 14 (ML1 4112 A008).

availability of the subseque nt information, namely , the J uly 3, 2014 "modifica tions to Davis-Be sse's Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram." I t theref ore c omplies with the I SO's timeliness 7 require ments beca use it is being submitted in a timely fashion under the pre-Aug ust 2012 version of 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f

)(2)(iii).ADMISS IBILITY CRITE RIA Contentions mus t meet the admissibility criter ia set for th in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)

, which re quires ea ch conte ntion to: (1) provide a spe cific state ment of the issue of la w or fa ct to be ra ised; (2) provide a brie f explanation of the basis for the contention; (3) de monstrate that the issue raised in the c ontention is withi n the scope of the proc eeding; (4) demonstra te that the issue raised in the c ontention is material to the finding s the NRC must m ake to support the lice nsing action; (5) pr ovide a c oncise stateme nt of the alleg ed fa cts or expert opinions in support of the petitioner's position on the issue and on which the petitioner intends to rely at hea ring; and (6)provide suff icient information to show that a g enuine dispute e x ists with t he applica nt/licensee on a mater ial issue of law or fac t, with refe renc e to spec ific disputed portions of the a pplication.

A fa ilure to meet a ny of these c riteria r ender s the contention inadmissible.

10 C.F.R. § 8 2.309(f)(1)(I)-(vi). These admissibili ty criter ia ar e addr essed in turn be low.1) Specific stateme nt of the issue of law or fact to be raised FEN OC's revisions to the AMPs in its Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram, da ted J uly 3, Beca use Mo nda y, Septe m ber 1, 2 014 is Lab or Day, I nte rvenor s' fi li ng dead li ne i s T ues day, 7 Sept ember 2, 201 4. I nte rna l c it at ion s omitt ed, re fe re nce d by the ASLB pa nel.8 2014, acknow ledg e not only the risk, but the re ality , of ag ing-rela ted cr acking propag ation --9 1 0 that is, worsening

- in the alre ady sever ely cra cked Shield B uilding, an a dmission which brings the issue within the scope of this L icense Renewa l Application proce eding. FEN OC's proposed modifications to its S hield Building Monitoring Prog ram AMPs, reg arding the scope (ar eas of the Shield Building to be examined), sample size (number of tests to be per formed), and the fre quency of its surveillance activities, are woef ully inadequa te. Signific antly more c ore bor es, as well as a broade r diversity of compleme ntary testing me thods should be require d, and at a much g rea ter fr equenc y than FE NOC has propose

d. The c rac king phe nomena must be identified, analy zed and addr essed within the F inal Supplemental Environmental I mpact Statement for the license r enew al.2) Provide a brief e xplanation of the basis for the contention I n light of the reve lation in August-Septe mber, 2013 of pr eviously undetec ted cr acks a nd the conc lusion that they wer e wor sening (propa g ating), I nterve nors cha lleng e the a dequac y of FEN OC's Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram AMPs proposed f or the 2017-2037 lice nse extension period. Specifica lly , FEN OC's testing f reque ncy is inadequate , and risks bec oming See FENOC's "Re ply to Requ est fo r Ad dit ion al I nfo rmati on f or the Review o f t he Da vis-Bess e 9 Nucl ear Power Sta ti on, Un it No. 1, Lic ens e Re newa l Ap pli cat ion (T AC No. M E464 0) and Lic ens e Re newa l Ap pli cat ion Am end m ent No. 51 ," Da vis-Bess e Nuc le ar Power Sta ti on, Un it No. 1, Docket No. 50-346, Lic ens e Number NP F-3, s ent by FENOC to the at te nti on o f t he Document Cont rol Des k at t he U.S. Nucl ear Regula tor y Com m is si on o n J uly 3, 2 014, per 10 CFR 54, Encl osu re: Da vis-Bess e Nuc le ar Power Sta ti on, Un it No. 1 (Da vis-Bess e), Let te r L-14-224, Am end m ent No. 51 to th e Davis-Bess e Li cen se Rene wal Appl ic at ion (8 pages), p. 1 of 8.ADAMS No. M L141 84B18 4 (her ei naf te r r ef er enc ed a s "FENOC's RAI Let te r J uly 3, 2 014"). T wo of numerou s e xamples: "The c rac king pro paga ti on was det er m ine d t o be a r esu lt of ic e-1 0 wedging (f re ezing wate r a t a pr e-exi st ing cr ack le adi ng edge),"

and "The r ate of cr acki ng prop agat ion is es ti m at ed a t 0.4 t o 0.7 in che s pe r f re ezing cycle bas ed o n l abo ra tor y sim ula ti on."Id., Page 7 o f 8 (1 3 of 14 o n pd f c ount er). (emphase s a dde d).

less adequa te over time (via re laxed, less freque nt testing). A nnual inspections, at a minimum, should be requir ed, not two- or e ven four-y ear inspection cy cles, a s FENO C has proposed.

I n addition, the number of c ore bor es to be e x amined should be sig nificantly incre ased over the meag er numbe r propose d by FEN OC. Vast ar eas of the Shield Building surfa ce a rea , and volume, would fa ll outsi de of F ENOC's Monitoring Prog ram AMPs, as cur rently construed, and so the scope of the testing should also be sig nificantly expanded.

Given the importanc e of the Shield Building to ra diologica l containment, such a s the proper functioning of the Emer g ency Ventilation Sy stem, as we ll as a biolog ical shield, and a 1 1 tornado a nd missil e shield, and thus to public health, saf ety , and envir onmental protec tion, and 1 2 in considera tion of the alre ady sever e, and w orsening , cra cking of the Shield Building , these inadequa cies in the Monitoring Prog ram AMPs are unacc eptable, a nd must be rec tified. Davis-B ess e Nuc le ar Power Sta ti on/Lic ens e Re newa l Ap pli cat ion/T ech nic al I nfo rmati on, 1 1 sec ti on 2.3.3.13 Emergency V ent il at ion Syste m. Page 2.3-88 [184/1,81 0 on pdf cou nte r]. T his doc um ent , da te d August 30, 2010 , ap pea rs to have no t b een pos te d at ADAMS nor as si gned an ML number. Ho wever, i t i s po st ed a t t he f oll owin g link on NRC' s we bsi te: htt p://www.nr c.gov/rea ct ors/op er at ing/l ic ens ing/r ene wal/a ppl ic at ion s/davis-bes se/davis-bes se-lr a.pd f. At s ect ion 2.4.1 CONT AI NMENT (IN CLUDI NG CONT AI NMENT V ESSEL, S HI ELD 1 2 BUI LDI NG, AND CONT AI NMENT I NT ERNAL ST RUCT URES)-SEI SMIC CLASS I , of th e Davis-Bess e Nuc le ar Power Sta ti on/Lic ens e Re newa l Ap pli cat ion/T ech nic al I nfo rmati on, FENOC st at es: "T he S hie ld Buil din g is a con cr et e s tr uct ure sur rou ndi ng the Cont ai nm ent V ess el.I t i s de si gned to pr ovide b iol ogical shi el din g duri ng normal op er at ion and fr om hypoth et ic al acc ide nt con dit ion s. T he b uil din g provide s a m ean s f or col le ct ion and fi lt ra ti on o f f is si on p rod uct le akage fro m th e Con ta inment V ess el fo ll owin g a hypothe ti cal ac ci den t t hro ugh the Em er gency V ent il at ion Syste m , an engine er ed s af et y feat ure des igned f or tha t p urp ose. I n ad dit ion , th e bui ldi ng provide s e nviro nm ent al pr ote ct ion fo r t he Co nta inment V ess el fr om adver se at m osp her ic con dit ion s a nd e xte rna l miss il es." Pa ge 2.4-3 [263 of 1,81 0 on PDF co unt er]T his Davis-B ess e NPS/LRA/T ech. I nfo. doc um ent , da te d August 201 0, i s po st ed a t htt p://www.nr c.gov/rea ct ors/op er at ing/l ic ens ing/r ene wal/a ppl ic at ion s/davis-bes se/davis-bes se-lr a.pd f.

3) Demonstration that the issue raised in the contention is withi n the scope of the procee ding As explained by FEN OC: The Enc losure identifies the change to the Lice nse Renewal App lication (LRA) by Affe cted L RA Section, L RA Pag e No., a nd Affe cted Par ag raph a nd Sentence. The count for the aff ecte d para g raph, se ntence , bullet, etc. starts a t the beg inning of the aff ecte d Section or at the top of the aff ecte d pag e, as a ppropriate. Be low eac h section the rea son for the c hang e is identified, and the sente nce aff ect ed is prin ted in italics wi th delete d text {lin ed out} and ad ded text underli ned. [Emphasis added]

1 3 1 4 Thus, italicized and underlined text is "aff ecte d," and "added." I nterve nors asser t that various sections of the italicized and underlined text , identified below, c ontain signific ant new ma terial information and that F ENOC's Jul y 3, 2014 revisions to its S hield Building Monitoring Prog ram AMPs finally acknow ledg e wha t should have bee n evident (a nd admitted) bef ore now , the ag ing-rela ted risk of c rac king pr opag ation. This issue is withi n-scope of this L RA proce eding , and worthy of a he aring , as will be shown.

4. Demonstration that the issue raised is material to t he findings the NRC must make to support the licensing action The NRC is mandated by the Atomic Ener g y Act and N ational Environmental Policy Act to provide re asonable assura nce of public health and sa fety , and envir onmental protec tion, during the proposed 20-y ear license e x tension at Davis-B esse, a nd to take a "

hard look" at environ-mental impacts, as by making predic tive safe ty finding s and conduc ting a n environmenta l analy sis reg arding the safe ty and envir onmental impacts of the 20-y ear license e x tension.The Shield Building at Davis-B esse is cr itical to radiolog ical conta inment during rea ctor I nte rvenor s a re not abl e t o i ndi cat e de le te d t ext by str iking it out , or li nin g it t hro ugh as i t 1 3 app ear s i n FENOC's or igina l, a nd s o i ndi cat e t his wit h {pa re nth ese s}. FENOC's RAI Let te r, J uly 3, 2 014, p. 1 of 8. 1 4 emer g encie s, such as meltdowns or othe r ra dioactive r elea ses. I t can f ilter radioa ctivity to a cer tain extent before it is expelled to the ext erna l atmosphere, a nd it is also essential to defending the I nner Stee l Containment Vessel, and Rea ctor Pressur e Ve ssel ag ainst ext erna l threats, such a s tornadoe s or missiles. The Shield Building f urther pr ovides biologic al shielding during normal opera tions. (See fns. 11 and 12 infra).The seve re, a nd finally-admitted "pr opag ation" cr acking of the Shield Building threa tens to fail the Shield Building from per forming its vit al desig n safe ty and envir onmental func tions. I nterve nors cha lleng e the a dequac y of F ENOC's Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram AMPs to g uara ntee the Shield B uilding fulfills its vital safety functions, as re quired by applicable laws and reg ulations. There fore the issues raise d by this contention are ma terial to a lice nse extension decision for Davis-B esse. 5. Concise statement of the allege d facts or expe rt opinions i n support of the petitioner's position and on w hich the petitioner intends to rely at hearing I nterve nors incorpor ate he rein by ref ere nce the "B ases f or Contention" sec tion below as their listing of the fac ts showing that F ENOC's Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram AMPs are inadequa te to provide re asonable assura nce tha t the Shield Building c an provide adequa te protec tion to publi c hea lth and safe ty and the e nvironment during the 2017 to 2037 license extension period.

6. Showing of a genuine dispute between the lice nsee on a m aterial issue of law or f act, with reference to specific disputed portions of the application I nterve nors incorpor ate he rein by ref ere nce the "B ases f or Contention" sec tion below in support of this criterion. I nterve nors provide infor mation which demonstrate s that a g enuine dispute exi sts with FENOC on a mate rial issue of law and fa ct re g arding the ade quacy of FEN OC's Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram AMPs to supply AEA a nd NEPA-re quired rea sonable a ssuranc es of a dequate protec tion of public health, saf ety , and the e nvironment, as well as the r equire d "har d look" at the e nvironmental impacts, of a 20-y ear license e x tension at Davis-B esse, g iven the seve re, a nd worsening , cra cking of the Shield Building

.BAS ES F OR CONTENTION

1. A new w rinkl e in tim e: admit ted crac king propagat ion FEN OC states:

1 5 The loca tions {of the core bore s} for the inspections are chosen f rom the cor e bores that ha ve bee n installed in the subcomponents of the Shield B uilding Wall, including new core bore s install ed as required to identify c hanges in the limits of crack ing in areas wit h previously identified crac k propagation.

The re prese ntative sample size includes

{20} a minimum of 23 core bore inspec tion locations in the subcomponent population (defined as Shield Building W all subcomponents having the same mate rial, environment, and aging effec t combination). The {20} 23 core bore location [sic] distribution has been chose n to include cor e bore inspections in 8 of the 10 flute shoulders with a hig h preva lence of eve nt-driven laminar crack ing-In addition, past evidenc e of crac k propagation is considered in choosing future inspection locations.

1 6 There is other evidenc e cr acking is gr owing worse w ith tim e, the phe nomenon to which FEN OC ref ers a s "cr ack pr opag ation." I nterve nors asser t that FENO C is unduly and improper ly vag ue in its assertion that, The loca tions {of the core bore s} for the inspections are chosen f rom the cor e bores that ha ve bee n installed in the subcomponents of the Shield B uilding Wall, As pr evious ly st at ed, del et ed t ext is re pro duc ed i n I nte rvenor s' m emorand um usi ng 1 5{par ent hes es}.FENOC's "Re ply to Requ est fo r Ad dit ion al I nfo rmati on f or the Review o f t he Da vis-Bess e 1 6 Nucl ear Power Sta ti on, Un it No. 1, Lic ens e Re newa l Ap pli cat ion (T AC No. M E464 0) and Lic ens e Re newa l Ap pli cat ion Am end m ent No. 51 ," t he J uly 3, 2 014 le tt er , ADAMS Acce ssi on No. M L141 84B18 4, LRA Se ct ion s Af fe ct ed: A.1.43; B.2.43, Aff ect ed L RA Sec ti on: A.1.43 , LRA Page No.:

Page A-25, Af fe ct ed P ar agraph and Sen te nce: 4 th Par agraph , p. 2/8 (p. 8/14 o n pdf cou nte r).

including new core bore s install ed as required to identify c hanges in the limits of crack ing in areas wit h previously identified crac k propagation.

This is so ambiguous that it hardly comprises a n ag ing ma nag ement plan. No c ommitm ents are clea rly expressed; it amounts to deferr ing a serious scientific or eng ineer ing c ommitm ent to monitoring, a nd g iven the thre e-y ear history since discove ry of the c rac king, is g rossly inadequa te. The sc ope - that is, the ar eas of the Shield Building to be monitored - is too narrow

.FEN OC mentions only "areas with previously identified crack propagation.

" This excludes vast are as of the ma ssive Shield Building, w hich could also be suffe ring cra cking initiation and propag ation.Additionally , an incr ease by 3 of cor e bore locations is insufficient, g iven the sig nificanc e of worse ning c rac king r evea led in Aug ust-September, 2013, a nd the vital safe ty , health, and environmenta l protection roles the Shield Building is intended to f ill.I n the extended sec tion entitled "Detec tion of Ag ing E ffe cts" (pp. 3-4/8 [pp. 9-10/14 on pdf counte r]) FENO C has made the f ollowing modifica tions: The Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram provide s for de tection of a g ing e ffe cts prior to the loss of Shield Building intended func tions. The inspections, testing and analyses of the Shield Building concre te and rebar that was done to support the root cause e valuation report, " Concrete Crack withi n Shield Building T emporary A cce ss Opening", and the foll ow-up report, " Shield Building L aminar Crack Propagation,"{will} provide a baseline for future Shield Building Monitoring Program activities.

Periodic visual inspections will be per formed in a ccor dance with an implementing pr ocedur e by inspectors qua lified as desc ribed in Chapter 7 of ACI Report 349.3R. The visual inspections will be per formed on a repr esenta tive sample of Shield B uilding Wall structural subcompone nts by inspection of the internal surf ace s of cor e bore s. The locations of the {core bores hav e bee n}inspections will be chose n from the core bore s that have bee n install ed in the subcompone nts of the Shield Building W all, including new core bores installed as required to identify change s in the limits of crack ing in areas wit h previously identified crack propagation. T he repre sentative sample size inc ludes {20} 23 core bore inspection locations in the subcomponent population (de fined a s Shield Building Wall subcomponents having the same mate rial, environme nt, and ag ing eff ect c ombination).

A minimum of 10 of the core bore s at inspection locations are curre ntly uncrack ed; howev er, they are adjace nt to areas of known crack ing.This st rategic location. and selec tion of core bores provides FE NOC wi th the ability to monitor for crack propagation. The {20} 23 core bore location distribut ion has been c hosen to include c ore bore inspec tions in 8 of the 10 flute shoulders with a hi gh prevale nce of e vent-driven laminar crac king. This distribution also covers shell sec tions above ele vation 780 fee t with 4 core bor es (2 pairs), and ea ch Main Steam L ine pene tration are a with one c ore bor e. In addition, past evide nce of c rack propagation will be considered in choosing future inspection locations.

Visual inspections will be supplemented by other established nondestruc tive examination (NDE) tec hniques and testing , as appropr iate.The initial fre quency of visual inspection of c ore bor es and c ore bor e samples will be base d on the re sults of inspections conducted be fore the per iod of extended opera tion. {lf no aging effects were identified by these visual inspections, then visual inspections will continue to be conducted at least onc e eve ry two years during the period of ex tended ope ration.} T he first inspection conducte d during the period of extende d operation is scheduled for 2017 and the next inspec tion is scheduled for {2019} 2018. If no aging effects are identified by the {two-year} one-ye ar interval visual inspections (defined as no discernable change in c rack width or the confirmation that no visibl e crac ks have deve loped in core bores that prev iously had no visible crack s), then the freque ncy of v isual inspections may be changed to at least once eve ry {five} two ye ars through 2026.

If no aging effects are ide ntified bv the two-year interv al visual inspections, then the frequenc y of visual inspections may be changed to at least once eve rv four years. Any evidenc e of de g rada tion will be documented and e valuated thr oug h the FEN OC Correc tive Action Prog ram. The evaluation will i nclude a de termination of the need for any required change to the inspection schedule or parameters that need to be inspected

-1 7 2. Better the devil you know: risks of know n/u nknow n cracking propagation Respecting FEN OC's statement "inc luding ne w cor e bore s installed as requir ed to identify chang es in the limits of crac king in a rea s with previously identified cr ack pr opag ation"(p. 3/8 [9/14 on pdf counter]), in Aug ust-September, 2013, F ENOC discover ed cr acks w here they had pre viously not been identifie d, and also discove red w orsening cra cking wher e none ha d been Id., Li cen se Rene wal Appl ic at ion Sec ti ons Aff ect ed: A.1.43; B.2.43, Aff ect ed L RA Sec ti on: 1 7 A.1.43 , LRA Pa ge No.: P age A-25, Af fe ct ed P ar agraph and Sen te nce: 4 th Par agraph , pp. 3-4/8 (pp. 9-10/14 o n pd f c ount er).

previously identified, nor e x pecte d. Thus, limit ing ne w cor e bore s to "are as with previously identified cr ack pr opag ation" is not sufficient, be cause new c rac ks, or worse ning c rac k propag ation, could deve lop in area s not under ca ref ul ag ing ma nag ement surve illance by FEN OC, and there by g o undetec ted for long periods of time.

This inattention has happene d befor e at Da vis-Be sse, with serious implications. I n FEN OC's own B liz zard of 1978 root c ause c onclusion, endorse d by the NRC Staff, the sub-laminar c rac king disc overe d in October 2011 had bee n there since 1978, for 33 y ear s, undetec ted beca use it was not visible on the surfa ce, a nd FEN OC's ag ing ma nag ement of the Shield Building was limited to visual inspections of the surfa ce. F ailing to investig ate into larg e portions for e vidence of the initiation or worsening of cr acks in the Shield B uilding which F ENOC does not expect is unacce ptable as a n AMP during the 20-y ear license e x tension period. F or this rea son, I nterve nors ca ll for additional testing methods, besides cor e bore s, to be invoked.

Ex tensive and c omprehe nsive complementa ry testing me thods should be deploy ed to compensa te for the limit ations of FE NOC's small number of pr oposed cor e bore tests. These c an and should include: ele ctronic te sting; impact re sponse mapping or impulse response testing (I RT, a testing technique use d to locate laminar cra cking inside a conc rete wall); cr eep te sting;pull tests; ul trasonic testing

lab testing (such as c hemical testing , for the pr esenc e of Ettring ite, which would indicate moisture exposure, or testing for sulfa tes, or other chemica ls known to have a deleter ious effe ct on conc rete , in order to de termine if they are prese nt in significa nt quantities in contact with the c oncre te containment struc ture), stre ng th tests, and tensile tests.

Given the vital saf ety and envir onmental role tha t the Davis-B esse Shield B uilding must perf orm from 2017 to 2037, such tests should be re quired to provide a compre hensive unde rstanding of the status of the Shield Building , and to g uara ntee its ca pability to perfor m its design func tions.FEN OC's incuriosity is not acce ptable.Reg arding FEN OC's statement "

A minimum of 10 of the core bore s at inspection locations are currently unc racke d; howeve r, they are adjac ent to areas of known crack ing. This strategic location and selection of core bore s provides FENOC with the abili ty to monitor for crack propagation

"(p. 3/8 [9/14 on pdf counter]) g iven the sig nificanc e of the unexpected, new ly detec ted cr acks, a nd worsening of pre viously identified cr acks, r evea led in Aug ust-September 2013. "A minimum of 10 of the cor e bore s at inspection locations [that]

are curr ently uncra cked"is a woef ully inadequa te sampling siz e ac ross the vast, seve rely cra cked -- and de teriora ting -safe ty and envir onmentally signific ant Shield Building. Whil e F ENOC should be on g uard ag ainst propag ation of known c rac king, it must also be vig ilant to root out unknown crac king, and g uard a g ainst its advance. After all, FEN OC was unaw are of the sub-la minar cr acking it claims was c aused by the B liz zard of 1978 until October 2011, that is, for nea rly 34 y ear s. To be unawa re of such a thre at ag ainst the Shield Building' s perf ormanc e of intende d safe ty and environmenta lly signific ant desig n functions for suc h a long period of time, c annot be a llowed to happen a g ain.3. Cracking's sign ificance de m ands stat istical sign ificance As to FENO C's statement that "The {20} 23 core bore location distribution has been chosen to include core bore inspections in 8 of the 10 flute shoulders wi th a high prevalenc e of eve nt-driven laminar crac king," (p. 3/8 [9/14 on pdf counter]) a me re inc rea se of 3 c ore bor es is insufficient, g iven the sig nificanc e of the new c rac king a nd advanc ing c rac king r evea led in Aug ust-September, 2013. (see f n. 5 above)

The number of cor e bore s must be significa ntly incre ased. This is espe cially the ca se, g iven that FE NOC has ar bitrarily excluded larg e sec tions of the Shield Building from fur ther e x amination under its proposed A MPs, such as two of the ten flute shoulders.

FEN OC further intends to use past cra cking evidenc e to choose future inspe ction locations: "

In addition, past evidence of crack propagation wi ll be considered in c hoosing future inspection locations.

" Since F ENOC had pr eviously missed "past evidenc e" of cr acking from 1978 to 2011, acc ording to its self-repor t, it appear s that "past evide nce" is inadequate to choose "future inspection locations," f or it could ea sily miss unknown crac king a cross stre tches of the Shield Building. Similarly , an unknown a ir void or g ap, extending most of the w ay throug h the Shield Building side w all, was pre sent during over two y ear s of full-powe r oper ations (late 2011 to ear ly 2014) simply beca use it was not visible at the surfa ce. E ven known cra cking has fa iled to prompt action at Da vis-Be sse. FE NOC and its prede cessor s actua lly wer e aw are of cr acking on the dome par apet a s ear ly as 1976, but did not revea l this i nformation to the public until 2012, 36 y ear s later.1 8 4. Tim e flies when your Sh ield Bui lding i s cracking:

inspection frequency increase nee ded Thus, "choosing future inspection locations

," base d solely on considera tions of "past"On Aug ust 15, 1976 th e To le do Ed is on Co mpany con st ruc ti on s upe ri nte nde nt doc ument ed a n 1 8 exa mina ti on o f t he s hie ld bui ldi ng d ome p ara pet th at fou nd a cr ack ed a nd b rok en a rch it ect ura l fl ute sho uld er at appr oxi mate ly 292 deg ree azi muth. The re were al so o the r ha ir li ne s hri nka ge cra cks in th e do me pa rap et at bot h co rne rs of eac h ar chi te ct ura l f lut e s houl der , at mid-wi dth of eac h f lut e, a nd v ert ic al aro und the per iph ery of th e pa rap et ," c it ed i n I NT ERV ENORS' T HI RD MOT I ON T O AMEND AND/

OR SUPPLEM ENT PROPOSED CONT ENT I ON NO. 5 (SHI ELD BUI LDI NG CRACKING), I n t he M at te r o f Fi rs t En er gy Nucl ear Oper at ing Company (Davis-Bess e Nuc le ar Power Sta ti on, Un it 1), Docket No. 50-346-LR, J uly 16, 2012 , se ct ion 5, Sh ie ld Buil din g Dom e Pa ra pet Cra cking, Page 7. (it al ic s i n or igina l FE NOC doc um ent , it s Re vised Root Caus e Ana lysis , RRCA, M ay 16, 20 12, P age 34 o f 1 31 o n PDF c ount er , ADAMS Acce ssi on Num ber ML 1214 2A053.)

evide nce of c rack propagation"(p. 4/8 [10/14 on pdf counter])

is not only unacc eptably vag ue, it is also not acce ptable in terms of r easona ble assura nce of adequa te protec tion of public health, safe ty , and envir onment over the proposed 2017-2037 license e x tension.FEN OC's statement setting hug e time interva ls betwee n investiga tory inspections is troublesome:

The first i nspection conduc ted during the period of exte nded operation is schedule d for 2017 and the next inspec tion is scheduled for {2019} 2018. If no aging effects are ide ntified by the {two-year} one-ye ar interval visual inspections (defined as no discernable c hange in crac k width or the confirmation that no visible crack s have deve loped in core bore s that previously had no visible crac ks), then the freque ncy of visual inspections may be changed to at least once eve ry {five} two ye ars through 2026. If no aging effects are identified by the two-year interval v isual inspections, then the frequenc y of visual inspections may be changed to at least once eve ry four years. (p. 4/8 [10/14 on pdf counter]).

The une x pecte d Aug ust-September 2013 ne w cr acking and cr ack pr opag ation discovery was de tected only beca use of a n annual F ENOC inspection. (See fn. 5 infra). I nterva ls of two or four y ear s as proposed me ans that new or dete riorating cra cking would be missed for y ear s. The cruc ial role the Shield B uilding play s in containment, hea lth, safety , and envir onmental protec tion makes it unacc eptable f or F ENOC to rela x inspections to less than annually. FEN OC's wea k commitment to document and eva luate evide nce of deg rada tion of the Shield Building throug h the company

's Corre ctive Ac tion Progra m and to "include a deter mination of the nee d for a ny require d chang e to the inspec tion schedule or pa rame ters that nee d to be inspecte d," is larg ely meaning less with two or four-y ear testing inter vals. A dete rmined inspection sche dule and cle ar r equire ments of par ameter s that need to be inspected must be made into license conditions for the lice nse extension now. I nterve nors urg e NRC to require expanded sampling siz e ac ross diverse are as of the Shield B uilding and inc rea sed fr equenc y of inspections, as compar ed to FE NOC's pre sent proposal, g iven the risks of Shield B uilding fa ilure.5. Sin s of Omi ssion: Cor rective Actions S peak Louder than In adequate Inspections Notably , FEN OC mentions no action, such as r epair s to the Shield Building, to be underta ken under its Corrective Ac tion Progra

m. The only corr ective a ction FEN OC has taken in response to the c rac king phe nomena wa s to whitewash the e x terior of the Shield Building in Aug ust 2012, 40 y ear s too late. And I nterve nors have previously pointed out the inadequa cy of the use of w hitewash to sea l the concr ete. Concerning "Monitoring and Tre nding" (pp. 4-5/8 [10-11/14 on pdf counter

]) FENOC's modifications include:

The Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram will include a baseline inspec tion, followed by periodic inspec tions. Visual inspections will be perfor med in acc ordanc e with the implementing pr ocedur e by personne l qualified as de scribed in Chapte r 7 of ACI Report 349.3R.

The represe ntative sample size include s {20} a minimum of 23 core bore inspection locations in the Shield Building W all subcomponent population having the same mate rial, environment, and aging effec t combination. A minimum of 10 of the core bores at inspection locations are currently unc racke d; howeve r, they are adjac ent to areas of known crack ing. This strategic location, and selection of core bore s provides FENOC wit h the ability to monitor f or crack propagation.

The {20} 23 core bore location distribut ion has been c hosen to include c ore bore inspec tions in 8 of the 10 flute shoulders with a hi gh prevale nce of e vent-driven laminar crac king. This distributi on also cover s shell sections above e levation 780 fe et with 4 core bores (2 pairs), a nd eac h Main Steam L ine pene tration are a with one c ore bor e. In addition, past evidence of crack propagation wi ll be considered in c hoosing inspection locations.

I nspection finding s will be docume nted and e valuated by assig ned eng ineer ing pe rsonnel such tha t the results ca n be tre nded. I nspection finding s that do not meet ac cepta nce c riteria w ill be evaluate d and trac ked using the FE NOC Correc tive Action Prog ram. 1 9 6. Few and far between: sam ple size m uch too sm all, scope m uch too n arrow FEN OC's sample size is troubling: "

The represe ntative sample size include s {20} a FENOC's RAI Let te r, J uly 3, 2 014, Sec ti ons Aff ect ed: A.1.43; B.2.43, Aff ect ed L RA Sec ti on: 1 9 A.1.43 , LRA Pa ge No.: P age A-25, Af fe ct ed P ar agraph and Sen te nce: 4 th Par agraph , pp. 4-5/8 (pp. 10-11/14 on p df cou nte r).

minimum of 23 core bore inspection locations in the Shield Building W all subcomponent population having the same material, env ironment, and aging effect c ombination" (p. 4/8 [10/14 on pdf counte r]) as mentioned a bove, 23 cor e bore inspection locations ar e too fe w ac ross the vast surfa ce a rea and volumetric de pth of the Shield Building structure. I nterve nors ca ll for a signific ant incre ase in both the sample size (number s of tests), scope of monitoring (locations to be monitored), a s well as fr equenc y of testing. I nterve nors have previously arg ued bef ore the ASL B pa nel in this procee ding tha t there a re multiple kinds of cra cking , located a t diverse plac es acr oss the hug e Shield Building (exhibit ing dif fer ent "material, environme nt, and aging effect combination[s]

") (p. 4/8 [10/14 on pdf counter]), including sub-surfa ce la minar cr acking , surfa ce c rac king, dome cra cking , micro-c rac king, a nd radia l cra cking. And as of A ug ust-September, 2013, F ENOC has be en for ced to a dmit that these cra cks ar e propa g ating over time, which mea ns that they are ag ing-rela ted.7. Tim ing (relatedness) is eve rythin g: contention w ithi n LRA scope FEN OC's ac knowledg ment of an "

ag ing e ffe ct" a ssociated with the Shield B uilding cra cking finally establishes wha t the ASL B ha s denied pre viously to the I nterve nors: this contention is indeed within scope, a nd worthy of a he aring , g iven the ag ing-rela ted risks of the Shield Building c rac king a nd its propag ation.FEN OC's statement that "

[a] minimum of 10 of the core bore s at inspection locations are currently unc racke d; howeve r, they are adjac ent to areas of known crack ing" is gr ossly inadequa te for sa mpling purpose s, g iven the sig nificanc e of the unexpected, new ly detec ted cra cks, and w orsening of pre viously identified cr acks, r evea led in 2013.

8. Loss of conforman ce: acrobatic 'aligning' on regulatory tigh trope FEN OC also has modified its "Ac cepta nce Criter ia" a s follows:

For core bore inspec tions, unacce ptable inspec tion findings will include any indication of new cra cking or a " discerna ble cha ng e" in previously identified cr acks. A ny indication of new cra cking is defined a s a visual inspection finding that visible crac ks have de veloped in cor e bore s that previously had no visible cra cks. A disce rnable chang e in a pre viously identified cr ack is de fined a s a visual inspection finding that there has been a discerna ble cha ng e in g ener al appe ara nce or in cra ck width as identified by cra ck compar ator mea surement.

Conditi ons to be ev aluated follow ing each inspec tion cycle for determination of " acce ptable results" include conformanc e with the plant design and licensing basis, as well as w ith previously determ ined crac k propagation rates.

Comparison wi th previously dete rmined propagation rates wil l be to identify any potential changes in the driving force of the c ondition. 2 0 These a g ain ar e bar e minimum requirements, a nd should be substantially streng thened."[C]onformance with the plant design and licensing basis

" should be a basic re quirement, a nd must be strictly enfor ced a t all times. But as appe ars to be the problem in dea ling with the Shield Building cra cking trend, the N RC S taff ha s been too willing to ignor e licensing and desig n basis violations.

2 1 Such reg ulatory violations, and the absenc e of a n ag ency interested in de manding compliance with them, cannot be a llowed in the cr itical decision to g rant a license e x tension.Short cuts on safety , allowed by reg ulator-industry collusion, were officia lly deter mined by the J apane se Diet (Par liament) to have been the root ca use of the F ukushima Daiichi nucle ar FENOC's RAI Let te r, J uly 3, 2 014, LRA Sec ti ons Aff ect ed: A.1.43; B.2.43, Aff ect ed L RA 2 0 Sec ti on: A.1.43 , LRA Pa ge No.: P age A-25, Af fe ct ed P ar agraph and Sen te nce: 4 th Par agraph , pp. 5/8 (p. 11/14 o n pd f c ount er). See "NRC ac rob at ic 'a li gning' on a r egulat ory ti ghtro pe," and as soc ia te d f oot not es (#8 1 an d 2 1 fol lowi ng), ci ti ng documents obt ai ned fr om NRC via FOI A, in W hat Humpt y Dump ty doe sn't want you to kno w: Dav is-Be sse's Crac ked Cont ain ment Sno w Job , Beyond Nu cl ear Fac t Sh eet , August 8 , 201 2, pp. 8-10 (pos te d on li ne a t: htt p://www.be yondnuc le ar.or g/sto ra ge/Snow%20J ob%20Re cen t%20Re velat ion s%208%208%20 2012.pdf.

cata strophe. The NRC has ac knowledg ed the ne ed to lear n lessons from F ukushima. Avoiding 2 2 2 3 a potential nucle ar c atastrophe should be the aim.

9. The roots of the problem

crac king acceleration, with m ulti ple drivers FEN OC's ref ere nce, "[c]omparison wit h previously de termined [crac k] propagation rates-to identify any potential changes in the driving force of the c ondition"(p. 5/8 [11/14 on pdf counte r]), is an overt a dmission by FEN OC that the cra cking is ag ing-rela ted. I ronica lly , FEN OC, and NRC staff f or that matter, ha ve pre viously arg ued bef ore this ASL B pa nel that I nterve nors' Shield Building containment cr acking-re lated conte ntions are not prope r for adjudication bec ause of FEN OC's deter mination that the root cause of the c rac king w as the Blizz ard of 1978, and so the c rac king is not ag ing-rela ted. B ut now, FEN OC acknow ledg es that cra cking could well g row wor se with time (that is, "propa g ate"), due to "

potential changes in the driving force of the condition

." Eve n as F ENOC and the N RC st aff stand by the dubious Blizz ard of 1978 root ca use conc lusion, FENOC now see ms willi ng to admit another "

driving force of the condition"(p. 5/8 [11/14 on pdf counter]) - that is, another root ca use - is likely at work initiating new c rac ks and worse ning pr eviously detec ted ones, pe rhaps e ven ac cele rating their spre ad over time. FENO C's admission is conclusive that Davis-B esse's Shield Building c rac king is a g ing-rela ted, making I nterve nors' c ontention within scope, and wor thy of a he aring on the merits.

10. Shaky sh ell gam es deman d concrete AMP solu tions FEN OC's Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram modifica tions concer ning a g e-r elated Nat ion al Die t [Par li ament] of J apa n, Of fi ci al Repo rt of th e Fu kushima Nucl ear Acci den t 2 2 I nde pen den t Inv est igati on Co m m is si on, E xec uti ve Sum m ar y, post ed o nli ne a t htt p://wa rp.da.n dl.go.j p/i nfo:nd lj p/p id/3856 371/nai ic.go.j p/e n/r epo rt/. ht tp://www.nrc.gov/r eac tor s/ope ra ti ng/ops-exp er ie nce/j apa n-das hboa rd.html 2 3 deg rada tion of reba r, while outside the 60-day period to bec ome par t of a c ontention, nonetheless rela tes to the nee d for r econside ration of the ne ws that the Shield Building cra cking is ag ing-rela ted: The a cce ptance criter ia for r ebar corr osion found during visual inspections will be that there is no evidence of cor rosion indicated by loose, flaky rust or re inforce ment section loss. Given the inher ent var iability of re inforce ment cross sec tion, and the encompa ssing c oncre te, no m easurem ent te chniq ue is em ployed. (Emphasis adde d).2 4 Despite their be ing una ble to challeng e this aspec t of FEN OC's AMPs, I nterve nors emphasize that their other points on this new Contention 7 should be the more c ompelling a nd urg ent, g iven the utter lac k of ade quate a g ing-manag ement on the c ritical re bar r einforc ement in the Shield Building. Mere visual inspection, and an utter lack of any measure ment technique r epre sents an 2 5 astounding defic iency in ag ing ma nag ement during the 2017-2037 lice nse extension. I f F ENOC ref uses to improve its ag ing ma nag ement of the reba r, then the a g ing ma nag ement of the sever ely cra cked c oncre te, bec omes all the more importa nt - espec ially g iven the Aug ust-September 2013 reve lation of new c rac k initiation, and worsening cra cking. I n particula r, this conclusion in the J uly 3 letter is suspect:

The Shield Building laminar cracking condition has been e valuated with respect to the design basis functions of t he Shield Building. The condition is documented in FENOC calculation C-CSS-099.20-063, as supported by Be chtel report "Effect of Laminar Cr acks on Splice Capacity of No. 11 Bars based on Testing C onducted at Purdue Unive rsity and University of Kansas for Davis-Besse Shie ld Building,"

that the FENOC's RAI Let te r, J uly 3, 2 014, Lic ens e Re newa l Ap pli cat ion Sec ti ons Aff ect ed: A.1.43;2 4 B.2.43 , Aff ect ed L RA Sec ti on: A.1.43 , LRA Pa ge No.: P age A-25, Af fe ct ed P ar agraph and Sent enc e: 4t h Pa ra graph p p. 5-6/8 (pp. 1 1-12/14 o n pd f c ount er). I nte rvenor s' Cont ent ion No. 6, opp ose d by FENOC and NRC st af f, a nd r ej ect ed b y this ASLB 2 5 pan el , al so r ai sed con cer ns a bout si gnifi can t d amag e FENOC h as inf li ct ed o n t he r eba r o f t he Shi el d Bui ldi ng, such as dur ing th e e ar ly 2014 st eam g ene ra tor re pla cement pro j ect. See fn s. 1 , 5, inf ra.

Shield Building "

-mee ts all design requirements specified in USAR and will perform its USAR desc ribed design functions." T his analysis bounds the identifi ed change s in the laminar cracking c ondition fr om the conditions identified in 2011.

2 6 As I nterve nors have mentioned above , Davis-B esse's compliance with licensing and desig n bases, due to the sever e and w orsening Shield Building c rac king, is dubious at best.

11. Diverse testing t echniques needed to avoid blind spots FEN OC's "Ope rating Ex perie nce"-re lated modifica tions in l ight of chang ed laminar cra cks ar e inade quate. I n the "Ope rating Ex perie nce" section of the July 3 letter, the c ompany states: Inspec tions of 12 core bores were c ompleted in 2013 under the "Design Guidelines for Maintenance Rule Evaluation of Structures" Procedure E N-DP-01511.

During that cycle of inspections, a crack was observed in one of the c ore bores. This finding, upon a review of the records was determine d to be a pre-e xisting crack giv en that the extracte d concre te core was cracke d at the location identified. Given this finding, the inspection population was i ncrease d, eve ntually leading to inspection of all available core bore s. This r e-inspec tion identifi ed a total of 7 core bores with similar conditi ons that were determine d to be pre-e xisting. This re-inspection al so identified 8 condition s where the lam inar cracking condit ions w ere de term ined to have undergon e a discernable change

. (empha sis added).

2 7 So FENOC over looked pre-existi ng cra cks, only to find them later. This under score s the nee d, as mentioned above , for diver se testing methods, so that "blind spots" can be avoided, a nd exis tent cra cks ca n be dete cted, instea d of g oing unnotice d and being overlooke

d. FEN OC's admission that "re-inspection also identified 8 c onditions where the la minar cr acking conditions were deter mined to have unde rg one a disc erna ble cha ng e," a nd the AMP modifications this has led to, FENOC's RAI Let te r, J uly 3, 2 014, Enc los ure L-14-224, p. 7/8 (p. 13/14 o n pd f c ount er).2 6 Id., Li cen se Rene wal Appl ic at ion Sec ti ons Aff ect ed: A.1.43; B.2.43, Aff ect ed L RA Sec ti on: 2 7 A.1.43 , LRA Pa ge No.: P age A-25, Af fe ct ed P ar agraph and Sen te nce: 4 th Par agraph , pp. 6-7/8 (pp. 12-13/14 on p df cou nte r).

is new, sig nificant, mate rial informa tion. "[A]

discerna ble cha ng e" is indica tive of an a g ing-rela ted mecha nism and bring s it withi n the scope of this L RA proce eding. Now that eve n FEN OC acknow ledg es wha t I nterve nors have arg ued since J anuar y 2012 befor e this very ASL B panel - that the c rac king is a g ing-rela ted, and subjec t to worsening

- I nterve nors urg e the ASL B panel to g rant a hear ing on the ir contention, in order to addre ss I nterve nors' mate rial dispute with FEN OC reg arding the ade quacy of its AMPs in t he Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram.12. Clear as ice on the Great Lakes shore: Loc king cracking propagation under belated whi tewash FEN OC further admits that crac king pr opag ation occur red f or some four deca des: The crack ing propagation w as determined to be a result of ice-wedging (freezing water at a pre-ex isting crack leading edge

). This conditi on requires water, freezing temperatures, and pre-ex isting cracks. Bec ause the Shield Building has been c oated it contains a finit e amount of water. It is not practical to remove the water in an acce lerated manne r given the c umulative magnitude of leading crac k edge s and transportabi lity of wat er. It is also not practical to remove the existing crack s or preve nt freezing tempe ratures. The rate of crack ing propagation i s estimated at 0.4 to 0.7 inches per freezing c ycle based on laboratory simulation. By application of t he ev aluation criteria hierarchy of ACI 349.3R, "Ev aluation of Existi ng Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures," Figure 5.1, the c ondition w as acce ptable through evaluation. The condition was not pas sive; howe ver, it was bounded by de sign basis documentation. The Shield Building Monitori ng Program was changed to ensure conformance with t he design requireme nts and to maintai n the USAR functions.

2 8 Acc ording to FENO C, "ice-wedg ing" went on fr om construction of the Shield B uilding in the 1970's until August 2012, when the company whitewashe d the Shield Building exterior. The NRC St aff itself broug ht to light that Davis-B esse's Shield Building c oncre te was of inferior quality , allowing not only water saturation, but also fr eezing tempera tures to pene trate w ell into Id., Li cen se Rene wal Appl ic at ion Sec ti ons Aff ect ed: A.1.43; B.2.43, Aff ect ed L RA Sec ti on: 2 8 A.1.43 , LRA Pa ge No.: P age A-25, Af fe ct ed P ar agraph and Sen te nce: 4 th Par agraph , p. 7/8 (13/14 on p df cou nte r).

the thick walls.

2 9 Davis-B esse's Aug ust 2012 whitewash may preve nt moist ure f rom pene trating the Shield Building side wall. Howe ver, moisture c ould stil l be pene trating the Shield Building from other pathway s. For e x ample, the pr eviously cited PI I revised r oot cause analy sis document broug ht to light a "top-down" moisture infiltra tion pathway

. There is even a "down-up" moisture 3 0 FENOC su bco ntr act or Per for m anc e I m pro vem ent I nte rna ti ona l, o r PII , br ought t his is sue to 2 9 I nte rvenor s' at te nti on i n i ts re vised ro ot cau se ass ess m ent re por t. P I I doc um ent ed o ne o f many NRC Requ est s f or Addi ti ona l Informati on: '1 6. I te m 56: Wh y was th e t her m al con duc ti vity of the SB [Shi el d Bui ldi ng] con cr et e 50% higher th an t he h ighes t r ange ex pec te d f or con cr et e? Did thi s c ont ri but e t o an in cr eas ed d ept h of fr eezin g such t hat th e a re a s usc ept ibl e t o cr acking was at the out er re bar m at s?' FENOC-Davis-Bess e Nuc le ar Power Sta ti on, Un it 1, Su bm it ta l o f Cont ra ct or Root Caus e As ses sment Re por t [Revise d Roo t Ca use Ass ess m ent Repo rt , or RRCAR]-Sec ti on 1 , fr om B.S. Al le n, Fi rs tEn er gy Nucl ear Oper at ing Company, to Cynthi a D.Pede rs en, NRC, NRC/RGN-I I I/ORA, L 196, Ma y 24, 201 2, s ee p. i ii (1 9/2 57 o n pd f c ount er), ADAMS Ac ces si on No. ML 1213 8A037.T his le d I nte rvenor s t o as k the f oll owin g: "I f Da vis-Bess e's s hie ld bui ldi ng conc re te con duc ts hea t 5 0% fa st er th an i t i s s uppo sed to , th is m ay have al lowe d or ca use d de epe r c ra cking in the shi el d bu il din g. Did Davis

-Bess e us e s ubs ta nda rd con cr et e i n t he s hie ld bui ldi ng con st ruc ti on? I s t his ano the r d esi gn and/or con st ruc ti on e rr or in the Davis-B ess e s hie ld bui ldi ng?I s t his al so a non-con for m anc e t o l ic ens ing and des ign bas es? Wh y, when FENOC h as bla m ed the Bli zz ar d of 197 8 an d l ack of a we at her se al ant on t he s hie ld bui ldi ng exte ri or as roo t c aus es of the sub sur fa ce la m ina r c ra cking in t he s hie ld bui ldi ng wall , di dn't t he u ti li ty al so menti on t his con cr et e t her m al con duc ti vity iss ue? Wh at ot her negat ive pr ope rt ie s do es the sub st and ar d Davis-Bess e s hie ld bui ldi ng conc re te have? Wh at ot her nat ura l o r man-m ade as sau lt s i s i t t her ef ore vulner abl e t o? A h ear ing on t he meri ts of I nte rvenor s' cr acked c onc re te con ta inment con te nti on, as sup ple m ent ed, m ight i ll um ina te ans wer s t o t hes e i m por ta nt que st ion s." No s uch il luminat ion was al lowe d, ho wever - th e c ont ent ion was re j ect ed i n i ts ent ir et y. See INTERV ENORS'FOURTH M OTION TO A ME ND AND/OR S UPPLEM ENT PROPOSED CONTENTION NO.

5 (SHIELD BUI LDING CRACKI NG), Firs t En erg y Nuc le ar Op era ti ng Co mpany (Da vis-Bess e Nucl ear Power Sta ti on, Un it 1), Docket No. 50-346-LR, J uly 23, 2012 , pp. 28-30, ADAM S No.ML1 2205 A507.At p. 18 [38/25 7] of PI I RRCAR, per fn. 28 imm edi at el y above, PI I st at es: "T he t op-down 3 0 m ois tur e t ra nsp ort pr oce ss ass um es tha t t he wa te r c om es fr om th e t op o f t he s tr uct ure and sl owly pen et ra te s do wn wit hin th e c onc re te wal l. Du ri ng the con st ruc ti on o f t he S hie ld Buil din g, the wal l wa s bu il t f ir st and th e do m e was sub seq uen tl y const ruc te d t wo year s a nd f our m ont hs l at er.So, t he j acking bar s, d ens e r eba r, a nd t op o f t he c onc re te wal l we re al l e xpos ed t o t he envir onment. M ore over, i nit ia l d ef ect s may be genera te d by the j acking bar s a nd d ens e r eba r, toget her wit h t he l ar ge agg re gate u sed in th e c onc re te. T hes e f act ors re sul te d i n t he p ote nti al fo r high po ros it y concr et e ne ar th e r eba r a nd j acking bar s a ll owin g for wa te r p ene tr at ion. Due to the het er ogeneou s c har act er is ti cs of con cr et e, t he wa te r c om es down a lon g rando m pat hs o f l eas t infiltration pathway , g iven the "w icking" dy namic due to a g g ressive, standing g roundwa ter saturating the base of the Shield Building wall, and a deg rade d moisture barr ier. I t follows that 3 1 any flaws or deg rada tion in the whitewash on the Shield Building side wall during the 2017-2037 license e x tension would allow wate r to pene trate D avis-B esse's substandard c oncre te during prec ipitation events, which ar e common on the L ake E rie shore line. This highlig hts the need f or a c omprehe nsive seala nt AMP as well.

Also common on the L ake E rie shore are fre eze/thaw cy cles. As F ENOC stated, "

It is also not practical to remove the existing crack s or preve nt freezing temperatures

" (p. 7/8 [13/14 on pdf counte r]). The imprac ticality of re moving the e x isting cr acks unde rscor es a point made above by I nterve nors: FEN OC has done nothing to addre ss the Shield Building c rac king, othe r re si st anc e whi ch may tend to exp la in the spo ra dic al ly dis tr ibu te d cr acks i n t he wa ll. T his m ois tur e t ra nsp ort m ech ani sm is i ll ust ra te d i n Fi gure 4." (p. 14 , ci ta ti ons omitt ed) And, a s m ent ion ed o n p. 14, a ny fai lur e of th e do m e's/par ape t's wa te rpr oof se al ant woul d al low wat er to per col at e do wn i nto th e SB wa ll bel ow. T his to p-down wa te r f low cou ld wors en c ra cking over ti m e - tha t i s, c aus e a ge-re la te d de gradat ion - du e t o r ai ns, m el ti ng of s now, e tc., whi ch a re comm on o ccu rr enc es on t he s hor el ine of th e Gr eat Lakes. So, i f "an u neven s now l oad" i s a s ba d as "t he e nti re ro of fi ll ing up wi th wat er ," t his is of great con cer n t o I nte rvenor s, n ot onl y due t o the wei ght of th e s now/wat er , but to th e po te nti al fo r wa te r t o f low thr ough ro of/sea la nt fl aws int o t he s hie ld bui ldi ng wall , ca usi ng fur the r d amag e be low." (pp. 3 2-33). IN TE RV EN ORS'FOUR TH MOT ION TO AMEN D AN D/O R SU PPLEME NT , per f n. 28 infra. "M ore over, Da vis-Bess e ha s ot her wat er pr obl ems ins ide th e s hie ld bui ldi ng. I n RAI re spo nse s 3 1 dat ed M ay 24, 20 11 (ML1 1151 A90), th e NRC s ta ff had not ed a 'h is tor y of ground wat er inf il tr at ion in to the ann ula r s pac e be twe en t he c onc re te shi el d bu il din g and st eel con ta inment.'Duri ng a 201 1 AM P au dit , NRC st af f a ls o r eviewe d do cumenta ti on t hat:[I]nd ic at ed t he p re sen ce of st and ing wat er in th e a nnul us s and poc ket r egion. T he st and ing wat er app ear s t o be a r ecu rr ing is sue of ground wat er le akage and a re as of cor ros ion wer e ob ser ved on t he c ont ai nm ent vesse l. In addi ti on, d uri ng the aud it th e s ta ff re viewed phot ograph s t hat in dic at e pe el ing of cl ear coa t o n t he c ont ai nm ent vesse l a nnul us a re a, a nd degrad at ion of th e moist ure bar ri er , co ncr et e grout , an d se al ant in th e a nnul us a re a t hat wer e ins ta ll ed i n 20 02-2003." I NT ERV ENORS' M OT I ON T O AMEND AND SUP PLEM ENT PROPOSED CONT ENT I ON NO. 5 (SHI ELD BUI LDI NG CRACKING), Fir st Ene rgy Nucl ear Oper ati ng Co mpany (Da vis-Bess e Nuc le ar Power Sta ti on, Un it 1), Docket No. 50-346-LR, J une 4, 20 12, p. 12 (i nte rna l c it at ion s omitt ed).

than the Aug ust 2012 whitewash (40 y ear s late), a nd its inadequate a ttempts at AMPs. No other corr ective a ctions, such as phy sical structure repa irs have be en done, nor are any planned. This does not provide r easona ble assura nce of adequa te protec tion of health, saf ety , and the environment throug h the 2017-2037 lice nse extension, given the Shield Building' s questionable capa bility of fulfilling vital desig n functions. Even w ithout flaws or deg rada tion, however

, FEN OC has not established that the whitew ash coa ting the e x terior of the Shield Building actua lly insulates the side wa ll thickness ag ainst fre ezing a nd thawing tempera tures. This is a problem, as a ppare ntly , there is enoug h water in the Shield Building side w all to continue to car ry out free ze and thaw c y cles, c ausing signific ant damag e ea ch time, in terms of c rac king g rowth. Also, the whitewa sh has sea led off the wall, has now loc ked that wa ter inside, so there is no g etting it out. I n addition to the trapped w ater continuing to inflict sig nificant da mag e by propag ating cra cks, there are other potential wa ter infiltration pathwa y s, as well. Crac king propag ation could simply acc eler ate a nd worsen ove r time.As FEN OC states in the J uly 3 RAI L etter, "It is not practical to remove the water in an acce lerated manne r given the c umulative magnitude of leading crac k edge s and transportabi lity of water" (p. 7/8 [13/14 on pdf counter]). Howe ver, impra cticality cannot e x cuse F ENOC under the Atomic Ener g y Act, fr om leg al or re g ulatory compliance. FEN OC chose to build Davis-B esse on the Gre at L akes shor eline. I t chose not to seal the Shield B uilding in the ea rly 1970s, or afte rwa rds, until August 2012, a ppare ntly in order to sa ve money. FEN OC is responsible for its actions, and ina ctions.The "ice-wedging (freezing water at a pre-ex isting crack leading edge

)"(p. 7/8 [13/14 on pdf counte r]) repr esents a dif fer ent root ca use of the Shield B uilding cr acking from the pur ported Blizz ard of 1978 root ca use pre viously arg ued. As I nterve nors contende d in previous contention filings r elated to the Shield B uilding cr acking problem, the root c ause is likely multi-face ted and sy nerg istic, as NRC staff's own RAI questions sugg ested, a nd as re veale d in PI I's RRCA. This "ice-we dg ing" cra cking propag ation will inflict damag e in addition to the sever e cr acking alre ady inflicted ostensibly by the B liz zard of 1978, and nume rous other possible root c auses.13. Of f to the ice r aces: start ling cracking p ropagation rate FEN OC's admission that "The rate of cracking propagation is estimated at 0.4 to 0.7 inches pe r freezing cy cle base d on laboratory simulati on" sug g ests a ver y high r ate of cra cking g rowth! I t raises many questions, including: How long has it alrea dy been g oing on? S ince the Blizz ard of 1978? Earlier? Does the f ree ze-thaw c y cle still penetra te the Shield Building side wall, due to the whitew ash's inability to insulate?

How long befor e cir cumfe rential c rac king g oes all the way around the diameter of the Shield Building

? How long befor e throug h-wa ll crac king g oes all the wa y throug h the Shield Building side wall, which is 30 inche s thick? How soon befor e the se vere ly cra cked Shield B uilding simply collapses unde r its own weig ht, due to a tornado, missile, ear thquake, or internal pre ssure build up, as NRC Staff conje cture d in internal emails in 2011 which we re br oug ht to light by FOI A, and c ited repe atedly by I nterve nors in previous cr acking-re lated conte ntion filings in this case.

3 2 See , fo r e xample: "If thi s as sum pti on i s c orr ect onl y 3-4 i nche s of the con cre te on t he 3 2 ins ide f ace can be u sed in the st ruc tur al anal ysi s. I n t he r esp ons e t o t he q ues ti ons , th e app li can t s ta te d t hat , 'S inc e we ass um e t hat out si de r ei nfo rc ement i s t o be tr eat ed i nef fe ct ive i n car rying any add it ion al st re ss beyond 1 2.4 ksi , und er ac ci den t t her m al lo ads th at m ay caus e st re sse s i n ex ces s of what th e r eba r c an c ar ry (as sumed 12.4 ksi), the re inf orc em ent is ass um ed to det ach it sel f f rom the out er sec ti on of the she ll.' Th ese st ate me nts se em s (si c) to be cont radi ct ory. In addi ti on, I am con cer ned t hat the con cre te w il l f ail in thi s r egi on due to bendi ng i n th is re gio n ev en un der sm all lo ads." NRC's engine er Pet e Her nan dez wro te "I thi nk t he g rea te r c once rn i s w il l t he SB st ay s tan ding and n ot w het her or not the dec ora ti ve conc ret e w il l f all of f. Bec aus e t he l ic ens ee has not per for m ed c ore bor es to see if th er e i s FEN OC's "Ope rating Ex perie nce" discussion contains a hig hly-suspec t conclusion:

Refere ncing the Ev aluation C riteria hierarchy of ACI 349.3R, Figure 5.1, the 2013 condition was determined to be ac ceptable through e valuation. The condition was not passive; howev er, it was bounded by design basis docume ntation. T he condition will therefore be subjected to incre ased monitoring to ensure conformanc e with the design requireme nts and USAR functions.

3 3 I nterve nors submit that the Shi eld B uilding's c ondition is not "bounded by desig n basis documentation." I nterna l NRC S taff e mails obtained by I nterve nors under FOI A show that desig n and licensing bases a re ve ry questionable a t Davis-B esse, due to Shield Building da mag e, which I nterve nors now under stand, per F ENOC admission, is li kely signific antly worsening with the passag e of time. F ENOC's vag ue commitment that "[t]

he condition will theref ore be subjected to incr ease d monitoring to ensur e conf ormanc e with the desig n require ments and USAR functions" is no commitment at all.

CONCLUSION I f F ENOC ca nnot assure D avis-B esse's safe ty , then the plant must be per manently shut down, not g rante d a 20-y ear license e x tension. I t has bec ome incre asing ly clea r that Da vis-Be sse fails the re asonable assura nce of adequa te protec tion test, given its Shield Building

's ag ing-rela ted deg rada tion, its sever e and w orsening cra cking , and its susceptibility to not properly perf orm vital desig n functions. FE NOC ca nnot be allowed to e ndang er the public throug hout its reg ion by opera ting Da vis-Be sse for 20 a dditional y ear s in such a deg rade d, and wor sening , state.cr acking in th e c re dit ed c onc re te , do t hey have a ba si s t o sa y t hat the st ruc tur al conc ret e w il l ma int ain a Se is mi c I I/I c ondi ti on?" (e m pha ses add ed) See INTERV ENORS' FOURTH MOT ION TO A ME ND AND/OR S UPPLEM ENT PROPOSED CONTENTION NO.

5 (SHIEL D BUILDI NG CRACKING), Fi rst Ene rgy Nucl ear Oper ati ng Co mpany (Da vis-Bess e Nuc le ar Power Sta ti on, Un it 1), Docket No. 50-346-LR, J uly 23, 2012 , pp. 22-23, M L122 05A50 7.FENOC's RAI Let te r, J uly 3, 2 014, Enc los ure L-14-224, p. 7/8 (p. 13/14 o n pd f c ount er).3 3 I n late De cembe r 2002, the NRC OI G war ned that F ENOC had put prof its ahead of safe ty at Davis-B esse. The OI G re ported that a lso NRC was guilty of allowing this at the very highe st levels of the a g ency. Certainly FEN OC should not be allowed to ag ain place its profits ahead of public safe ty , as by being allowed to oper ate Da vis-Be sse for 20 a dditional y ear s with a Shield Building of dubious structura l integr ity and func tionality.WHEREFORE , Petitioners pray the Atomic Safe ty and L icensing Boa rd pane l admit Contention 7 for full adjudication.

Exe cuted ac cording to 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d)/s/ Terry J. L odg e Terr y J. L odg e (O hio Ba r #0029271) 316 N. Michig an St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 Phone/fax (419) 255-7552 tjlodge50@

y ahoo.com Counsel for I nterve nors CONSULTATIO N P URSUANT TO 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(b)

Under signe d counsel he reby cer tifies that he made a since re a ttempt to consult wit h opposing c ounsel for the Nuclea r Reg ulatory Commi ssion St aff and for FirstEne rg y Nuclea r Oper ating Company in an ef fort to re solve the conc erns r aised in the for eg oing Motion. Counsel for F irstEnerg y Nuclea r Ope rating Company indicated dur ing a meet-a nd-conf er phone confe renc e on September 2, 2014 that FEN OC would oppose I nterve nors' Motion. Counsel for the NRC Staff stated that the Staff did not oppose I nterve nors' rig ht to file this Mot ion, give n the ASL B's mention of the possibilit y in its J uly 25, 2014 order , but reser ved the r ight to oppose it upon revie

w.

Exe cuted in Ac cord with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d)

/s/ Terry J. L odg e Terr y J. L odg e Counsel for I nterve nors UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA NUCLEAR REG ULATORY COMMISSION I n the Matter of

)Docke t No. 50-346-L FirstEne rg y Nuclea r Ope rating Company)September 2, 2014 Davis-B esse Nuc lear Power Station, Unit 1

))CERTIFIC ATE OF SERVICE I here by cer tify that a copy of the for eg oing I NTERVENORS' MOTI ON F OR ADMI SSI ON OF CONTENTI ON NO. 7 O N WORS ENI NG SHI EL D B UI L DI NG CRACKI NG AND I NADEQ UATE AMPS I N SHI EL D B UI L DI NG MONI TORI NG PROGRAM was deposited in the NRC's Electr onic I nformation Exchang e this 2 day of September , 2014 and n d was ser ved upon all par ties of re cord.Exe cuted in Ac cord with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d)

/s/ Terry J. L odg e Terr y J. L odg e (O hio Ba r #0029271) 316 N. Michig an St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 Phone/fax (419) 255-7552 tjlodge50@

y ahoo.com Counsel for I nterve nors-37-