VR-SECY-22-0052, Proposed Rule: Alignment of Licensing Processes and Lessons Learned from New Reactor Licensing (Rin 3150 AI66) (Caputo)
| ML24222A657 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/08/2024 |
| From: | Annie Caputo NRC/OCM |
| To: | Carrie Safford NRC/SECY |
| Shared Package | |
| ML24222A650 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-22-0052 VR-SECY-22-0052 | |
| Download: ML24222A657 (1) | |
Text
RULEMAKING ISSUE NOTATION VOTE RESPONSE SHEET TO:
Carrie M. Safford, Secretary FROM:
Commissioner Caputo
SUBJECT:
SECY-22-0052: Proposed Rule: Alignment of Licensing Processes and Lessons Learned from New Reactor Licensing (RIN 3150 AI66)
Approved Disapproved X Abstain Not Participating COMMENTS:
Below Attached X
None Signature Date 8/8/2024 Entered in STAR Yes X
No Annie Caputo Digitally signed by Annie Caputo Date: 2024.08.08 15:31:32 -04'00'
1 Commissioner Caputos Comments on SECY-22-0052, Proposed Rule: Alignment of Licensing Processes and Lessons Learned from New Reactor Licensing (RIN 3150 AI66)
The ADVANCE Act was signed into law on July 9, 2024, and with it came Congress bipartisan direction that the NRC become more efficient, predictable, and timely. This is a clear signal of the need for change. Of the many changes the ADVANCE Act calls for, one is of particular significance here: Title V, Improving Commission Efficiency. In its current form, the proposed rule in SECY-22-0052 does not align with this clear congressional direction. Furthermore, the proposed rule is inconsistent with our Principles of Good Regulation for Efficiency, Clarity, and Reliability. Therefore, I disapprove publication of the proposed rule in SECY-22-0052 for the reasons discussed below.
Section 501 of the ADVANCE Act directs the Commission to update the mission statement of the Commission to include that licensing and regulation of the civilian use of radioactive materials and nuclear energy be conducted in a manner that is efficient.1 Section 505 requires the Commission to provide for efficient and timely reviews and proceedings for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license or construction permit.2 The proposed changes to our regulations would add inefficiencies to our existing regulatory framework.
The staffs underlying purpose in SECY-22-0052, to ensure that equivalent design applications submitted for NRC review under [10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 licensing processes] would be assessed against consistent technical standards that yield outcomes with equivalent demonstrations of adequate safety, security, and environmental protection,3 is fundamentally flawed. The staff fails to recognize the impact of the different allocations of enterprise risk between the developer of a design, the architect-engineer constructing the facility, and the ultimate operator of that facility in deciding which regulatory framework to choose. There are benefits to the differences in the two regulatory frameworks. They result in the need for different levels of design maturity in the different licensing processes. This drive to align the processes as recommended in SECY-22-0052 ignores these benefits and introduces uncertainty into Part 50 which is, so far, the regulatory path of choice for advanced reactors.
If the proposed rule moves forward, it will add complexity and inefficiencies, reduce clarity, and undermine predictability without a safety justification or cost benefit. Thus, such an approach is inconsistent with the Principles of Good Regulation:
Efficiency:
Regulatory activities should be consistent with the degree of risk reduction they achieve. Where several effective alternatives are available, the option which minimizes the use of resources should be adopted.
Clarity:
Regulations should be coherent, logical, and practical. Agency positions should be readily understood and easily applied.
1 ADVANCE Act of 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-67, tit. V, Section 501.
2 Id. at Section 505.
3 SECY-22-0052 at page 2.
2 Reliability:
Once established, regulation should be perceived to be reliable and not unjustifiably in a state of transition.
As described more fully below, only one of the proposed changes is actually cost beneficial demonstrating that proceeding with the recommendations in SECY 22-0052 would inject uncertainty into new plant licensing by thrusting our regulations unjustifiably into a state of transition.
Codifying Commission Policy Statements Once again, the staff is proposing to turn policy statements into regulatory requirements similar to the approach taken in SECY-23-0021, where staff proposed to codify the Quantitative Health Objectives (QHOs) in the Part 53 draft proposed rule. Policy statements are non-legally binding guidance documents. When the Commission establishes policy statements, it makes a decision to issue high-level statements to guide decision making. Such text is ill-suited for use as regulatory requirements subject to compliance. Furthermore, the SECY 22-0052 proposal to codify such language lacks clarity and a well-documented, cost-justified reason for doing so.
Thus, the proposed rule runs afoul of the Efficiency and Clarity Principles: Regulatory activities should be consistent with the degree of risk reduction they achieve; Regulations should be coherent, logical, and practical; Agency positions should be readily understood and easily applied; and Once established, regulation should be perceived to be reliable and not unjustifiably in a state of transition.
In particular, in SECY-22-0052,4 the staff proposes to codify several aspects of the Commission policy statement: Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods in Nuclear Regulatory Activities, Final Policy Statement.5 The complications inherent in such an approach are clearly demonstrated in a plain language reading of those policy statements. For example, the PRA Policy Statement says the following on expanded NRC use of PRA:
(1) The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that complements the NRCs deterministic approach and supports the NRCs traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.6 Notably, this portion of the PRA Policy Statement does not suggest codifying a requirement for PRA. With respect to how PRA should affect what the NRC requires, the PRA Policy Statement says the following:
(2) PRA and associated analyses (e.g., sensitivity studies, uncertainty analyses, and importance measures) should be used in regulatory matters, where practical within the bounds of the state-of-the-art, to reduce unnecessary conservatism associated with current regulatory requirements, regulatory guides, license commitments, and staff practices. Where appropriate, PRA should be used to support the proposal for additional regulatory requirements in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109 (Backfit Rule). Appropriate procedures for including PRA in the process for changing regulatory requirements should be developed and followed. It is, of course, understood that the intent of this 4 SECY-22-0052, Enclosure 1, page 61.
5 60 Fed. Reg. 42622 (August 16, 1995) (PRA Policy Statement).
6 Id. at 42629.
3 policy is that existing rules and regulations shall be complied with unless these rules and regulations are revised.7 (emphasis added)
Neither the first nor the second portion of the PRA Policy Statement calls for codifying a requirement for an applicant or licensee to provide a description of their PRA; nor do the remaining portions of the PRA Policy Statement. Instead, they call for the use of PRA as a useful tool to reduce unnecessary conservatism in our current regulations. When codifying the need for an applicant to provide a description of its PRA in 10 CFR Part 52 applications, there is neither a corresponding reduction in conservatism in the remainder of the regulations nor a methodology to seek such a reduction. In the absence of a reduction to the deterministic requirements in our regulations, the requirement to provide a PRA description for review in a new reactor application represents a stricter set of requirements for a new reactor than the currently operating fleet of power reactors. The Commission has repeatedly declined to do this.8 Furthermore, a PRA isnt necessary to meet any of the findings the Commission must make in issuing a construction permit.
Finally, the preamble to the 2007 Part 52 rulemaking expresses the following:
In implementing these new requirements, it is the NRC's expectation that industry stakeholders will work with the NRC and appropriate codes and standard setting bodies to continually upgrade the relevant codes and standards, identify potential issues, resolve problems, and create relevant guidance to assist in periodically improving the quality and comprehensiveness of the PRA.9 Given the express expectation for continual upgrade of codes and standards, and the improvement of quality and comprehensiveness of the PRA, it should be no surprise that stakeholders have expressed views that a PRA may not be necessary for all designs.10 In stark contrast with the expectation for every increasing complexity and coverage of the PRA in Part 52, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) previously noted in its report on the Part 53 rulemaking that a requirement for risk-informed analysis is appropriate if the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is approached in a graded fashion commensurate with the potential consequences and the simplicity of the design.11 However, in a later report, the ACRS went further and recommended that the Alternative Evaluation for Risk Insights (AERI) approach should be expanded beyond the [Part 53] Rule and made available for applicants to pursue under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52.12 The AERI approach would use a simpler analysis for a very low risk reactor using a bounding event to address the NRC safety goals rather than a PRA.13 7 Id.
8 See, e.g., Staff Requirements SECY-10-0121 Modifying the Risk-Informed Regulatory Guidance for New Reactors, (SRM-SECY-10-0121) (ML110610166), which continued the Commissions long-standing policy that the NRC will not use industrys design objectives as the basis to establish new requirements as articulated in SRM-SECY-89-102 (ML003707881).
9 Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants, 72 Fed. Reg. 49352, 49406 (August 28, 2007).
10 See SECY-23-0021, Enclosure 4, page 15.
11 ACRS Letter Report, Preliminary Proposed Rule Language for 10 CFR Part 53, Licensing and Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Reactors, Interim Report, May 30, 2021 (ML21140A354).
12 ACRS Letter Report, Final Letter on Draft 10 CFR Part 53 Rulemaking Language, (ML22319A104).
13 See Pre-Decisional Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1414, Alternative Evaluation for Risk Insights (AERI)
Framework, page 7 (ML22146A041).
4 Congress now shares the concerns of stakeholders and the ACRS and provided direction in Section 208 of the ADVANCE Act, Regulatory Requirements for Micro-Rectors, to find alternatives to PRA for risk analysis. More specifically, Section 208 directs the Commission to develop risk-informed and performance-based strategies and guidance to license and regulate micro-reactors, including strategies and guidance for risk analysis methods, including alternatives to probabilistic risk assessments [emphasis added].14 Section 208 further requires the Commission to implement these strategies and guidance within the existing regulatory framework; through the technology-inclusive regulatory framework to be established under section 103(a)(4) of the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act, or through a pending or new rulemaking.15 Thus, the proposed changes would prevent the Commission from implementing strategies and guidance to license and regulate micro-reactors using alternatives to PRAs, as required by Section 208 of the ADVANCE Act. This regulatory activity is not practical, is not consistent with the degree of risk reduction achieved, nor does it minimize the use of resources. Under our current regulations, Part 50 is the only licensing path without a PRA requirement and, as such, the only regulation that is consistent with the ADVANCE Act direction.
In SECY 22-0052,16 the staff also proposes to codify the Commissions Policy Statement on Severe Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants.17 It is unclear how this would be applied, in practice, to novel technologies. Additionally, much has changed since the Severe Accident Policy Statement was finalized in 1985. The NRC has accomplished the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analysis, showing that cancer risk from reactor accidents is thousands of times lower than the NRC Safety Goal of 2 in every million years and millions of times lower than the general U.S. cancer fatality risk.18 To put this in perspective, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration estimates that once every few million years, an object large enough to threaten Earths civilization comes along. Impact craters on Earth, the moon and other planetary bodies are evidence of these occurrences.19 It is questionable whether driving risk analyses of events hundreds of times less probable than an asteroid strike threatening Earths civilization is either practical or meaningful, much less an efficient licensing practice that is easily applied.
Changes to the Backfit Rule In SECY-22-0052, staff proposes to modify certain provisions in the Backfit Rule, 10 CFR 50.109, with the intent to improve clarity.20 The Backfit Rule, simply put, means regulatory requirements should not be revised unless there is a substantial safety benefit that is cost-justified. This is important to ensuring that regulatory actions are consistent with the risk reduction achieved and are not unjustifiably in a state of transition. However, these proposed modifications have the potential to undermine regulatory efficiency and reliability, in conflict with Congressional direction in the ADVANCE Act.
14 ADVANCE Act of 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-67, tit. II, Section 208.
15 Id.
16 SECY-22-0052 at page 3.
17 50 Fed. Reg. 32138 (August 8, 1985).
18 State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Report NUREG-1935, pages xix-xx (ML12332A057).
19 https://www.nasa.gov/solar-system/asteroids/asteroid-fast-facts/, last visited August 6, 2024.
20 SECY-22-0052, Enclosure 1, pages 183-88.
5 The first of these proposed modifications is the deletion of a sentence in § 50.109(a)(1)(vii),
removing the requirement that the staff and ACRS must rely on design matters resolved in a standard design approval (SDA).21 The staff supports this proposal by mischaracterizing the provisions of § 52.98 to imply that it prohibits the Commission from changing any term or condition of a combined license, the design of the facility, or the inspections, tests, and acceptance criteria that are not derived from a referenced standard design certification or manufacturing license. In fact, Section § 52.98 simply requires any modifications, additions or deletions to be consistent with the Backfit Rule, which incorporates by reference the provisions for issue finality of SDAs.22 Those issue finality provisions do not end with the issuance of a combined license (COL), but continue in force with respect to reviews by the NRC staff and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards of applications to amend a COL. The NRC should neither change its requirements nor change its interpretations of those requirements unless there is a sound, safety-beneficial, and cost-justified reason to do so. Adherence to the Backfit Rule and issue finality is essential for regulatory stability and predictability. Staff would need to remove this portion from the Federal Register notice (FRN) for the proposed rule in order to avoid inserting inefficiencies and inconsistencies into the regulatory processes governing the finality of licenses and SDAs.
The second proposed change to the Backfit Rule is the deletion of a sentence in
§ 50.109(a)(1)(vii) that states that, for a COL referencing an early site permit (ESP), § 52.39 applies to the site characteristics, design parameters, and terms and conditions specified in the ESP once the COL is issued.23 The staff supports this proposal with an assertion that once the COL is issued, the ESP is subsumed into the COL and is therefore no longer operative so
§ 52.39 cannot apply to an issued COL that references an ESP.24 This is in direct conflict with the terms of § 52.39(a)(2), which apply [i]n making the findings required by § 52.103, the findings necessary to authorize commencement of operation. These findings take place years after the issuance of a COL, when construction of the facility is complete, and the acceptance criteria of the COL are met. One example of an unintended consequence could be the loss of issue finality for emergency preparedness aspects of the ESP before the 52.103 findings are made. Staff would need to remove this portion from the FRN for the proposed rule in order to avoid inserting inefficiencies and inconsistencies into the regulatory processes governing the finality of licenses and ESPs.
The third proposed change to the Backfit Rule removes the words or manufacturing license (ML) from the definition of backfitting, thereby eliminating the applicability of the Backfit Rule to manufacturing licenses.25 The staff supports this proposal by stating that § 52.171 will always control the modification, rescissions, or imposition of new requirements on the design of a manufactured reactor.26 However, removing applicability of the Backfit Rule for MLs and substituting reliance on the provisions of § 52.171 is problematic. The provisions of
§ 52.171(a)(1) for controlling changes to the design of a manufactured reactor are limited to the term of the ML. In the absence of applicability of the Backfit Rule, the only remaining provisions after the MLs term has expired would be § 52.171(a)(3), which direct that the Commission treat 21 Id. at pages 184-85. The requirement for reliance on an SDA is contained in § 52.145.
22 See § 50.109(a)(1)(vii), which incorporates by reference the issue finality provisions of § 52.145.
23 SECY-22-0052, Enclosure 1, at page 185.
24 Id. See also §§ 52.26(d) and 52.39.
25 SECY-22-0052, Enclosure 1, at page 185.
26 Id.
6 as resolved all matters resolved in the ML, including the adequacy of the design of the manufactured reactor. This result would be an untenable restriction on the power of the Commission to direct changes to the design of the manufactured reactor that are necessary for adequate protection of public health and safety or the common defense and security. Staff would need to remove this portion from the FRN for the proposed rule in order to align it with the requirements of Section 161.b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, authorizing the Commission to establish by rule, regulation, or order, such standards and instructions to govern the possession and use of special nuclear material as the Commission may deem necessary or desirable to promote the common defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life.27 A Majority of the Proposed Changes are not Cost-Beneficial While the staff provided its draft Regulatory Analysis for the proposed rule using the guidance of NUREG/BR-0058, Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, draft final Revision 5,28 that analysis did not directly address the disaggregation of individual requirements called for in NUREG/BR-0058, Section E.2.3, Criteria for the Treatment of Individual Requirements.29 The purpose of that treatment is to avoid aggregating or bundling different requirements in a single analysis in a way that could potentially mask the inclusion of an individual requirement that is itself unnecessary. Because the disaggregation is not directly addressed in the draft regulatory analysis, it is necessary to look to the cost-benefit calculations included in Appendix A of the draft regulatory analysis and the discussion of the particular individual requirements to determine whether they are cost-beneficial. Many are not and would need to be removed from the proposed rule in order to be consistent with congressional direction regarding efficiency in the ADVANCE Act and our Efficiency and Reliability principles.
The following analysis results were provided by the staff using a 7% net present value to 2021 dollars.
The first set of requirements analyzed by the staff in the draft regulatory analysis is the severe accident requirements. Table A-2 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the net cost of NRC implementation of these requirements as $113,000 using a 7% net present value.30 While Table A-1 shows a net benefit to industry implementation of $181,000, a brief look at the wording of this tables entries reveals them to be costs rather than benefits. This is confirmed by reviewing the discussion in Section 4.3.1.1, Industry Implementation and Operations, that Applicants under 10 CFR Part 50 would be required to describe and analyze design features for the prevention and mitigation of severe accidents approximately 3 years earlier than under current regulations. This results in a net increase in costs to applicants due to the time value of money.31 Summing the costs of this proposed set of requirements yields a total cost of
$294,000 for the two sets of applications and the NRC implementation analyzed by the staff.
Because there are no offsetting benefits to developing and imposing these requirements on industry, it is not cost-justified and, thus, not the option that minimizes the use of resources.
Staff would need to remove the severe accident requirements from the FRN for the proposed rule prior to publication.
27 42 USC 2201.
28 See SECY-22-0052, Enclosure 3.
29 See SECY-20-0008, Enclosure 1, Appendix E (ML19261A287).
30 SECY-22-0052, Enclosure 3, page A-1.
31 Id. at pages 51 and A-1.
7 The second set of requirements analyzed by the staff in the draft regulatory analysis is the probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) requirements. Table A-3 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the net cost to the industry of these requirements as being $1,927,000 with a 7% net present value.32 Table A-4 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the net cost to the NRC of these requirements as being $176,000 with a 7% net present value. Summing these costs yields a total cost of $2,103,000 and shows that this is not the option that minimizes the use of resources. Staff would need to remove the PRA requirements from the FRN for the proposed rule prior to publication.
The third set of requirements analyzed by the staff in the draft regulatory analysis is the TMI Requirements. Table A-5 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the net cost to the industry of these requirements as being $167,000 with a 7% net present value.33 Table A-6 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the net cost to the NRC of these requirements as being $108,000 with a 7% net present value. Summing these costs yields a total cost of $275,000 and shows that this is not cost-justified and, thus, not the option that minimizes the use of resources. Staff would need to remove the TMI Requirements from the FRN for the proposed rule prior to publication.
The fourth set of requirements analyzed by the staff in the draft regulatory analysis is the fire protection requirements. The staff did not quantify any benefits or costs associated with this change, which it described as an improvement to the clarity, consistency, and alignment of requirements between parts 50 and 52 that would help stakeholders make well-informed decisions on which licensing process is best suited to their needs.34 This is in contrast to the analysis of the severe accident requirements in which the staff evaluated the differential costs that would result due to the time value of money and the need to address those issues earlier in the licensing process. Table A-7 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the net cost to the NRC of these provisions as being $41,000 with a 7% net present value.35 Summing the NRC costs for implementation with the unanalyzed costs to industry of earlier implementation of the requirements would likely show that this is not cost-justified and, thus, not the option that minimizes the use of resources. Staff would need to remove the fire protection requirements from the FRN for the proposed rule prior to publication.
The fifth set of requirements analyzed by the staff in the draft regulatory analysis is the operator licensing requirements. Table A-8 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the net cost to industry of these requirements as being a total cost of $2,364,000 or $27,700 per operator per year using a 7% net present value.36 Table A-9 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the net benefit to the NRC of implementing these requirements as being $238,000 using a 7% net present value.37 Summing the industry costs and the NRC benefits yields a total cost of
$2,126,000 using a 7% net present value and shows that this is not the option that minimizes the use of resources. Staff would need to remove the operator licensing requirements from the FRN for the proposed rule prior to publication.
32 Id. at page A-1.
33 Id. at page A-2.
34 Id. at page 55.
35 Id. at page A-3.
36 Id. at page A-3.
37 Id. at pages A-3 to A-4.
8 The sixth set of requirements analyzed by the staff in the draft regulatory analysis is the physical security requirements. Table A-10 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the net benefit to industry of these requirements as being a total benefit of $127,000 using a 7% net present value.38 Table A-12 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the net cost to the NRC of these requirements as being $207,000 using a 7% net present value.39 Summing the industry benefits and the NRC costs yields a total cost of $80,000 using a 7% net present value and shows that this is not cost-justified and, thus, not the option that minimizes the use of resources. Staff would need to remove the physical security requirements from the FRN for the proposed rule prior to publication.
The seventh set of requirements analyzed by the staff in the draft regulatory analysis is the fitness for duty requirements. Table A-11 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the net costs to industry of these requirements as being $60,000 using a 7% net present value.40 Table A-13 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the net costs to the NRC of these requirements as being $65,000 using a 7% net present value.41 Summing these costs yields a total cost of
$125,000 using a 7% net present value and shows that this is not cost-justified and, thus, not the option that minimizes the use of resources. Staff would need to remove the fitness for duty requirements from the FRN for the proposed rule prior to publication.
The eighth set of requirements analyzed by the staff in the draft regulatory analysis is the emergency planning requirements. Table A-14 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the net benefits to industry of these requirements as being $116,200 using a 7% net present value.42 Table A-15 of the draft regulatory analysis provides the costs to the NRC of these requirements as being $274,000 using a 7% net present value.43 Summing the industry benefits and the NRC costs yields a total cost of $157,800 and shows that this is not cost-justified and thus, not the option that minimizes the use of resources. Staff would need to remove the emergency planning requirements from the FRN for the proposed rule prior to publication.
Elimination of Design Certification Expiration Of particular note, the single greatest contributor to the proposed rules total net benefit is the elimination of the expiration of design certifications: $16,127,00044 using a 7% net present value. Table A-16 of the staffs draft regulatory analysis documents a net benefit to industry of
$11.1 million using a 7% net present value for that change.45 Table A-17 documents a net benefit of $9.5 million for that change to the NRC for implementation and operations using a 7%
net present value. These results combine to make a total net benefit of $20.6 million. This demonstrates that the elimination of the design certification expiration is the option that minimizes the use of resources and increases efficiency consistent with the ADVANCE Act.
Furthermore, removing this change from the rule would leave a total net cost of $4.5 million.
This result emphasizes the hazards of failing to disaggregate the costs and benefits of the 38 Id. at page A-4.
39 Id. at page A-5.
40 Id. at page A-4.
41 Id. at page A-5.
42 Id. at pages A-5 to A-6.
43 Id. at pages A-6 to A-7.
44 SECY-22-0052, Enclosure 3, Table ES-1, page ix.
45 Id. at pages A-7 to A-8.
9 individual requirements as called for under NUREG/BR-0058, Section E.2.3, Criteria for the Treatment of Individual Requirements.
Conclusion While there are a few proposed regulatory changes in SECY-22-0052 that the draft regulatory analysis shows would be cost-beneficial, it is clear that the vast majority of the proposed changes are not. Additionally, the staffs overall assessment in SECY-22-0052 is that the current processes for licensing new reactors ensure that applications provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety and are consistent with the common defense and security.46 Considering these two facts, the proposed rule must be returned to the staff without approval to publish it for comment. An efficient, modern, risk-informed regulator would use the established tools to develop a sound regulatory analysis to ensure that any recommended regulatory changes not necessary for adequate protection of public health and safety, are cost-justified. These tools should be used to aid decision-making and provide an objective basis for determining what requirements should be imposed on its licensees rather than as an ex post facto rationalization of requirements once imposed.
In light of the significant benefit attributable solely to the elimination of design certification expirations, this action should proceed independently of any efforts to align the licensing processes of 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 or to address lessons learned from new reactor licensing as suggested by Commissioner Wright.47 As I noted in my vote on COMDAW-24-0001, the Commission should decide now on modifying the 15-year duration of design certifications. The significant cost-benefit of this one provision should not be used to obscure so many other flawed proposals.
46 SECY-22-0052 at page 2.
47 Revising the Duration of Design Certifications, COMDAW-24-0001, dated June 4, 2024 (ML24159A006).