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and unimpeded during accident/event conditions. Component controls will be functional and provide desired control during accident/event conditions. Operating

and adequate during accident/event conditions. Component controls will be functional and provide desired control during accident/event conditions. Operating

and adequate during accident/event conditions. Component controls will be functional and provide desired control during accident/event conditions. Operating

probability of an accident or event, create an accident or event of a different type, nor increase the rr.diological consequences of accidents or events previously

INITIATING EVENT 0.00 YES4 IE-LLOCA LARGE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT INITIAT. EVENT 0.00 YES4 IE-LOCCW LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER INITIAT. EVENT 0.00 YES4

INITIATING EVENT 0.0+00 YES2 IE-LLOCA LARGE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT INITIATING EVENT 0.0+00 YES2 IE-LOCCW LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER INITIATING EVENT 0.0+00

Large LOCA Event Tree Model . . . .... ... .. . .............. 4-3 4.2.1 Event Description . , . . ... . ........... .......... 4-3 4.2.2 Event Tree Model

design basis function under accident/event conditions and had been maintained to be consistent with design assumptions. External event analyses were reviewed

coolant accident followed by loss of core cooling 193.23 Accident Event Progression CassIV: Anticipated transients without scram The accident event progression

Initiating Accident Event Tree i Figure A.2 - Reduced Generic LMFBR Initiating Accident A-6 Event Tree Figure A.3 - Red uc ed Initiating Accident Event Tree

spiking: (1) maximum pre-accident iodine spike; and (2) maximum accident-induced or concurrent, iodine spike. For the case of a pre-accident iodine spike, a reactor

Large LOCA Event Tree Model . . ............. ... . . .......... 4-3 4.2.1 Event Description . . ............ ...................... 4-3 4.2.2 Event Tree Model

v t e ENS Event 22:05 Jul 1, 2013 Title High Pressure Core Spray Minimum Flow Valve Pressure Switch Setpoint Found Outside of Tolerance Event Description

Characteristics and Dose Analyses Chapter 16 - Accident Analysis Evaluation Cause of Event Detection of Event Event Consequences and Regulatory Compliance Corrective

v t e ENS Event 08:30 Nov 28, 2007 Title Hpci Inoperable Due to Level Switch Failure Event Description On 11/28/2007 at 0230 CST, Browns Ferry Unit 1 received

Consequences of an Accident an Event That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of the Safety Function to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, ENS 402292003-10-07T19:31:0007

Consequences of an Accident an Event That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of the Safety Function to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, ENS 402292003-10-07T19:31:0007

Consequences of an Accident an Event That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of the Safety Function to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, ENS 402292003-10-07T19:31:0007

Consequences of an Accident an Event That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of the Safety Function to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, ENS 402292003-10-07T19:31:0007

made a notification (Event Number 42305) to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) (i.e., any event or condition that at