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On 10/23/06 at approximately 1050 hours, d … On 10/23/06 at approximately 1050 hours, during a routine area walk-down of Dry Conversion Facility (DCF) 4th level an operator noticed the pungent/repulsive smell of hydrogen fluoride (HF) vapor near the L-3 UF6 to UO2 conversion vessel and back-up filter vessels. (Note: The odor threshold for HF is approximately 0.042 ppm.) He immediately exited the area, placed it on respiratory protection required status and then notified a Health and Safety Technician (HST).</br>The operator donned respiratory protection equipment and 'Dragered' the suspect area for HF vapor and the results were positive. The HST also pulled samples for airborne radioactivity and none were observed. The operator notified the DCF control room and shutdown of the affected was initiated.</br>This report is being made because it has the potential for meeting the following two 10 CFR 70 Appendix A, 24 hour reporting Criteria.</br>1. Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the ISA and which results in an accident sequence with high consequence that is not at least highly unlikely, or an accident sequence with intermediate consequence that is not at least unlikely.</br>The location of the HF leak was in a Dry Conversion UF6 to UO2 conversion vessel. This major component is in the powder production process system. However, the boundary of UF6 Vaporization process system ends at the conversion vessel inlet. Accident sequence 810-5 for UF6 Vaporization process system, as reported in the ISA Summary, clearly bounds the conditions associated with this event. The protections listed in this accident sequence are also applicable to this event. However, this condition is not specifically covered in the accident evaluation of the powder production process system. Because this condition was not specifically evaluated in the powder production process system accident evaluation, it is not clear that this reportability criterion does not apply.</br>3. An acute chemical exposure to an individual from licensed material or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material that could:</br>a. Lead to irreversible or other serious, long lasting health effects to a worker</br>b. Cause mild transient health effects to any Individual located outside of the controlled area.</br>Based on the low odor detection threshold for HF and the operator's response to immediately leave the area until protective equipment had been donned, the subsequent measured HF concentrations, estimated exposure time and the physical evidence of the individual exposed to HF, long lasting serious health effects are not expected.</br>All other conversion units were shut down at approximately 1300 on 10/26/2006 to further evaluate the other unit's conditions although no leakage of HF or radioactivity has occurred.akage of HF or radioactivity has occurred.
17:50:00, 23 October 2006 +
42,936 +
21:09:00, 26 October 2006 +
17:50:00, 23 October 2006 +
On 10/23/06 at approximately 1050 hours, d … On 10/23/06 at approximately 1050 hours, during a routine area walk-down of Dry Conversion Facility (DCF) 4th level an operator noticed the pungent/repulsive smell of hydrogen fluoride (HF) vapor near the L-3 UF6 to UO2 conversion vessel and back-up filter vessels. (Note: The odor threshold for HF is approximately 0.042 ppm.) He immediately exited the area, placed it on respiratory protection required status and then notified a Health and Safety Technician (HST).</br>The operator donned respiratory protection equipment and 'Dragered' the suspect area for HF vapor and the results were positive. The HST also pulled samples for airborne radioactivity and none were observed. The operator notified the DCF control room and shutdown of the affected was initiated.</br>This report is being made because it has the potential for meeting the following two 10 CFR 70 Appendix A, 24 hour reporting Criteria.</br>1. Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the ISA and which results in an accident sequence with high consequence that is not at least highly unlikely, or an accident sequence with intermediate consequence that is not at least unlikely.</br>The location of the HF leak was in a Dry Conversion UF6 to UO2 conversion vessel. This major component is in the powder production process system. However, the boundary of UF6 Vaporization process system ends at the conversion vessel inlet. Accident sequence 810-5 for UF6 Vaporization process system, as reported in the ISA Summary, clearly bounds the conditions associated with this event. The protections listed in this accident sequence are also applicable to this event. However, this condition is not specifically covered in the accident evaluation of the powder production process system. Because this condition was not specifically evaluated in the powder production process system accident evaluation, it is not clear that this reportability criterion does not apply.</br>3. An acute chemical exposure to an individual from licensed material or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material that could:</br>a. Lead to irreversible or other serious, long lasting health effects to a worker</br>b. Cause mild transient health effects to any Individual located outside of the controlled area.</br>Based on the low odor detection threshold for HF and the operator's response to immediately leave the area until protective equipment had been donned, the subsequent measured HF concentrations, estimated exposure time and the physical evidence of the individual exposed to HF, long lasting serious health effects are not expected.</br>All other conversion units were shut down at approximately 1300 on 10/26/2006 to further evaluate the other unit's conditions although no leakage of HF or radioactivity has occurred.akage of HF or radioactivity has occurred.
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00:00:00, 26 October 2006 +
SNM-1227 +
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23:34:02, 24 November 2018 +
21:09:00, 26 October 2006 +
3.138 d (75.32 hours, 0.448 weeks, 0.103 months) +
17:50:00, 23 October 2006 +
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