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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 56559 | 5 June 2023 21:58:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1823 EDT, the shift manager was notified that one siren, part of the public notification system (siren number 10), spuriously activated for approximately one minute. Monroe County agencies were notified regarding the actuation. The cause of the actuation is being investigated and the ability for the siren to actuate has been removed until the cause is determined. There is no impact to the emergency planning zone. This event is a four-hour, non-emergency report for notification to other government agencies in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). |
| ENS 55609 | 24 November 2021 20:24:00 | This 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report one invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Containment Isolation System Train "A" in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On October 17, 2021 at approximately 1358 (EDT), a DC breaker was opened to perform an inspection of a Containment Isolation (CI) rack. A CI signal was produced and resulted in a loss of Letdown during filling and venting the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) with the RCS at 344 psig. RCS pressure began to rise, and prompt actions were taken by the Control Room to secure a Charging Pump within 20 seconds. The RCS pressure rise continued and both Pressure Operated Relief Valves cycled at 409.9 psig as designed, lowering RCS pressure. The CI Train "A" was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of Train "A" Containment Isolation valves in more than one system. All valves functioned successfully. The DC breaker was closed, CI signal reset, and associated CI valves re-opened. All systems functioned as required and returned to normal service. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 53696 | 27 October 2018 01:50:00 | RCS (Reactor Coolant System) Pressure: vented to containment, refueling cavity greater than 23ft. (above reactor vessel). RCS temperature: 96 degrees Fahrenheit. The 12A bus de-energized, 'A' EDG (Emergency Diesel Generator) automatically started and loaded on (emergency) buses 14 and 18. The RCS configuration is refueling cavity level greater than 23ft. above the reactor flange with no impact to shutdown cooling. Radiation monitor R-1, Control Room radiation monitor, lost power for 2 hrs 10 min. This placed Ginna in a major loss of emergency preparedness capabilities. A temporary radiation monitor has been installed in the Control Room. Prior to the notification, the licensee had restored the 12A bus from offsite power and the R-1 monitor was re-energized. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |