Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 52756 | 15 May 2017 18:55:00 | The following information was received via email: This letter is issued to provide an interim notification of a potential defect in certain lots of Grayboot socket contacts supplied with EQ qualified Grayboot Connector Kits. On March 16, 2017, Curtiss-Wright, Nuclear Division, Huntsville Operations was contacted by Georgia Power Vogtle Nuclear Power Plant concerning a potential defect where the socket contact tines were in a relaxed state. Although we have completed some testing and verification activities, additional testing is in progress now and will provide necessary information to complete our evaluation. Current testing will be completed and final conclusions made by May 31, 2017. At this time, based on test results, evaluations and operating experience, Curtiss Wright is confident that any potentially affected Grayboot Assemblies will continue to perform their intended safety functions. As such, if the final recommendation is to replace the potentially defective socket contact, this can be accomplished during subsequent routine maintenance activities. This notification is being made to comply with 60 day interim reporting requirements as defined in 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2). For additional information, please contact Samuel Bledsoe, EGS Products Engineering Manager (1-256-690-7852) or Tony Gill, EGS and Trentec Quality Assurance Manager (1-256-426-4558).
The following information was provided via email: This letter is issued to provide final findings associated with a potential defect concerning GRAYBOOT socket contacts. This issue was initially identified in an interim report dated May 15, 2017. As documented previously, Curtiss-Wright, Nuclear Division, Huntsville Operations was contacted by Georgia Power Vogtle Nuclear Power Plant on March 16, 2017 concerning a potential defect wherein GRAYBOOT socket contact tines were in a relaxed state. This notification of a potential defect concerns model GB-1 GRAYBOOT kits supplied with two-tined, silver-plated, 12-14 AWG socket contacts. Based upon this scope, potentially affected kits/parts are: 1. GB-1(12-14) GRAYBOOT kits, 2. GB-1 (12-14/ 16-18) GRAYBOOT kits, and 3. GB-1-6 GRAYBOOT 12-14 AWG socket contacts. This issue does not affect the following: 1. Any GRAYBOOT 'A' kits/parts, 2. Any model GB-2 or GB-3 GRAYBOOT kits/parts, or 3. Any model GB-1 GRAYBOOT kits/parts with 16-18 AWG socket contacts. Our evaluation is documented in Report No. EGS-TR-880708-15 and is available for review at our facility in Huntsville, AL. The results identify the most likely root cause is improper heat treating of the socket contacts during manufacturing. Additional testing and analysis was performed to confirm that any affected GRAYBOOT assemblies can still preform their safety-related function and do not present a substantial safety hazard . The findings outlined in Report No. EGS-TR-880708-15 provide a high level of confidence that affected GRAYBOOT assemblies do not present a substantial safety hazard. This position is further validated by the lack of negative operating experience over the last 20 plus years from properly installed GRAYBOOT assemblies. However, this condition causes the contact to be more susceptible to damage from handling during connection and disconnection, and therefore the following actions are recommended: 1. Any affected sockets in inventory should be replaced. Affected sockets in service should be replaced during routine maintenance activities. OR 2. In lieu of replacement, it is acceptable to perform the following (steps 1-3) to confirm a separation force greater than 0.19 lbs. This is consistent with existing Curtiss-Wright dedication acceptance criteria. It is recommended that any contacts not meeting this criteria be replaced. 1. Crimp a spare pin contact to an appropriate piece of wire. 2. Connect a force gage or 0.19 lbs. of static weight to the opposite end of the wire. 3. Insert the pin into the socket and confirm that the pin does not separate from the socket under a minimum load of 0.19 lbs. To confirm this deviation is not present in existing inventory or in future purchased lots, the following corrective actions have been or will be implemented by Curtiss-Wright: 1. Micro hardness testing was performed on all socket contact lots in inventory to verify their acceptability. Results confirmed that all lots were acceptable. 2. Acceptance criteria for dedication of socket contacts will be revised to include verification of acceptable contact hardness. This corrective action will be completed by June 9, 2017. No dedication of socket contacts will be performed until this corrective action is complete. A list of affected utilities and associated purchase orders is being developed and will be complete and submitted by June 9, 2017. For additional information, please contact Samuel Bledsoe, EGS Products Engineering Manager (1-256-690-7852) or Tony Gill, EGS and Trentec Quality Assurance Manager (1-256-426-4558). Notified R1DO (Bower), R2DO (Shaeffer), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (O'Keefe) and Part 21 Operating Reactors Group via email.
The following update was received via email: On May 31, 2017, Curtiss-Wright, Nuclear Division, Huntsville Operations issued a letter documenting final findings regarding a potential defect concerning model GB-1 GRAYBOOT kits supplied with two-tined, silver-plated, 12-14 AWG contacts. Please find that letter attached. Pursuant to the attached letter, please find attached a list of affected purchase orders. For additional information, please contact Samuel Bledsoe, EGS Products Engineering Manager (1-256-690-7852) or Tony Gill, EGS and Trentec Quality Assurance Manager (1-256-426-4558). List of Sites Affected: Arkansas Nuclear 1 Bruce Nuclear Power Development Brunswick Callaway Calvert Cliffs Clinton Columbia Cooper CTEAM/CRIT Davis-Besse Diablo Canyon Duane Arnold Farley FMM Fort Calhoun Gentilly Ginna Haddam Neck Harris Indian Point Kewaunee La Salle Limerick Millstone Nine Mile Point North Anna Oconee Oyster Creek Peach Bottom Pilgrim Point Beach Prairie Island Quad Cities River Bend Saint Lucie San Onofre Sizewell B South Texas Summer Turkey Point Vermont Yankee Vogtle Waterford Wolsong Zion Notified R1DO(Welling), R2DO(Suggs), R3DO(Orlikowski), R4DO(Rollins), Part-21 Reactors (via email).
The following information was received via email: At initial issuance, the evaluation documented in Report No. EGS-TR-880708-15 presented metallurgical analysis as well as thermal, functional and seismic testing. This report has been revised to include cycle aging, functional testing and pull-out force. Test results confirm that affected socket contacts will continue to perform their intended safety function throughout their qualified life. Based on these final findings, no further actions are recommended for the potentially affected utilities previously notified. Any potentially affected socket contacts, either in inventory or installed, are acceptable for use in their intended safety-related application. It is recommended that all utilities confirm that installation and handling of GRAYBOOT assemblies is in accordance with Installation Instructions EGS-TR-880707-02. For additional information, please contact Samuel Bledsoe, EGS Products Engineering Manager (1-256-690-7852) or Tony Gill, EGS and Trentec Quality Assurance Manager (1-256-426-4558). Notified R1DO(Dentel), R2DO(Michel), R3DO(Riemer), R4DO(Groom), Part-21 Reactors (via email). |
| ENS 51927 | 13 May 2016 14:35:00 | The following information was provided by Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division via fax: On March 16, 2016, Curtiss-Wright was notified by one of our commercial suppliers that they had received an Important Product Safety Notice (safety notice) from Emerson Valve Automation/Hytork concerning Hytork models XL1371 and XL1126 pneumatic rack and pinion actuators, manufactured after 2005 and before June 2015. Curtiss-Wright began evaluating any possible impact at that time. On May 11, 2016 Curtiss-Wright made the decision that the defect was reportable under 10 CFR Part 21. A total of four (4) Hytork XL1126 pneumatic actuators had been dedicated by Curtiss-Wright and provided as safety-related. Two (2) of the actuators were supplied to the PSEG, Salem Generating Station and the other two (2) were supplied to MOX Services. Both Salem Generating Station and MOX Services have been notified of this potential defect. Curtiss-Wright has not supplied any of the XL 1371 actuators. Emerson Valve Automation/Hytork states that there is a small possibility that a crack may develop in the actuator body under normal operation. The Emerson/Hytork investigation determined that a combination of actuator body structural design and material specifications along with manufacturer processes, could lead to material properties that are not within stated specifications. This condition may cause higher than allowable stresses to occur in the actuator body, which could lead to crack initiation. If a crack does develop and the actuator continues to operate, the crack may propagate to the end of the body and the end caps could be forcefully ejected. In addition to operational concerns, this condition may present a personnel safety hazard. Based on phone conversations with Hytork it was learned that only one model XL1126 actuator failure has been reported out of approximately 10,000 supplied. Hytork stated that the failed actuator was in a 'severe' (mechanical, operational) application with very high cycle frequency and likely experienced high impact loading. The list below identifies the affected customers, approximate ship dates, applicable purchase orders and actuator details. PSEG/Salem, approximate date of shipment November, 2011, Customer PO Number 4500606542, Affected Equipment One Hytork EIA-XL1126-S80AH0 Actuator Damper Tag 1CAA14 MOX, approximate date of shipment June, 2014, Customer PO Number 10888-P-6374, Affected Equipment Two Hytork XL1126SR80 Actuators Catalog ID 14306 (HDE*AOD 0142B) & Catalog ID 14309 (HDE*AOD 0197B) PSEG/Salem, approximate date of shipment September 2015, Customer PO Number 4500826720, Affected Equipment One Hytork EIA-XL1126-S80-A00 Actuator Damper Tag 2CAA14 Hytork ceased production of the XL1126 and XL1371 actuators in June 2015 due to the described problem. Hytork is revising the design to connect the defect and will issue new model numbers for the re-designed actuators. Hytork expects to begin production of the new models in June of this year. Although Curtiss-Wright has successfully seismically tested two Hytork model XL1126 actuators under load, providing reasonable assurance that the actuators will survive and operate under normal and seismic loading, it is still recommended that the actuators be replaced as soon as practical. In the interim it is recommended that operating plants perform periodic (recommend weekly or if infrequently operated, following each operation) visual and/or soap-bubble inspections. The recommended actions provided below are considered to provide adequate indication of onset of this potential condition since instantaneous failures have not been identified and are not projected. a) For all persons who are or could be in the area where the affected equipment is present, ensure they are warned of the potential danger. b) Visually inspect all affected models for cracks, especially underneath the dual stroke adjustment pad and on top of the actuator body in the pinion area. c) If you are unsure whether a crack is present, perform a soap bubble test. d) If you identify a crack or leak, immediately remove this actuator from service. For additional information please contact the following personnel. Steve Willard, Engineering: 256-924-7463 (office); swillard@curtisswright.com (e-mail) Tony Gill, QA Manager: 256-924-7438 (office); 256-426-4558 (cell); tgill@curtisswright.com (e-mail) |
| ENS 47643 | 6 February 2012 17:56:00 | The following report was received via fax: This letter is issued to provide initial notification of a potential defect in Plug Insulators (P/N: GB-1A-1) supplied as part of GRAYBOOT 'A' (GB-1A) Connector Kits. There are two affected lots of Plug Insulators (Lot #: BA59961 and BA67711). The potential defect is an out of tolerance dimension that will possibly affect the sealing ability of the Plug Insulator to wire interface. The affected Customers and their associated Purchase Orders are listed below. All Customers will be notified today. Ralph a. Hiller; PO: NUC7505, Item 1, 15 Kits (P/N: GB-1A (16-18), Lot BA59961) supplied 19JAN2012. Bruce Power, PO: 00168187, Item 1, 20 Kits (P/N: GB-1A (12-14), Lot BA59961) supplied 13DEC2011. Dominion - Surry, PO: 45886290, Item 1, 22 Kits (P/N: GB-S-1A, Lot BA59961) supplied 19DEC2011. Dominion - Surry, PO: 45897749, Item 2, 30 Kits (P/N: GB-S-1A, Lot BA67711) supplied 01FEB2012. Ringhals AB, PO: 621728-053, Item 10, 30 Kits (P/N: GB-1A (16-18), Lot BA59961) supplied 19DEC2011. Ringhals, PO: 620625-066, Item 10, 300 parts (P/N: GB-1A-1, Lots BA59961/BA67711) supplied 30JAN2012. Ringhals, PO: 620996-066, Item 50, 1 Kit (P/N: GB-1A (16-18), Lot BA59961) supplied 29NOV2011. OKG, PO: 4113847, Item 4, 86 parts (P/N: GB-1A-1, Lot BA59961) supplied 30NOV2011. It is requested that all affected parts be returned for replacement to QualTech NP; 330 West Park Loop; Huntsville, AL 35806. Customers can contact Cindy Tidwell at (256) 895-7250 ext. 229 for freight collect shipping instructions. Additional details, corrective actions and root causes will be provided once complete. If you require additional information or would like to discuss this further please do not hesitate in contacting: Tony Gill Quality Assurance Supervisor QualTech NP, Huntsville A business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company Office 256-722-8500 ext. 1 Cell 256-426-4558 tgill@curtisswright.com
This letter provides for the formal closeout of notification 10CFR21-2012-01. The initial notification was made on February 06, 2012. All corrective actions and corrective actions to prevent recurrence have been completed and all affected parts listed on the initial notification have been returned by our customers and replacement items supplied. All affected parts in inventory at our facility were removed and discarded. The initial corrective action was to retrieve all affected parts both in our inventory and those provided to our customers as safety-related. As stated above, all affected parts have been returned and/or retrieved from inventory and discarded. There were four primary root causes identified that allowed the defective items to be manufactured and accepted. The causes are listed below: 1. Mold sections/mold inserts for the two different size plug insulators (regular and oversized) are used in the same mold assembly. Not all required mold parts were removed when changing from the manufacture of oversized to regular boots causing the defective parts to be manufactured. 2. Vendor did not verify the affected dimension prior to shipment of the parts to QualTech. 3. The inspection drawing in the QualTech dedication guidelines was not clear as to the required dimension to be verified. 4. The QualTech Inspector incorrectly interpreted the inspection drawing and verified the wrong dimension thus accepting the defective parts. The corrective actions to prevent recurrence have been completed and include the following: 1. An additional mold was purchased from our supplier to prevent mixing of inserts. Now there are no mold parts utilized in the manufacture of different sized plug insulators (regular vs. oversized). This issue was one of the primary causes of the defect. 2. Notification was made to our supplier and corrective actions implemented at their facility. 3. The QualTech inspection drawing in the affected dedication guidelines was revised to better define the required dimension. 4. The error was discussed with the QualTech Inspector to ensure understanding of the critical dimension. Based on the above information and corrective actions this part 21 file is considered closed. If you would like to discuss this information further please contact the undersigned at 256-722-8500 ext. 131 (office), 256-426-4558 (cell), or tgill@curtisswright.com. Tony Gill Quality Assurance Manager QualTech NP, Huntsville Operations a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company Notified R2DO (Haig) and the Part 21 Group via email. |
| ENS 46776 | 22 April 2011 12:46:00 | This letter is issued to provide notification of a potential defect in QualTech NP Top Potted Generation 3 Quick Disconnect Connector Pin Side assemblies installed on Topworx C7 and SV7 switches. All assemblies supplied prior to April 20, 2011 are potentially affected. These assemblies were supplied to Topworx (as) submergence qualified in accordance with our Test Report EGS-TR-23009-14. It was discovered during supplemental qualification testing that previously supplied assemblies may not properly seal against moisture intrusion if utilized in a submergence application. The recommended corrective action for existing assemblies is to pressure test and, if required, repair them. Corrective actions already implemented will be effective in preventing recurrence of this condition. Additionally, all future assemblies will be required to pass pressure testing prior to acceptance. It has been confirmed that all assemblies previously supplied are for use in Chinese Nuclear Power Plants and therefore, no US plants are affected." Most of the assemblies are still in this country and the remainder are in Switzerland awaiting shipment. All assemblies will be recalled and pressure tested.
The purpose of this letter is to provide additional information concerning the status of all affected assemblies. As stated in the previous notifications all serial numbers affected by this defect have been identified and to date only 30 production units remain to be returned for testing/repair. We are still experiencing 100% success when repair is needed. It was previously reported that 'all affected assemblies were for use in Chinese Nuclear Power Plants and therefore no US Plants are affected'. This is no longer a correct statement. Our customer, Topworx, notified us on August 9 that one of their customers, Flowserve, had supplied valve packages containing 16 of these assemblies to Pilgrim Station in Plymouth, MA. It has been reported to us that these assemblies were never installed and are in the process of being returned for testing/repair. These 16 assemblies are included in the 30 production units remaining to be tested/repaired. It has been identified that 4 of the remaining assemblies are still in China and the other 10 were supplied to Flowserve. Additional information concerning these assemblies will be provided as it becomes available. A final letter will be issued once corrective actions for these 30 assemblies are complete. Notified R1DO(Powell), Part 21 GRP via e-mail
On April 22, 2011 QualTech NP, Huntsville issued an initial notification letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and our Customer Topworx concerning a potential defect in QualTech NP Top Potted Generation 3 Quick Disconnect Connector Pin Side assemblies installed on Topworx C7 and SV7 Switches. A total of three notification/status letters associated with this subject have been previously issued. As of this date all affected production units have been returned and tested/repaired. We have experienced 100% success when repair was needed. This letter provides the final status and closeout of the above referenced 10CFR21 notification. Notified R1DO (Holoday) and Part 21 group via email. |
| ENS 44592 | 22 October 2008 14:50:00 | On October 15. 2008, Ensign Power Systems. Inc. of Loveland, Colorado informed Scientech of a defect. An internal audit had revealed that some Model 9061-01 power supplies provided to Scientech for use in their safety related line of NUSI modules had been inadvertently manufactured with an unauthorized part. The design required the use of two capacitors in the power line filter. When Ensign attempted to purchase the required parts, their supplier made an unauthorized substitution of capacitors. These capacitors are virtually identical, and the packaging was labeled with the correct Ensign Power Systems part number. Scientech immediately put a HOLD on all shipments of modules with Ensign power supplies until it could be verified that they were built using the correct parts. (Complete 10/15/08) Scientech located all Ensign power supplies in house and isolated them. (Complete 10/16/08) Scientech notified H. B. Robinson that some of the twelve modules contain power supplies with unauthorized parts. (Complete 10/16/08) Scientech is working with H. B. Robinson to replace the eight Ensign power supplies with (authorized) parts. (in progress) Scientech will return all affected power supplies to Ensign for installation of the approved components. Scientech will review the revised Ensign receipt inspection procedures to assure that they are robust enough to prevent reoccurrence. |