Semantic search
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 52829 | 26 June 2017 18:39:00 | On June 26, 2017, at 1531 (EDT), Indian Point Unit 2 inserted a manual reactor trip prior to Steam Generator levels reaching the automatic reactor trip setpoint. Steam Generator water level perturbation resulted from a loss of 22 Main Boiler Feed Pump. All Control Rods verified inserted. The Auxiliary Feedwater System started as designed and supplied feedwater to the Steam Generators. Heat removal is via the Main Condenser through the High Pressure Steam Dumps. Offsite power is being supplied through the normal 138kV feeder 95332. The cause of the 22 Main Boiler Feed Pump loss is currently under investigation. Entergy is issuing a press release/news release on this issue. Unit 2 is stable and in Mode 3. There was no impact on Unit 3. The licensee notified the State of New York and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 52751 | 14 May 2017 15:32:00 | On May 14, 2017, with the Unit in Mode 4, it was identified that a single flow barrier access point (Gate C) to the 46 ft. elevation of Containment was unbolted for access to the inner crane wall to perform surveillance testing. This single flow barrier access point is required to be bolted closed to ensure the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) operability basis which requires the sump barrier system to be operable in Modes 1- 4. The sump barrier system is required to prevent the transport of debris to the recirculation and containment sumps. This event is a safety system functional failure as the condition could have prevented adequate post-accident core cooling due to Design Basis Accident debris blockage of the recirculation and/or the containment sump and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the New York Public Service Commission. |
| ENS 49573 | 22 November 2013 15:18:00 | On November 21, 2013 during an Access Authorization Fitness for Duty (FFD) Baseline Inspection, an NRC Inspector identified laboratory testing of a Blind FFD sample failed to provide anticipated testing results. Laboratory testing results for sample (specimen number 422136066) should have reported the sample as 'Dilute' but the laboratory report results came back as 'Negative.' In addition, the specific gravity of the sample was also outside the expected range. It should have been reported at or near 1.0015 but was reported at 1.0224 instead. The sample was submitted on March 3, 2013. The results error was not identified when the results were received which caused a violation of 10CFR26. An investigation with the laboratory has been initiated through the Medical Review Officer for IPEC (Indian Point Energy Center). Additionally an investigation with the vendor supplier of the Blind sample will be initiated. The corrective action for this event is that an extent of condition is being performed to verify that no other Blind errors exist. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying New York State Public Service Commission. |
| ENS 49171 | 3 July 2013 10:46:00 | On July 3, 2013, at 0741 EST, the Indian Point Unit 2 CCR received a trip of both Main Boiler Feed Pumps (MBFP) and entered 2-AOP�FW-1, Loss of Feedwater. The unit was manually tripped at 0741 per 2-AOP-FW�1 due to the trip of both MBFPs. Operators entered E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. All control rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as expected. The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System actuated as expected. Offsite power and plant electrical lineups are normal. No primary or secondary code safety valves lifted. The 23 and 24 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) failed closed as a result of the loss of Instrument Air (IA). The 21 and 22 MSIVs remain open with the Main Condensers being used for heat sink. The reactor is in Mode 3 and stable. Unit 3 was unaffected and remains at 100% power. Preliminary investigations determined a two inch copper IA line in the switchyard which is normally buried had a failed coupling causing loss of IA to the main feedwater regulating valves. The IA line traversed an excavated area of the switchyard going to the Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump (ABFP) Building. AFW operated using the Nitrogen backup supply to ABFP control valves until Instrument Air was restored to the ABFP building. An investigation is in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48750 | 13 February 2013 16:41:00 | At 1352 (hrs. EST), the Unit 2 CCR (Central Control Room) noted a trip of both heater drain tank pumps and entered Abnormal Operating Procedure 2-AOP-FW-1, 'Loss of Feedwater'. Prior to the event, Instrumentation and Controls personnel were performing testing on the heater drain tank level control system. Turbine load was reduced per plant procedures, however a manual reactor trip was initiated at 1355 due to an inability to maintain steam generator water levels. The team subsequently entered E-0, 'Reactor Trip or Safety Injection'. All control rods fully inserted. All safety systems responded as expected with the exception of source range detector N-31 and intermediate range detector N-35. N-31 and N-35 were declared inoperable. The auxiliary feedwater system actuated as expected and provided feedwater to maintain steam generator water level. Decay heat removal is via the steam generators to the main condensers. Offsite power and plant electrical lineups are normal. No primary or secondary code safety relief valves lifted. The reactor is in Mode 3 and stable. Unit 3 was unaffected and remains at 100% power. An investigation is in progress. Unit 2 is currently at normal operating pressure and temperature. The licensee plans to issue a press release on this event. The licensee notified the State of New York Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector. |