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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 53786 | 11 December 2018 15:09:00 | This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The successful, complete train actuation of the 22 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was initiated by an invalid signal during testing. The Auxiliary Feedwater System was not impacted in its ability to perform its function. There were no safety consequences or impacts to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 53386 | 7 May 2018 05:23:00 | This 4 and 8 hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 initiated a manual reactor trip and subsequent automatic Auxiliary Feedwater system actuation. The trip was initiated due to a 21 Reactor Coolant Pump reaching its procedural limit for motor winding temperature of 302F. Salem Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3. Reactor Coolant system pressure is 2235 PSIG and Reactor Coolant System temperature is 547 F with decay heat removal via the Main Steam Dump and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. Unit 2 has no active shutdown technical specification action statements in effect. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS (emergency core cooling systems) and ESF (emergency safety function) systems functioned as expected. No safety related equipment or major secondary equipment was tagged for maintenance prior to this event. No personnel were injured during this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified. |
| ENS 52294 | 11 October 2016 16:48:00 | At 0938 (EDT), the watertight door in the Unit 1 Inboard Service Water Penetration Area was unable to be closed. The watertight door serves as a High Energy Line Break (HELB) and Medium Energy Line Break (MELB) barrier between the mechanical penetration room and the service water penetration room. A HELB/MELB event occurring in a room with its barrier door open could adversely affect equipment in an adjacent room. Consequently, a HELB/MELB event could have rendered equipment in the adjacent room inoperable. At 1005, station maintenance was able to successfully close and latch the door restoring the barrier. This event is being reported under the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as, 'the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.' An ENS notification is required if an unanalyzed condition occurred within 3 years of the date of discovery even if the event is not on-going at the time of discovery. The licensee notified Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this notification is to retract event report number 52294 made on 10/11/2016 at 1648 (ET). Previously PSEG reported that Salem Unit 1 was determined to be in an unanalyzed condition due to being unable to close the Unit 1 Inboard Service Water Penetration Area Water Tight Door. The watertight door was reported to serve as a High Energy Line Break (HELB) and Medium Energy Line Break (MELB) barrier between the mechanical penetration room and the service water penetration room. Subsequent review identified that the condition did not meet the reporting criterion. Engineering evaluation determined that the service water penetration room had been previously evaluated for the impact due to a HELB event occurring in the adjacent mechanical penetration area with the watertight door open and that the event would not impact the operability of the service system. Engineering evaluation also determined that the Salem Unit 1 Design Basis does not require analysis of a MELB event occurring in the service water penetration room. This is due to the timing of the Unit 1 operating license issue date. At the time of the issuance of the Unit 1 operating license analysis of a MELB event was not required. Therefore an unanalyzed condition for a MELB event did not exist. Additionally while the door was difficult to close, it was able to be closed and dogged in a reasonable time interval (27 minutes), therefore, any potential internal flooding which would have been detected immediately by the attendant with required actions taken to close the door and isolate the leak rapidly. Therefore PSEG is retracting the notification made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Schroeder). |
| ENS 49300 | 22 August 2013 17:08:00 | Salem Unit 1 has initiated a unit shutdown in accordance with TS (Technical Specification) Action Statement 3.4.6.2(b) for unidentified leakage greater than 1 gpm (gallon per minute) (Entered on 8/22/13 at 1029 EDT). TS 3.4.6.2 Action Statement (b) requires a reduction of leakage rate to within limits within 4 hrs. or be in at least Hot Standby within the following 6 hours. Initial investigation has indicated that the leakage source is from packing on Pressurizer Spray Valve 1PS1 located in the RCS (Reactor Coolant System) Pressurizer shroud area inside Containment. Unidentified leakage is currently indicating 4 gpm. NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified. Manual isolation is in progress. Additionally, TS Action Statement 3.6.1.4 Primary Containment Internal Pressure was entered at 1510 (EDT) for exceeding 0.3 psig. Action requires restoration of containment pressure to within specification in 1 hour or be in hot standby within the next 6 hours. Containment pressure was restored to less than 0.3 psig at 1647 (EDT) and TS 3.6.1.4 was exited. Peak containment pressure reached (was) 0.33 psig. Location of leak: Unit 1 RCS (containment), Pressurizer, 1PS1 Pressurizer Spray Valve Packing Time & date leak started: 1019 (EDT) on 08/22/2013 Leak rate: 4 gpm, T/S leak limits: 1 gpm Last known coolant activity: Primary (DEI (Dose Equivalent Iodine)-microCuries/cc) 5.973E-5 microCuries/cc Secondary (gbg (Gross Beta Gamma)-microcuries/cc) < LLD (Lower Limit of Detectability) Was this leak a sudden or long-term development? Sudden The licensee is reducing power at 30%/hour and anticipates entering Mode 3 in approximately 3 hours. The 1PS1 Pressurizer Spray Valve was replaced and the air operator rebuilt during the last refueling outage in April/May of 2013. The licensee informed the State of New Jersey and will 9inform the Lower Alloways Creek (LAC) Township. |
| ENS 45848 | 16 April 2010 22:08:00 | At 1641 hours (EDT) on April 16, 2010, an (unplanned) automatic start signal was generated for the 1C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). Surveillance testing was being performed on the 1C 4160 volt bus to verify the ability to swap between the 13 and 14 Station Power Transformers (SPT) which are the offsite power in-feeds for the 1C 4160 volt bus. The (failure to) swap from the 13 SPT to 14 SPT resulted in a loss of power to the 1C 4160 volt vital bus generating the automatic start signal for the 1C EDG. The 1C EDG started but the output breaker did not close. Abnormal operating procedure S1.OP-AB.4KV-0003 was entered for loss of the 1C 4160 volt vital bus. Salem Unit 1 was in Mode 6 with core reload (fuel movement) in progress. Fuel movement was stopped as a result of the loss of the 1C 4160 volt bus. All fuel assemblies were placed in a safe position. There was no impact to shutdown cooling and no loss of spent fuel pool cooling. Core reload has been suspended until power is restored to the 1C 4160 volt bus. Initial investigations determined the suspected cause to be a failed auxiliary contact associated with a SPT in-feed breaker. This prevented the opposite in-feed and EDG breaker from closing. Extent of condition review and repairs are in progress. Fuel movement was suspended due to loss of the fuel handling building exhaust fan which is powered by the 1C 4160V bus. There was no further impact on any safety related equipment required in Mode 6. The license will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, Lower Alloways Creek Township, the State of New Jersey, and the State of Delaware. |
| ENS 45760 | 11 March 2010 19:00:00 | This notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the issuance of a press release concerning an individual that previously performed work at Salem Generating Station. PSEG Nuclear provided the following statement to Channel 6 News, the ABC-TV affiliate out of Philadelphia, which read as follows: 'Sharif Mobley previously worked as a laborer at PSEG Nuclear for a variety of contractors from 2002 to 2008 mainly during refueling outages for several weeks at a time. This individual satisfied federal security background checks required to work in the US nuclear industry as recently as 2008. While working here, he did routine labor work carrying supplies and assisting maintenance activities. He also worked at other nuclear plants in the region. We are cooperating with law enforcement as part of their investigation as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other nuclear plant operators.' Sharif Mobley has been the focus of recent news stories due to his activities in the country of Yemen. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and the Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified. |