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The State provided the following information via email: On April 17, 2008, the agency received written notification from the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), reporting that during their routine inventory check they, accompanied by two of their health physics consultants, found the one tritium (H-3) exit signs in a non-public receiving area in their Cypress, Texas store, had a missing face plate, frame and label, red 'EXIT' cover and several H-3 tubes. The RSO reported that the remaining H-3 tubes were intact. The RSO reported that they conducted informal interviews with store managers and associates that revealed no additional information as to the date or circumstances of the damage to the sign. The RSO and their consultants stated that because available information does not suggest that the H-3 exit sign (TES) was recently damaged, Wal-Mart believes that no significant contamination currently exists at the site. Additionally, he stated that Wal-Mart reached this conclusion in consultation with consultant Certified Health Physicists (CHPs). The RSO stated that their long term corrective actions included: implementing protocols, which have been communicated to employees, for the proper handling of TES to ensure public health and safety and the protection of its employees. They report that they are in the process of inventorying all of the TES at its sites across the country to re-establish the accuracy of its records and to track the current locations of the TES, with the intent of ensuring that all TES are accounted for and handled properly. The RSO stated that the damaged TES will be packaged for shipment according to protocols established by their consultants and consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidelines. Wal-Mart anticipates shipping the remnants of the damaged TES to a specific licensee or arranging for a waste broker to ship the TES to a specific licensee authorized to receive it within thirty-days of their report to the agency, which was dated April 10, 2008. Texas report I-8507

• * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY LATISCHA HANSON VIA E-MAIL TO JASON KOZAL ON 04/23/08 AT 1449 * * *

On 04/22/08: The agency received written notifications each dated April 17, 2008 that three more exit signs were found damaged at the following locations: 1) 4700 East Palm Valley Blvd., Round Rock, Texas 78665-2580; Store # 5480

   - Damaged exit sign discovered on 03/19/08
   - approximately 11.5 Ci; Serial # unknown
   - one damaged exit sign with the tubes in the letter "T" broken.

2) 620 S IH-35, Georgetown, Texas 78628-4157; Store # 1303

   - Damaged exit sign discovered on 03/18/08
   - 20 Ci; Serial #289930
   - one damaged exit sign uninstalled and stored in the manager's office, missing it's face plate, it's red "EXIT" cover and all H-3 tubes.

3) 1030 Norwood Park Blvd., Austin, Texas 78753-6600; Store # 1185

   - Damaged exit sign discovered on 03/19/08
   - 20.0 Ci; Serial #274828
   - one damaged exit sign with broken tubes, installed in the non-public receiving section of the store.

Notified R4DO (Cain), FSME EO (Hsueh).

• * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ART TUCKER TO JASON KOZAL ON 4/30/08 AT 1029 * * *

The State provided the following information via email: The State of Texas received notification of nine additional exit signs which had either damaged (4) or missing (5) vials containing tritium (H-3.) The RSO for Wal-Mart stated that the information gather in the inspections conducted throughout the United States was being entered into a database and that they would supply the State of Texas with the results of their inspections conducted in Texas as soon as it was available. No estimate of the number of vials involved or the total activity released has been determined as of today's date. He also stated that he had been in contact with the NRC. Notified R4DO (Pick), FSME (Burgess). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

The following report was received via email from the State of Texas: At 8:04 p.m., Radiation Control (RC) was contacted through the 24-hour Radiological Emergency Assistance telephone number by San Jacinto Emergency Management, reporting a car accident in San Jacinto County, on Highway 59, north of Houston, where a company was transporting a radioactive camera which was thrown from the truck onto the roadside. The Emergency Management representative reported that there was no leakage from the camera and that the driver sustained minor injuries. They did not have the company's name or any additional information on the radioactive source and was following instructions to make the initial notification to the State. The Emergency Management representative said they would call back with additional information.

The Emergency Management representative called back and relayed the following information:

Company/Licensee: National Inspection Services - out of Crowley, TX The Emergency Management representative reported that the Cleveland Haz-Mat team was handling the incident, but did not have any contact information for them.

RC placed a call to the company contact, who informed RC that he was enroute from Sulphur, LA and would be on-site in 2 hours. He gave me the name and the telephone number of the Haz-Mat chief on-site. He also said another company supervisor was enroute from Lafayette, LA and would be there ~1 hour.

RC then called the Haz-Mat chief on-site, who reported that they surveyed with a Victoreen 6A series survey meter on the x100, x10 and x1 scales and got no readings of any radiation leakage. He said the camera was intact but out of its transport container. He informed RC that they were going to transport it back to the station. RC asked him for the manufacturer's information on the camera. The chief said he had it an ice cooler, with styrofoam overpack in the back of his truck and to call him back ~ 3 minutes for the information.

Meanwhile RC called the company representative from Lafayette, had the camera information:

Mfg.: SPEC 150 Ir-192 camera with ~ 30 Ci source.

He said that a Level II Radiographer was also in the company vehicle and was on the accident scene with the chief and could answer any questions. He also said the Texas Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was contacted and would get with RC. He said the truck was a complete loss, the darkroom broke apart off of the truck and the camera was thrown out of the darkroom. He said the Level II Radiographer followed their O&E procedures for handling the recovery and securing of the camera. He said the camera would be picked up tonight by the company representative from Sulphur and would be sent off to SPEC in the morning for leak testing. I reminded him of the written notification as a follow-up to the telephone notification. He did not know off-hand their Texas Radioactive Materials License (RAML) number.

RC called the chief back right away, whose information concurred with the company representative's. RC then asked to speak with the Radiographer, who confirmed that he oversaw the camera recovery, examination and radiation surveying and concurred that the camera was neither damaged nor leaking. RC told him and the chief that in keeping with Increased Controls (IC), to have the Radiographer travel with the camera when it is transported back to the fire station, so that visual control of the camera is maintained by the licensee. RC also asked that the company representative from Sulphur, LA contact RC when they picked up the camera and the employee.

RC placed a call back to the other company representative from Lafayette and relayed the same information to him. He agreed to call me back as soon as he had secured them both.

RC followed up with a resolution summation call to San Jacinto Emergency Management.

I will await the camera secured-confirmation call from Joe. At 11:04 p.m. (CST) RC received the telephone call from the Haz-Mat employee that the camera and company employee were both picked up.

02/19/08, camera verification information from licensee @ 9:49 a.m.: Mfg: SPEC Model: 150 Serial No.: 875 or 820 Source: Ir-192 25 Ci Mfg.: SPEC Serial No.: OH2913 Last leak test: 01/31/08 Texas Incident #: I-8484

The State provided the following information via email: On October 18, 2007, the agency was contacted at 12:49 p.m. by their emergency answering service, reporting that a licensee had lost a gauge in Houston and was requesting Incident Investigation Program (IIP) to call them back to assist them with (the lost gauge). IIP called the licensee back and talked with (DELETED), Site RSO for their LaPorte, TX location. (RSO) reported that his technician was driving down the highway in Houston and discovered that the gauge had fallen out of his truck around 12:15 -12:30 p.m. on 10/18/07. The RSO stated that the tailgate was up, but the gauge may not have been braced down. The technician immediately called the RSO, who drove down the highway and found pieces of the gauge, the handle, and the Cs-137 source. The RSO stated the Cs-137 source is intact. He remains on location with the agency's investigator. The agency's investigator has surveyed the area and the gauge pieces that were recovered with a NaI detector and was not able to locate the AmBe source. The gauge specifications are: Mfg: Troxler Model 3430, Serial #: 29328, Last Leak test: 10/11/07 Source Information: 1) Cs-137 Serial #: 750-2544; 8 mCi 2) AmBe Serial #: 47-26370; 40 mCi. The source is double-encapsulated in stainless steel, with dimensions of: .4 in.x.3 in. and is less than 1/2 in. long and 1/4 in. in diameter.

Mfg states that the chance of the source encapsulation being broken and breached is remote. The agency has notified local law enforcement (LLE) to shut down the 3-lane highway (so that) safe surveying for the AmBe source can be accomplished. The agency has asked LLE to contact and coordinate with the local HAZMAT team. IIP will continue to investigate and assist with locating the lost AmBe source. Additionally, the licensee was given contact information for two consultants to assist with this incident and location of the lost source. Incident Investigations will continue to update this incident as current information is received. Disposition/Action Taken: 1) Report to NRC and NMED, 2) Contacted local law enforcement (LLE) and local HAZMAT. Texas Incident Number: I - 8449, Event Report: TX-07-43606

• * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO JOE O'HARA AT 2125 ON 10/18/07 * * *

The state along with DOD personnel performed a search of highway 225 for the missing source. However, the search was unsuccessful. The highway has been reopened, and the state will meet tomorrow to discuss further follow-up actions. Notified R4DO(Proulx), FSME EO(Tschiltz), ILTAB(e-mail), and Mexico(fax). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

EVENT: Radioactive Material (RAM) found - sealed License Number: "Unlicensed The agency received a call at 2:15 p.m. today (7/19/07) from DSHS Food & Drug Inspector, (DELETED) inquiring about four radiation devices found with 1994 inspection stickers on each of them. She said there appears to be some concern as of what company owns them and the facility they are located at. She gave me three names of possible companies, or owners: I Q Distributors Diversified Materials Services Diversified Medical Services Inc. The facility is located at: 2400 Central Parkway, Suite LP in Houston, Texas 77092. She is currently on location. Agency Action Taken: Region 6 RAM Inspector to go to the facility as soon as possible to conduct incident investigation & identify sources. Texas Incident Number: I-8428

* * * RETRACTION FROM L. HANSON TO P. SNYDER AT 1657 ON 9/4/07 * * * 

The NRC received the following information from the Agreement State of Texas via facsimile: On 08/23/07, the Agency received a telephone call from the individual who received the gauges from Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. (KBR) & was given the following information: The individual stated that on 03/03/06, he purchased a portion of the building at 2400 Central Parkway, Ste. L, Houston, Texas. The purchaser reported to the Agency that he was not aware that the portion of the building he just bought, Suite L, contained the alloy analyzers found by DSHS inspectors until he was recently contacted by the agency. He stated he thought he bought lab equipment only & was unaware that the building purchase included the alloy analyzers. The other suite, Suite P, is not owned by him & overseen by the initial individual contacted at the site by the agency's inspectors. He is not sure why this individual did not make the suite distinction with the inspectors nor contact him to let him know the building was being inspected. He contacted the agency's general licensing acknowledgement (GLA) division & was given the following information: These devices with Fe-55 and Cd-109 sources and no longer issued a GLA so anyone can possess these devices if transferred by manufacturer/distributor. A transfer is allowed if the devices are transferred in their physical location, which occurred when he bought the building. Additionally, the agency received documentation from the manufacturer that they removed the RAM sources from the two empty analyzers & shipped the analyzers back to KBR in 1997. The two analyzers which had very low-strength RAM sources were transferred in accordance with the above stated allowance. The purchaser asked if the agency could give him information on how he could dispose of the analyzers. The agency responded by forwarding information to the purchaser for possible contacts who could assist him with disposal. BASED ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION, THE AGENCY IS REQUESTING A RETRACTION OF THIS INCIDENT, SINCE IT IS NOW DEEMED NON-REPORTABLE. Notified R4DO (T. Pruett) and FSME (J. Davis). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

The licensee while transporting a Campbell Moisture Density Gauge S/N MC1391 from one jobsite to another in El Paso, TX, discovered upon arrival that the tailgate of the truck was down and the transport case with gauge were missing. The loss occurred within a sixteen (16) mile radius of the intersection of Hawkins Blvd. and Montana Ave. The licensee acknowledged to the TX Department of Health representative that the instrument had not been properly secured prior to transport. The gauge contains two (2) sources, i.e., 50 millicuries Am-241/Be and 10 millicuries Cs-137. The licensee informed local law enforcement and the TX Department of Health. TX Incident No. I-8338

• • • • UPDATE ON 5/17/06 AT 2250 EDT VIA E-MAIL FROM LATISCHA HANSON TO SANDIN ****

Incident # correction: It should be I-8337.

• • • • UPDATE ON 5/29/06 AT 2057 EDT FROM LATISCHA HANSON TO KNOKE ****

The licensee (RSO) contacted the TX Department of Health representative to indicate that a trucker who is presently in Chicago, IL., found the instrument. The RSO requested the trucker FedEx the gauge back to the licensee. When the State tried the trucker's phone number they received a message that the number is disconnected. No other identification concerning the trucker was available. Contacted NMSS (Janosko) and R4DO (Cain). Emailed ILTAB and Mexico.

• * * UPDATE PROVIDED FROM LATISCHA HANSON TO JEFF ROTTON AT 2110 EST ON 11/29/07 * * *

The State provided the following information via email: On November 24, 2007 at 3:08 pm CST, the Incident Investigation Program (IIP) was contacted by the local El Paso, Texas FBI during the State holiday office closure, that the (moisture density) gauge had been recovered by the local police department and retained for evidence. The individual had made a call to the local fire department reporting that his family may have been exposed to radiation from a piece of equipment on his property. The local fire department in turn contacted the local police department, who discovered it was the reported stolen gauge in May 2006. The local police department contacted the local FBI. The individual was questioned thoroughly by the FBI and finally admitted to having picked up the gauge over a year ago. The FBI asked if it was ok to return the gauge to the owner; IIP gave the ok. The FBI will contact the licensee owner to retrieve the gauge from them. The FBI agent reported the gauge was intact. It is still being decided if the individual will be prosecuted. On November 27, 2007 at 3:38 pm CST, IIP received a telephone call from the licensee asking if they could take possession of the gauge and asked if they had any more reporting requirements. They were given permission to take possession, asked to submit in writing to the licensing program that the gauge was found and to give information that gauge was checked and found to be intact. The licensee agreed. Notified R4DO(Pick), FSME EO (Rathbun), ILTAB (via email), and Mexico (via Fax). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injured someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

The State provided the following information via email: The (Texas) Department of State Health Services (DSHS), Radiation Control received written notification from (Name Deleted), Texas Regional RSO for IRISNDT, Inc. that one of its previous employee's received exposure in excess of 5 Rem annual dose. The RSO reports that while doing an update of radiation dose reports for all licensees' Texas employees, the Texas Regional RSO noted that a past employer exposure history was not recorded for a former employee (the radiographer) of the licensee. The RSO reviewed the personnel files for the individual and could not find a past exposure history from the record from the radiographer's previous employer. The Texas RSO contacted the Corporate RSO to see if he had a record for the individual. The Corporate RSO found an exposure history record and faxed it to the Texas RSO. The previous employer's record, H&G Inspection, (address deleted) reflected a dose of 3.918 Rem in the first 6.5 months of employment. The doses were compiled with IRISNDT's records and it was immediately noted that the radiographer had an accumulated dose in excess of 5 Rem. The Texas RSO called the former employee to notify him of the overexposure that same day of record discovery. The former employee stated that he thought the dose he had been assigned was not correct and that's why he did not inform the Texas RSO. It was determined through discussions with the radiographer that the radiographer has not worked since November 2005 and was informed that he cannot work in the industry until he talks to the DSHS. IRISNDT, Inc. stated they failed to check previous records and the radiographer failed to report (previous dose) to (IRISNDT). In the future IRISNDT, Inc. will provide a form for potential employees to complete pre-hire for dose records to be reviewed and the safety program administrator has been assigned the responsibility to call 2 times per week to follow-up on previous employer dose histories for new hires. Texas Incident No: I-8287

• * * UPDATE FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS (E-MAIL) TO HUFFMAN AT 1200 ON 2/6/06 * * *

The final Texas Department of State Health Services Radiation Branch report on this incident noted that the total annual expose received by the individual involved was 5.713 Rem. The exposure breakdown was 3.918 Rem for individual's previous employer and 1.795 Rem while the individual worked at IRISNDT. The R4DO (Nease) and NMSS (Morell) were notified.

The State provided the following information via email: The State of Texas received a call from the Radiation Safety Officer for Terra-Mar Inc. on Tuesday, November 15, 2005, reporting the theft of a moisture/density gauge, Troxler Model # 3430, Serial # 32220, with a 40 milliCurie AmBe source, Serial # 47-28552 and an 8 milliCurie Cs-137, Serial # 750-7360. The licensee went to the gauge storage area of the site on Monday, November 14, 2005, and discovered that the gauge was missing. The licensee checked with personnel to see if any one had removed it from the storage area. When no one acknowledged removing the gauge, the licensee contacted Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS), Dallas-Ft Worth Department of Public Safety, and the Irving Police Department that the gauge was possibly stolen. The licensee will send in the police report and a written statement to DSHS. The last leak test performed on the missing gauge was performed on July 9, 2005. Texas Report Number: I-8277

• * * UPDATE FROM S. SIMMONS TO J. KNOKE AT 13:28 EST ON 12/12/05.

The licensee provided more detail surrounding the missing Troxler gauges and added security measures for the storage area of other gauges. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for further information. The incident report No. from DFW Airport DPS is 050-5143. The DFW DPS is investigating the apparent theft and has assigned a detective to the case. A copy of the police report was sent to DSHS. On November 17, 2005, licensee installed an additional keyed padlock on the nuclear storage doors and placed a heavy duty chain and lock through the case handles of the remaining gauges. The licensee has also changed the combination code to the entry door of the building. Only the site RSO and one authorized user have access to the building and gauge storage area. Notified R4DO (Johnson) and NMSS (Morell)

• • • • UPDATE ON 02/01/06 AT 1500 VIA E-MAIL FROM S. SIMMONS TO MACKINNON *****

On Monday, January 30, 2006, I received a call from the RSO for Terra-Mar US Labs, informing the agency that an employee of the company had found the stolen gauge. The gauge was recovered at "First Cash Pawn" located at Wisdom Camp Rd., Duncanville, TX. The agency immediately responded by dispatching an inspector to verify that the gauge was in fact the property of the licensee. Once accomplished, the licensee was notified to recover the property. The gauge is now in possession of the licensee. Law enforcement officials are investigating the possibility of criminal prosecution. Case Close. R4DO (Runyan), NMSS EO (Greg Morell), TAS (e-mail) & MEXICO (e-mail) notified. Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

The State provided the following information via email: Texas Radiation Control received a telephone call from (the licensee's RSO) . The RSO was contacted by Landauer regarding an exposure to a 'film badge' in excess of 1,000 (one thousand) rads. The badge was being worn by (name deleted). His exposure for the previous quarter was 350 millirem and for 2004 he received a total exposure of 290 Mr. The badge had been returned for evaluation with 4 other badges, which had no problems with excessive exposure. (The individual) only performed four tracer study jobs during the monitoring period and worked with a 34 mCi Ir-192 source. (The RSO) believes the badge was not worn. The licensee will be requesting the exposure be deleted. Texas Incident Investigation Program has contacted the licensee and requested additional information. A written report will be submitted within 30 days. The Event has received no media attention. Texas Incident No.: I - 8242

• • • • • UPDATE ON 12/19/05 AT 1830 EST from Latischa M. Hanson (via e-mail) entered by MacKinnon ******

The licensee believes that the badge worn by (name deleted) during the first quarter of 2005 was intentionally exposed. The licensee states that the reported dose was in excess of the reporting capabilities of 1000 rad & concluded that the reported dose was not accurate. The licensee reported that (name deleted) terminated employee at the end of the first month of the quarterly monitoring period & that the employee worked with sealed sources during the first week & radiation work was performed afterward until time of termination. All jobs were short duration & neither the individual nor his single co-worker (supervisor) reported any unusual occurrences that would have resulted in a higher than normal dose. Based on the amount of the extremely high dose, the licensee concluded that the employee was not the recipient of 1000 rem (rad) dose & that the dose should be considered erroneous. Permanent dose record for (name deleted) reported by the licensee is as follows: 1st quarter 2005 - 0.349 rem; 2nd quarter 2005 - 0.100 rem. Licensee corrective action: "No corrective actions taken or planned since reported dose appears to be incorrect. The licensee has calculated a dose of 0.100 rem for the 2nd quarter & consequently assigned this to (name deleted) permanent personnel monitoring record. This is based on the individual's previous cumulative six-month period dose of 0.593 rem, which averages to (approx) 0.100 rem/month. R4DO (Shaffer) & NMSS EO (Essig) notified.