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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 46624 | 18 February 2011 09:00:00 | This report is being made per paragraphs 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address an actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' on 12/29/10 while performing a Diesel Generator shutdown. Emergency AC Electrical Power system including Emergency Diesel Generators is a system named in 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(6). Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' was coasting down following a normal shutdown in accordance with steps in a routine surveillance test procedure. A manual reset was performed prior to verification that the generator had stopped rolling causing it to return to idle speed and continue to run. A procedure compliance error occurred during the conduct of the test. The control room individual did not request verification that the diesel generator had stopped rolling prior to pushing the reset pushbuttons. This is considered an INVALID signal with respect to 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). However the system was not fully removed from service (i.e. the diesel was not considered to be in a testing mode at the time of the event). The re-start only affected Emergency Diesel Generator 'A'. Specific information required per NUREG-1022: a. The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: The specific train(s) .and system(s) was Emergency Diesel Generator 'A'. The 'B' train was not affected by this event. b. Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: The actuation was considered complete (i.e. all necessary components responded to the reset signal as expected under the actual field conditions). c. Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' started and operated successfully until secured by Operations personnel. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 44108 | 31 March 2008 10:50:00 | At or about 0800 on 3/31/08 it was reported that a petroleum sheen was observed in the parking lot headed for the creek. Upon investigation from the responding spill team and Maintenance, the source of the sheen was found to be coming from an employee's vehicle. It was a very minor drip of petroleum (less than 1/2 cup) that was pushed by the rain to the soil and storm catch basin. A boom was put in place to avoid the sheen from entering the creek. The parking lot and soil were cleaned and a catch device was placed under the vehicle. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) - Avon Spill Unit- was notified and assigned spill number 0751599 to the event. No further action is required. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 43473 | 4 July 2007 02:42:00 | Failure of main control board annunciator panels A, B, C, and D occurred at 0158 hours. At that time the control room had just commenced a load reduction to repair the turbine control valve #3. The load reduction was terminated at the time of the annunciator panel failure. Reactor power is 98.5%. Unusual Event EAL is 7.3.1 RCS Pressure is 2235 psig RCS Temperature is 573 degrees The plant is currently stable and holding power. The Plant Process Computer remains operable monitoring at power parameters. The licensee has commenced an investigation to determine the cause of failure related to the power supply for the affected annunciator panels. The licensee informed both State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee exited the Unusual Event at 1542 EDT on 07/04/07. All repairs have been completed, successful post maintenance test is complete, and all annunciator panels have been restored to operable condition. A blown fuse was discovered on the AA panel flasher card. The flasher cards for the AA panel and the A panel have been replaced. Two separate annunciator cards in the D panel have also been replaced. The licensee informed both State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Rogge), NRREO (Lubinski), IRD (Cruz), R1 RA (Collins), NRR ET (Dyer), DHS (Frost), and FEMA (Dwight). |
| ENS 43182 | 23 February 2007 15:55:00 | On Friday 2/23/07 at approximately 13:36 EST the Ontario, NY Volunteer Fire Department arrived on site at the Ginna Training Center in response to a report of natural gas leak The report was made to the local gas utility by an employee of the facility. This report was not made through the normal channel of control room communications. Per the local gas utility response procedure, they notify the 911 Emergency call center, if their response time is greater than 30 minutes. The local television media responded to the site based on the 911 radio transmission. The Fire Department left site at 13:57 hours. The gas utility found a minor leak on the gas meter outside the building. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and is expected to discuss this incident with the media. |
| ENS 43128 | 28 January 2007 00:02:00 | On January 27, 2007 at approximately 2040 hours an automatic reactor trip occurred. The cause of the trip was Over Temperature Delta T (2/4). All systems functioned as designed. All control rods inserted on the trip. Decay heat removal is via condenser steam dump and Auxiliary Feedwater. The initial cause of the trip appears to be from a loss of load due to a turbine electro-hydraulic system issue. This is still under investigation. RCS Temperature is 547 Degrees F and stable RCS Pressure is 2235 psig and stable Both pressurizer PORVs momentarily opened and then closed during the transient. For 8Hr Non Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) RPS actuation occurred. Auxiliary Feed Water actuation occurred. There was no testing or maintenance in progress at the time of the transient. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 42909 | 16 October 2006 11:00:00 | At 0520 hours on 10/16/06 with the plant in Mode 6, with containment shutdown purge system in operation and core alterations in progress, a Control Room Operator noted that Main Control Board annunciator L-4 'Safeguard DC Failure (Containment Isolation) CI and (Containment Ventilation Isolation) CVI Logic' was illuminated. ITS LCO 3.9.3 c. 2. requires that 'Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either (1) closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or (2) capable of being closed by an operable Containment Ventilation Isolation System.' ITS LCO 3.3.5 Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation Table 3.3.5-1 requires that Function 1, 'Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays' be operable during core alterations and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. Contrary to the requirements DC power was removed from the Containment Ventilation Logic and Actuation Relays on Friday 10/13/06. On Saturday 10/14/06 reactor vessel head lift was performed. Between Sunday 10/15/06 from 1559 until Monday at 0514 the movement of fuel and core alterations in containment were conducted. All fuel movement and core alterations were stopped at 0514 on 10/16/06. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 42892 | 9 October 2006 10:52:00 | On October 9, 2006 at or about 0400 EDT it was discovered that the containment Sump B grating had been covered with temporary lead shielding. The shielding was placed as part of refueling outage activities in containment. Investigation has revealed that the lead shielding was put in place at about 0230 hours. All lead was removed from the grating. This was confirmed by the Outage Control Center at 0930. At the time of discovery the plant was in MODE 4 with RCS pressure of 315 psig, RCS Temperature of 337 �F. The plant entered MODE 5 at 08:15 hours on 10/9/06. The B containment sump is the suction point for the A and B RHR pumps. When required, the RHR pumps also provide suction flow to the Safety Injection pumps. The containment sump is require to be operable in modes 1-4. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41558 | 1 April 2005 16:30:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax (licensee text in quotes): With the plant in mode 6 and refueling operations in progress, a loss of offsite power circuit 751 occurred. This loss of power caused an undervoltage condition on safeguards busses 16 and 17 and an automatic start of Emergency Diesel Generator 1B. Both of these busses were subsequently energized by the diesel. Refueling operations in progress were immediately halted. Core cooling was momentarily interrupted and restored upon safeguards bus reenergization. The spent fuel pool cooling loop in operation was powered from the opposite train and hence was not interrupted. RCS temperature was maintained at 74 degrees Fahrenheit and spent fuel pool temperature was also at 74 degrees Fahrenheit throughout the event. This partial loss of power was due to a substation transformer fault (one of two offsite power sources were lost). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |