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At 0750 EDT on October 1, 2014, the Shift Manager was notified that site Information Technology (IT) personnel were being mobilized to investigate a potential voice and network loss at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Joint Information Center (JIC). Site IT personnel were notified by offsite IT resources at 0727 EDT on October 1, 2014 of the issue that was first identified by IT monitoring software at 0124 on October 1, 2014. The site IT personnel that responded to the EOF and JIC reported to site Control Room and Emergency Preparedness (EP) personnel at 0845 that connectivity to the Exelon network and the internet was unavailable at both the EOF and the JIC. This loss of connectivity would prevent the ability of the EOF Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel to directly monitor key plant parameters via the site's Plant Process Computer (including the Site Parameter Display System) and other network-based plant parameter display systems. Site IT and EP personnel determined that the following communications equipment was not impacted by the connectivity issue: - Dedicated Offsite Agency Phones (primary method for contacting state and local agencies) - Commercial Phones and dedicated bridge line (primary method for contacting other site Emergency Response Facilities) - FTS-2001 Phones (e.g., ENS and HPN lines) - ERDS Additionally, EP personnel verified with Dose Assessment Office personnel that dose assessment and dose monitoring functions from the EOF could still be performed without delay. Site IT personnel reported to the Control Room at 1135 that connectivity to the Exelon network and the internet had been restored to a fully functional status. While site and fleet IT personnel continue to address and verify all appropriate corrective actions have been taken to prevent recurrence of the connectivity issue, the site has employed appropriate compensatory measures to ensure that the verbal transmission of key plant parameters from the site (Technical Support Center or Control Room) to the EOF is recognized and maintained. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * RETRACTION FROM TIM HUBER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1208 EDT ON 10/27/2014 * * *

This update retracts Event Report #50502, which reported that a loss of connectivity to the Exelon network and internet at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Joint Information Center (JIC) had impacted the ability of staff in these facilities to directly monitor key plant parameters via the site's Plant Process Computer and other network-based plant parameter display systems. Subsequent to the identification of this event, further investigation by site and fleet staff determined that adequate direction was included in applicable Emergency Response Organization (ERO) procedures to respond to data display system failures of this type. Specifically, the checklist (procedure) for the Operations Communicator in the EOF provided adequate direction for this ERO member to obtain required plant data from the Operations Communicator located in the Control Room via alternate methods (e.g., over the phone - phone lines remained functional throughout the time that the loss of computer connectivity condition existed). Therefore, this event did not result in a major loss of emergency assessment capability and was not reportable to the NRC under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Bickett) and Cyber Assessment Team via email.

Calvert Cliffs will be performing planned maintenance to the U-1 Plant Process Computer to install isolation transformers. This maintenance window was expected to start at 2100 (EST) today, 2/26/2012, but the U-1 Plant Process Computer failed at 1546 this afternoon and it was decided to commence the planned maintenance window at that time versus spending resources to attempt recovery of the computer for just a short time period. The planned maintenance window is expected to be 54 hours long and end February 28, around 2300. This will impact the Unit 1 data dissemination to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), TSC Computer. PI (Plant Trending Software) and ERDS will also be out of service for both Unit-1 and Unit-2. Should an emergency be declared during this period, the Control Room will continue to have the capability to retrieve plant data inputs to assess plant conditions and perform core damage assessment. Control Room Emergency Response Organization personnel will use backup methods already captured in emergency response procedures to disseminate plant parameter data to the effected Emergency Response Facilities and NRC during the plant data network outage. MIDAS (Meteorological Data) will continue to be operational at the site. Applicable Reporting Requirement: 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) (xiii); 8 Hour report. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 1209 EST ON 03/01/12 FROM JAY GAINES TO S. SANDIN * * *

At 1000 (EST) this morning planned maintenance was completed to the Unit 1 plant process computer. All plant assessment capabilities have been restored. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Ferdas).

At 04:05 hours EST, on February 17, 2009, the Plant Process Computer System was removed from service to perform a planned maintenance on the inverter power supply. The plant computer provides monitoring capability for the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The expected duration of plant computer inoperability is approximately 16 hours. The loss of the plant computer requires alternate methods, as described in plant procedures, to be used. Therefore, appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications and communications can still be made, if required, during the time that the plant computer is inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability or offsite communications capability. As previously stated, alternate means remain available to assess plant conditions, make notifications and accomplish required communications, as necessary. An additional notification will be provided when plant computer operability is restored. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * UPDATE AT 1600 EST ON 02/17/09 FROM KENT MILLS TO S. SANDIN * * *

The SPDS was restored at 1545 EST. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Jackson).

On December 8, 2007 at 0050, during plant maneuvers to return Unit Two from 84% to 100% reactor power following main turbine control valve testing, the two-minute instantaneous thermal power was inadvertently increased above the accident analysis thermal power limit of 2735.1 thermal megawatts while adjusting main turbine load to maintain Reactor Coolant temperature on program. The maximum power level attained was 2741 thermal megawatts. This is a potentially unanalyzed condition. Prompt operator action was taken to restore reactor power to within limits. Reactor thermal power was restored to within limits (below 2735.1 thermal megawatts) eight minutes later at 0058. The two-minute instantaneous thermal power was restored to below 2700 thermal megawatts (100% rated thermal power) at 0105. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID SUPANICH TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 12/27/07 @ 1243 EST VIA EMAIL * * *

Based on the results of an evaluation of the event, the licensee concluded that Unit 2 operated at a maximum power level of 2741 MWth (101.5 percent rated thermal power (RTP)). The maximum analyzed steady-state reactor core power levels, including uncertainties, are 102 percent of RTP or 2754 MWth. The unit was not in an unanalyzed condition. Therefore, this event is not reportable. Based on this evaluation, the associated non-emergency notification made on December 8, 2007, is retracted. Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Perry).