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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 49652 | 18 December 2013 13:01:00 | NRC Operations Center notification for planned routine preventative maintenance on the Technical Support Center HVAC. Expected start of the preventative maintenance is 12/18/13 at 1300 EST. Planned completion is 12/19/13 at 0100 EST. This maintenance renders the TSC non-functional. The planned TSC alternate location will be the Control Room. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
At 1405 EDT, maintenance was completed, and the TSC was declared functional. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Freeman). |
| ENS 48764 | 18 February 2013 03:19:00 | This is an non-emergency event notification to the NRCOC in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) (four hour notification) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid Engineered Safeguards (ESF) actuation due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) initiation (eight hour notification). On 2/18/2013 at 0055 Unit 3 commenced a unit shutdown due to high # 1 seal leak-off on the 3A Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). At 0129 3A RCP #1 seal leak-off exceeded operating limits. Unit 3 reactor was manually tripped. Auxiliary feedwater actuated as designed based on steam generator levels as a result of the trip. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3 and stable. No complications were noted as a result of the reactor trip. Steam generator levels are being returned to normal level following the reactor trip. All other plant systems functioned as designed during and after the reactor trip. 3A RCP high #1 seal leak-off is under investigation. All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat was removed by AFW to the steam generators out the atmospheric reliefs. There was no primary to secondary leakage. Electrical buses are being supplied via offsite power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48289 | 8 September 2012 13:12:00 | FPL (Florida Power & Light) previously reported (EN 47819) that a portion of the Turkey Point Technical Support Center (TSC) Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning System (HVAC) was deenergized for maintenance during two extended periods. FPL concluded that due to the condition, the TSC may not have been fully functional under every postulated design basis accident scenario. As a result of further investigation, FPL has been unable to validate the historical TSC design basis assumptions for habitability for an indeterminate period in the past. Among the issues identified include (a) seized HVAC isolation damper, (b) unsecured HVAC balancing damper, and (c) voids in the concrete shield wall. Additionally, while the original design basis did not provide for any unfiltered air inleakage, the HVAC system was constructed and maintained to ensure only that a positive pressure could be achieved. FPL has addressed the TSC issues. A new dose analysis and recent tracer gas test have established TSC compliance with the current licensing basis. Therefore, the TSC is fully functional at this time. This report is made for historical conditions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48096 | 12 July 2012 02:30:00 | The Turkey Point Nuclear Plant will be performing the semi-annual HVAC inspection of the TSC Building on 7/12/2012. The work is scheduled to start at 0500 EDT and complete at 1500 EDT. The projected non-functional time is 10 hours. The Emergency Response Organization duty team members will be informed to respond to alternate locations if activation is required during that period. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to loss of an emergency response facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The maintenance on the TSC has been completed and the TSC was declared operable at 1535 EDT on 7/12/12. Notified R2DO (Calle). |
| ENS 46362 | 25 October 2010 22:30:00 | This report is made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as a condition resulting in a serious degradation of the Containment liner. During a visual inspection on 10/22/10, corrosion was found in the containment sump liner on Unit 3, A more detailed inspection was performed on 10/24/10 after the corroded area was cleaned. Evaluation of the inspection results has determined that the corrosion is greater than allowed by the ASME Code, including through wall areas, and requires repair. At this time, it is not known whether any leakage caused by the through-wall condition would have resulted in exceeding the containment allowed leakage limit. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 5 preparing to return to service following refueling. The corroded areas will be repaired prior to entering Mode 4. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector |