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This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to notification of other government agencies at 15:30 on 8-25-06. Florida Power & Light Company (PPL) has identified a small amount of tritium in a settling pond at its St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Site. The level of tritium detected in the settling pond, 3.0 E-6 microCuries per milliliter (uCi/ml), is well below the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) drinking water standards of 2.0 E-5 uCi/ml and is less than two per cent of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) safe standards for tritium that apply to water in an unrestricted area. The source of the tritium is under investigation. The most likely source was from a leaking drain valve off a recirculating line associated with the Refueling Water Storage Tank. The leak has been stopped. This discovery presents no health or safety risk to employees or the public.

The St. Lucie Plant does not have drinking water wells on site and the plant

does not impact drinking water off site. The settling pond is a part of the normal drainage process at St. Lucie. Any water that is released from the settling pond is sampled for radioactivity and the results of any findings are included in a Radioactive Effluent Release Report that is filed annually with the NRC. Monitoring of the settling pond is conducted on a monthly basis. The previous measurements of the pond water on July 20, 2006 indicated that there was no tritium present. Notification to the State of Florida and St. Lucie and Martin county agencies has been reported in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Institute's voluntary reporting initiative. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

On 5/18/05 at 20:59 the 1A3 4160 V safety related A.C. bus inadvertently de-energized and the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) automatically started and loaded onto the bus. The inadvertent de-energization of the 1A3, 4160 V bus appears to have resulted from testing of the 4160 V under voltage relays. Currently, normal power has been restored to the 1A3, 4160 V bus and the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator has been secured. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) to be completed within 8 hours as a safety systems actuation of the 1A3, 4160 V under voltage relaying and inadvertent start and load of the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY THE LICENSEE (HURCHALLA) TO NRC (HELD) AT 2207 EDT ON 5/19/05 * * *

On 5/18/05 at 20:59 the 1A3 4,160 KV safety related AC bus inadvertently de-energized and the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) automatically started and loaded onto the bus. This event was initiated during the performance of a plant surveillance 1-OSP-100.07, to test the 1A3 4,160 KV Bus Under Voltage Relay. The 1A EDG loaded and carried the 1A3 bus. The 1B3 4,160 KV bus was unaffected and the "B" side power remained energized. This update is to provide the following additional information identified during the follow up investigation. This update is to identify that HVS-1B, Containment Fan Cooler, did not start as expected after the 1A EDG automatically loaded on the 1A3 4,160 KV Bus. The HVS-1A and HVS-1B were both load shed from the bus prior to closure of the 1A EDG output breaker. The HVS-1A did start as expected following closure of the EDG output breaker. The HVS-1B is on the three (3) second load block for the 1A EDG to restart, but did not start. A Root Cause Team has been formed to identify the cause of the initiating event and the auto-start failure of HVS-1B. A Condition Report was generated and a troubleshooting plan has been developed to determine the cause of the initiating event and failure of the HVS-1B to automatically restart. The 1B3 4,160 KV safety related AC bus and associated EDG were not affected by this event and remained operable during and following the event. Troubleshooting for the subject failed equipment is ongoing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R2DO (Ogle) was notified.