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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 44433 | 22 August 2008 14:36:00 | Plant Technical Specifications, Appendix B, Section 4.1, Unusual or Important Environmental Events, states that the NRC Operations Center will be notified within 72 hours as described in 10 CFR 50.72 for an unanticipated or emergency discharge of waste water or chemical substances. This notification is due to an unanticipated emergency discharge of storm drain waste water beginning 8/20/08 at approximately 0600 due to Tropical Storm Fay. A 30 day letter detailing the event to the NRC is also required. On 8/20/08, St Lucie Plant water levels in all of the plant storm water basins and Unit 1 Condenser Pit experienced a significant level increase received due to approximately 15 inches of precipitation from Tropical Storm Fay. Over the next 24 hours the site pumped approximately 23 million gallons of water from the storm water basins into the intake canal from an approved outfall (008). The water level in the basin has decreased 8.7 feet to 6.7 feet. Pumping activities will continue until we reach a level of 5 feet in the pond. The total estimated amount of water expected to be discharged from outfall-008 is 40 million gallons. Chemistry obtained samples from the storm basin and Condenser Pit both and the samples were determined not to contain radioactivity. The non-radiological analysis will be forthcoming from an offsite laboratory (the FPL 45th street lab), however no oil sheen was observed prior to any discharge. The lab results will be included in the 30 day NRC letter detailing the event. The DEP ( Department of Environemntal Protection) was contacted and a verbal request was made and consent received to pump water from the U- I condenser pit to the intake canal. A final report will be sent to the DEP when pumping is concluded identifying total volumes and water profiles. The Plant NPDES permit does not regulate the volume of water discharged from 008. As a result of the Unit 1 Condenser Pit flooding, secondary Condensate and Feedwater chemistry levels sodium and chloride levels increased to Plant Action Level 3 conditions which require the Unit to be shutdown to at least Mode 2 conditions. Due to End of Cycle conditions and Xenon build-in, the Unit was shutdown and is currently in Mode 3. The Turbine was manually tripped and the Control Rods were driven to All Rods In, i.e., there was no reactor trip or RPS / AFAS actuation. Residual reactor heat is being removed by Atmospheric Dump Valves and Auxiliary Feedwater is providing makeup to the S/Gs. Repairs are being implemented to prevent Condenser Pit flooding and secondary inleakage. Unit 2 operations was not affected by this event. Off-Site power remained available during this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 44268 | 4 June 2008 21:10:00 | On 6/4/2008 at 17:30 hrs an unplanned manual reactor trip was initiated on St. Lucie Unit 2 from 100% power due to a trip of the 2B Heater Drain pump leading to a trip of the 2A Main Feedwater Pump and decreasing S/G levels. The Reactor was manually tripped due to decreasing Steam Generator levels. Following the reactor trip, EOP-1, Standard Post Trip Actions, and EOP-2, Reactor Trip Recovery procedures were completed and Unit 2 was stabilized in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted. The S/G Safety Valves lifted and the last valve reseated at 950 psig. Feedwater to the S/G was supplied by the 2B Main FW Pumps and then the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. Unit 2 electrical requirements are provided from offsite power. All safe shutdown equipment operated as expected. There were no major equipment failures. Unit 1 was not affected by this event. The Grid is stable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 43874 | 29 December 2007 07:54:00 | At 2320, on 12/28/07, a Reactor Startup was commenced. At 0025, on 12/29/07 Subgroup #15, of Regulating Group #3, was placed on the hold bus. Placing the Subgroup on the hold bus was a pre-planned action that was briefed prior to the reactor startup, in accordance with an approved interim engineering disposition. The interim engineering disposition was written and approved on 12/28/07 for concerns over CEA #1, of Subgroup #15, dropping into the core unexpectedly. Subgroup #15, of Regulating Group #3, contains five CEA's (CEA # 60, 62, 64, 66 and 1). At 0047, all Regulating Group CEA's, with the exception of Regulating Group #5, were placed at the Upper Electrical Limit (136 inches withdrawn). Regulating Group #5 was at 120 inches withdrawn in preparation for diluting to criticality. At 0107, the dilution to criticality was commenced. At 0131, all 5 CEA's in Subgroup #15 slipped into the core approximately 20 inches. A manual reactor trip was then ordered by the unit supervisor. 2-EOP-1, 'Standard Post Trip Actions' was then performed. The unit was borated to shutdown boron concentration. All Safety Functions were met satisfactorily and 2-EOP-1 was exited. The unit was in Mode 3 approaching Mode 2 at the time of the trip. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, Hot Standby. Reactor coolant pump heat is being removed using the atmospheric steam dumps. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 43580 | 19 August 2007 22:19:00 | On 08/18/2007 at 16:03 EDT a Planned Manual Reactor Trip was initiated on Unit 2 based on increased unidentified RCS leakage. The RCS leakage had increased over a two day period and surpassed the hard limit of 0.28 gpm established by a plant Operational Decision Making (ODM) plan. The downpower was initiated on 08/18/07 at 10:35 EDT from 100% power and proceeded in a controlled manner to 25% power. The Feedwater Control System was maintained in the automatic mode. Station Power was transferred by procedure from the Auxiliary to the Startup Transformers. The reactor was manually tripped at 16:03 EDT. Following the reactor trip, EOP-1, Standard Post Trip Actions, and EOP-2, Reactor Trip Recovery procedures were completed without contingencies and the unit was stabilized in Mode 3. Decay heat was removed by the Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS) to the condenser. The Steam Generators were fed by the MFW System and levels remained above Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation (AFAS) setpoint. There were no significant equipment failures identified post trip. The plant was cooled down and entered Mode 5 on 8/19/07 at 15:09 EDT. On 8/19/07 at 17:00 EDT while in Mode 5, a Containment walkdown confirmed the 2B1 RCP Seal injection line to be the only active RCS leakage source. The leak is unisolable from the RCS and is located at or adjacent to a socket weld on the 3/4" Class 1 Schedule 160 seal injection line. Removal of obstructions and insulation must occur before the specific details of the leak can be identified. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). Additional investigation is being perform to determine the detailed configuration of the leak and the root cause. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 43410 | 6 June 2007 18:10:00 | On 6/06/07 at 13:10 EDT while performing a surveillance to verify the position of administratively locked valves for Containment and Shield Building Integrity, two manual Containment Isolation valves were found Locked Open, versus the required Locked Closed position. The valves were restored to the Locked Closed position at 13:30 EDT of the same day. The subject valves, V18794 and V18796, provide Service Air (a non-safety class system) to the Containment during Mode 5 and 6 conditions through Containment Penetration #8. The subject valves are required to be returned to Locked Closed prior to entering Mode 4 in accordance with the Plant Technical Specifications 3.6.1.1 for Containment Integrity and plant procedures. The valves are to be verified in the Locked Closed position once every 31 days per Administrative Procedure 1-0010123 Appendix E, which was last performed on 5/09/07. Unit 1 exited Mode 5 and entered Mode 4 on 5/20/07 following a refueling outage and is currently in Mode 1 at 100% power. It is assumed the valves have been incorrectly positioned since entering Mode 4. The Service Air System is intact and pressurized at approximately 110 psig. There is no open path from Containment to the outside atmosphere. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), based on principal safety barriers being seriously degraded. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 42429 | 19 March 2006 17:44:00 | On 3/19/06 at approximately 1240, the U2 ERDADS computer failed and stopped providing updated plant data to the Unit 2 and Technical Support Center Operator Consoles, leaving the displays essentially static. Investigation of the failure mode is ongoing and attempts to restore the ERDADS to normal are in progress. A similar event occurred on 3/16/06, EN# 42425. Loss of the ERDADS output for greater than one hour is reportable as a major loss of assessment and communication capability under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The ERDADS computer has been restored but the licensee does not considered it fully operable. Vendor is coming in on 3/20/06 to try to correct the ERDADS computer problem. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this by the licensee.
ERDADS system is restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (C. Evans) |
| ENS 42390 | 6 March 2006 14:42:00 | On 03/06/06 at 10:40 (EST) a plant operator was dispatched to investigate an unexpected Annunciator D-43, 'TURBINE LUBE OIL RESERVIOR LEVEL HIGH/LOW'. He reported the alarm was a valid low reservoir level (for the main turbine). A contractor painter had inadvertently bumped open a drain valve on the Kaydon turbine oil filter system. The valve has been closed. The spilled oil was contained within the Unit 1 Turbine Lube Oil Secondary Containment Structure. The volume of spilled oil has been calculated to be approximately 200 gallons. The Florida Department of Environmental Protection. (DEP) was notified on 3/6/06 at 12:20 EST in accordance with plant procedures for oil spills greater than 25 gallons on a pervious surface. No equipment damage was incurred due to the loss of reservoir level. Actions to retrieve the spilled oil are in progress. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi.) due to the notification of the Offsite Agency - DEP, The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 42132 | 9 November 2005 21:43:00 | On 11/09/2005 at 18:35 hours, it was identified that St Lucie Units 1 & 2 had lost both of the computer trains associated with Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System (ERDADS). This is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Other means to monitor critical data and communicate this data to government agencies exist in each unit. The system was returned to an operable status at 19:45 hrs. The cause of the computer problem was software related. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41944 | 24 August 2005 23:43:00 | On 8/24/2005, at 2302 an Unusual Event was declared at St. Lucie Plant based upon the 2300 EDT Tropical Storm Katrina Forecast/Advisory. A Hurricane Warning has been issued for the southeast Florida coast from Vero Beach southward to Florida City. A Hurricane Warning means that Hurricane conditions are expected with the warning area within the next 24 hours. The St. Lucie Plant falls within this Hurricane Warning area. The licensee entered the Unusual Event based on EAL '5-B.' Currently Unit 2 'B' Train of Component Cooling Water is out if service for planned maintenance. The licensee notified the state and the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE FROM J. ABERNETHY TO ROTTON AT 1824 EDT ON 08/25/05 * * * The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1815. Updated National Weather Service data removed the hurricane warning in the area. The licensee notified state and local governments. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ayers), NRR EO (Kuo), IRD Manager (Wilson), FEMA (Erwin), and DHS (Haselton). |
| ENS 41628 | 23 April 2005 14:58:00 | On April 23, 2005, at 10:45 hours St. Lucie Plant last the ERDADS NRC Data Link capability. The System Engineer reports that the ERDADS periphery switch failed to swap to the "A" CPU from the "B" CPU on a auto failover that occurred at 10:45. The switch has been manually swapped and the Data Link has been restored. A work order has been prepared to investigate and repair the cause for this failure. The NRC resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 40403 | 20 December 2003 13:00:00 | On December 20, 2003, at 0949 hours, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a loss of excitation of the turbine generator. All plant safety functions were maintained throughout the event. The plant was stabilized in Mode 3. All plant safety systems responded normally with the exception of the 2C Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (steam driven) which tripped on mechanical overspeed. The 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (electric driven) functioned normally to restore the 2A and 2B Steam Generator levels. Post trip system anomalies include RCS Letdown isolated, Steam Generator Blowdown isolation valves closed, Control Room ventilation system swapped to recirculation mode, and the Fuel Handling Building ventilation system swapped to the Shield Building. An Emergency Response Team has been formed to review these conditions prior to plant restart. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to the automatic RPS Reactor Trip. All controls inserted properly. Decay heat is being removed using the turbine bypass valves. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
This update is provided to include the 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) notification criterion for the auxiliary feedwater actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified., Reg 2 RDO(Fredrickson) was informed. |
| ENS 40375 | 4 December 2003 20:14:00 | On December 4, 2003, at 1605 hours, a down power was initiated due to a failing bearing on the 2A Condensate Pump. The pump bearing was hot and smoking. The plant fire team was deployed as a precautionary action. Due to continued degradation of the Pump bearing, a Manual Reactor Trip was initiated at approximately 60% power. Feed to the 2A and 2B Steam Generators was maintained via the 2B Main Feedwater Pump. All plant safety systems responded normally and plant safety functions were maintained throughout the event. The Plant was stabilized In Mode 3. Plant post trip anomalies include Steam Generator Blowdown isolation valves closed, Control Room ventilation system swapped to recirculation mode, the Fuel Handling Building ventilation system swapped to the Shield Building, and it was necessary to take Steam Bypass Control System to manual. An Emergency Response Team was formed to review these conditions prior to plant restart. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to the manual initiation of the RPS Reactor Trip. All control rods fully inserted into the reactor on the trip. The emergency diesel generators are available and the offsite electrical grid is in a normal configuration. No safety relief valves or power operated relief valves were known to have actuated during this event. St. Lucie Unit 1 was not affected and continues to operate in mode 1 at 100% rated thermal power. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |