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The following was received from the Utah Department of Environmental Quality via email: On April 18, 2022, Licensee personnel reported a strong fuel smell coming from a recent excavation associated with a new facility under construction. The excavations for sumps extended into the groundwater and were not included on the conditionally approved plans. The smell triggered an investigation where groundwater samples were collected for both chemical and radiological analysis. One sample indicated a concentration of 12,000 pCi/L of uranium (preliminary findings). The presence of uranium in the groundwater was unanticipated. Subsequently, the Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control has communicated to the licensee to characterize the nature and extent of the contamination. The Division is waiting for additional information from the licensee. Event Report ID No.: UT220003

• * * UPDATE AT 1612 EDT ON MAY 16, 2022, FROM JALYNN KNUDSEN TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

The following update was received from the Utah Department of Environmental Quality (the agency) via email: On April 18, 2022, (Licensee) personnel reported a strong fuel smell coming from a recent excavation associated with a new facility under construction. The (Licensee) did not anticipate encountering groundwater at the depth of excavation. Upon encountering the groundwater and observing a hydrocarbon odor, the Licensee collected groundwater samples for both organic and radiological analysis. The preliminary screening of one sample indicated a potentially high concentration of uranium. The preliminary result of the analysis was reported to the agency with the intent to conduct additional confirmatory work. The Licensee contends that the initial high concentrations were in error due to improper analytical methodology. These results were presented to the agency prior to confirmation. Results of further investigation by the Licensee indicate that the contaminant was thorium, not uranium, and that all radionuclides were below detection limits. The agency collected confirmatory samples for analysis and is awaiting results of both organic and radiological analysis. The Licensee is preparing an investigation plan to fully characterize the nature and extent of the contamination. Event Report ID No.: UT220003 (updated) Notified R4DO (Gepford) and NMSS Events Notification (email).

EN Revision Imported Date : 1/10/2020 AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - HIGH DOSE RATE APPLICATOR DISLODGED The following was received from the PA Department Bureau of Radiation Protection (DEP) via fax: On December 16, 2019, the medical physicist for the licensee verbally reported that during an HDR (high dose rate) treatment using a Varian Model VariSource IX with a Tandem & Ovoid applicator, the applicator was found dislodged at the end of the treatment period. This was fraction 4 of 5 planned fractions. It is unknown at this time how long the applicator was not in the planned position or what caused it to move. The prescribed dose was 600 cGy from a 5.126 Ci Iridium-192 source. No further information is available at this time. The DEP will update this event as soon as more information is provided. Event Report ID No: PA190029 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

• * * UPDATE ON 1/9/20 AT 1:17 PM FROM JOHN CHIPPO TO KARL DIEDERICH * * *

The following information was received from the Agreement State via fax: The patient was seen on 12/27/2019, 12/30/2019, and 1/6/2020 for follow-up appointments. Observed skin effects were described as 'moist desquamation' due to the applicator being dislodged from the vaginal canal and positioned against the skin. The patient is being treated with Silvadene topical cream and will be followed up with regular skin checks. Based on the evidence observed, the licensee assumes that the applicator was against the skin long enough to deliver a skin dose in the range of 10-30 Gy. This dose makes the event a potential Abnormal Occurrence. The Department has performed a reactive inspection and continues to investigate the event. Notified R1DO (Schroeder) and NMSS group (via e-mail).

EN Revision Text: PLANNED LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT At 0800 CST on November 3, 2019, Comanche Peak began a planned modification on the Unit 2 Plant Computer System. During this modification, the ability to perform emergency assessment in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be impacted. Since the ability to perform emergency assessment is not expected to be restored within 72 hours, this is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a loss of emergency assessment capability. During this modification, the Control Room will continue to have the ability to perform emergency assessment. If an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency is declared during this modification, communicators dedicated to performing emergency assessment will be stationed in the Control Room, TSC, and EOF. The Plant Computer System modification is scheduled to be completed on November 24, 2019 and a follow-up ENS notification will be made once the Unit 2 Plant Computer System is declared functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

• * * UPDATE FROM MATT KARL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1104 EST ON 12/10/19 * * *

Unit 2 Plant Computer System has returned to service at 0756 CST on 12/10/19. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Groom).

At 1106 CDT Braidwood Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to lowering steam generator water levels following closure of the 1B steam generator feed water regulating valve.

The cause of the 1B steam generator feedwater regulating valve failing closed is unknown at this time and is under investigation.

Both trains of auxiliary feedwater started automatically following the reactor trip to maintain steam generator water levels.

All systems responded as expected with the exception of intermediate range nuclear instrument N-36 which was identified as being undercompensated following the reactor trip. Both source range nuclear instruments were manually energized in accordance with station procedures. Steam generator power operated relief valves lifted momentarily and reseated as designed in response to the secondary transient due to the reactor trip. The main steam dump valves are in service to the main condenser to provide heat sink cooling. The plant is being maintained at normal operating pressure and temperature. AC power is being provided by offsite power with the diesel generators in stand by and all safety systems available. There is no impact to Unit 2. This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a RPS actuation, 4 hour notification, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system, 8 hour notification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

EN Revision Text: CONTAINMENT PENETRATION DISCOVERED NOT ISOLATED At 2115 CDT on 9/5/2019, an inside containment test connection and inoperable outside containment isolation valve were discovered to be open for a containment air sample penetration. This resulted in the containment penetration not being isolated. The inside containment test connection was closed at 2322 CDT on 9/5/2019.

This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * UPDATE FROM PAUL BURTON TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1342 EST ON 11/7/19 * * *

This event was originally reported on September 6, 2019 under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Upon completion of the investigation of the event, it was determined that the event had insignificant safety consequences because the containment breach was disconnected from the Reactor Coolant System by a series of closed valves for the duration of the event. Additionally, the lines to the inside containment connection and the outside inoperable containment isolation valve that was found to be open as well as the main line connecting and passing through the penetration were one-inch diameter lines. Analysis determined that containment breaches that are less than a three-inch diameter do not lead to a large radiation release. The event did not place the plant in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Therefore, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) did not apply to this event and this notification is to retract reporting under that criterion. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Drake).

The following is a summary of information received from the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) via email: At about 0910 (CDT) on 8/30/19, DEQ received a call from W2 Engineering, Oklahoma license OK-32142-01. W2 Engineering holds an Oklahoma license for portable gauges and is based in Oklahoma City. (W2 Engineering) reported that it had lost contact with one of the technicians who had been driving one of the company's vehicles with a Humboldt portable gauge (s/n 8700) in it. The last known location for (the technician) (and presumably the gauge) was at 0856 (CDT) Thursday when (the technician) made a purchase at Perry, Oklahoma. (The technician) had not made contact since then, nor had (the individual) responded to numerous messages and efforts to contact. (W2 Engineering) now considers the gauge out of the licensee's control. (W2 Engineering) has advised the (Oklahoma Highway Police), and they say the vehicle is not known to be in any of their impound yards. (W2 Engineering) has filed a report with Oklahoma City police, and a police officer is on site taking the report now. This report is based on an initial phone notification, and more information will be added when it becomes available.

• * * UPDATE FROM MIKE BRODERICK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1717 EDT ON 9/1/2019 * * *

The following information was received via E-mail: The gauge missing from W2 engineering has been recovered along with the vehicle in Blackwell, Oklahoma. More details will be provided as they become available." Notified R4DO (Drake) and the NMSS Events Notification E-mail group. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSURE DURING RADIOGRAPHY The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email: The licensee called (the Agency) to report an event involving a radiographer and trainee. They were conducting (non-destructive testing) NDT on pipe, shooting 8 second shots with a 76.3 Curie Ir-192 source and a QSA Global D888 camera. The radiographer went to the darkroom to complete some paperwork. The trainee took down film and moved the collimator to the next shot location. It was about then (the trainee) realized (the trainee) had not retracted the source. (The trainee) reported the mistake to the radiographer trainer. The trainee did not have dosimetry and did not conduct a camera survey prior to moving the camera. Both the trainer and trainee were issued RadEye G's so they did not have direct reading dosimeters. (The trainer and trainee) took the trainee's dosimeter that was left in the truck and decided to expose it to the source for a few seconds. Then they reported that (the trainee) received 145 mrem on his dosimeter. When the RSO questioned them, they told (the RSO) what had happened and (the RSO) then conducted a time dose study. Based on reenactment, the RSO determined the trainee was exposed to the source about 6 seconds. The calculations indicated the trainee may have received 1456 rem to the hand. (The RSO) didn't take credit for the collimator shielding and used 5.9 R/hr/Curie at 1 foot as the basis for the calculation. The radiographer and trainee have been placed on administrative leave pending a decision from the company's review board. (The Agency) told (the licensee) that it would be investigating this event and that it will want to interview the radiographer and trainee. The Agency believes the calculated dose may be high but will follow-up during the investigation. Texas Incident #: 9691

• * * UPDATE ON 06/27/2019 AT 1531 EDT FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email: During an investigation, the Agency learned there had been a miscommunication in the dose the licensee reported for the radiographer trainee's hand. The dose was not 1456 rem. The licensee is working with a consultant to make both a hand and whole body dose calculation. With the information provided, it appears the calculated dose to the radiographer trainee's hand should be less than 10 rem, which is below the regulatory reporting limit. The licensee will continue to monitor the radiographer trainee's hand. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300. Notified R4DO (Groom) NMSS (Rivera-Capella) and NMSS Events and INES (Milligan) via e-mail.

• * * RETRACTION ON 8/1/19 AT 1725 EDT FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO MICHAEL BLOODGOOD * * *

The following retraction information was obtained from the state of Texas via email: Miscommunication during initial incident reporting. Exposure was well below reporting requirement/no overexposure. Notified R4DO (Groom) and NMSS Event Notifications via email.

The following is a synopsis of an event received via phone call: During a shipment from Pasadena, TX to Billings, MT, a 4 milliCurie Cobalt-60 (Co-60) source was lost in transit. The last known location was Memphis, TN. It was shipped on May 17, 2019 and was identified lost on May 22, 2019. The shipper and the common carrier are investigating.

• * * UPDATE ON 05/25/2019 AT 1045 EDT FROM MONTY POPE TO JOANNA BRIDGE * * *

The following is a summary of a phone call with Mr. Pope: On May 24, 2019, the source that was misplaced by the common carrier was able to be located. New shipping documents are being generated. Notified R1RDO (Arner), R4RDO (GEPFORD), ILTAB (e-mail), NMSS Events (e-mail) and CNSNS Mexico (email). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.p

At 2006 (MST), on 3/31/2019, the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Shift Manager was informed that leakage was measured from the Train A Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) piping at approximately 100 ml/minute through a High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) A drain valve. This value exceeds the assumed 3000 ml/hour ECCS leakage for a large break loss of coolant accident analysis. At 0230 (MST) on April 1, 2019, the valve was flushed and the leakage reduced to 10 ml/minute (600 ml/hour) and was no longer above the limit of the safety analysis. This condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)3)(ii)(B) and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to the control the release of radioactive material per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). This event did not result in an abnormal release of radioactive material. Notification received by Caty Nolan and emailed to HOO.HOC@NRC.GOV The NRC asked a followup question: Why was the criterion for Control of Radioactive Material selected? per the PVNGS Unit 1 Shift Manager, this criterion was selected due to the potential of exceeding offsite dose projections, post recirculation, following a Design Basis Accident. The resident inspector has been notified.

• * * UPDATE ON 05/15/19 AT 1417 EDT FROM SEAN DORNSEIF TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

An engineering evaluation concluded that the as-found ECCS leakage would not have degraded the performance of the Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup system; therefore, it remained operable. The evaluation also concluded that the as-found leakage was within the analysis margins for HPSI pump hydraulic performance and containment flood level following a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident; therefore, the ECCS also remained operable. Based on the above information, the condition identified on March 31, 2019, was an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), but did not prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of the structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The NRC resident inspectors have been informed. Notified R4DO (Proulx).