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Report date | Site | Event description | |
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05000282/LER-2016-003 | 4 March 2016 | Prairie Island | On 1/7/2016, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) reviewed corrective actions associated with the transition to National Fire Protection Association "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants" (NFPA 805). PINGP discovered no cold shutdown repair procedure existed to restore power to train B reactor coolant system (RCS) vent valves to reduce RCS pressure in event of fire in Fire Area (FA) 59 (Auxiliary Building Mezzanine Floor Unit 1) and FA 74 (Auxiliary Building Mezzanine Floor Unit 2). The PINGP Appendix R safe shutdown analysis (SSA) credits such actions for train B RCS vent valves for a fire in these areas. PINGP established compensatory measures for affected equipment and, with automatic detection and suppression capability, these measures ensured protection of potentially affected equipment. The health and safety of the public was not at risk. PINGP submitted Event Notification (EN) 51642 on 1/7/2016 as this event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. On 04/14/2005, a revision of the SSA was approved that credited a cold shutdown repair 'as a compliance strategy for FA 59 and 74, but no repair procedure existed in the event of afire in FA 59 nor FA 74. On 1/11/2016, F5 Appendix D "Impact of Fire Outside Control/Relay Room" was issued and includes cold shutdown repair procedures for Train B RCS vent valves. Lack of technical rigor to ensure procedure F5 Appendix D included actions required by the SSA is the identified cause. |