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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Event description | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 05000368/LER-2017-002 | 26 April 2017 26 June 2017 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | On April 26, 2017, ANO-2 was in day 28 of a refueling outage with the core completely off loaded to the spent fuel pool (SFP). Power to ANO-2 plant equipment was supplied from Start Up Transformer 2 (SU2) while SU3 was out of service for planned maintenance. 500kV and 161kV offsite power lines were in service. The area around the plant was experiencing severe weather from thunderstorms and tornado warnings had been issued from the National Weather Service for the four county area. Switchyard work was ceased. At approximately 1002 CST switchyard breakers for 500kV lines opened on fault current. High winds had damaged the transmission towers approximately 16 miles away from ANO and caused phase to ground faults. This resulted in a loss of all offsite power lines to the 500 kV bus. The autotransformer also locked out, as designed, when the 500 kV transmission lines faulted. When the 500kV bus tripped, the 4.16kV bus that feeds a vital 480 volt bus was subjected to a voltage transient; subsequently; the #1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) auto started. The EDG output breaker never closed due to the fact that voltage was restored to normal almost immediately. This EDG was secured due to running unloaded. Both SFP cooling pumps were out of service after the transient. A SFP cooling pump was restarted at 1020 CST. The temperature of the SFP did not change during this event. |
| 05000368/LER-2017-001 | 6 April 2017 30 May 2017 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | On April 6, 2017, as part of the closure of an Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 (ANO-1 & 2) Tornado Protection Study, a nonconforming condition in the plant design for a conduit that contains safety related cables for the ANO-2 #1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) meter and relay cabinets, was identified. The conduit did not meet current design basis for protection against a potential tornado missile impact. This vulnerability is similar to those previously reported in LERs associated with ANO-1. On April 6, 2017, Operations declared the #1 EDG inoperable, implemented Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, “Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,” along with necessary compensatory measures, and subsequently declared the affected equipment operable but non- conforming. Interim corrections include implementation of compensatory strategies. Plant modifications and license basis changes are being evaluated to resolve outstanding issues. The cause of this issue was unclear and changing regulatory requirements during original plant licensing that led to an inadequate understanding of the regulatory guidance with respect to tornado missile protection design requirements. |
| 05000368/LER-2016-001 | 16 September 2016 15 November 2016 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | On September 28, 2016, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, initiated a plant shutdown due to the inability to restore one of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) to an operable status prior to exceeding the Limited Condition Operation action time. It was determined the EDG was inoperable due to the lack of sufficient lubrication in the inboard generator bearing leading to bearing failure. The lack of lubrication was determined to be caused by improper bearing lube oil level indication due an inverted oil sight glass. It was further determined that the insufficient bearing oil level condition had existed since the performance of maintenance activities in June of 2016. The corrective action plan addresses the root cause, contributing cause, extent of condition, and extent of cause. |
| 05000368/LER-2015-001 | 26 October 2015 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | On October 26, 2015, the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Process Monitor was discovered to be inoperable due to not having its required sample pump in operation. The Containment Building Purge Radiation Monitor Sample Pump provides flow to the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Process Monitor. Technical Specification 3.3.3.1, Table 3.3-6, requires the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation was in Mode 6 with refueling operations in progress while the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Process Monitor was inoperable. The apparent cause of this event was a a human performance error associated with the failure to restart the Containment Building Purge Radiation Monitor Sample Pump following manual transfer to its alternate power supply. |
| 05000368/LER-2014-004 | 9 June 2014 | On June 12, 2014, at 1136 Central Standard time (CST), while shutdown in Mode 3, it was determined that on June 9, 2014, at 1820 CST Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit -2 (ANO-2) made a Mode Change from Mode 4 to Mode 3 with one of the two required Emergency Feedwater Pumps (EFW) inoperable due to a human performance error. The work instructions for the normal control system calibration performed in Mode 5 was not performed as written and did not require a second verification after critical adjustments were performed. This permitted an undetected mis-adjustment of the low governor frequency null voltage to exist within the governor control circuit resulting in EFW pump 2P-7A being inoperable. The 2P-7A inoperability resulted in a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.4 which precludes entryjn a mode or other specified condition in the Applicability statement when a Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) is not met and the Action requires a plant shutdown if the LCO is not met within a specified interval. LCO 3.7.1.2 requires two EFW pumps to be OPERABLE in Modes 1, 2, and 3. EFW pump 2P-7A has a 72-hour Allowable Outage Time with a required plant shutdown per TS 3.7.1.2 Action statement. The condition was corrected and a surveillance test assuring Operability was completed on June 11, 2014, at 0420 CST. 2P- 7A EFW pump was declared Operable on June 11, 2014, at 0523 CST. This issue resulted in minimal safety significance. | |
| 05000368/LER-2014-003 | 27 April 2014 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | During severe weather on April 27, 2014, both units at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) were informed of a system-wide grid emergency and were ordered to come off-line as soon as possible. Both units commenced a rapid plant shutdown. ANO, Unit 2 (ANO-2) was at the end of the core life. During the shutdown, the Axial Shape Index (ASI) became more negative (power rising to the upper portion of the core) during the shutdown. This led to one channel of the Plant Protection System (PPS) to be actuated on an ASI auxiliary trip. At this time, the direction to manually trip the reactor was given, but before the action could be taken, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to the two-out-of-four PPS logic being made up for the ASI conditions. The cause of this condition was not effectively executing the reactivity management plan by delaying insertion of Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) and not inserting CEAs deep enough to maintain ASI within the desired control band. Training material is being modified to include details on the dynamic effects of ASI change that occurs at the end-of-cycle. Additionally, improvements to the guidance in the reactivity plans that involve rapid plant shutdowns are being made as are changes to the standards for use of CEAs during transients. |
| 05000368/LER-2014-002 | 3 April 2014 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | On April 3, 2014, at approximately 1300 CST, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 (ANO-2) tripped from 100% power due to a fault in 161kV Russellville East Line. The fault caused a momentary degraded voltage state on the 161kV and 500kV grid at ANO and an undervoltage condition for ANO-2 Startup #3 Transformer (SU3). This under voltage condition caused SU3 undervoltage relays to initiate a fast transfer of ANO-2 4160V bus (2A-1) and 6900V bus (2H-1), to Startup Transformer #2 (SU2). Buses ANO-2 6900V (2H-2) and 4160V (2A-2) were not allowed to fast transfer to SU2 because of operational restraints per design. The removal of power to 2A-2 caused an auto start of the ANO-2 Emergency Diesel Generator (2K-4B) due to under voltage on safety bus 2A-4 which is normally fed from 2A-2. Bus 2A-2 slow transferred back to SU3. 2K-4B did not tie to 4160V safety bus (2A-4) as voltage had recovered prior to the diesel reaching rated speed and voltage. Bus 2H-2 was de-energized causing the loss of two Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) which led to a reactor trip on low RCP speed and the actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) on low Steam Generator Level. It was determined that a lighting strike caused a three phase fault on the 161kV Russellville East Line causing the ANO-2 trip. The corrective action is for Entergy Arkansas to review the adequacy of 161kV Russellville East Transmission Line Lightning Protection System. |
| 05000368/LER-2014-001 | 31 March 2014 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | While performing a post-assessment of a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation performed in 2002 for a modification to the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Unit 2 switchgear room exhaust fans, ANO identified that automatic action had been replaced with credit for manual operator action. During additional evaluations of this concern, it was identified that there was one occasion within the last three years in which the room coolers and exhaust fan configuration did not support the operability of the switchgear room without reliance on operator action, which was longer than the time allowed by Technical Specification. The apparent cause of this condition is the inappropriate credit of operator action in place of an automatic action. As a corrective action, caution cards were promptly placed on the Control Room hand switches and local breakers associated with the exhaust fans. |
| 05000368/LER-2013-004 | 9 December 2013 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | On December 9, 2013, at approximately 0747 CST, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2), experienced an electrical fault on the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (2X-02) buses resulting in a fire and catastrophic failure of the transformer. This caused an automatic reactor and main turbine trip, lockout of the Switchyard Auto Transformer, lockout of (ANO-2) Startup 3 Transformer (2X-03) and loss of power to Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) Startup 1 Transformer (X-03) The switchyard auto transformer supplies one of the two credited offsite sources supplying both Startup 3 Transformer (2X-03) and Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) Startup 1 Transformer (X-03). A loss of one of the two available offsite power sources for ANO-2 resulted in an auto-start of the ANO-2 Emergency Diesel Generator (2K-48) to supply ANO-2 safety bus 2A-4 and initiation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System. Investigations determined the most probable cause of the event that led to failure of the Unit Auxiliary Transformer began with a phase-to-ground fault on the 6900V 'C' phase non-segregated bus flexible link for 2X-02. Transformer 2X-02 protective relays designed to isolate the bus from an electrical fault actuated, but due to a disconnected lead, the Main Generator Lockout relays failed to actuate leading to 2X-02 failure. A root cause evaluation determined a flexible link for 2X-02 was not properly installed which led to an insulation breakdown at the bolted connection. The subsequent 2X-02 explosion and fire resulted from a non-landed wire due to a human performance error most likely occurring in 1995 that failed to connect the DC conductor to the output contacts for the protective relays. |
| 05000368/LER-2013-003 | 20 August 2013 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | On August 20, 2013, a switchyard walkdown by engineering revealed an undocumented wiring configuration associated with the Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 (ANO-2) Startup Transformer 3 (SU3) voltage regulator (VR) circuit. (SU3 is one of two offsite power source transformers designed to supply ANO-2). Subsequent investigation revealed that the wiring configuration would have prevented the SU3 VR from operating as designed. The VR has an automatic tapchanger designed to step up SU3 voltage in response to a low voltage condition after a twenty second time delay to maintain a pre-defined voltage control band. This twenty second time delay is designed to be bypassed for three minutes in the event of a Main Turbine Generator lockout, to allow immediate voltage adjustments as ANO-2 station loads are fast transferred from the Unit Auxiliary Transformer to the offsite SU3 transformer during worst case accident load sequencing. The discovered wiring configuration of the SU3 VR prevented the bypass of the twenty second time delay, resulting in SU3 being declared inoperable. The wiring configuration for the SU3 VR appears to have been introduced in the 2005-2006 time frame, during a switchyard improvement project by Entergy Arkansas Transmission and Distribution, which was responsible for ownership of the subject VR at that time. On August 21, 2013, a temporary modification was installed to remove the SU3 VR tap change controller twenty second time delay, which restored the SU3 operability. |
| 05000368/LER-2013-002 | 4 February 2013 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | On February 4, 2013, at 1255 CST, Control Room Emergency Chiller 2VE-1A breaker tripped shortly after the chiller was started. 2VE-1A is one of two control room emergency chillers common to both Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Unit-1 and ANO Unit-2. The 2VE-1A breaker (2B-52D5) is a Siemens 480 volt, 100 amp molded case circuit breaker. An Apparent Cause Evaluation determined that the the "C" phase load side wire lug was not properly connected when the breaker was installed on November 15, 2012, resulting in a loose connection between the lug and the breaker stab. The condition was corrected and 2VE-1A was declared operable on February 6, 2013. The apparent causes of the condition were determined to be a human performance error during breaker replacement due to the inadequate use of human performance tools and an inadequate molded case circuit breaker testing procedure which did not provide a step to perform a visual inspection of the wire grip style lug after installation. Initial corrective actions included a human performance error review and a requirement for visual verification of the wire lugs for remaining breaker replacement work orders. The Apparent Cause Evaluation provided firm evidence that the condition existed since the breaker was incorrectly installed on November 15, 2012, resulting in the inoperability of 2VE-1A. The redundant 2VE-1B Chiller was considered inoperable from November 26, 2012 to December 3, 2012, resulting in the potential inoperability of both control room emergency chillers and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. |
| 05000368/LER-2013-001 | 2 January 2013 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | On January 02, 2013 at 1308 CST, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit-2 (ANO-2) experienced an invalid Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS), and Containment Cooling Actuation Signal (CCAS) while technicians were performing Plant Protection System (PPS) matrix testing, resulting in the auto start of the Emergency Diesel Generators, High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Pumps and Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Pumps in the standby mode, and the re-positioning of numerous safety related components to their actuated state. The operating crew appropriately entered the Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP) for inadvertent SIAS and inadvertent CIAS. In accordance with the inadvertent SIAS AOP, the operating crew restored Auxiliary Cooling Water flow from the Service Water (SW) System and restored SW flow to the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System by overriding the SIAS to the respective flow path valves. HPSI and LPSI Pumps were placed in pull-to-lock to prevent pump overheating, as procedurally directed. In accordance with the inadvertent CIAS AOP, the operating crew overrode the CIAS to CCW isolation valves to restore CCW flow to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. The SIAS initially aligned boric acid injection into the Reactor Coolant System as designed, and resulted in a reactor power decrease to approximately 87%. The invalid actuation signals were reset and HPSI/LPSI pumps were restored within one hour of actuation. ANO-2 returned to full power operation the same day. A failure modes analysis determined that the direct cause of the event was the degradation of a PPS matrix test switch, with the Root Cause determined to be failure to implement a preventative maintenance strategy for the switch during a 1986 modification. |
| 05000368/LER-2012-001 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | On August 08, 2012 at 0823 CDT, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit-2 (ANO-2) tripped from approximately one hundred percent power due to degraded main condenser vacuum. The 2C-5B Condenser Vacuum Pump (one of two condenser vacuum pumps) had been secured by taking the control handswitch to pull-to-lock by Operations personnel to perform routine oil level checks. Ambient temperatures were low enough to maintain condenser vacuum with one condenser vacuum pump (2C-5A) in service. When 2C-5B was secured, two solenoid valves failed to reposition the isolation valves on 2C-5B, which resulted in a significant air flow path from atmosphere through the vacuum pump, causing condenser pressure to increase to the main turbine trip setpoint. The main turbine tripped on high turbine exhaust pressure which resulted in an automatic reactor scram due to high reactor coolant system pressurizer pressure. The Emergency Feedwater Actuation System actuated for the "A" Steam Generator due to steam generator water level trending slightly below setpoint. After investigation and corrective maintenance, ANO-2 was reconnected to the electrical grid on August 09, 2012. The root cause investigation determined that the subject solenoid valves were installed in an environment with temperatures in excess of designed temperature ratings. This condition resulted in heat related binding of the solenoid valves and failure to reposition when de-energized. The planned corrective action to preclude recurrence of this root cause will implement a modification to change the solenoid valve location to allow proper heat dissipation. | |
| 05000368/LER-2010-002 | 23 August 2010 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown |
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| 05000368/LER-2010-001 | 1 February 2010 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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| 05000368/LER-2009-005 | 8 December 2009 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation |
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| 05000368/LER-2009-004 | 20 September 2009 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation |
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| 05000368/LER-2009-003 | 8 September 2009 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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| 05000368/LER-2009-002 | 7 September 2009 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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| 05000368/LER-2009-001 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | On Friday, March 13, 2009, at approximately 21:51 CDT, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 was manually tripped from 84% power due to decreasing level in the "B" Steam Generator caused by the "B" Main Feedwater Regulating Valve moving in the closed direction without input demand to close. The trip was manually initiated at approximately the 25% Steam Generator water level. Due to the valve malfunction the system was unable to restore the Steam Generator water level before the 22.2% Emergency Feedwater System Control actuation set point was reached. The Emergency Feedwater System actuated, as designed, restoring Steam Generator water levels to normal. Post trip responses were normal with all plant safety systems functioning as expected. Investigation revealed that the most probable root cause of the event was a foreign substance in the clearance area of the armature, internal to a current-to-pressure (UP) converter in the "B" Main Feedwater Regulating Valve positioner. The positioner was replaced and tested, and Unit 2 returned to 100% power operation, Mode 1, at 17:01 CDT on March 17, 2009. | |
| 05000368/LER-2008-002 | 7 April 2008 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(IV)(A) | On April 7, 2008, at approximately 1345 CST, with the plant shutdown in Mode 3, and with all Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) withdrawn two steps in preparation for CEA drop time testing, the Control Room was informed that the software verification for the Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEACs) had not been verified and that the CEACS should be considered inoperable. The Shift Manager (SM) was told by Reactor Engineering (RE) personnel that the raw CEA inputs to the CEACs could not be used to verify CEA position. Although the CEACs were not required to be operable in Mode 3, at least one position indicator is required to be operable for each CEA not fully inserted. At 1350, the Shift Manager directed that the reactor trip breakers be opened to comply with the associated technical specifications action statement. The cause of this event was inadequate communication between the SM and RE personnel which led to the incorrect conclusion that the CEA position indicators were inoperable. A "Lessons Learned" document regarding this event was prepared by the involved SM and was distributed to the SMs of both ANO units. |
| 05000368/LER-2008-001 | 13 March 2008 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | On March 18, 2008, with the plant shutdown in Mode 5, the outside containment isolation valve for the chill water system did not fully close during "as-found" stroke time testing. Investigation by Operations personnel revealed that a scaffold pole was interfering with the close stroke of the valve, resulting in it remaining approximately 30 to 40 percent open. The scaffold was constructed on March 13, 2008, while the plant was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. Since the plant was shutdown for Refueling Outage 2R19 on March 16, 2008, the valve was inoperable for a period of time longer than allowed by the Technical Specifications. The obstruction was removed, and the valve was successfully stroke tested. The cause of this event was human error in that the walkdown conducted before the scaffold was installed did not identify the subject valve as a work site interference issue. Due to the unique design of the valve associated with this event, it was determined to be an isolated occurrence. However, a "lessons learned" discussion will be conducted with the Operations staff of both ANO units regarding this event to stress the importance of walkdowns with scaffolding personnel in identifying all potential interference issues. |
| 05000368/LER-2005-001 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | On March 9, 2005, following shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage, a visual inspection of the reactor coolant system pressurizer revealed indications of leakage below the insulation around three pressurizer heater sleeves. On March 12, 2005, with the insulation removed from the heater sleeves and bottom head of the pressurizer, a total of eight heater sleeves and one pressurizer heater penetration containing a plug were found to be leaking. Leakage was !identified by small amounts of boron discovered at the sleeve penetration interfaces. On March 15, 2005, with the pressurizer filled with water, one additional leaking pressurizer heater sleeve was identified by visual observation of moisture on the sleeve. Leakage was confirmed in nine pressurizer heater sleeves and one plugged penetration. The failure mechanism for the ten leaking pressurizer penetrations was primary water stress corrosion cracking of Alloy 600 material. Non-destructive examination of the penetrations confirmed the presence of axially oriented flaws. Inspection of the pressurizer base material surrounding each penetration indicated that no boric acid wastage had occurred. The leaking heater sleeves were repaired using NRC approved ASME Code-qualified mechanical nozzle seal assemblies. The leaking plugged penetration was replaced with an Alloy 690 sleeve and plug. The pressurizer will be replaced during the refueling outage scheduled for the fall of 2006. 5 | |
| 05000368/LER-1998-004, Forwards LER 98-004-00,concerning Surveillance Tests of Fuel Handling Area & Containment Purge & Exhaust Fan Flow Rates | 8 July 1998 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1998-001, Forwards LER 98-001-00,concerning Surveillance Testing of Containment Building Personnel & Escape Air Lock Door Interlocks | 7 April 1998 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1996-006, Forwards Supplemental LER 96-006-01 Re Inadvertent Start of Edg.Supplement Deletes Inaccurate Statement from Abstract & Corrects Typo Re Commitment Completion Date | 30 July 1997 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1996-004, Forwards LER 96-004-02 IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).Suppl Provides Revised Schedule for Implementation of Plant Design Change | 28 January 1999 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1995-001, Provides Comments on Preliminary Accident Sequence Analysis Re LER 95-001-00 | 9 September 1996 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1994-001, Forwards Rev 1 to LER 94-001 Re Excore Nuclear Instrumentation.Rev Revises Commitment Re Future post-maint Testing Method Used to Verify Continuity of Cable Connectors | 21 November 1994 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1990-024, Forwards LER 90-024-01 Re Steam turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump,Revising Commitment Date for Preventive Maint Procedure Changes | 10 December 1991 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1990-015 | 30 July 1990 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1990-014 | 27 July 1990 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1990-013 | 29 June 1990 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1990-011 | 25 May 1990 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1989-022 | 25 May 1990 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1987-003, Informs That Suppl to LER 87-003-00 Will Be Delayed Until 880501 Due to Preliminary Nature of Some Aspects of Permanent Repair Plan of Unit Pressurizer,Per 871026 Meeting | 28 October 1987 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1986-006, Corrected LER 86-006-00:on 860421,reactor Protective Sys Actuated on Two of Four Core Protection Circulator Channels. Caused by Electrical Noise from Starting Reactor Coolant Pump.Channel C Circuit Card Replaced | 30 May 1986 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1986-000, Forwards Corrected LER 86-00-00 Re Inadvertent Reactor Protection Sys Actuation During Surveillance Testing.Ltr Should Be Disregarded | 30 May 1986 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1985-022, Corrects Forwarding LER 85-022-00.Unit,docket & License Number Incorrectly Listed on Cover Ltr 2CAN118503 | 12 December 1985 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1983-045, Revised LER 83-045/03X-4:on 830916-1123,fire Protection Deficiencies Identified.Cause & Corrective Actions Listed | 16 December 1983 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1983-020, Telecopy LER 83-020/01T-0:on 830519,fire Watch Posted in Wrong Location for Period Exceeding Tech Spec Limit.Further Details Will Be Provided | 19 May 1983 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1983-019, Forwards LER 83-019/03L-0 | 4 April 1983 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1983-017, Forwards LER 83-017/03L-0 | 8 April 1983 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1983-016, Forwards LER 83-016/03L-0 | 7 April 1983 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1983-015, Forwards LER 83-015/03L-0 | 31 March 1983 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1983-014, Forwards LER 83-014/01T-0 | 25 April 1983 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1983-012, Forwards LER 83-012/03L-0 | 24 March 1983 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1983-011, Forwards LER 83-011/03L-0 | 18 March 1983 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1983-010, Forwards LER 83-010/03L-0 | 17 March 1983 | ||
| 05000368/LER-1983-009, Forwards LER 83-009/01T-0 | 18 March 1983 |