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| Quarter | Site | Title | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05000282/FIN-2013007-01 | 2013Q2 | Prairie Island | Failure to Verify the Adequacy of Cooling Water System Design | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to correctly model the effects of the strainers and isolation valves in the cooling water flow calculations. Specifically, calculations did not account for the strainer backwash differential pressure setpoint and leakage of the ring header isolation valves. This finding was entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program (CAP) to revise the affected calculations and evaluate the need for additional corrective actions. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the cooling water system to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the magnitude of the errors required the licensee to re-perform the cooling water flow calculations to assure the system would be able to meet the flow demand. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality. Specifically, the licensee removed conservatisms from the calculations, added the maximum allowable strainer loss, and reasonably determined that the system remained operable. In addition, the licensee determined the isolation valves had not experienced gross leakage. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it did not reflect current performance due to the age of the performance deficiency. |
| 05000282/FIN-2013007-02 | 2013Q2 | Prairie Island | Failure to Review the Suitability of the Cl Strainers Under POST-SEISMIC Flow Conditions | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to review the suitability of the cooling water strainers under post-seismic flow conditions. Specifically, the licensee did not recognize the post-seismic hydraulic parameters were greater than the vendor design values for the strainers. This finding was entered into the licensees CAP to evaluate the condition and initiate further actions as necessary. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the cooling water system to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, flow rates higher than design values may impair the cleaning function and cause damage to the strainers affecting the capability of the cooling water system to perform its accident mitigating function. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because a detailed risk evaluation determined the core damage frequency of this finding was 1.9E-7/yr. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it did not reflect current performance due to the age of the performance deficiency. |
| 05000282/FIN-2013007-03 | 2013Q2 | Prairie Island | Failure to Demonstrate the Ability to Transfer Diesel Fuel Oil Between Unit 1 Fuel Oil Tanks | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for the failure to demonstrate the ability to transfer diesel fuel oil from any Unit 1 fuel oil storage tank to any Unit 1 emergency diesel generator or diesel driven cooling water pump day tank. Specifically, the licensee did not intentionally or periodically verify the ability to transfer fuel between the Unit 1 tanks as credited in the Technical Specification Basis and Updated Safety Analysis Report. This finding was entered into the licensees CAP to test the affected flow paths. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the Unit 1 emergency diesel generators and diesel drivel cooling water pumps to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to verify the fuel oil transfer capability did not ensure the minimum fuel oil volume required by Technical Specifications could be supplied to these systems to support their accident mitigating function. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality. Specifically, the licensee reviewed the recent history of the affected piping system and determined the affected flow paths were successfully used in 2010 and 2011 providing reasonable assurance the flow paths were available. The inspectors did not find an applicable cross-cutting aspect, which represented the underlying cause of this performance deficiency; therefore, no cross-cutting aspect was assigned. |
| 05000454/FIN-2008005-02 | 2008Q4 | Byron | Failure to Evaluate Radiological Hazards for Airborne Radioactivitity | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for failure to implement procedures required to evaluate radiological hazards for airborne radioactivity. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to re-start an air sampler on the refuel floor which provided the only air monitoring system while workers were performing activities in the area. The corrective actions taken by the licensee included starting the required air sampler. The issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as IR 828767. The finding is more than minor because it impacted the program and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation, in that the failure to fully evaluate the radiological hazards present in work areas could result in unplanned exposure to workers. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) planning issue, there was no overexposure nor potential for overexposure, and the licensees ability to assess dose was not compromised. This finding was caused by inadequate self-checking and peer checking. Consequently, the cause of this deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance. (H.4(a)) Specifically, the licensee failed to utilize human error prevention techniques commensurate with the risk of the task |
| 05000454/FIN-2008005-01 | 2008Q4 | Byron | Failure to Remove or Evaluate Loose Debris Inside of Containment Prior to Applicable Mode | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to follow procedure BAP 1450-1, Access to Containment. Specifically, the inspectors determined that the licensee failed to remove loose debris items from Unit 2 containment prior to Mode 4 or to perform an engineering evaluation per procedure. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as Issue Report (IR) 867171, removed the loose debris, and completed an evaluation to verify that the containment sump was not adversely affected. The finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the issue could have become a more significant safety concern. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Finding, dated January 10, 2008, for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Since this finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in loss of system or train safety function, and was not safety significant due to external events, this issue is screened as very low safety significance. This finding is related to the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area for the licensees failure to coordinate work activities and the need for work groups to coordinate with each other. (H.3(b)) The personnel who left the material in containment assumed it was acceptable as they had documented the material in a surveillance data sheet, and the personnel who reviewed the completed data sheet assumed the material had been or would be removed from containment, and none questioned the potential impact upon the recirculation sump screens or coordinated with each other to ensure resolution of the material prior to a mode change |
| 05000454/FIN-2008005-03 | 2008Q4 | Byron | Licensee-Identified Violation | NRC Order EA-03-009, for Byron Unit 2, requires that the licensee perform ultrasonic testing of each RPV head penetration nozzle every refueling outage because of its high susceptibility ranking. Contrary to this, the licensee discovered during the current B2R14 outage that penetration 41 was not ultrasonically tested during the prior Unit 2 outage in April 2007 (B2R13). No observable boric acid deposits were noted as a result of the bare metal visual examination of the penetration nozzles performed during outages B2R13 and B2R14; and there were no reportable indications found as a result of the B2R14 ultrasonic test of penetration 41. Based upon this, the violation was of very low safety significance. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as IR 829647 |
| 05000454/FIN-2008005-04 | 2008Q4 | Byron | Licensee-Identified Violation | \"10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. Licensee Procedure LS-AA-125, Revision 12, Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure, was written in accordance with Criterion XVI. Step 2.12 of LS-AA-125 requires, in part, ...a Corrective Action is any action that meets any of the following.... Is necessary to restore a Significance Level 1, 2, or 3 Condition.... Contrary to the above, on October 22, 2008, licensee personnel failed to correct a condition adverse to quality as stated in IR 834410. Specifically, loose debris that had been left on the polar crane had not been removed prior to Unit 2 changing from Mode 5 to Mode 4. IR 834410 had been designated by the licensee as a Significance level 3 condition. This issue is of very low safety significance because this finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in loss of system or train safety function and was no safety significant due to external events.\ |
| 05000454/FIN-2008005-05 | 2008Q4 | Byron | Licensee-Identified Violation | 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, since April 18, 2007, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality regarding design of AFW tunnel hatch covers. Specifically, upon finding a design deficiency in the hatch structural calculation, the licensee failed to promptly identify all the related design issues through more detailed reviews and field inspections, and to complete corrective actions to address the design deficiencies and to restore the design margins. This finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. The issue was identified in the licensees CAP as IR 857487. The licensee had completed a temporary modification to increase the safety margin of the hatches and is in the process of designing a permanent modification to restore full design margi |
| 05000454/FIN-2008005-06 | 2008Q4 | Byron | Licensee-Identified Violation | 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, required, in part, that design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculation methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Contrary to this, on December 4, 1987, the licensee failed to ensure design measures were in place for verifying or checking the adequacy of AFW hatch cover plate design. Specifically, in Calculation 5.6.3.9, the licensee failed to ensure that a safety factor in accordance with the station design criteria was applied in the design of expansion anchors. The issue was identified in the licensees corrective action as IR 654270. This finding was of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment |
| 05000266/FIN-2005017-01 | 2005Q3 | Point Beach | Licensee's failure to self-identify the untimely declaration of an Alert classification during an August 2002 emergency preparedness (EP) drill. | The NRC also identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, associated with incomplete and inaccurate information the licensee provided to the NRC in a falsified critique record associated with the August 2002 EP drill. The licensee provided the falsified critique record to NRC inspectors on November 20, 2002. Specifically, the falsified critique record for the August 2002 EP drill indicated that the licensee had self-identified the untimely declaration of an Alert emergency classification. However, the OI investigation determined that the EP Manager and the EP Coordinator deliberately altered the critique record to indicate that the untimely Alert classification declaration was self-identified by the licensee as a part of its formal critique process. The information is material to the NRC because, the NRC relies, in part, on the licensees conduct and self-critiquing of EP drills and exercises to ensure the licensee maintains an effective emergency preparedness and response capability. In a letter to the NRC, dated May 16, 2003, the licensee documented the corrective actions it had taken based upon its own internal investigation of the EP Manager and the EP Coordinators November 2002 deliberate falsification of the August 2002 EP drill and providing of the falsified record to the NRC. Based upon information developed during the NRC inspections and investigation and provided in your letter dated May 16, 2003, we believe that we have sufficient information to make a final significance determination for the preliminary White Finding and to determine the appropriate significance and enforcement actions for the apparent violations. However, before we make a final decision on these matters, we are providing you an opportunity to present to the NRC your perspectives on the facts used by the NRC to arrive at the finding and its significance, and the apparent violations and their significance at a combined regulatory and predecisional enforcement conference (conference) or through the submittal to the NRC of your position on the finding and the apparent violations in writing. If you choose to request a conference, it should be held within 30 days of the receipt of this letter and we encourage you to submit supporting documentation at least one week prior to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a conference is held, that portion of the conference associated with the White Finding and the associated apparent violation will be open for public observation. The portion of the conference associated with the 10 CFR 50.9 apparent violation will be closed for public observation because it involves an OI investigation. If you decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC within 30 days of the receipt of this letter. |