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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 53559 | 14 August 2018 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Report - Defect of Westinghouse 7300 Process Analog Control System Circuit Cards | This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. 10 CFR Part 21 Notification - Defect of Westinghouse 7300 Process Analog Control System circuit cards On August 14, 2018, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) completed an evaluation of a deviation at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3) which concluded the condition constitutes a defect pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21. The Waterford 3 Site Vice President was notified of the result of this evaluation on August 21, 2018. An interim report stating that an evaluation of this deviation was in progress was submitted to the NRC on July 5, 2018 (Entergy letter W3F1-2018-0040, ADAMS Accession Number ML18186A694). Three Westinghouse 7300 Process Analog Control System (PAC) circuit cards were identified to be failed due to failed hex inverter chips. Some of these cards were installed in applications which support the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) at Waterford 3. These PAC cards use Texas Instruments Part Number SN74LS04N, W113 hex inverter chips. The circuit card types of concern are Analog Comparator model number 2838A32G01, Control Board model number 2838A30G011, and Prom Logic model number 2838A33G01. Entergy concluded that this condition could have prevented the UHS from performing its safety function and thus could have created a substantial safety hazard. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 51492 | 23 October 2015 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Westinghouse Type Kir-60 Current Transformer | The following is excerpted from LER 2015-007 submitted by the licensee (see related EN #51348): On October 9, 2015, Waterford 3 received information from the external evaluation concerning the Generator Differential Current Transformer. The evaluation concluded that a manufacturing defect internal to the current transformer was the cause of the failure. On October 22, 2015, engineering evaluation determined the manufacturing defect could create a substantial safety hazard, as defined in 10 CFR 21, and provided the site vice president information of the defect the same day. Additional information identified in the report is as follows: Constructor - Westinghouse Type KIR-60 current transformer, style 7524A01G16, serial number 28218571; Defect and safety hazard - There were voids found in the insulation, and the thickness of the insulation material around the fault area appeared reduced when compared to the other areas of the current transformer. There is only one transformer of this type remaining installed in the plant. Scheduled replacement is no later than November 15, 2015. | ||
| ENS 50191 | 18 April 2014 09:29:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Masoneilan Actuators Discovered to Fail-Closed Instead of the Required Fail-Open Configuration | This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning the deviation of a basic component from manufacturing purchase specifications. On 04/18/2014, during pneumatic actuator replacement for Emergency Feedwater (EFW) valve EFW-224A (EFW to Steam Generator #1 Primary Flow Control Valve), it was identified that the fail action of the actuator was incorrect in that it was in a fail-closed instead of fail-open configuration. The actuator model, as identified in Waterford 3 site receipt/acceptance document and the actuator's name plate data, was a Masoneilan model 47 Sigma-F, which is specified as a fail-open actuator. However, the actuator was discovered to have a fail closed action, which is indicative of a Masoneilan model 48 actuator. The fail-action of these Masoneilan Sigma-F actuators can be changed in accordance with its technical manual TDM120.0565 with no additional parts; therefore, Waterford 3 corrected the fail action of EFW-224A's replacement actuator (to fail-open) and ensured the handwheel indicator was corrected prior to entering mode 4. Two of these actuators were received and accepted as Masoneilan model 47 Sigma-F (fail-open) actuators in September of 2010, both of which were labeled as such, yet configured in the fail-closed action. One of these two actuators remains in the warehouse and has been placed on hold. The vendor, Dresser Masoneilan, has been notified in writing on May 12, 2014. On 6/9/2014 at approximately 1600 CDT, Entergy concluded that for those potential applications of this valve operator model in the EFW system, had they been installed without correcting the deviation, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard in that it could have prevented fulfillment of EFW safety function, and therefore reportable under 10CFR PART 21. The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed on 06/11/2014. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Steam Generator Feedwater | |
| ENS 48357 | 28 September 2012 19:10:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Defective Masoneilan Transducer Model 8005N | This message is notification to the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) requirements, that the Vice President Operations at Waterford 3 was notified on September 28, 2012 at 14:10 CDT of a condition which will be conservatively reported as a defect under the rule. A written report to the NRC will follow within 30 days. The basic component that is subject to reporting is the Masoneilan I/P (current to pneumatic) Transducer Model 8005N. These transducers are utilized in safety related applications at Waterford 3. This condition has been corrected in the plant. Waterford has identified that the subject transducer fails to calibrate at the high end of its span. No defective components are currently installed. Waterford 3 is operating normally at 100% power. This identified condition caused no loss of safety function and had no impact on public health and safety. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |