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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 53786 | 15 October 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Invalid Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Actuation | This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The successful, complete train actuation of the 22 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was initiated by an invalid signal during testing. The Auxiliary Feedwater System was not impacted in its ability to perform its function. There were no safety consequences or impacts to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Auxiliary Feedwater | |
| ENS 52805 | 16 April 2017 14:53:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Invalid Edg Actuation During Surveillance Testing | This is to report the Salem Unit 2, 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) actuation due to an invalid signal. This report is being made per paragraphs 10CFR50.73(a)(1) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address the invalid actuation of the 2C EDG on April 16, 2017, while performing the 2C Safeguards Equipment Controller (SEC) Mode OPS Surveillance test. Plant conditions: Salem Unit 2 was in mode 5 at the time of the invalid actuation. On April 16, 2017, at approximately 1053 (EDT) while performing Solid State Protection System (SSPS) testing of the 2C SEC, the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) output breaker was manually opened per the associated procedure step. The EDG output breaker unexpectedly reclosed and the 2C 4kV vital bus loaded onto the EDG in SEC Mode 2. The cause of the 2C EDG output breaker reclosure and 2C 4kV Vital bus loading during testing was determined to be two faulty input block switches in the 2C SEC. When Step 5.2.27 of the test procedure was performed, the 2C SEC 'input block' switches failed to block a 'blackout' actuation signal. This resulted in the breaker reclosure and loading of the 2C Vital Bus onto the EDG. Trouble shooting identified that the two failed switches exhibited high resistance across the switch contacts which is indicative of being in a 'fail to block' (the input signal) condition. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will also notify the States of New Jersey and Delaware. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 52007 | 18 April 2016 01:04:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Invalid Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator | This is to report the Salem Unit 1, 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) actuation due to an invalid signal. This report is being made per paragraphs 10CFR50.73 (a)(1) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address the invalid actuation of the 1B EDG on April 17, 2016, during replacement of an indicating bulb. Plant conditions; Salem Unit 1 was in mode 6 at the time of the invalid actuation. On April 17, 2016, at approximately 2055 (EDT) while performing Solid State Protection System (SSPS) testing of the 1B Safeguards Equipment Cabinet (SEC), operators identified that an input test light was not lit as expected. At approximately 2104 (EDT) while attempting to replace the light bulb, the 1B EDG unexpectedly automatically started. The 1B EDG responded properly to the auto start signal and started in SEC Mode 1, accident only, and did not load. The cause of the inadvertent start was determined to be a loss of the block circuit which allowed an output to the logic module which then caused the EDG to auto start. Subsequent testing of the input block switches demonstrated that, due to switch degradation, slight pressure applied to the switch was enough to allow the block signal to be momentarily interrupted, even without repositioning of the switch. It was determined that the loss of the block was most likely due to the operators finger coming in contact with the switch during the bulb replacement. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the State of New Jersey and Delaware. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 51624 | 29 October 2015 16:12:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Invalid Actuation of Unit 2 2C Safeguards Equipment Cabinet | This is to report the Salem Unit 2, 2C Safeguards Equipment Cabinet (SEC) actuation due to an invalid signal. This report is being made per paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address the invalid actuation of the 2C SEC on October 29, 2015, during performance of maintenance on the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). Plant conditions: Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 6 at the time of the invalid actuation. On October 29, 2015, at approximately 1112 (EDT) during performance of maintenance to replace slave relays in the SSPS output test panel 131, the maintenance technician inadvertently made contact with the relay plunger for the 2C SEC. This caused a signal to be sent to the 2C SEC which actuated the equipment associated with it. The 2C SEC train responded to the signal as required. The equipment associated with the 2C SEC that was not previously removed from service for outage related activities or already in service responded as required. As a result of the actuation, the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started but did not load (no undervoltage condition existed on the associated vital bus requiring loading), the Unit 2 Emergency Control Air Compressor (ECAC) started. The 22 Charging Pump (CVC) started, and the 22 Safety Injection Pump (SI) started (the Sl pump did not inject as it was isolated and in the process of being tagged out of service at the time of the invalid signal). The cause of the invalid actuation signal was a human performance error. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 48667 | 14 November 2012 20:58:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | 60 Day Telephone Notification of an Invalid Reactor Trip Actuation in Mode 4 | This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of a reactor trip while subcritical. On November 14, 2012 Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 4 performing unit startup activities during its 2012 Refueling outage. Rod Control system and Individual Rod Position Indication testing was in progress with the Reactor Trip breakers closed. Control Rod Banks were being withdrawn from the core in accordance with a testing procedure. At 1558 hours (EST), an Instrument and Controls technician removed control power fuses from the Nuclear Instrumentation System Intermediate Range Drawer 2N36, generating an invalid reactor trip. Affected equipment responded as designed. Both reactor trip breakers opened and all control rods dropped into the core. 2N36 troubleshooting had been in progress. Repair or replacement options for a broken connector had been discussed between the technician and his supervisor. Concerned for his personal safety, the technician pulled the 2N36 control power fuses in order to perform a wiring inspection. The technician failed to apply human performance standards including written directions, pre-job briefing, and notifying control room personnel and supervision prior to work. The technician failed to recognize that he was working outside of the expectations of normal work processes and failed to properly evaluate the full consequences of his actions. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | Control Rod | |
| ENS 43889 | 13 October 2007 15:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | 60 Day Ler Report - 1C Edg Invalid Start | This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) for an invalid actuation (start) of the 1C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). On November 13, 2007, at 1013 hours, while performing the replacement of an indicating bulb on the 1C EDG local start/stop CMC switch (a turn to stop/start switch) the switch was pushed inward making up the start contact and causing an inadvertent start of the 1C EDG. The EDG started but did not load since this was not a valid demand for operation of the 1C EDG. The 1C EDG was shutdown in accordance with operating procedures and returned to its normal standby status. The local start/stop switch was replaced and the removed switch was examined. The removed switch was determined to be missing a cardboard collar on the shaft of the switch that prevents inward movement. Lack of the cardboard collar did not inhibit the turn to start/stop function of the switch. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, State of New Jersey, State of Delaware, and local government agencies. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 43428 | 17 April 2007 02:23:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Invalid Esf Actuation During Refueling Outage | This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid Engineered Safeguards Feature (ESF) actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater(AFW) system reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On April 16, 2007, at 2223 with Unit 1 in Mode 3, starting up from refueling outage 18, the 11 Steam Generator Feed Pump (SGFP) trip AFW Pump Auto Armed light extinguished unexpectedly and the Steam Generator (SG) sample valves 11 through 14-SS94 and SG Blowdown valves 11 through 14-GB4 closed. At the time, the 11 and 12 SGFPs were already tripped and the 11 and 12 Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were in service. No control room manipulations were in progress. A signal was generated to start the already in service AFW pumps. The invalid signal to start the AFW pumps was determined to be from a faulty SGFP alternate trip relay. The defective relay was replaced and the isolation signal was reset and retested satisfactorily. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid ESF actuation and invalid system actuation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Steam Generator Auxiliary Feedwater | |
| ENS 40806 | 12 April 2004 19:43:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | 60-Day Notification of Invalid Actuation of Safety Injection Signal | On April 12, 2004, Salem station made an 8 hr report titled ACCIDENT MITIGATION - COMMON CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) (Event number 40670). This report was the result of an invalid Unit 1 Safety Injection signal during troubleshooting/testing of Train 'B' of Solid State Protection. During the troubleshooting a card was moved from one slot to another, when the card was inserted into the new slot a safety injection signal was generated. The failed part of the card (a malfunctioning isolator card) was not used in its prior position, thus the failed circuit remained undetected. Further investigation determined that the safety injection signal was invalid; it was not the result of a plant condition requiring the protective action. Therefore this event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' This event is reportable as it 60-day phone call in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)(1) 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section, except when: (1) The actuation resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation; or (2) The actuation was invalid..' Licensee event report 311/04-003 is being submitted to report the loss of accident mitigation capability for Unit 2. Event number for reference 40670. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |