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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 53242 | 3 March 2018 04:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Potential Loss of Offsite Response Capabilities | At 2315 EST on March 2, 2018, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) determined, based on information received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, that there may be a potential loss of offsite response capabilities due to ongoing severe natural hazard conditions (i.e., major winter storm) along the coast of Massachusetts. According to information received by PNPS, towns within the 10 Mile EP Radius could be hampered in implementing some protective actions specified in the emergency plan in the unlikely event an emergency were to occur. There is no condition at the Station that would warrant implementation of any emergency plan at this time. PNPS continues to operate safely and is monitoring the weather conditions closely. The Station maintains emergency assessment, response, and communication capability. This report is being made conservatively in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. As stated previously, the Station maintains emergency assessment, response, and communication capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 53041 | 30 October 2017 06:47:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Severe Weather Causes Loss of Power to Support Buildings | There was a loss of power from the local grid which did not affect the power block. The support buildings lost power and a UPS failed which affects computers, switching, and telephones. This includes a loss of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). The Joint Information Center and Emergency Operations Facility were not affected. Though this is a major loss of communications ability, alternate communications methods are available. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Emergency Response Data System | |
| ENS 51523 | 9 November 2015 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Unavailable Due to Planned Maintenance | On Monday, November 9, 2015 at 0800 (EST), planned routine maintenance was initiated on the Technical Support Center/Operations Support Center (TSC/OSC) ventilation system. The planned maintenance is to replace the charcoal filters and test the HVAC trains. All other TSC/OSC functions remain available. Under certain accident conditions the TSC/OSC may become unavailable as a result of the ventilation system not being available. Existing Emergency Procedures direct the responsible Emergency Plant Manager to relocate the TSC/OSC staff to the designated alternate location. The affected Emergency Response Organization facility leads have been informed. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts will be notified. This notification to the USNRC Operations Center is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF).
At 1730 EST on Monday, November 9, 2015, the TSC/OSC ventilation system was restored to service. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Arner). | HVAC | |
| ENS 50790 | 5 February 2015 18:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Sea Water Intake Bay Level Instrumentation Due to Loss of Instrument Air | On January 27, 2015, during winter storm JUNO, there was a loss of instrument air at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). Follow-up evaluations of the plant events that occurred on that day revealed that the loss of instrument air resulted in a loss of water level indicators in the seawater intake bays. The affected instruments, LI-3831 A/B, are utilized in assessing conditions for entry into the Emergency Action Levels. PNPS Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) EP-IP-100.1 specified a compensatory action of 'visual inspection required' should these instruments be unavailable. However, there was not a clear linkage between the EPIP compensatory actions and the operations procedure for loss of instrument air. Neither the EPIP nor operations procedure identified the specific actions necessary to perform the local monitoring action. Based on the above, we have concluded that this event was reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The review of the event revealed actual sea water levels in the intake bay did not meet plant specified EAL entry conditions at any time during the winter storm and therefore no plant equipment was impacted. The capability to assess intake bay water level locally in the intake bay was available. Subsequent to the winter storm event, the instrument air system and sea water bay level instrumentation were restored to service. Public health and safety were not adversely affected. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. | ||
| ENS 50273 | 11 July 2014 12:23:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability - Loss of Power to the Plant Process Computer | At 0823 EDT on Friday, July 11, 2014, the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) determined that the plant process computer and, therefore, the in-plant Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) was not functioning as designed due to a loss of power. The SPDS provides numerous plant parameters, some of which are credited for emergency assessment capability. The site has determined that this constitutes a major loss of assessment capability. Immediate actions were taken to restore the system to functional status and applicable plant procedures were entered to determine temporary mitigating actions. Power was subsequently restored at approximately 1030 EDT via an alternate supply, and SPDS has been restored to normal operation. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. This notification is conservatively being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). There is no impact to plant operations. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State. | Safety Parameter Display System | |
| ENS 49905 | 12 March 2014 17:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Communication - Federal Telephone System (Fts) | At 1315 (EDT) on Wednesday March 12, 2014, while performing monthly communications testing, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) discovered that portions of the Federal Telephone System (FTS) were not functioning as designed. Specifically, the Emergency Notification System (ENS), is not available from the Control Room or Technical Support Center/ Operations Support Center (TSC/OSC) while the Health Physics Network (HPN), the Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCL), and the Protective Measures Counterpart Link (PMCL) are not currently available from the Technical Support Center/ Operations Support Center (TSC/OSC). All four of these systems were confirmed to be available from the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The initial investigation has determined that the failure has not impacted the entire FTS, but may have the potential to impair the licensee's ability to communicate in the event of an emergency. Immediate actions are being taken to restore the system to functional status and applicable plant procedures have been entered to determine any further mitigating actions. Members of the Emergency Response Organization have been notified of the failures and the need to utilize commercial phone lines as a compensatory action. The NRC Operations Center has been contacted and informed of these communication system failures. It cannot be determined at the time of this notification as to when the system will be restored to full functional status. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is conservatively being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of certain emergency response communication capabilities as provided by the FTS. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the state.
Federal Telephone System (FTS) communications testing was completed at 1130 EDT on March 14, 2014. The FTS System has been restored to full functional status. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has been informed. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Notified R1DO (Ferdas). | ||
| ENS 49605 | 3 December 2013 18:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Communications Capability- Ep Conferencing Lines Unavailable | At approximately 1330 (EST) on Tuesday, December 03, 2013, while performing a table top drill, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) discovered that EP (Emergency Preparedness) bridge conferencing lines were unavailable. The conference lines affected included the mitigation line, plant data phone, radiation data phone, emergency conferencing line, and the back up conference bridge line. Reviews to determine the cause of the event and efforts to restore the system are ongoing. The licensee has determined the Emergency Plan to be functional based on other communication methods that are available between onsite and offsite facilities. These include direct telephone lines, portable handheld radios, satellite phones and cell phones. Immediate actions to establish compensatory conferencing lines have been completed. On-going actions are in-progress to ensure procedure instruction is provided at each facility to enable use of the compensatory conference lines. At the time of this report, the plant is currently operating at 82% power due to a planned power maneuver unrelated to the reported communication event. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector (and will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts). This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of emergency response communication capability.
The primary communications method has been restored. The backup communications method should be restored tomorrow. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Cook). | ||
| ENS 49013 | 8 May 2013 21:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Main Annunciator System Inoperable Due to Maintenance | On May 8, 2013 at 1700 hours with the reactor in a Cold Shutdown condition and the Reactor Mode Select Switch in Refuel, the main control room annunciator system became inoperable during a preplanned activity to repair the associated 120VAC/125 VDC instrument power supply transfer switching scheme. The reactor cavity is flooded, the fuel pool gates are removed, shutdown cooling is in service and reactor vessel reassembly activities are in progress. The appropriate abnormal procedure was entered and compensatory actions including periodic monitoring of bus voltages and field annunciator panels were implemented for systems in service at the time of the loss. Station risk is green and all key safety functions are green. Troubleshooting is in progress however, return to service time has not been determined. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The USNRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public. | Shutdown Cooling | |
| ENS 48997 | 3 May 2013 09:42:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Main Control Room Annunciators During Planned Spds Maintenance | On May 3, 2013 at 0542 (EDT) hours with the reactor in Cold Shutdown and Reactor Mode Switch in Refuel, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) was removed from service as part of a preplanned activity in order to repair the associated 120VAC instrument power supply transfer switching scheme. The reactor cavity is flooded the fuel pool gates are removed and refueling activities are in progress. Station risk is green and all key safety functions are green as well. It is anticipated the repair will be completed in approximately ten hours. Following the planned de-energization, it was determined that an apparent equipment failure resulted in the loss of main control room annunciator system. The appropriate abnormal procedure was entered and compensatory actions including periodic monitoring of bus voltages and field annunciator panels implemented for systems in service at the time of the loss. The annunciator system was restored on May 3, 2013 at 0640 hours. This USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public. The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. | Safety Parameter Display System | |
| ENS 48743 | 11 February 2013 19:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Response Capability - Joint Information Center (Jic) Unavailable | On Monday, February 11, 2013 at 1435 EST with Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) at 0% core thermal power, the Joint Information Center (JIC) was determined to be unavailable and was declared non-operational. (Power was lost) to the facility (due) to winter storm Nemo. This facility serves as the Joint Information Center for Entergy, State, and Federal organizations during an emergency response. Existing emergency procedures direct the responsible Emergency Plant Manager to relocate the JIC staff to the designated alternate location (Bridgewater State University) as required. It has been confirmed that the alternate location is available for use. The Emergency Response Organization has been informed to establish the JIC at the Moakley Center at Bridgewater State University in the event of a declared emergency classification requiring activation of this Emergency Response Facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This eight-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency offsite response facility. An update will be provided when power has been restored to the JIC and the facility is available to be activated if called upon.
Power has been restored to the Joint Information Center (JIC). At approximately 1000 on 2/12/13 the JIC was deemed to be available for activation if called upon by the Emergency Preparedness Department. The Emergency Response Organization has been informed to establish the primary JIC in the event of a declared emergency classification requiring activation of this Emergency Response Facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis). | ||
| ENS 48574 | 10 December 2012 19:14:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Response Capability - Tsc/Osc Unavailable | Unavailability of TSC/OSC Ventilation System due to Ventilation Fan (FN-1) failure to start. On Monday, December 10, 2012, at 1414 hours with Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) at 100% core thermal power, the Technical Support Center (TSC)/Operations Support Center (OSC) emergency ventilation system was declared non-functional due to the failure of a fan (FN-1) to start during a scheduled surveillance (8.B.24). The balance of the TSC/OSC ventilation is not affected by this event and remain available. Under certain accident conditions the TSC/OSC may become unavailable due to inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC/OSC personnel to the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) and the Control Room. In the event of a declared emergency, all OSC personnel will report to the Control Room Annex. TSC minimum staffing will report to the Control Room and all other TSC staff will report to the EOF. The troubleshooting is being worked as a high priority and is conservatively scheduled to be completed by 1900 hours on Wednesday, November 12, 2012. A follow-up to this notification will be made when the TSC/OSC is returned to functional status or if the maintenance effort is significantly extended. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility.
This is an informational update to notification EN# 48574 made on Monday December 10, 2012. On Wednesday, December 12, 2012 at 1550 (EST) with Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) at 100% core thermal power, the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) emergency ventilation system was returned to functional status following repair and successful post maintenance testing of the fan (FN- 1). Notification has been made to the Emergency Response Organization that the normal facility activation capability has been restored. Additionally, in our initial notification there was a documentation error in that we stated November 12, 2012 as the expected return to service vice the correct date of today, December 12, 2012. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector that the TSC/OSC emergency ventilation has been restored to functional status. Notified the R1DO (Holody). | ||
| ENS 47615 | 23 January 2012 11:33:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out of Service Due to Planned Maintenance | On January 23, 2012 at 0633 hours, planned routine preventive maintenance was initiated on the Technical Support Center/Operations Support Center (TSC/OSC) diesel generator. The planned maintenance includes fluid and filter replacements, damper inspections and cleaning and is scheduled to be complete on January 26, at 1500 hours. The normal TSC/OSC power supply and all other TSC/OSC functions remain available. During certain periods of the preventive maintenance the diesel generator would not be capable of being restored to service within one hour. Under certain accident conditions the TSC/OSC may become unavailable as a result of the diesel generator not being available. Existing Emergency Procedures direct the responsible Emergency Plant Manager to relocate the TSC/OSC staff to the designated alternate location (EOF or main control room) as required. The affected Emergency Response Organization facility leads have been informed. The USNRC Resident Inspector Staff has been notified. This notification to the USNRC Operations Center is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF). The licensee plans to notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. | ||
| ENS 46271 | 23 September 2010 10:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Response Capability - Tsc/Osc Is Unavailable | Unavailability of TSC/OSC Ventilation System Due to Scheduled Maintenance. At 0600 (EDT) on Thursday, September 23, 2010, the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) emergency ventilation system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The balance of the TSC/OSC ventilation is not affected by the maintenance and remains available. Under certain accident conditions the TSC/OSC may become unavailable due to inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC/OSC personnel to the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) and to the Control Room. In the event of a declared emergency, all OSC personnel will report to the Control Room Annex. TSC minimum staffing will report to the Control Room and all other TSC staff will report to the EOF. The maintenance is scheduled to be completed by 1900 hours on Thursday September 23, 2010. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) (xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility. The licensee also informed the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
TSC/OSC ventilation was restored to operable status at 1600 EDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Dentel). | ||
| ENS 45840 | 14 April 2010 21:03:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Response Organization In-Plant Notification System | At 1703 EDT on Wednesday, April 14, 2010, the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) determined that the in-plant paging/notification systems used to notify the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) were not functioning as designed or required by the Emergency Plan. Specifically, the in-plant notification system which is comprised of the Computerized Automated Notification System (CANS) and back-up system (BEEPS) could not be determined to function reliably or consistently during an Emergency Plan drill or event. Compensatory measures exist to contact members of the ERO by procedure via call-trees through the operations and security organizations at the site. Immediate actions are being taken to restore the system to functional status working with the service provider for the in-plant paging/notification systems. It cannot be determined at the time of this notification as to when the system will be restored to full, functional status. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 45219 | 21 July 2009 18:05:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Response Capability - Tsc/Osc Is Unavailable Due to Hvac System Trouble | Unavailability of TSC/OSC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System. At 1405 hours on Wednesday, July 21, 2009, the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) HVAC system was discovered to be nonfunctional. During initial troubleshooting, the breaker providing power to the supply fan mechanically tripped and will not be reset until troubleshooting certifies the breaker is acceptable for use. This event occurred during scheduled preventative maintenance (PM) of the system. Under certain accident conditions, the TSC/OSC may become unavailable due to inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC/OSC personnel to alternate locations. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector/Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency.
This is a follow-up courtesy notification to EN #45219. All corrective maintenance activities on the TSC/OSC HVAC system are complete and the TSC/OSC is now functional and available for use. The NRC Resident has been notified. The licensee will inform the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. Notified R1DO (Rogge). | HVAC | |
| ENS 44509 | 22 September 2008 10:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center Unavailable | Unavailability of TSC/OSC Charcoal Filter for Scheduled Maintenance. At 0600 on Monday, September 22, 2008, the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operational Support Center (OSC) ventilation system charcoal was removed from service for planned charcoal bed maintenance. The balance of the TSC/OSC ventilation is not affected by the charcoal bed maintenance and remains available. Under certain accident conditions the TSC/OSC may become unavailable due to inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC/OSC personnel to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and to the Chiltonville Training Center. Charcoal filter maintenance is scheduled to be completed by 1700 hours on Monday September 22, 2008. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility.
The TSC/OSC ventilation system was returned to functional status on Monday, September 22, 2008. This follow-up notification is being made to provide closure from the initial notification under 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also notified the State of Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. Notified R1DO (Conte) | ||
| ENS 43667 | 26 September 2007 18:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center Ventilation Inoperable | At 1455 on September 26, 2007 investigatory surveillance testing identified that the emergency ventilation system designed to be manually initiated upon facility activation to maintain the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) at positive pressure was not functioning properly. The emergency fan motor operated discharge dampers were not fully opening preventing the ability to achieve rated system flow and therefore design positive pressure. Maintenance is currently in progress to restore the degraded dampers/damper controls. Pilgrim is also investigating a temporary modification that would allow manual damper alignment to support achieving design positive pressure. Responsible Pilgrim Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel have been notified of this condition. The alternate technical and operations support facilities remain fully functional. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify the State of Massachusetts. | ||
| ENS 40448 | 14 January 2004 15:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Sirens Inoperable/Degraded Due to Potential Amplifier Problems | At 1049 EST on January 14, 2004 the Control Room was notified that 78% (87 out of 112) Emergency Sirens failed a 'Quiet Test.' The Quiet test is a status check between the Emergency Offsite Facility and each individual siren. Further investigation revealed that 53 sirens would not operate as required and 34 were experiencing some degree of degradation. Indications point toward amplifier problems within each affected siren. Efforts are ongoing to troubleshoot and repair the effected sirens. Contingency plans are in place for alternate notification. The resident inspector has been notified. This condition was discovered during routine monthly testing. The sirens were upgraded about a year ago using equipment supplied by Federal Signal. * * * UPDATE ON 1/20/04 AT 1422 EST FROM RANDY HAISLET TO GERRY WAIG * * * The following was received via facsimile: This is a follow up to event report 40448 concerning a loss of 53 sirens. As of this morning, 105 of the 112 sirens are considered operable. Six of the 7 inoperable sirens are due to rotational problems. The remaining siren is inoperable due to the impact of a vehicle on it's pole. Work is currently on going to restore these sirens. The siren failures reported in event report are believed to be the result of a manufacturing defect which resulted in temperature sensitivity. A temporary means of heating the subject equipment has been put in place. Investigation is continuing. Notified R1DO (Clifford Anderson) |