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At 2050 CDT, on 03-23-2014, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that the C-333 High Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) Sprinkler System A-16 had been inspected by Fire Services and 11 sprinkler heads had visible corrosion on them, including 4 heads adjacent to each other. The system configuration was evaluated using EN-C-822-99-047, 'Effects of Impaired Sprinkler Heads on System Operability' and determined that with these heads potentially impaired, a portion of the building would not have sufficient sprinkler coverage. The HPFW system is required to be operable according to (Technical Safety Review) TSR LCO 2.4.4.5. HPFW system A-16 was declared inoperable and TSR LCO 2.4.4.5 Required Action B was implemented for the area without sprinkler coverage. Based on past testing results, there is a possibility that the heads would have been able to perform their specified safety function. Once the heads are removed from the system, testing will be performed to determine the actual affect on operability. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed. The NRC Region II (Marvin Sykes) has been notified of this event. PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-14-0324; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2014-03; NRC Worksheet No. 49953 Responsible Division: Operations TSR LCO 2.4.4.5 Action B requires an hourly fire patrol in the affected area.

• * *RETRACTION ON 3/28/14 AT 1959 EDT FROM JOE BARLETTO TO DONG PARK * * *

Subsequent to the event, the corroded sprinkler heads were replaced with new heads and the removed heads were tested In the laboratory. Based on the test results and the operability criteria defined in EN-C-822-99-047, A-16 was capable of performing its intended safety function. The clustered heads were on a single branch line in a ceiling beam pocket. The middle head failed testing, however overlapping coverage was provided by the adjacent heads on both sides. Notified R2DO (Sykes).

On 11/17/13, at 1417 CST, an alert was declared at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant due to an apparent tornado strike/severe weather event. Multiple facilities were damaged with no injuries and no hazardous material released. No damage to the security fence was observed and the protected area remained secured during the event. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(a)(4) where an emergency condition has been declared an Alert. NRC Branch Chief has been notified. PGDP has no NRC Resident Inspector. PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2013-08. Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email.

• * * UPDATE FROM DAVID PETTY TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1746 EST ON 11/17/13 * * *

On 11 /17/13, at 1638 CST, the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant decided to issue press releases describing the Alert issued by the plant that afternoon. The Alert was declared due to an apparent tornado strike/severe weather event on 11/17/13 at 1417 CST. This event is reportable under Criteria P in Appendix D of USEC procedure CP2-RA-RE 1 030 as any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. NRC Branch Chief has been notified. PGDP has no resident inspector. PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2013-08. Notified RA (McCree), NMSS EO (Damon), R2DO (Desai), IRD (Gott), NMSS (Haney), DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email.

• * * UPDATE FROM DAVID PETTY TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1910 EST ON 11/17/13 * * *

The Alert was terminated at 1806 CST on 11/17/13 after a complete security check of the site perimeter and a compilation of the damages sustained by the site. There were no personnel injuries and no releases (HAZMAT or radiological). Notified RA (McCree), NMSS EO (Damon), R2DO (Desai), IRD (Gott), NMSS (Haney), DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email.

At 1409 hours (CDT) on 6/28/2013, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of an unplanned contamination event that occurred in the C-710 Laboratory building. The controller program for the sample cylinder wash system in room #21 failed, causing supply water to flow out of the system. The water leaked through the floor into room B-23, which is located in the basement, and spread contamination onto the floor and a table. The area of the known water leak was immediately posted as a contamination area. Chemical Operations decontaminated the area that was initially contaminated by the water leak at 1730 hours on 6/28/2013. During follow-up investigative surveys conducted by Health Physics, additional contamination was discovered in other areas of the room causing the entire room to be posted as a contamination area (CA). It was initially thought that the additional contamination which was found was legacy contamination unrelated to the water leak; however, based on further investigation and HP survey results (on 7/1/13), it appears that contamination found elsewhere in the room also came from the water leak event. All contamination related to this event was not cleaned up within 24 hours and the room remains restricted at this time. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1)(i), 'An unplanned contamination event that: Requires access to the contaminated area, by workers or the public, to be restricted for more than 24 hours by imposing additional radiological controls or by prohibiting entry into the area'. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. Room B-23 remained locked over the weekend and was not accessed by plant personnel so the possibility of spreading contamination was minimized. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-13-1468: PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2013-05.

• * * RETRACTION AT 1522 EDT ON 7/14/13 FROM DEREK WARFORD TO BILL HUFFMAN * * *

Calculations were performed by the Health Physics group of the estimated quantity of material in the release. The estimate was based on: (1) An isotopic analysis of the contamination revealed three predominant isotopes, all Uranium daughters, Pa-234, Thorium-231, and Thorium-234; (2) the estimated water volume 'released' of 8.0 liters; and (3) that the isotopic concentration in the 8.0 liters of water was homogeneous. Based on the calculations, the summation of the mixture of isotopes was 4.52E2 microcuries and is approximately 30 percent of 5 ALI (annual limit on intake) for the most restrictive isotope, Th-234 (1.5E3 microcuries). Therefore part (ii) of 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1) was not met and reporting is not required. Based on the above information the subject notification should be retracted. This retraction has been discussed with the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. R2DO (Nease) and NMSS EO (Benner) notified.

At 1616 CDT, on 05-08-12 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that C-360 (Toll Transfer & Sampling Building) Autoclave #2 had a failure in the Autoclave High Pressure Isolation System (AHPIS). (AHPIS) is designed to: 1) prevent a cylinder failure inside the autoclave as a result of overheating; and 2) mitigate releases to the atmosphere from releases inside the autoclave. Autoclave containment is required to be operable per TSR 2.1.3.1 while the autoclave is in TSR modes 3 (containment), 4 (autoclave closed), and 5 (autoclave heating). On 5/08/12 at 1610 CDT an operator noticed water flowing from the autoclave head to shell sealing surface on the #2 autoclave in C-360 while a cylinder was being heated (TSR mode 5 - autoclave heating). The PSS was notified of the loss of containment at 1616 CDT and the (AHPIS) was declared inoperable. The steam cycle was interrupted and the autoclave was placed in a non-applicable TSR mode at 1657 CDT. No release of UF6 occurred due to the failure of the (AHPIS). This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand; and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATRC-12-1195; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2012-02; Responsible Division: Operations

• * * UPDATE FROM BILLY WALLACE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1640 EDT ON 5/9/2012 * * *

After further review the licensee determined that additional reportability criteria were met as described below: At 1616 on 05/08/2012, the PSS was notified that C-360 Autoclave #2 had water flowing from the autoclave head to shell sealing surface indicating a potential failure in the Autoclave High Pressure Isolation System (AHPIS) containment, which is relied on as an engineered control in NCSE 042 (SRI 5.5.3). The AHPIS is designed to minimize leaks to atmosphere from the autoclave under maximum pressures resulting from a UF6 release from the cylinder, valve or pigtail in the autoclave. The maximum acceptable leak rate for the autoclaves is 12 SCFM at a minimum test pressure of 90 psig or a 10 psi pressure drop in 1 hour. In order to determine if the AHPIS would have met its safety function, a pressure decay test will be performed. However, the pressure decay test will not be performed within 24 hours of discovery. Therefore, it is conservatively assumed that the leak discovered is greater than 12 SCFM or greater than 10 psi pressure drop in 1 hour; resulting in a 24 hour NCS reportable event. When the leak was noticed, the heat cycle was interrupted and the autoclave placed in a safe configuration. No release of UF6 had occurred in the autoclave when the leak out the autoclave was found. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 24-Hr. NRC BL 91-01 Supp. 1. This is a criticality safety event in which violations involving operations that comply with the double contingency principle and do not meet the criteria for a 4-hr report, but still result in a violation of the double contingency principle, such as, events where the double contingency principle is violated but control is immediately reestablished. Safety Significance of Events: --While an NCSA control was not maintained resulting in the potential autoclave leak rate being exceeded, a release of fissile material from a cylinder in the autoclave did not occur and therefore a criticality was not possible. Potential Criticality Pathways Involved: --In order for a criticality to be possible, a cylinder, valve, or pigtail of a fissile cylinder would have to fail and release greater than a safe mass of fissile material into the autoclave and the autoclave containment would have to fail allowing a large release to atmosphere of uranium and settle out in an unfavorable geometry with sufficient moderator present. Controlled Parameters: --The first leg of double contingency is based on mass. --The first leg of double contingency is based on administrative and design controls to ensure that it is unlikely to have a large release of UF6 from the cylinder, valve or pigtail in the autoclave while healing the cylinder. --The second leg of double contingency is based on geometry moderation. Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material: --No leakage of UF6 occurred. Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or Control System(s) and Description of the Failures or Deficiencies: --The first leg of double contingency is based on mass. --The first leg of double contingency is based on administrative and design controls to ensure that it is unlikely to have a large release of UF6 from the cylinder, valve or pigtail in the autoclave while heating the cylinder. This control was maintained. --The second leg of double contingency is based on geometry / moderation. --Small leaks out of the autoclave to atmosphere are considered normal case and the Autoclave High Pressure Isolation System ensures containment to minimize a significant release to atmosphere if a release occurs in the autoclave during heating. The AHPIS ensures that the maximum leak rate from the autoclave will not exceed 12 SCFM or a maximum acceptable pressure drop of 10 psi in 1 hour. If the containment leak rate is maintained, only a small amount of uranium could leak to atmosphere and the uranium would form in thin layers on surfaces in a geometrically safe configuration. Also there would be insufficient uranium to leak outside of the building; therefore there would not be a sufficient source of moderation. Since this control is assumed to have failed, uranium could leak out of the autoclave to atmosphere if a large release of UF6 occurred in the autoclave and potentially deposit in geometrically unfavorable configurations in areas where sufficient moderators exist. Since the leak rate cannot be confirmed within 24 hours, it is conservatively assumed that the geometry moderation parameter was lost and double contingency was not maintained. Corrective Actions To Restore Safety Systems and When Each Was Implemented: --Perform a pressure decay test on Autoclave #2 according to procedures and if the leak rate is determined to be greater than 12 SCFM or 10 psi in one hour, repair AHPIS prior to heating another cylinder containing uranium. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATRC-12-1195; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2012-03; Responsible Division: Operations. Notified R2DO (Freeman) and NMSS EO (Campbell).

• * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID PETTY TO DONG PARK AT 1403 EDT ON 5/15/2012 * * *

Subsequent to the above notifications on May 10, 2012, autoclave no. 2 was subjected to a pressure decay test in the as-found condition. The test indicated that the High Pressure Isolation Safety System would have been capable of performing its intended safety function if called upon on May 8, 2012, during the heat cycle subject of the event reports. Thus, the event was not required to be reported under 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i) and the notifications may be retracted. Subsequent to the above notifications on May 10, 2012, autoclave no. 2 was subjected to a pressure decay test in the as-found condition. The test indicated that the High Pressure Isolation Safety System would have been capable of performing its intended safety function if called upon on May 8, 2012, during the heat cycle subject of the event reports. The pressure drop from the as-found test was less than the maximum allowable pressure drop for the system required for criticality safety. Thus, the event did not meet the criteria to be reported under 24-Hr. NRC BL 91-01 Supp. 1. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer) and NMSS EO (Guttmann).

At 0930 CST on 11-28-11, during annual inspection of the C-400/C-409 floor drains and sumps according to procedure CP4-CU-CH6021, a chemical operator identified that an eye wash drain was no longer properly sealed around the concrete base and would not prevent solutions from entering the drain if challenged. NCSA (Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment) CHM-001 requires specific drains to be sealed to prevent the accumulation of fissile material in the unsafe geometry drain system. In violation of NCSA CHM-001, the poured concrete base surrounding the eye wash drain #147 in C-400 was discovered to be broken loose from the floor so that it could no longer provide a seal against spilled uranium solution getting into the drain system. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS Although the concrete block has broken loose from the floor, only a small crack exists at the base of the concrete block which would present a torturous solution path to the drain. Therefore, a large release will be prevented from transporting a significant amount of solution to the drain system. While the Safety Related Item failed, no fissile material was released onto the C-400 building floor and no fissile material entered the drain system through this drain. POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED In order for a criticality to occur a release of greater than a safe mass of uranium onto the floor of C-400 would have to occur. A solution containing greater than a safe mass would then have to migrate to the drain, leak into the drain system, and accumulate in an unfavorable geometry. CONTROLLED PARAMETERS The two process conditions relied upon for double contingency for this scenario are mass and geometry. ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL Process is designed to handle uranium contaminated solutions with a maximum assay of 5.5 wt.% U235. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES The first leg of double contingency is based on the mass of uranium in solution form that leaks out of the system. The analysis credits both the integrity of the system and the fact that the tanks and piping are inspected for leakage. Small leaks will be identified and fixed before they have leaked enough uranium mass in solution to be a concern. Since no leakage has occurred, this control was not violated. The second leg of double contingency relies on the integrity of the floor drain seals to prevent uranium solution from getting into the unsafe geometry drain system. Since a pathway from the floor to the drain system exists, this control was violated and the parameter was not maintained. Because the parameter was not maintained double contingency was not maintained. Double contingency was not maintained because the geometry parameter was not maintained. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1. Stop fissile solution operations in the vicinity of the eyewash drain. This was completed at 1000 CST on

    11-28-11.
 2. Restore the seal to this drain. Pending
 3. Upon successful restoration of the seal for the eyewash drain #147, fissile solution operations may be 
     resumed. Pending

Since one leg of double contingency was lost, this is being reported to the NRC as a 24-hour Event Report in accordance with NRC BL 91-01 Supplement 1. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-11-3171 and PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2011-20.

At 0415 CDT while changing out a cylinder of Fluorine/CL3 gas mixture in the C350 building, apparently a gasket failure occurred and an uncontrolled release of the gas mixture began. The licensee estimates that at the time the release began, there was approximately 160 lbs. of material in the cylinder. The release continues at this time. The C350 building was evacuated. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this event. No offsite assistance is being requested by the licensee. The local emergency squad is responding. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM MIKE BOREN AND GREG BARNA TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0631 EDT ON 7/27/2011 * * *

The licensee believes, but has not verified at this time, that the gas leak has been stopped. A 'shelter in place' order has been issued for the following buildings: C337, C337a, C360, C335, C635 and C631. Samples exterior to building C350 are negative. Samples interior to building C350 still show residue and fog in the building. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM MIKE BOREN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0714 EDT ON 7/27/2011 * * *

The licensee has verified that the leak has been stopped.

• * * UPDATE FROM GREG BARNA TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0726 EDT ON 7/27/2011 * * *

At 0615 CDT, an employee that was involved with the cylinder change-out and response to the event was transported to the onsite medical facility. He was complaining of a burning sensation to his right arm. At 0625 CDT, samples obtained both inside and outside of building C350 were negative. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM GREG BARNA TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0736 EDT ON 7/27/2011 * * *

At 0631 CDT, the licensee has terminated the Alert. The licensee is controlling access to building C350 for investigation. The licensee has setup a recovery team. As a precautionary measure, a second individual that was involved in the cylinder change-out was also transported to the onsite medical facility. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey), NMSS EO (Habighorst), IRD MOC (Marshall), DHS (Arnold), FEMA (Hollis), DOE (Connally), EPA (Brett), USDA, and HHS (Jones).

• * * UPDATE FROM DEREK WARFORD TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0916 EDT ON 7/27/2011 * * *

On 7/27/11 at 0710 (CDT), the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant decided to issue a press release describing the Alert issued by the plant earlier in the morning. The Alert issued on a chlorine trifluoride (CIF3) release in the C-350 facility was declared on 07/27/11 at 0415 (CDT) and terminated on 07/27/11 at 0631 (CDT). . This event is reportable under Criteria P in Appendix D of USEC procedure UE2-RA-RE1030 as any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. Notified R2DO (Blamey), NMSS EO (Habighorst) and PAO (Harrington).

At 1254 CDT, on 05/15/2011, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that the C-333 High Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) Sprinkler System C-14 had been inspected by Fire Services and eleven sprinkler heads had visible corrosion on them. The system configuration was evaluated using EN-C-822-99-047, 'Effects of Impaired Sprinkler Heads on System Operability' and determined that with these heads potentially impaired, a portion of the building would not have sufficient sprinkler coverage. The HPFW system is required to be operable according to TSR LCO 2.4.4.5. HPFW system C-14 was declared inoperable and TSR LCO 2.4.4.5 Required Action B was implemented for the area without sprinkler coverage. Based on past testing results, there is a possibility that the heads would have been able to perform their specified safety function. Once the heads are removed from the system, testing will be performed to determine the actual affect on operability. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP (Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant) Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-11-1192; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2011-08; Responsible Division: Operations An hourly fire patrol is being conducted in the affected area. (Licensee) estimated correction date: 5/20/2011.

• * * RETRACTION FROM BILLY WALLACE TO JOE O'HARA AT 1145 EDT ON 5/20/11 * * *

Subsequent to the event, the corroded sprinkler heads were replaced with new heads and the removed heads were tested in the laboratory. Testing by the laboratory has shown that six of the 10 removed sprinkler heads would have performed their safety function, five of the heads would not have performed their safety function, but these heads would not affect the system operability. The conclusion of the tests is that the C-333 sprinkler system C-14 would have performed its intended safety function if called upon. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO(Shaeffer) and NMSS EO(Damon)

On 10/04/2009 at 1500 C-331 unit 2 cell 2 was being charged and placed on stream and had just gone above atmospheric pressure when a Maintenance Mechanic observed smoke coming from the cell instrument cubicle and determined it to be UF6 outleakage from cell process instrumentation. To stop the release the cell was immediately taken back below atmospheric pressure. Investigation revealed that a UF6 release had occurred inside the instrument cubicle. The amount of material released has not yet been determined. Decontamination is underway but has not been completed inside the cabinet. The area outside the cabinet has been decontaminated. No injuries or personnel exposure occurred as a result of this event. This is being reported based on 10 CFR 76.120(c)(1)(i) (unplanned contamination event). PGDP Problem Report Nos. ATRC-09-2435; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2009-016. Responsible Division: Operations PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-09-2435; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2009-16; Worksheet No. Responsible Division: Operations The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. Decontamination is expected to be completed on 10/6/2009.

• * * RETRACTION FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/03/09 AT 1551 EST* * *

After further review, it was determined that the amount of contamination was significantly less than five times the lowest annual limit on intake specified in Appendix B to Section 20.1001-20.2402 of 10CFR20 for the material. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie) and NMSS (Whaley).

The site staffed their Emergency Operations Center to troubleshoot an ongoing recirculating cooling water leak under the concrete floor of the C337A autoclave facility. The process in that facility automatically shutdown and is in a stable condition. Overall impact to the plant is minimal and processes continue to operate in the cascade facility. Offsite assistance has been requested. DOE, Massac County, Illinois and McCracken and Ballard Counties in Kentucky have been notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 0220 ON 1/15/2009 FROM MIKE BOREN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The event was terminated at 0220. The leak is not isolated but has been localized. Notified the R2DO (Rudisail) and NMSS (Davis).

At 2043 CST, on 12-26-08 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that C-337 Unit 6 Cell 9 was above atmospheric pressure and the UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) System was inoperable. The cell had been running below atmosphere earlier in the day but a new gradient was put in and load movement caused pressure to go above atmosphere. The PGLD System for Unit 6 Cell 9 had been inoperable for an extended period of time due to wiring problems. TSR 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the cell are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. Even though the increase in cell pressure was due to load movement which is transient in nature, it was determined that the pressure had been above atmosphere for about four and a half hours, which is longer than the typical transient. With the Unit 6 Cell 9 PGLD system inoperable, none of the required cell heads were operable. TSR LCO 2.4.4.1.B.1 was entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

• * * RETRACTION ON 12/31/2008 AT 1716 FROM TONY HUDSON TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

A subsequent review of the cell pressure proved that the cell pressures were below atmosphere at all times with the exception of one pressure spike of approximately 20 minutes. Since the cell was not operated above atmosphere and the TSR does not require PGLD systems to be operable during short term pressure transients, reporting under 10CFR76.120 is not required. Notified the R2DO (Lesser) and NMSS (Lorson).

At 0308 CST, on 11/18/2008, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that the C-337 High Pressure Fire Water (HPFW) Sprinkler System D-9 had been inspected by Fire Services and six sprinkler heads had visible corrosion on them. The system configuration was evaluated using EN-C-822-99-047, 'Effects of Impaired Sprinkler Heads on System Operability' and determined that with these heads impaired, a portion of the building would not have sufficient sprinkler coverage. The HPFW system is required to be operable according to TSR LCO 2.4.4.5. HPFW system D-9 was declared inoperable and TSR LCO 2.4.4.5 Required Action B was implemented for the area without sprinkler coverage. Based on past testing results, there is a possibility that the heads would have been able to perform their specified safety function. Once the heads are removed from the system, testing will be performed to determine the true affect on operability. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. The site has implemented hourly fire patrols while this impairment is in affect.

• * * RETRACTION FROM TONY HUDSON TO HOWIE CROUCH @1536 EST ON 11/21/08 * * *

The affected sprinkler heads were removed and subjected to testing in the plant laboratory. A total of nine heads (three of these heads were previously identified with corrosion) were removed and tested with five of the nine actuating as designed. Using these results, the plant's fire protection engineer concluded that adequate sprinkler coverage existed prior to the discovery and the system would have performed as designed to a fire demand. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Guthrie) and NMSS EO (Smith).

The following information is provided without quotation for readability: DESCRIPTION: On 10/09/08 at 1537 hours it was determined that procedure CP4-CU-CH6430, "In Storage Fissile Cylinder Inspection", does not fully meet the periodic inspection requirements of NCSA GEN-003. GEN-003 requires inspection every four years of all thick wall cylinders that contained fissile material since they were last washed on the inside of the cylinder. Only cylinders that were filled with fissile material on their last fill have been identified for inspection. Cylinders filled with fissile material, emptied and subsequently filled with non-fissile material and emptied, have not been inspected as required. Approximately 73 Cylinders that have contained fissile material since their last washing have not been inspected in violation of the requirement of NCSA GEN-003, these cylinders could contain residual nonvolatile material referred to as heel. Potentially the residual heel could contain fissile material. Double contingency is maintained by implementing two independent controls on one parameter (moderation). The first leg of double contingency relies on the design of the cylinder to ensure moderation control. Cylinders are designed to the requirements of ANSI N14.1 and ensure that it is unlikely for the cylinder wall to breach and allow water intrusion. This control on moderation was not violated. The second leg of double contingency relied on inspections every 4 years of the cylinder wall, valve, and plug for abnormal corrosion. This control ensures that in the event of a cylinder breach, it is unlikely that sufficient moderation to cause a criticality will enter the cylinder before it is identified and mitigated. Since the cylinders were not inspected within the 4 year time frame as required, this control on moderation was violated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-08-2918; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-31; NRC Worksheet No. 44558. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Although a control requiring inspection of the cylinders every 4 years was violated, no cylinder breaches occurred. Later inspections identified no cylinder integrity issues, moderation control was lost and double contingency was not maintained. POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): In order for a criticality to be possible, more than 10kgs of water would have to enter a breach in a cylinder which contains more than a critical mass of material enriched to greater than 1.0 wt% 235U. CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): Moderation. ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS) : There were 73 cylinders which were not inspected as required. These cylinders had at one time held fissile material. The cylinders were emptied except for a small residual heel and then filled with non-fissile material. The non-fissile material was then emptied leaving only the residual heel in the cylinder. Cylinder heels are typically less than 50 pounds. Assay is always less than 5.5% enrichment. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: NCSA GEN-003 requires cylinders containing material enriched to greater than or equal to 1.0 wt % 235U to be inspected every 4 years to identify significant signs of degraded cylinder wall, valve and plug. These cylinders were filled with fissile material, emptied and then subsequently filled with non-fissile material and then emptied again, but were not inspected within the four year requirement. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED : Cylinders have been inspected per the CP4-CU-CH6430 and the identified cylinders were found to comply with NCSA GEN-003.

• * * UPDATE AT 1750 EDT ON 10/10/08 FROM BILLY WALLACE TO STEVE SANDIN VIA FAX * * *

On 10/10/08 at 1500 CDT, an additional 8 cylinders were discovered which had not been properly inspected. The additional cylinders were of a different size than the initial cylinders found, but fall under the same requirement. The additional cylinders have been inspected and all met the NCSA requirements. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer) and NMSS (McCartin).

Site experienced high winds and sustained weather related damage to mobile offices and isolated site power outages. Plant wide assessment in progress. Plant systems are still operational and have not been impacted by the wind damage. No chemical hazards have been identified at this time. AC power was lost to the offsite Public Warning System sirens, but battery power available for 72 hours. Licensee has requested expedited action from the electric utility company to return AC power to the siren system. The site EOC was activated to assist the on shift personnel with weather damage assessment and the licensee was in an Unclassified Emergency. The licensee notified the McCracken County Sheriff's Dispatch office, Kentucky Division of Emergency Management, and the DOE Oak Ridge Operations Center.

• * * UPDATE PROVIDED AT 1339 EDT ON 09/14/08 FROM STEVE WAGNER TO JEFF ROTTON * * *

Licensee provided a courtesy notification that they had terminated their unclassified emergency at 1232 CDT and deactivated their EOC. All damage to the site was minor and they have established recovery teams. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRDMOC (McMurtray), R2DO (Payne) and NMSS EO (Brach)