Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 55674 | 22 December 2021 17:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Siren System | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On December 27, 2021, at 1014 EST, a system error in the site's Alert and Notification Siren System was identified, indicating a loss of the siren system affecting a greater than 25% of the emergency planning zone population. Review of the system's data logger indicates the system error has been present within the system since December 22, 2021, at 1245 EST. The fleet's telecommunications department has been contacted and is aware of the issue. In the event that a radiological emergency should occur at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Primary Route Alerting procedures will be put in use by the local jurisdictions. This condition is reportable as a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident, state and local agencies have been notified.
The following information was provided by the Licensee via email: Further troubleshooting efforts identified that the Chatham County EOC Siren Activation Point remained capable of sending an alert signal to the sirens for the duration of the event described above. This ensures siren activation would be performed in a timely manner in the event of a radiological emergency. This Event Notification is therefore retracted, as no loss of emergency preparedness capabilities has occurred. The NRC Resident and local agencies have been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller) | ||
| ENS 55213 | 25 April 2021 16:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Seismic Monitoring System Out of Service for Planned Maintenance | At 1200 EDT on April 25, 2021, planned maintenance activities on the Harris Nuclear Plant Seismic Monitoring System will be performed. The work includes performance of preventive maintenance and system upgrades. The work duration is approximately 10 days and compensatory measures will be in place for seismic monitoring. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a planned loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 55017 | 1 December 2020 16:16:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Technical Support Center Functionality | On December 1, 2020 at 1116 EST, a condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered during surveillance testing. The issue resulted in a loss of TSC functionality due to a high flow rate measured on outside air intake fans. The cause of the high flow rate is under investigation. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with site procedures. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54773 | 10 July 2020 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Common Emergency Operations Facility Maintenance | At 900 EDT on July 10, 2020, Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson Nuclear Sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at Harris Nuclear Plant, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the McGuire Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54651 | 8 April 2020 13:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Technical Support Center Functionality | On April 8, 2020, at 0945 EDT, a condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered. The issue involved a loss of TSC habitability due to failure of outside air intake fans. These fans were returned to service at 1237 EDT and the TSC is currently functional. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. | ||
| ENS 53366 | 26 April 2018 22:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability | This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because planned maintenance activities were performed on April 23rd through April 25th on the seismic monitoring system without viable compensatory measures established. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 52418 | 8 December 2016 18:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation System Out of Service Due to Failed Air Intake Fan | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered on December 8, 2016, at 1330 (EST). The issue involved a loss of the ability to maintain habitability of the TSC due to a failed outside air intake fan. The repair of the equipment failure is currently being planned. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The secondary TSC has been notified that relocation may be necessary upon facility activation. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 52291 | 8 October 2016 17:28:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Unusual Event Declared Due to Loss of Offsite Power | Loss of all offsite power capability, Table S-5, to 6.9kV emergency buses 1A-SA and 1B-SB for greater than or equal to 15 minutes. At 1328 EDT, while shutdown in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown), Harris declared an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power. Following the loss of offsite power (LOOP), the Emergency Diesel Generators started and loaded onto their respective emergency buses. The reactor remains stable and shutdown in Mode 4. The licensee is currently investigating the cause of the LOOP and the emergency buses will continue to be powered by the EDGs until the licensee has determined the cause for the LOOP. Offsite power is currently available into the switchyard. The licensee notified the state government, the local government, and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).
The cause (of the LOOP) is not known. Duke Energy Control Center has evaluated the grid and is comfortable with Harris connecting emergency buses back to the grid. Harris Plant is evaluating restoration. Faults were validated on the 115kV Cape Fear North and South supply lines into the Harris switchyard. This notification also addresses various valid actuations of safety systems, including the Emergency Diesel Generators, as well as, potential loss of Emergency Assessment Capabilities due to the LOOP impacting Emergency Planning equipment. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (King).
The cause of the LOOP has been determined to be a momentary electricity loss on the 115kV Cape Fear North and South supply lines into the Harris switchyard. This event notification also addresses the loss of safety function of the offsite power system which occurred as a result of grid perturbations. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (King).
Based on the grid being stable and the 115kV Cape Fear North and South lines being available, the licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 2049 EDT on 10/8/16. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bonser), IRD (Grant), and NRR EO (King). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, FEMA National Watch (email only), DHS NICC, Nuclear SSA (email only).
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(XI) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION At approximately 1305 EDT on October 9, 2016, Duke Energy personnel notified the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources of a spill of untreated sanitary wastewater. During a significant rainfall event associated with Hurricane Matthew, wastewater was released from the overflow of a lift station that did not function as a result of a power outage. The untreated sanitary wastewater entered the plant's storm drain system. The release has been stopped and the lift station power is restored. An investigation is in progress to further determine the cause and additional corrective actions. There is no impact to public health and safety or the environment due to this incident. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser). | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 52152 | 4 August 2016 15:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Out-Of-Service | This is a non-emergency eight-hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation system was discovered on 8/4/16 at 1100 EDT. Repairs are complete. If an emergency would have been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC had become uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Site Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to the Alternate TSC in accordance with applicable emergency plan implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Manager and Site Emergency Coordinator were notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 51625 | 28 December 2015 21:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability Due to Functionality of Technical Support Center Ventilation | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality of technical support center (TSC) ventilation system was discovered on December 28, 2015, at 1645 (EST). The issue could result in higher temperatures than normal for a working environment. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. Relocation will be considered based upon temperature and radiological conditions. Repairs will be prioritized, but a firm schedule for resolution is not available at this time. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 51472 | 15 October 2015 19:54:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation System Out of Service Due to Discovered Condition | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality of the TSC Ventilation system was discovered on October 15, 2015 at 1554 EDT. The issue involved a loss of heating capability of the TSC Ventilation system due to failed ventilation system components. The review of the impact of this equipment failure on the habitability of the TSC over the 30 day mission time determined that this condition was reportable as a loss of emergency assessment capability. The repair of the equipment failure is currently being planned. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Subsequent calculations determined that the loss of heating capability of the TSC Ventilation system did not affect the TSC functionality at the time of discovery or during the 30 day mission time period. Therefore, the TSC remained functional throughout the time in question. The initial 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) report is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification retraction. Notified the R2DO (Ehrhardt). | ||
| ENS 51212 | 7 July 2015 15:05:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Out of Service | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality of the TSC Ventilation system was discovered on July 7, 2015 at 11:05 EDT. The issue involved a loss of cooling capability of the TSC Ventilation system due to failed ventilation system components. Maintenance started repairs immediately following the discovery of the component failures and completed repairs to restore functionality of the TSC Ventilation system on July 8, 2015 at 17:07 EDT. On July 8, 2015, at approximately 15:30 EDT, further review of the impact of this equipment failure determined that this condition was reportable as a loss of emergency assessment capability. If an emergency were declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC became uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC became necessary, the Emergency Director would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team was notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition did not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
An extent of condition review revealed three additional instances of loss of cooling capability of the Technical Support Center due to failed ventilation system components: January 7, 2015; June 20, 2015; and June 30, 2015. Functionality was restored after these conditions were identified. Each of these instances was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. Notified R2DO (Rose). | ||
| ENS 51146 | 10 June 2015 17:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Temporary Loss of Meteorological Data | This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a loss of emergency assessment capability at the Harris Nuclear Plant. Between March 24, 2015, and April 28, 2015, the meteorological data transfer process from the sensors to the emergency response facilities stalled intermittently five times. The control room staff was unaware of this condition for a maximum of 6.6 hours at any given time. When the data transfer process was stalled and the control room staff was unaware of the issue, the staff may have used inappropriate information in implementing the emergency plan. There was no impact from this condition because there were no actual emergencies during this time. On June 10, 2015, at approximately 1300 (EDT), further review of the impact of this equipment failure determined that this was reportable as a loss of emergency assessment capability. The condition that caused the data transfer process to stall has been corrected. In addition, measures have been implemented to ensure that if the data transfer process stalls again, backup sources of information will be used in accordance with the emergency plan to preclude loss of the assessment capability. There was no adverse impact to the public health and safety or to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition. Until this information is captured in a plant procedure, the licensee has issued a standing instruction. | ||
| ENS 50443 | 10 September 2014 08:53:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation System Out of Service Due to Fire Alarm | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. At approximately 0453 EDT on September 10, 2014, a fire alarm in an area near the primary Technical Support Center (TSC) triggered an automatic shutdown of the TSC ventilation system. The system was restored at 0755 EDT. The alternate TSC was available at all times. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 49994 | 3 April 2014 13:06:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Sirens Declared Nonfunctional | At approximately 0906 EDT, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) offsite emergency sirens were identified to be nonfunctional. Troubleshooting was initiated and the offsite emergency sirens were restored and verified to be functional at 1127 EDT. This event requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. In the event that the sirens would have been needed, the State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone would have implemented mobile route alerting, as detailed in the Emergency Plan. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was informed. There was no impact to public health and safety. | ||
| ENS 49742 | 18 January 2014 15:16:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Alert Declared Due to Fire in 480V Bus | (At 1016 EST, an) Alert (was declared) based on EAL # HA 2.1 Fire or explosion resulting in either: visible damage to any table H-1 structure or system/component required for safe shutdown of the plant, or control room indication of degraded performance of any safe shutdown structure, system, or component within any table H-1 area. Fire in 480V bus 1D2. Reactor was manually tripped 480 VAC safety related transformer fire in switchgear room. Plant reduced power and tripped the reactor manually. Reactor trip was uncomplicated. Fire was extinguished when the 480 VAC bus was de-energized. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of North Carolina, and other local authorities. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Operations Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC, and NuclearSSA via e-mail.
Harris Nuclear Plant secured from the Alert at 1551 EST, on 1/18/14. The plant is stable, the fire is out, the TSC and EOF have been secured and plant recovery has been transferred to the outage control center. There were no personnel injuries or radiological releases. Radiation monitor RM-*1TS-3653C (Technical Support Center Radiation Monitor) is out of service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (King), R2RA (McCree), NRR (Leeds), IRD MOC (Grant), OPA (Brenner), NRR EO (Lee) Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Operations Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC, and NuclearSSA via e-mail. | ||
| ENS 49720 | 13 January 2014 15:22:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Response Facilities Out of Service Due to Planned Maintenance | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because work activities affect the functionality of emergency response facilities. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. At approximately 1022 (EST) on January 13, 2014, planned maintenance activities began on the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system. The scope of the maintenance is to obtain samples of the charcoal filter. The planned work activity duration is expected to be approximately 20 hours ending on January 14, 2014. In addition, a multi-day (5 days) maintenance activity will begin on January 13, 2014 on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC system, involving flow-balancing the system, which may involve intrusive maintenance during certain intervals. This intrusive maintenance will render the TSC HVAC system non-functional. This planned work activity is expected to be completed on January 17, 2014. The EOF and TSC HVAC systems will be restored periodically throughout this maintenance period. If an emergency is declared requiring emergency facility activation during this period, the emergency facilities will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If relocation of the emergency facilities becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the emergency response organization to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. An update will be provided once the EOF and TSC ventilation systems have been restored to normal operation and all planned maintenance is complete. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The planned maintenance is complete and the EOF and TSC have been restored to normal operation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (King) | HVAC | |
| ENS 49270 | 12 August 2013 19:50:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center (Tsc) Ventilation Out of Service Due to Discovered Condition | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition. On August 12, 2013 at 1550 (EDT), during routine testing of the HVAC (Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning) system, the TSC Emergency filtration Fan, MUF-1, was observed to have high vibration levels. Maintenance is working to determine the cause of the high vibrations and to make necessary repairs. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions, the Site Emergency Coordinator - TSC will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate TSC in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the condition and the possible need to respond to or relocate to an alternate TSC during an emergency. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation has been returned to service on August 16, 2013 at 2100 (EDT) following bearing replacement on TSC Emergency Make-up Fan, MUF-1. Post maintenance testing has been completed and the emergency response facility is functional. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Musser). | HVAC | |
| ENS 49228 | 31 July 2013 09:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Response Facility Preplanned Maintenance | This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. At 0510 (EDT) on July 31, 2013, preplanned maintenance commenced which affects the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation and radiation monitoring systems. The scope of the maintenance is to inspect and perform functional checks on various TSC ventilation system fans and the outside air intake radiation monitor. This maintenance is scheduled to be performed and completed within approximately 20 hours. TSC functionality requires all occupied areas of the TSC be maintained between 60.8 degrees F and 82.4 degrees F. Actual TSC temperatures have been verified to be less than 78 degrees F. If an emergency should occur, the ventilation system will be restored, but potentially not within the time required for activation of the TSC. If the facility were activated with full staff, temperatures could rise above the 82.4 degree F limit. Consideration will be given to relocating the TSC to the alternate emergency facility in accordance with PEP-240. The alternate TSC has been verified to have electrical power, ventilation, and communication capability. The Technical Support Center - Site Emergency Coordinator has been notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Preplanned maintenance was completed at 1540 EDT on 7/31/13. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (King). | ||
| ENS 49150 | 27 June 2013 08:25:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Planned Maintenance | This is a non-emergency notification. Planned maintenance activities will be performed today which will temporarily affect Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation. The maintenance will be completed in approximately 20 hours and is scheduled to be worked to minimize out-of-service time. In the event of an emergency, specific conditions may warrant relocating the TSC to the alternate facility per existing procedures. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the maintenance. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the scheduled maintenance affects an emergency response facility. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 49004 | 6 May 2013 14:16:00 | Other Unspec Reqmnt 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | One of Two National Weather Service Tone Alert Radios Out of Service | At 10:16 AM EDT on May 6, 2013, the National Weather Service (NWS-NOAA) reported a loss of the (NWS-NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitter, WXL-58 located in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, which serves the Northeast Piedmont on 162.550 MHZ. The NWS-NOAA does not have an expected return to service time. The NWS-NOAA Tone Alert Radio Transmitters are in place to provide a redundant means to alert residents within five miles to an emergency at the plant. Eighty-three Alert and Notification System (ANS) sirens are located throughout the ten mile radius of the plant. The ANS sirens have the same function as the Tone Alert Radios, but extend out to ten miles. All ANS sirens are currently in service and fully functional. Therefore, there is a means to alert the public within the 10 mile radius of the plant if an actual emergency were to occur. There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." This report was also made per a requirement of licensee procedure PLP-201. | ||
| ENS 48928 | 16 April 2013 08:14:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center (Tsc) Unavailable Due to Preplanned Maintenance | This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, based on LOSS of ASSESSMENT capability. This is a non-emergency notification. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. At approximately 0414 (EDT) on April 16, 2013, preplanned maintenance will be performed that will affect the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. The scope of the maintenance is to inspect and clean all Air Handler Units, Fans, and Outside Air Condensing Units that support TSC Ventilation. This maintenance is scheduled to be performed and completed within approximately 50 hours. TSC functionality requires all occupied areas of the TSC be maintained between 60.8 degrees F and 82.4 degrees F. Actual TSC area temperatures have been verified to be less than 78 degrees F. If an emergency condition should occur, the ventilation system will be restored, but potentially not within the time required for activation of the TSC. If the facility were activated with full staff, temperatures could rise above the 82.4 degrees F limit. Should the TSC need to be activated for an event, we have compensatory measures which would include relocating the TSC to the Alternate Emergency Facility per PEP-240. This decision would be based on the existing event conditions and coordinated with the Emergency Response Manager, Main Control Room - Site Emergency Coordinator, and Radiological Control Manager. The Alternate TSC has been verified to have electrical power, ventilation, and communication capability. The Technical Support Center - Site Emergency Coordinator has been notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 48915 | 11 April 2013 19:41:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Coolers Out of Service | This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, based on 'Loss of Assessment' capability. This is a non-emergency notification. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. At approximately 15:41 EDT on 4/11/2013, AH-11 and AH-17, Technical Support Center (TSC) Air Handling Units' coolers were not working. The cause of the condition has not been identified. However, troubleshooting efforts are being planned and will be worked immediately. TSC functionality requires all areas of the TSC be maintained between 60.8 degrees F and 82.4 degrees F. Actual TSC area temperatures have reached 77 degrees F. If the facility were activated with a full staff, temperatures could rise above the 82.4 degree F limit. Should the TSC need to be activated for an event, we have compensatory measures which would include relocating the TSC to the Alternate Emergency Facility per PEP-240. This decision would be based on the existing event conditions and coordinated with the Emergency Response Manager, SEC-MCR, and Radiological Control Manager. The Alternate TSC has been verified to have electrical power, ventilation, and communication capability. The Technical Support Center-Site Emergency Coordinator has been notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48840 | 21 March 2013 09:07:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radiation Monitors Inoperable for Pre-Planned Maintenance | This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 0507 EDT on March 18, 2013, radiation monitor RM-01TV-3536-1, Turbine Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) was declared inoperable for pre-planned corrective maintenance. Compensatory actions were put in place to sample per the requirements of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) and the duration of the maintenance was originally not expected to take longer than 72 hours. This event is now reportable because the planned equipment outage exceeded 72 hours. This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health or safety of the public or the operation of the facility. Compensatory actions remain in place to sample per requirements of ODCM. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. | ||
| ENS 48804 | 4 March 2013 09:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radiation Monitor Inoperable for Pre-Planned Maintenance | This is a non-emergency notification. At 0415 EST on March 4, 2013, REM-01MD-3528, Turbine Building Floor Drain Liquid Effluent Radiation Monitor, was declared inoperable for pre-planned corrective maintenance and surveillance testing. The pre-planned maintenance and surveillance testing is scheduled to take approximately 62 hours. Proceduralized compensatory measures are in place to sample and analyze for radioactivity at a lower limit of detection of no more than 10E-7 microCuries/ml at least once per 12 hours when the specific activity of the secondary coolant is greater than 0.01 microCuries/gram Dose Equivalent I-131, or at least once per 24 hours when the specific activity of the secondary coolant is less than or equal to 0.01 microCuries/gram Dose Equivalent I-131. The expected return to service and operability date is March 6, 2013. The Liquid Effluent Radiation Monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. The NRC Resident has been notified.
. . . Radiation Monitor REM-01 MD-3528 would be out of service for preplanned maintenance for approximately 62 hours, and the estimated return to service date was March 6, 2013. The preplanned maintenance is taking longer than expected and the current estimate is approximately 110 hours with return to service on Friday, March 8, 2013. The compensatory measures will continue until the monitor is returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Nease). | ||
| ENS 48779 | 25 February 2013 13:04:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability - Radiation Monitors Inoperable for Pre-Planned Maintenance | This is a non-emergency notification. At 8:04 AM EST on February 25, 2013 radiation monitor RM-21AV-3509-1, Plant Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) was declared inoperable for pre-planned maintenance. The maintenance is scheduled to be completed around 6:00 PM EST on 02/27/2013. This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. The Technical Support Center-Site Emergency Coordinator has been notified about this preplanned maintenance. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 48686 | 21 January 2013 18:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Response Capability - Technical Support Center Ah-17 Supply Fan Non-Functional for Preplanned Maintenance | This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 1300 (EST) on January 21, 2013 preplanned maintenance will be performed which will remove AH-17, one of three Technical Support Center (TSC) Supply Fans from service. The scope of the maintenance is to replace and align the fan's sheave with a contingency to replace its drive belt. This maintenance is expected to be performed and completed within approximately 7 hours. If an emergency condition should occur, the ventilation system will be restored, but potentially not within the time required for activation of the TSC. In addition, the ventilation system will be restored, but potentially not within the time required for activation of the TSC. In addition, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) emergency plan has procedural guidance for use of an alternate location in the event the TSC is not habitable. The on-call TSC Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48684 | 20 January 2013 21:41:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Disabled | At 1641 on January 20, 2013, the Technical Support Center (TSC) became non-functional when the ventilation system was secured and disabled by a fire alarm. Investigation of the alarm condition determined the fire alarm was not valid and would not reset. At 1830, Technical Support Center ventilation was restored by disabling the deficient fire alarm by using guidance in alarm response procedure APP-FP-KBLDG. The Technical Support Center was restored to functional status at 1830 on January 20, 2013. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this condition affected an emergency response facility for greater than facility activation time (one hour). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed | ||
| ENS 48670 | 14 January 2013 13:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability - Radiation Monitors Inoperable for Pre-Planned Maintenance | This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 08:40 EST on January 14, 2013, radiation monitor RM-01TV-3547-1, Waste Processing Building Vent Stack 5A Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) will be declared inoperable for pre-planned maintenance. MST-I0377, WPB Stack 5A Accident Monitor Channel Calibration will be performed. The maintenance activity is expected to complete January 15, 2013. This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health of safety of the public or the operation of the facility. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. | ||
| ENS 48611 | 20 December 2012 12:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability - Radiation Monitors Inoperable for Pre- Planned Maintenance | This is a non-emergency notification. At 0735 (EST) on December 20, 2012, radiation monitors RM-1CR-3561A, RM-1CR-3561B, RM-1CR-3561C and RM-1CR-3561D, Containment Ventilation Isolation Radiation Monitors, were declared inoperable for preplanned maintenance. These monitors are the only monitors credited in the EALs for monitoring elevated radiation levels inside containment for irradiated fuel. These radiation monitors are necessary for accident assessment and are credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to these monitors being out of service is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health or safety of the public or the operation of the facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 48597 | 15 December 2012 12:34:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Cooling Fan Inoperable | This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 based on 'Loss of Response' capability. This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 0734 EST on 12/15/2012 AH-17, the Technical Support Center (TSC) Cooling Fan was found exhibiting no flow. The cause of the no flow condition was a broken fan belt. Repairs are being planned and will be worked immediately. TSC functionality requires all areas of the TSC be maintained between 50 degrees F and 86 degrees F. The actual TSC area temperatures range from 59 degrees F to 67 degrees F. Should the TSC need to be activated for an event, . . . compensatory measures are in place to consider relocating the TSC to the Alternate Emergency Facility per PEP-240. This decision would he based on the existing event conditions and coordinated with the Emergency Response Manager, SEC-MCR, and Radiological Control Manager. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48588 | 13 December 2012 16:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Seismic Monitoring System Inoperable for Pre-Planned Maintenance | This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 11:00 EST on December 13, 2012, the Seismic Monitoring System was declared inoperable for pre-planned preventative maintenance, MPT-10240 Triaxial Time History Accelerograph. The preventive maintenance is expected to last approximately 5 to 6 hours. The Seismic Monitoring System is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health of safety of the public or the operation of the facility. Licensee has available redundant seismic indication and the on-site Emergency Response Organization has been notified. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. | ||
| ENS 48573 | 10 December 2012 12:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability- Radiation Monitors Inoperable for Pre-Planned Maintenance | This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 07:30 EST on December 10, 2012, radiation monitor RM-01TV-3536-1, Turbine Building Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) will be declared inoperable for pre-planned corrective maintenance on the FT-01TV-3536-1, Turbine Bldg Vent Stack flow rate monitor. The corrective maintenance is expected to last approximately 5 to 6 hours. This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health or safety of the public or the operation of the facility. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. | ||
| ENS 48563 | 6 December 2012 12:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radiation Monitor Inoperable for Pre-Planned Maintenance | This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 0700 EST on December 6, 2012, radiation monitor RM-01TV-3536-1, Turbine Building Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) was declared inoperable for pre-planned maintenance to perform surveillance testing. The surveillance test is scheduled to take approximately four hours. This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health or safety of the public or the operation of the facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 48559 | 5 December 2012 13:47:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Removed from Service for Maintenance | At approximately 0847 EST on December 5, 2012, maintenance (was commenced) on the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system to restore automatic differential pressure control to the TSC ventilation damper D-5. Following the maintenance, a 10 hour functionality run will be performed. Following a successful 10 hour run, full functionality of the TSC ventilation system will be declared. If an emergency requiring activation of the TSC should occur, procedural guidance exists for the Radiation Protection staff to perform continuous air monitoring of the TSC atmosphere to determine habitability conditions. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the Technical Support Center ventilation support system being non-functional during the maintenance and the 10 hour run. The Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been notified. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. | ||
| ENS 48538 | 27 November 2012 14:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability- Radiation Monitor Inoperable Due to Database Error | This is a non-emergency notification. At 0900 EST on November 27, 2012, it was discovered that radiation monitor RM-1WV-3546-1, Waste Processing Building Wide Range Gas Monitor was inoperable due to a database error. The database error appears to have occurred at approximately 1724 EST on November 26, 2012. The database error was corrected and the monitor returned to service at 0958 EST on November 27, 2012. This monitor is the only monitor credited in the EALs for monitoring a gaseous release from the Waste Processing Building. This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility because no events occurred during the time the radiation monitor was out of service. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. See EN #48536 for similar report. | ||
| ENS 48536 | 26 November 2012 15:29:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability- Radiation Monitor Inoperable for Pre-Planned Maintenance | This is a non-emergency notification. At 1029 EST on November 26, 2012, radiation monitor RM-1 WV-3546-1, Waste Processing Building Wide Range Gas Monitor was declared inoperable for pre-planned maintenance. This monitor is the only monitor credited in the EALs for monitoring a gaseous release from the Waste Processing Building. This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and Is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health of safety of the public or the operation of the facility. An alternative method for sampling and determination of activity levels has been implemented. The licensee stated that the radiation monitor was returned to service at 1728 EST on 11/26/12. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48524 | 20 November 2012 09:34:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability - Radiation Monitor Declared Inoperable | This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 0434 (EST) on November 20, 2012, radiation monitor RM-1WV-3547-1, Waste Processing Building Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) was declared inoperable due to a loss of sample flow. This monitor is the only monitor credited in the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) for monitoring a gaseous release from the radiochemistry facility. This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for EAL classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Revision 2. This condition does not affect the health or safety the public or the operation of the facility. An alternative method for sampling and determination of activity levels has been implemented. Actions are being taken to restore the monitor functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 48507 | 14 November 2012 15:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Assessment Capability - Gross Failed Fuel Detector | This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 10:00 am on November 14, 2012, it was identified that on June 14, 2012 at 4:04 am, the Gross Failed Fuel Detector was not controlling flow as required and therefore would not be able to perform its function. Further investigation revealed that the monitor has been in and out of service since that time. The last time the monitor was taken out of service was November 2, 2012 at 08:40 am and currently remains out of service. This condition has not impacted the health and safety of the public as this condition is not impacting the operation of the facility. This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification for an Unusual Event in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. Actions are in place to restore the monitor to functional status. The licensee can obtain chemistry grab samples to determine if there is failed fuel though this is not as responsive. The Gross Failed Fuel Detector is planned for repair on 11/16/2012. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48440 | 24 October 2012 19:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Support System Non-Functional | At 3:30 PM EDT on October 24, 2012, Harris Operations discovered that the Technical Support Center (TSC) outside differential pressure controller (PDC-4011) was not working. This pressure controller makes the TSC non-functional due to the ventilation system not being capable of maintaining a positive pressure with respect to outside. Procedural guidance exists for the Radiation Protection staff to perform continuous air monitoring of the TSC atmosphere to determine habitability conditions. Actions are being taken to expeditiously restore the system. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the Technical Support Center ventilation support system being non-functional. The on call Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been notified. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. | ||
| ENS 48408 | 16 October 2012 12:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Technical Support Center (Tsc) Maintenance | At approximately 0800 on October 16, 2012 pre-planned maintenance will be performed that will affect the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. The scope of the maintenance is to inspect and clean all air handler units, fans, and outside air condensing units that support TSC ventilation. This maintenance is expected to be performed and completed within approximately 13 hours. If an emergency condition should occur, the ventilation system will be restored, but potentially not within the time required for activation of the TSC. In addition, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) emergency plan has procedural guidance for use of an alternate location in the event the TSC is not habitable. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 48399 | 11 October 2012 18:28:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out of Service Due to Maintenance | At approximately 1428 EDT on October 11, 2012, preplanned maintenance will be performed that will affect the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. This maintenance will be performed as part of an electric heater control panel inspection (DH-1). This maintenance is expected to be performed and completed within 4 hours. If an emergency condition should occur, the power will be restored, but potentially not within the time required for activation of the TSC. In addition, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) emergency plan has procedural guidance for use of an alternate location in the event the TSC is not habitable. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48381 | 5 October 2012 12:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Response Facility Information System Due to Planned Modification | At approximately 0800 EDT, on October 5, 2012, the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) will be removed from service to perform a planned modification for the improvement of site wide data communications between various plant process computing platforms. The expected duration of ERFIS non-functionality should not exceed 24 hours and during this time would not be able to be restored within one hour. The ERFIS computer system provides monitoring and communications capability for plant data systems including the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The loss of ERFIS requires alternate methods, as described in plant procedures, to be used for the above described functions. Therefore, assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the ERFIS computer system is non-functional. The on call Emergency Response Organization has been notified of the ERFIS outage. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Emergency Response Data System Safety Parameter Display System | |
| ENS 48373 | 4 October 2012 12:02:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation System Repairs | At approximately 0802 EDT on 10/04/2012, (Air Handler) AH-17, TSC Cooling Fan, was discovered not running. The fan belt for AH-17 TSC was found broken. AH-17 TSC belt has been replaced; it is expected to be placed back in service by 1200 (EDT), 10/04/2012 and after verification of proper operation will be declared operable. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. In addition, at approximately 0900 EDT, on October 4, 2012, the Harris Nuclear Plant Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned maintenance on TSC outside air fan OA-2 (belt replacement). The fan was out of service for greater than one hour for this activity then returned to service for an 8 to 24 hour run in period for the new belts. After the run in period, the TSC outside air fan and AH-17 TSC will be taken out of service again for greater than one hour for belt adjustment. Following the belt adjustment, the fans will be returned to service and TSC ventilation will be declared operable. Compensatory actions are in place for periodic monitoring of TSC temperatures and the two other TSC HVAC units which are operating satisfactorily. The assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the TSC ventilation system is non-functional. The on-call Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been notified. The alternate TSC is available per plant procedure if required. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | HVAC | |
| ENS 48250 | 29 August 2012 12:27:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability Due to Limited Range on Indicator | |||
| ENS 48149 | 1 August 2012 16:12:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Tsc Inoperable Due to Non-Functional Ventilation Support System | At 1212 EDT on August 1, 2012, Harris Operations discovered that cooling function was degraded on Technical Support Center (TSC) air handler 17. The TSC has three air handlers that provide the ventilation function, and the other two are operating with no known problems. Air Handler 17 has been removed from service and troubleshooting is in progress. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the Technical Support Center ventilation support system being potentially non-functional. The on-call Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been notified. The Alternate TSC is available per plant procedure if required. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. | ||
| ENS 48127 | 24 July 2012 09:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out of Service | At approximately 0555 (EDT) on 07/24/2012, the AH-17 TSC Cooling Fan was found with the cooling system not fully working. The fan is running, but the condensing compressor is not. Repairs are being planned and will be worked immediately. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Revision 2. The on call Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been notified. The Alternate TSC is available per plant procedure, if required. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
TSC cooling system repairs have been completed and the system has been returned to normal. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Franke). | ||
| ENS 47894 | 3 May 2012 12:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Preplanned Maintenance on Tsc Ventilation System | At approximately 0830 EDT on 5/3/12, preplanned maintenance will be performed on the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. This maintenance will be performed for TSC Fan OA-2 for a motor replacement. This maintenance is planned to be performed and completed within 8 hours. If an emergency condition should occur that would require evacuation of the TSC, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) emergency plan has procedural guidance for use of an alternate location. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Maintenance work has been completed and the TSC is considered operable as of 1713 EDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour). | ||
| ENS 47855 | 19 April 2012 21:24:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Tsc Ventilation Inoperable | At approximately 1724 EDT on April 19, 2012 with the Harris Nuclear Plant operating at 90% power in mode 1, Air Handler 17 was discovered not operating. Air Handler 17 provides ventilation supporting environmental habitability to the Technical Support Center (TSC) to keep ambient temperatures habitable for personnel and to ensure communications and assessment equipment remains functional. This degrades the heating and cooling capacity of the TSC by approximately one third. Due to the cool weather in the forecast, the remaining cooling systems will be operating more efficiently than they would in the hot summer months, which mitigates the impact of the degraded ventilation system. The system has been repaired as of 1950 EDT on April 19, 2012. The cause of the equipment failure was a broken belt and a condition report has been entered into the site's corrective action program. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii) as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility. The plant continues to operate at 90%. Other equipment functioned as expected. The on call Emergency Response Manager and Site Emergency Coordinator (TSC) have been notified and the alternate TSC is available. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 47843 | 17 April 2012 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Had Only One Power Source During Preplanned Maintenance | On April 16, 2012, at 0738 hours, the Harris Nuclear Plant notified the NRC Operations Center (i.e., Event Number 47838) of preplanned maintenance on the Technical Support Center (TSC) normal power supply. Following completion of the power transfer, it was discovered that in the current alignment, the TSC is only powered from one power source, which is the backup power supply. A backup diesel generator is stationed near the TSC which can be connected if necessary during an emergency. Activities are in progress to modify the existing procedure to allow the TSC to be connected to the offsite power source which will restore two sources of power to the TSC. This normal power arrangement is expected to remain in place while maintenance is performed on the TSC normal power supply for approximately two months. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. This report was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
On April 19, 2012, the power configuration was revised to restore the availability of two sources of power to the TSC. An extent of condition review identified two similar conditions in 2009 and 2010 where the TSC had only one source of power for approximately two months each time. The backup diesel generator described in the initial report was not available during these two periods; providing an alternate power source in the event it was needed would have required lifting a clearance and closing a breaker. These conditions might be of generic interest or concern and are therefore provided as a follow-up report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer). |