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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 57186 | 21 June 2024 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Burnable Poison Rod Assembly Misload | The following is a synopsis of information provided by Framatome, Inc. (Framatome) via email: During startup testing at the affected plant, unexpected high reactor peaking factor readings resulted from an incorrect boron concentration of Al2O3-B4C pellets in two burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRAs). The cause of the issue was due to 0.2 percent boron concentration Al2O3-B4C pellets inadvertently combined with the intended 2.0 percent boron concentration Al2O3-B4C pellets, which were then placed back into inventory labeled as 2.0 percent. This issue was determined to be a 10 CFR 21 Defect on June 21, 2024. Corrective actions are that Framatome replaced the two affected BPRAs with BPRAs fabricated correctly and a root cause analysis has been initiated by Framatome which is scheduled for completion by July 31, 2024. The affected plant is Oconee Unit 3. The name and address of the individual reporting this information is: Gayle Elliott Director, Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Framatome Inc. Office 434 832-3347 Mobile 434 841-0306 3315 Old Forest Road Lynchburg, VA 24501 gayle.elliott@framatome.com | ||
| ENS 56457 | 6 April 2023 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Breakers Potentially Closing Following Charging | The following is a synopsis of information provided by Framatome, Inc. via email: In 2011, Framatome supplied a DS-206DC breaker that incorrectly closes at the end of the charging cycle of the closing mechanism. Such a defect could result in potential unwanted start of the load of the breaker. The cause of this issue is due to an Eaton trigger roller (Eaton part number 783A446H01) being out of round. The trigger roller is a component in the main cam assembly (Eaton part number 436B418G03). This issue was determined to be a 10 CFR 21 Defect by Framatome on April 6, 2023. Framatome has identified this and other breakers with this potential defect listed below: Calvert Cliffs / Electrical Load / DS-206, DS-416 Breakers Oconee / Reactor Trip Switchgear / DSII-516 Breakers South Texas Project / Electrical Load / DS-206, DS-416 Breakers TVA (Watts Bar and Sequoyah) / Electrical Load / DS-206, DS-416 and DS-632 Breakers Eaton made changes to their manufacturing process to correct the issue. Affected utilities will be provided an inspection procedure to determine if the defect is located in affected components that may be in storage or in operation. Also, Framatome will provide written correspondence to each customer regarding the issue and respond to technical questions regarding the issue. Affected Plants with potentially defected parts include Calvert Cliffs, Oconee, South Texas Project, Sequoyah, and Watts Bar. | ||
| ENS 56052 | 23 May 2022 17:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 Interim Report of Deviation | The following is a summary of a report provided by Southern Nuclear: On May 23, 2022, Framatome notified Farley Nuclear Power Plant, among other plants, by letter of a potential nonconformance in certain Siemens medium voltage circuit breakers that could create a substantial safety hazard in certain applications. Southern Nuclear has determined that additional time beyond the 60-day evaluation period is needed to perform the necessary walkdowns of the installed equipment and complete the substantial safety hazard evaluation for reportability in accordance with 10 CFR 21. At the time, Framatome did not have enough information to determine where licensees intended to or had installed the supplied breakers, or how many breakers within the population supplied were actually nonconforming. The interim report does not describe details of the nonconformance and the original May 23, 2022 letter was not sent to the Headquarters Operations Center. Contact Information: Ryan Joyce, Fleet Licensing Manager, (205) 992-6468 Known affected plant: Farley among others | ||
| ENS 55993 | 2 May 2022 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Report - Failure of an Eaton Electrical Cutler Hammer Relay | The following information was provided by Framatome Inc. via email: Framatome Inc. (Framatome) supplied an Eaton Electrical Cutler Hammer, Inc. (Eaton) D26MRD704A1 Relay to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, McGuire Nuclear Station, that failed to change state during testing of their load sequencer. This relay was supplied as a safety related component by Framatome. A molded contact bar in the D26 top adder deck prevented a contact spring from settling into its proper position. Top adder decks manufactured between 2003 and 2022 were inspected for the existence of flashing, but no specific time frame where the excess flashing was found could be identified. Testing of additional relays with this similar excess flashing condition, by both Framatome and Eaton, showed that contact springs tended to stay in place and were unaffected by the excess flashing. There have been no past similar relay reports by Framatome customers despite there being at least 587 other relays with top adder decks supplied as commercially dedicated components. Eaton has also indicated that they have had no other reports of this condition or failures associated with it. The extent of condition determined that the failure is an isolated incident. Only one relay, supplied to McGuire Nuclear Station, failed to change state. In the future, as a precaution, the Framatome commercial grade dedication process will include the inspection of the adder deck contact bars. Relays containing contact bars with excess flashing will be rejected. | ||
| ENS 41621 | 21 April 2005 15:00:00 | 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1) | Received Two Packages Exceeding External Radiation Limits. | Framatome ANP, Mt. Athos Road, Lynchburg, VA, received seven packages of nuclear services equipment from Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. Two of the packages exceeded the surface external radiation limit of 10 CFR 71.47 (200 millirems/hr). The first package , ID # 9070108, had one hot spot on the bottom of the container that read 301 mRem/hr. The second package, ID # 9011352, had one hot spot on the bottom of the container that read 280 mRem/hr. The packages have been received and are in the Framatome secure area. Framatome ANP is reporting per the requirement of 10 CFR 20.1906. The hot spots on both packages were small, less than one square inch in size. Radiation surveys taken inside the cab of the truck that delivered the packages found no elevated radiation levels. Neither package had surface contamination. | ||
| ENS 41335 | 14 January 2005 08:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21, Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation | Part 21 Report | The following information was provided by Framatome ANP The turbine generator load rejection with failure of the turbine bypass valves to open event (LRNB) is a potentially limiting anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) considered in establishing the MCPR operating limit and confirming that the linear heat generation rate (LHGR) limits are adequate. Framatome ANP analyses for the LRNB event assume that the load rejection will initiate a fast closure of the turbine control valves (TCV) at all power levels. Some plants have indicated that the fast closure of the TCV is not initiated below a plant specific power level. The fast closure of the TCV initiates a scram and minimizes turbine over speed. If a fast closure of the TCV does not occur, the TCV will close at a slower rate, scram will be delayed, and the turbine will overspend. This may increase the severity of the event. The turbine overspend may result in an increase in recirculation pump speed that will also increase the severity of the event. The affected plants LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 10 and Browns Ferry Unit 3 Cycle 12 have been notified. A set of revised operating limits, which are appropriate for the conditions when a fast closure of the TCV does not occur, have been provided to the affected plants. | ||
| ENS 41289 | 23 December 2004 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(2) | External Radiation Levels Greater than Limits | On a shipment received from Hope Creek, one of eight packages had a high radiation level on the bottom of the package. The radiation level was 236 millirem/hour. The packages contained nuclear service equipment. Packages were offloaded and placed in a secure area of the plant. The package has not been opened. Framatome has notified Hope Creek and will notify the shipper. |