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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 57186 | 21 June 2024 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Burnable Poison Rod Assembly Misload | The following is a synopsis of information provided by Framatome, Inc. (Framatome) via email: During startup testing at the affected plant, unexpected high reactor peaking factor readings resulted from an incorrect boron concentration of Al2O3-B4C pellets in two burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRAs). The cause of the issue was due to 0.2 percent boron concentration Al2O3-B4C pellets inadvertently combined with the intended 2.0 percent boron concentration Al2O3-B4C pellets, which were then placed back into inventory labeled as 2.0 percent. This issue was determined to be a 10 CFR 21 Defect on June 21, 2024. Corrective actions are that Framatome replaced the two affected BPRAs with BPRAs fabricated correctly and a root cause analysis has been initiated by Framatome which is scheduled for completion by July 31, 2024. The affected plant is Oconee Unit 3. The name and address of the individual reporting this information is: Gayle Elliott Director, Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Framatome Inc. Office 434 832-3347 Mobile 434 841-0306 3315 Old Forest Road Lynchburg, VA 24501 gayle.elliott@framatome.com | ||
| ENS 56457 | 6 April 2023 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Breakers Potentially Closing Following Charging | The following is a synopsis of information provided by Framatome, Inc. via email: In 2011, Framatome supplied a DS-206DC breaker that incorrectly closes at the end of the charging cycle of the closing mechanism. Such a defect could result in potential unwanted start of the load of the breaker. The cause of this issue is due to an Eaton trigger roller (Eaton part number 783A446H01) being out of round. The trigger roller is a component in the main cam assembly (Eaton part number 436B418G03). This issue was determined to be a 10 CFR 21 Defect by Framatome on April 6, 2023. Framatome has identified this and other breakers with this potential defect listed below: Calvert Cliffs / Electrical Load / DS-206, DS-416 Breakers Oconee / Reactor Trip Switchgear / DSII-516 Breakers South Texas Project / Electrical Load / DS-206, DS-416 Breakers TVA (Watts Bar and Sequoyah) / Electrical Load / DS-206, DS-416 and DS-632 Breakers Eaton made changes to their manufacturing process to correct the issue. Affected utilities will be provided an inspection procedure to determine if the defect is located in affected components that may be in storage or in operation. Also, Framatome will provide written correspondence to each customer regarding the issue and respond to technical questions regarding the issue. Affected Plants with potentially defected parts include Calvert Cliffs, Oconee, South Texas Project, Sequoyah, and Watts Bar. | ||
| ENS 55993 | 2 May 2022 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Report - Failure of an Eaton Electrical Cutler Hammer Relay | The following information was provided by Framatome Inc. via email: Framatome Inc. (Framatome) supplied an Eaton Electrical Cutler Hammer, Inc. (Eaton) D26MRD704A1 Relay to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, McGuire Nuclear Station, that failed to change state during testing of their load sequencer. This relay was supplied as a safety related component by Framatome. A molded contact bar in the D26 top adder deck prevented a contact spring from settling into its proper position. Top adder decks manufactured between 2003 and 2022 were inspected for the existence of flashing, but no specific time frame where the excess flashing was found could be identified. Testing of additional relays with this similar excess flashing condition, by both Framatome and Eaton, showed that contact springs tended to stay in place and were unaffected by the excess flashing. There have been no past similar relay reports by Framatome customers despite there being at least 587 other relays with top adder decks supplied as commercially dedicated components. Eaton has also indicated that they have had no other reports of this condition or failures associated with it. The extent of condition determined that the failure is an isolated incident. Only one relay, supplied to McGuire Nuclear Station, failed to change state. In the future, as a precaution, the Framatome commercial grade dedication process will include the inspection of the adder deck contact bars. Relays containing contact bars with excess flashing will be rejected. |