Semantic search

Jump to navigation Jump to search
 Start dateReporting criterionTitleEvent descriptionSystemLER
ENS 5430130 September 2019 04:00:0010 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or DefectPart 21 - Valve Manufacture Acceptance Criteria

The following information was received from Flowserve US Inc. via facsimile: Description: Contrary to the requirements of ASME Section Ill - NC-4000, Flowserve Raleigh identified that they were utilizing as standard practice, the base material acceptance criteria in lieu of welding acceptance criteria for valves with temporary attachments (i.e. - Lug removal areas). This utilization of criteria has been ongoing as far back as Flowserve's Review could determine. No specific orders or customers are identified as this is systemic to the overall process of valve manufacturing at Flowserve Raleigh. Evaluation: A review was completed of the ASME Code requirements by Flowserve Raleigh's Engineering and Metallurgical Process Control Departments with the following results: The examination of Temporary Attachment Removal Areas, to the NB/NC-2540 Examination and Repair of Forgings and Bars, and NB/NC-2570 Examination and Repair of Statically and Centrifugally Cast Products is contrary to NB/NC-5340 and 5350 acceptance criteria. However, it can be determined that Temporary Attachment Removal Areas examined to NB/NC-2500 acceptance criteria is consistent with the acceptable surface condition resulting from a welded repair performed on the same material product form. No greater risk to pressure integrity is created by the examination of Temporary Attachment Removal Areas to NB/NC-2500 acceptance criteria. The examination of Temporary Attachment Removal Areas examined to NB/NC-2500 acceptance criteria does not result in a Risk to safety relating to pressure integrity. Paragraph NB/NC-4435 of Article NB/NC-4000 FABRICATION AND INSTALLATION contains mandatory requirements for the examination of Components. Contrary to the requirement of NB/NC-4435 (b) (3) to examine the Nonstructural Temporary Attachment Removal Area in accordance with the Acceptance Criteria of NB/NC-5340 or NB/NC-5350 Flowserve performed these examinations in accordance with Article NB/NC-2000 in accordance with the Acceptance Standards of NB/NC-2500 for the applicable Material Product Form. NB/NC-2540 Examination and Repair of Forgings and Bars, NB/NC-2570 Examination and Repair of Statically and Centrifugally Cast Products. ND-4435 contains no mandatory requirements for the examination of Nonstructural Temporary Attachment Removal Area. Extent of Condition: This utilization of criteria has been ongoing as far back as Flowserve's Review could determine. No specific orders or customers are identified as this is systemic to the overall process of valve manufacturing at Flowserve Raleigh. Corrective Actions: Flowserve Raleigh Corrective Action, (CAR-393758) has been issued, and is currently in process of determining root cause and preventive action measures. Summation: After review by Flowserve Raleigh's Engineering and Metallurgical Process Control Departments. It is the position of Flowserve Raleigh, that in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21, this condition, while reportable to the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), is not a significant/substantial safety hazard. Megan Strong Quality Manager office: 919-831-3220 mstrong@flowserve.com

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/22/19 AT 1404 EDT FROM FLOWSERVE TO OSSY FONT * * *

In addition to the information previously provided, Flowserve provided the following via fax: Scope/ Extent of Condition: This utilization of criteria has been ongoing as far back as Flowserve's Review could determine. After further review, the scope of impact was determined as cast steel valves, Class 1 and Class 2 only. Anything outside of this criterion would not have been impacted. Corrective Actions: Flowserve Raleigh issued Corrective Action, (CAR-393758), and is continuing their process of completing the root cause and corrective actions needed to prevent recurrence. Actions that have already taken place and/or are in progress are:

  1. ASME Code Training is to be developed, with application toward the criteria as outlined in this Part 21. This training is to be developed to enhance the code knowledge of Flowserve Raleigh Personnel generating Quality Assurance Plans.
  2. Quality Assurance Personnel are to be trained in accordance with the applicable code requirements, to ensure adequate knowledge of the above condition.
  3. Non-Destructive Examination Personnel are to be trained in accordance with the applicable code requirements, to ensure adequate knowledge of the above condition.
  4. Flowserve's Quality Assurance Plans are to have their applicable NOE matrix's revised to incorporate the applicable criteria needed for the removal of temporary attachments.

Summation: After review by Flowserve Raleigh, the following is to be a summation of the above listed 10 CFR Part 21.

  1. The review has determined a programmatic condition that had been existent for many years. Raleigh can only assure that any customers for whom were supplied Class 1 or Class 2 cast steel valves, prior to the issuance of this Part 21 may have this condition.
  2. To date, there have not been any reported failures or technical issues as a result of this condition.
  3. While the above condition is a reportable condition to the NRC, with regards to the violation of the ASME B&PVC Code, it is Flowserve Raleigh's position that it does not pose a compromised condition to safety.

Notified R1DO (Bickett), R2DO (Lopez), R3DO (Stoedter), R4DO (Young) and the Part 21 group via email.

ENS 4293024 October 2006 08:00:00Agreement StateAgreement State Report - Booth Radiography Source Disconnected and Subsequently ReconnectedN.C. Radiation Protection Section was notified on 24 Oct. 2006 by the RSO for Flowserve US Inc. of a booth radiography source disconnect. The sealed source involved is reported as approximately 4.3 Curies of Ir-192. Discovery of the disconnect and subsequent actions were made in accordance with licensee policy and procedures. The licensee is controlling access to the booth, allowing for a safe and well considered response. The licensee is in contact with the vender of the camera and associated equipment in an effort to determine the best course of action (i.e. source recovery). The NC Radiation Protection Section is working in conjunction with the licensee and vender and will continue to update NRC as appropriate. The Flowserve Inc. RSO has reported that by following directions from vendor, the source was successfully retrieved and is in the safe, shielded and secure position. He further reports he is immediately replacing all similar equipment and returning the old equipment (including the specific malfunctioning equipment associated with this incident) to the vendor. Both Flowserve and the equipment vendor are planning after action reports to determine root cause if possible. North Carolina Ref. NC-06-33.
ENS 4080710 June 2004 19:00:00Agreement StateAgreement State Nc - Notification of Equipment Failure Due to Metal FatigueThe licensee (Flowserve US Inc.) performing Booth IR has an automatic IR setup that uses source switches to stop the extension of the source for IR operations. The source switch at the end of the guide tube failed and the source (Ir-192) extended beyond the end of the guide tube and got stuck. The licensee contacted Amersham (the manufacturer of the camera) for advice. By following Amersham's suggestions the licensee was able to remotely retract the source back into the guide tube, and from there to retract the source back into the camera in the fully shielded position. The licensee intends to have the source leak tested as soon as possible and said they would submit a complete report within 30 days. No one was injured or overexposed during this incident.