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 Start dateReporting criterionTitleEvent descriptionSystemLER
ENS 525372 January 2017 06:00:0010 CFR 50.55(e)
10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect
Part 21 - Valve Assembly NonconformanceSubject: 3" Style HPNS Valve Body/Cage/Plug Retainer Binding Equipment Affected by this Fisher Information Notice: Items subject to this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) are confined to the equipment and orders referred to in Appendix A attached. Specifically, affected equipment refers to the 3" style HPNS valve body for next-generation nuclear plants and its associated cage and plug retainer. Purpose: The purpose of this FIN is to alert affected customers that, as of 2 January 2017, Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) became aware of a situation which may affect the performance of the aforementioned equipment, including its safety-related function. Fisher is informing affected customers of this circumstance in accordance with Section 21.21(b) of 10 CFR 21. Applicability: This FIN applies only to the equipment identified in Appendix A, which lists serial numbers and order numbers that were delivered to customers. Specifically, it applies to the Fisher 3 style HPNS valve body assembly, sold to AP1000 next generation plant sites, Commodity Package PV14, Datasheet 111. Discussion: During plant hot functional testing, certain valve assemblies did not achieve full travel. Upon disassembly, site inspection found wear between the cage and plug retainer in some valves. Vertical scratches in the cage internal diameter and plug retainer outside diameter was confirmation of galling which prohibited full travel. In one valve, the cage could not be removed from the body as it was friction-welded due to galling. The valve body-to-cage interference is attributed to body-to-bonnet gasket compression which caused the valve body gasket groove to distort/yield, particularly the cage guide internal diameter bore. Regarding the cage-to-plug retainer binding, thermal expansion calculations between cage internal diameter and plug retainer outside diameter indicate an undersized diametrical clearance at temperature. Extent of Condition: In addition to the equipment listed in Appendix A, all other style HPNS designs (NPS 1/2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8) were examined for extent of condition. Results indicate that DS111 was a lone outlier and this issue is not expected to occur for the other sizes, material combinations and datasheets sold into their respective applications and temperatures. Arrangements have been made with the customers to replace or maintenance the trim for the equipment listed in Appendix A. In addition, a Corrective Action Request (CAR 1817) has been initiated by Fisher to prevent reoccurrence of this issue. 10 CFR 21 Implications: Fisher requests that the recipient of this FIN review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10 CFR 21. If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact: Ben Ahrens, Quality Manager, Emerson Automation Solutions, Fisher Controls International LLC, 301 South First Avenue, Marshalltown, IA 50158, Phone: (641) 754-2249, F (641) 754-2830.
ENS 5267830 August 2016 05:00:0010 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or DefectPart 21 Notification - Identified Fisher 546S Electro-Pneumatic Transducers Standard Mounting Brackets Failed Seismic Testing StandardsFisher Controls International LLC issued Fisher Information Notice FIN 2017-02 to inform users that certain identified Model 546NS electro-pneumatic transducers, when mounted on the supplied standard mounting brackets, were determined to be not adequately robust at seismic test levels. Affected customers have been notified. Fisher requests that the recipient of this FIN review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10 CFR 21. If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact: Ben Ahrens Quality Manager Emerson Automation Solutions Fisher Controls International LLC 301 South First Avenue Marshalltown, IA 50158 Phone: (641) 754-2249 Benjamin. ahrens@emerson.com
ENS 5202929 April 2016 05:00:0010 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or DefectPart 21 - Insufficient Valve Cage HardfacingThe following is excerpted from an email provided by the supplier: Items subject to this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) are confined to the equipment and orders referred to in Table 1 (see original submission). Specifically, 'Equipment' refers to the eight inch sized hardfaced HPNS cages supplied per the order numbers listed in Table 1. The purpose of this FIN is to alert affected customers that, as of 29 April 2016, Fisher Controls International LLC ( Fisher) became aware of a situation which may affect the performance of the aforementioned Equipment, including its safety-related function. Fisher is informing affected customers of this circumstance in accordance with Section 21.21(b) of 10 CFR 21. The Equipment in question is subject to CoCr-A hardface overlay requirements. The CoCr-A overlay deposit thickness must be 0.060 inch minimum after machining. However, the cages supplied in fulfilment of the orders listed in Table 1 may have insufficient hardfacing depth on the inside bore diameter at the top of the cages (approximately 1.50 inches from top). This issue first came to Fisher's attention when a material grade inspection revealed insufficient cobalt. Subsequent PMI testing confirmed the upper section at the top of the cage fell short of expected CoCr-A. Two in-stock cages were sent to a third party accredited laboratory for macroetch examination and hardness survey. The results of this survey confirmed the top of the cages did not meet the minimum hardness requirement of 34 HRC and further confirmed the insufficiency is limited to the uppermost 1.50 inches of the inside bore diameter of the cages. The absence of hardfacing at the mating surface between cage and plug creates the potential for galling, which could prevent the valve from performing its intended safety function. Testing has been conducted to analyze the risk of galling. Typically, galling is observed in cycle tests well exceeding the 600 cycle recommended lifetime for the equipment. However, testing has proven galling to be an unpredictable phenomenon and could occur prior to the recommended lifetime of the equipment. There are no known field issues with the affected equipment. The problem of post-hardfacing material shrinkage is associated with the ratio of bore diameter to cage wall thickness. Large bore diameter thin-walled cages are at greater risk for material shrinkage. A third party accredited laboratory performed additional macroetch supplemental tests and evaluations on similar cages of varying bore sizes. It was determined that this issue is unique to the 8 inch sized HPNS cages. Fisher will provide the affected customers with a properly coated cages at Fisher's cost. In addition, a Corrective Action Request (CAR 1804) has been initiated by Fisher to prevent reoccurrence of this issue. The US reactor sites affected by this issue include VC Summer and Vogtle. The foreign reactor sites include Sanmen and Haiyang. FIN 2016-06 dated 20 June, 2016. Point of Contact: Ben Ahrens Quality Manager Emerson Process Management Fisher Controls International LLC 30 1 South First Avenue Marshalltown, IA 50 1 58 Phone: (64 1 ) 754-2249 Benjamin.ahrens@emerson.com
ENS 5186921 March 2016 05:00:0010 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or DefectPart 21 Fisher 3582G Positioners Essential to Function Travel Pin Lock Provided as Commercial GradeItems subject to this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) were provided to Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSEG) per PSEG Order 4500798699 (Fisher Order Number 003 - V028245881) (Order). Specifically, this FIN pertains to Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) supplied safety-related Type 3582G positioners, serial numbers F000516516-517 ('Equipment') provided per the Order. In these assemblies, the essential-to-function travel pin lock was erroneously provided as commercial-grade. Fisher information Notice: (FIN) 2016-04
ENS 514942 September 2015 05:00:0010 CFR 50.55(e)
10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect
Part-21 Report - Closed Switch Not Actuating When Valve Is Fully Closed

The following is a summary of a submitted facsimile: Items subject to this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) were provided to Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) per CNS Order 00178457 (Fisher Order Number 033-D800306145). Specifically, Fisher supplied an 8 inch Design A11 Butterfly Valve with a Type 1052 Actuator and TopWorx Switches, serial number F000458892 ('Equipment'). The issue is with the closed switch not actuating when the valve is fully closed. The purpose of this FIN is to alert CNS that as of 2 September 2015, Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) became aware of a situation which may affect the performance of the Equipment, including its safety-related function. If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact: Ben Ahrens, Quality Manager, Emerson Process Management, Fisher Controls International LLC, 301 South 1st Avenue, Marshalltown, La 50158, Phone: (641) 754-2249, benjamin.ahrens@emerson.com

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/5/15 AT 1731 EST FROM CHAD ENGLE TO DONG PARK * * *

The following is a summary of a submitted facsimile: The purpose of this document is to correct an erroneous serial number on FIN 2015-03, dated 22 October 2015. Serial number F000458892 should read F000503836. Notified R2DO (Desai) and PART 21/50.55 REACTORS via email.

ENS 509116 June 2014 05:00:0010 CFR 50.55(e)
10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect
Part-21 Report - Valve Seat Leakage DefectThe following is a summary of a submitted facsimile: A valve plug originally supplied as a spare parts order was returned to Fisher after the customer discovered a machining error was present on the plug. The Type 461 valve plug has a groove machined across the seating surface of the plug. This groove is required to provide a controlled leak rate thru the valve when the plug is on the seat. The issue recently identified shows that the machined groove did not extend through the full length of the seat. This could lead to a situation in which the intended/required leakage for this design is not fully achieved. Affected plants are: Waterford-3 and St Lucie.