Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 52157 | 5 August 2016 17:09:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Fire Detection Panel Failure and Loss of Assessment Capability | At 1209 CDT on 8/5/16, during testing of Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Pre-action Sprinkler Systems, all zones on the Unit 2 Pyrotronics Fire Detection Panel went into an alarm state and were unable to be reset. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Assessment capability. The NRC Resident has been notified. The licensee has initiated all necessary compensatory and corrective actions.
At 1600 CDT on 8/6/16, the Unit 2 Pyrotronics Fire Detection Panel was declared functional following repair of master override reset test switch and supply fuse. The Pyrotronics Fire Detection Panel was successfully tested following maintenance. The emergency assessment capability for the site's Emergency Plan has been fully restored. The NRC Resident has been notified Notified the R2DO (Suggs). | ||
| ENS 50677 | 13 December 2014 07:52:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Malfunction of Smoke Detection System in Containment Due to High Humidity | At 0152 CST on December 13, 2014, both strings of the Unit 2 containment smoke detection system were declared non-functional due to a non-radioactive steam leak inside containment. The steam leak was causing spurious alarms to the smoke detection system. This condition prevents identification and assessment of a fire in containment. Required compensatory measures have been established. Since a fire in the containment building is an entry condition for the site's emergency plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The steam leak was caused by a faulty main steam flow detector. The licensee has shut down the reactor to effect repairs. | Main Steam | |
| ENS 50604 | 12 November 2014 08:02:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | No Functional Smoke Detection Capability in Containment | At 0202 (CST) on November 12, 2014, it was determined that Unit 2 had no functional smoke detection capability in the containment. During post modification testing on the smoke detection system, it was discovered that both trains of detection were not functional. Required compensatory measures have been established. Since a fire in the containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered an unplanned loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). (Farley) Condition Report: 892818. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | ||
| ENS 50034 | 14 April 2014 11:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Post-Accident Hydrogen Sample Analyzers Out-Of-Service | This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0600 CDT on 4/14/14, it was determined that the ability to obtain a post-accident hydrogen sample from Unit 1 containment was lost. With both trains of Post-Accident Hydrogen Analyzers (PAHA) out of service, it was discovered that there was reduced sample flow indicated on the backup methodology through a containment sample port (R67). Repair efforts are underway. A follow-up notification will be sent when assessment capability is restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Assessment capability has been restored as of 1933 EDT on April 14, 2014 utilizing the containment particulate rad monitor sample port R-67. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Widmann). | ||
| ENS 49901 | 12 March 2014 13:41:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Pyro Panel Maintenance Results in Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability | At 0841 (CDT) on March 12, 2014, the Unit 1 Pyro Panel (fire/smoke detection panel) was removed from service for required maintenance. The pyro panel was declared non-functional when it was removed from service. Compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in the Containment Building is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperature is being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service however this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. A courtesy follow up notification will be sent when the pyro panel is returned to service and functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
The repairs to the Unit 1 Pyro Panel have been completed and the panel was returned to service on 3/12/14 at 1010 CDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue). | ||
| ENS 49862 | 28 February 2014 14:42:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Pyro Panel Removed from Service for Maintenance | At 0842 CST on February 28, 2014, the Unit 1 Pyro Panel (fire/smoke detection panel) was removed from service for required maintenance. The Pyro Panel was declared non-functional when it was removed from service. Compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in the Containment Building is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperature is being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. A courtesy follow up notification will be sent when the pyro panel is returned to service and functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
At 1704 CST on 2/28/2014 the Unit 1 Pyro Panel was declared functional following the return of the fire indicating unit (FIU) to the original status. The Pyro Panel fire detection system was successfully tested following the maintenance. The emergency assessment capability for the site's Emergency Plan has been fully restored concerning a containment fire. The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (McCoy). | ||
| ENS 49789 | 3 February 2014 18:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out of Service Due to a Refrigerant Leak in the Hvac System | The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered non-functional due to a malfunction in the TSC HVAC system. A leak in the refrigerant tubing has resulted in a loss of refrigerant and affected the system's ability to provide proper climate control. Repairs are being planned and will commence today. The out of service time is greater than one hour which by the station's Technical Requirements Manual is an 8 hour non-emergency report. Compensatory measures per site procedure FNP-0-EIP-6.0 (TSC Setup and Activation) for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities are available. These measures include the conditional relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC to be uninhabitable. A follow up notification will be made when the TSC is declared functional. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following was received as a courtesy notification follow-up: At 2320 CST on 2/3/2014 the TSC HVAC was declared functional following post maintenance testing. Satisfactory pressure testing, system evacuation, and system re-charging were performed following the repair to two tubing leaks. Emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities have been fully restored to the Technical Support Center. The Emergency Director, and NRC Senior Resident Inspector have been informed. Notified R2DO (McCoy). | HVAC | |
| ENS 49744 | 18 January 2014 16:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Unit 2 Pyro Panel Non-Functional Due to Unknown Equipment Problems | At 10:20 (CST) on January 18, 2014, the Unit 2 Pyro Panel (fire/smoke detection panel) was declared non-functional due to an unknown equipment problem. Compensatory measures (e.g. continuous roving fire watches) have been established for all affected areas with the exception of the Unit 2 Containment Building. Containment fire watches have been established per the FSAR, which includes monitoring various temperatures, pressures, and other parameters for Containment, and systems associated with containment. However, this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. Since a fire in Containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability, and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
At 0404 CST on 1/20/14 the Unit 2 Pyro panel was declared functional following the replacement of the fire indicating unit (FIU) and the power supply, and successful post maintenance testing. The emergency assessment capability for the site's Emergency Plan has been fully restored concerning a Containment fire. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (King). | ||
| ENS 49735 | 17 January 2014 15:25:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Pyro Panel Taken Out of Service for Planned Maintenance | At 0925 (CST) on January 17, 2014, the Unit 1 pyro panel (smoke detection panel) was removed from service for required maintenance. The pyro panel was declared non-functional when it was removed from service. Compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in Containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperatures are being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however, this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. The site NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The pyro panel was restored to service as of 1650 CST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (King). | ||
| ENS 49637 | 16 December 2013 20:54:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Containment Smoke Detection Capability | At 1454 CST on December 16, 2013, the Unit 1 pyro panel (smoke detection panel) was declared non-functional due to an unexpected failure. Viable compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in Containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperatures are being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however, this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Unit 1 pyro panel has been returned to service as of 1554 CST on 12/17/13, which restores Unit 1 containment fire detection capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Freeman). | ||
| ENS 49619 | 9 December 2013 15:06:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Smoke Detection Panel Removed from Service for Planned Maintenance | At 0906 CST on December 9, 2013, the Unit 1 pyro panel (smoke detection panel) was removed from service for planned repairs. The pyro panel is expected to be out of service for approximately 8 hours. Viable compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in Containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperatures are being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining an effective assessment capability. A follow-up notification will be provided upon restoration of Containment Building smoke detection capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Unit 1 pyro panel (smoke detection panel) has been returned to service after planned repairs. The loss of emergency assessment capability reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) has been restored. The NRC Resident (Inspector) will be notified of the update. Notified R2DO (Masters). | ||
| ENS 49417 | 7 October 2013 23:04:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Vent Stack and Area Radiation Monitors Taken Out of Service for Maintenance | This is a report of a loss of emergency assessment capability as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). On October 7, 2013 at 1804 CDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 6 during a refueling outage, power was interrupted to all Unit 1 vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors as part of a pre-planned activity to connect the radiation monitors to an alternate temporary power supply to support deenergizing the normal power source for preventative maintenance. The connection to the alternate supply was completed and power was restored to the vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors at 1833 CDT. While the radiation monitors were without power, pre-planned compensatory measures were implemented where possible to monitor vent stack discharge and to minimize activities that posed a potential for release. At the completion of the preventive maintenance on the normal power supply, power to the vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitor will again be briefly interrupted to reconnect the normal power source to the monitors. The pre-planned compensatory measures will again be utilized during this power interruption. An update to this report will be provided following the restoration of normal power to the radiation monitors. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
On October 13, 2013 at 0217 CDT, with Unit 1 in defueled mode during a refueling outage, power was interrupted to all Unit 1 vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors as part of a pre-planned activity to transfer the radiation monitors back to their normal power supply. The connection to the normal supply was completed and power was restored to the vent stack radiation monitors and area radiation monitors at 0245 CDT. Pre-planned compensatory measures were implemented where possible to monitor vent stack discharge and to minimize activities that posed a potential for release. Notified R2DO (Widmann) and the licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 49091 | 5 June 2013 15:39:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Communications with the Integrated Plant Computer | This is a report of a loss of emergency assessment capability as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 1039 CDT on June 5, 2013, Farley Unit 2 experienced a communication failure of the Integrated Plant Computer (IPC). This represents a loss of Unit 2 automated SPDS and ERDS capability. This also rendered the Technical Support Center (TSC) non-functional for Unit 2 since the TSC relies on IPC data displays for event assessment. The Unit 2 IPC was returned to service at 1115 CDT, restoring all affected emergency response capability. Investigation to determine the cause of the failure is ongoing. With the exception of the Unit 2 IPC all systems functioned as required. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | ||
| ENS 48968 | 25 April 2013 22:59:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Vent Stack Radiation Monitors De-Energized for Short Duration During Pre-Planned Maintenance | This is a report of a loss of emergency assessment capability as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). On April 25, 2013 at 1759 CDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 6 during a refueling outage, power was interrupted to all Unit 2 vent stack radiation monitors as part of a pre-planned activity to connect the radiation monitors to an alternate temporary power supply to support de-energizing the normal power source for preventative maintenance. The connection to the alternate supply was completed and power was restored to the vent stack radiation monitors at 1845 CDT. While the radiation monitors were without power, pre-planned compensatory measures were implemented to monitor vent stack discharge and to minimize activities that posed a potential for release. At the completion of the preventive maintenance on the normal power supply, power to the vent stack radiation monitors will again be briefly interrupted to reconnect the normal power source to the monitors. The pre-planned compensatory measures will again be utilized during this power interruption. An update to this report will be provided following the restoration of normal power to the radiation monitors. The NRC Resident inspector has been informed.
On 28 April, 2013, power was again interrupted to the Unit 2 vent stack radiation monitors to restore the connection to their normal power supply. The radiation monitors were out of service from 2315 until 2340 CDT. Pre-planned compensatory measures were again implemented to monitor vent stack discharge and minimize potential for vent stack release. The reported time for the initial loss of vent stack radiation monitoring on April 25, 2013 was incorrect. The correct time was 1759 CDT. The NRC Resident has been notified. Notified R2DO (Sykes). | ||
| ENS 48926 | 16 April 2013 05:37:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Main Control Board Annunciation During Loss-Of-Offsite-Power Test | This is an 8-hour report of a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0037 CDT on 4/16/13, during the performance of an 'A' train loss-of-offsite-power test per procedure FNP-2-STP-80.14, Farley Unit 2 experienced a complete loss of main control board annunciation. Emergency Power Board annunciators are unaffected. No emergency action level criteria have been exceeded as a result of the loss of annunciation, however, annunciators normally relied upon for emergency assessment are not functional. Troubleshooting to identify the cause of the loss of annunciation is in progress. No estimate for restoring annunciator power is currently available. Compensatory measures for critical parameter monitoring have been established and implemented. Unit 2 plant conditions remain stable in mode 5. Unit 1 is unaffected by this event. There has been no release of radioactivity to the environment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Unit 2 main control room annunciators were restored at 0907 EDT on 4/16/13. The cause of the failure was determined to be a relay in the annunciator power supply circuit. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Vias). | ||
| ENS 48718 | 5 February 2013 16:05:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Non-Functional Due to Hvac System Malfunction | The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered non-functional due to a malfunction in the TSC HVAC system. A lugged connection on the air conditioning system control power relay became loose causing a loss of contact between the spade and the relay. Repairs have been completed and the air conditioning has been returned to service. However, the out of service time was greater than 30 minutes, which by the station's reporting procedures, is an 8 hour non-emergency report. The out of service time was from 0935 to 1342 CST. Compensatory measures per site procedure FNP-0-EIP-6.0 (TSC Setup and Activation) for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities were available. These measures included the conditional relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC to be uninhabitable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | HVAC | |
| ENS 48672 | 14 January 2013 18:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out-Of-Service Due to Failed Air Conditioning Belt | The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered non-functional due to a malfunctioning TSC ventilation system. The TSC HVAC Air Handling Unit fan belt broke rendering the air conditioning non functional. Repairs have been completed and the unit has been returned to service however, the out of service time was greater than 30 minutes which by the station's reporting procedures is an 8 hour non-emergency report. The out of service time was from 1225 to 1630 (CST). Compensatory measures per site procedure FNP-0-EIP-6.0 (TSC Setup and Activation) for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities were immediately put in place. These measures include the conditional relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC to be uninhabitable. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | HVAC | |
| ENS 48026 | 14 June 2012 18:53:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Control Room Annunciator Outage | During a maintenance task to replace a main control board annunciator power supply an electrical short occurred while installing a jumper. This caused two circuit breakers to trip and a loss of all control room annunciators. The cause of the short was identified and corrected. The two circuit breakers were closed and the annunciator function was restored at 1358 CDT resulting in a total out of service time of 5 minutes. The unit was at a stable 100% power during the loss of annunciators. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 47924 | 15 May 2012 12:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Planned Maintenance | The Farley Nuclear Plant Technical Support Center (TSC) has been rendered non-functional due to a pre-planned and scheduled maintenance period to perform PMs (Preventive Maintenance) on the TSC ventilation system. The TSC ventilation maintenance will be worked with high priority to include around the clock support. Pre-planned compensatory measures are in place in accordance with site procedures to include the conditional relocation of the TSC staff should the Emergency Director deem the TSC to be uninhabitable. This report is being generated per Technical Requirements Manual TRM section 13.13.1 condition B for the TSC emergency response facility being out of service for greater than 30 minutes. The projected return to service is on 5/15/12 at 16:30 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 47920 | 13 May 2012 01:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Hvac for Technical Support Center Out of Service | The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered non-functional due to the TSC HVAC Air Handling Unit (AHU) ventilation system being out of service. Investigation into the cause of the failure of the TSC ventilation AHU found a tripped supply breaker. The supply breaker was subsequently reset and the TSC HVAC unit placed back in service. This report is being generated per TRM bases 13.13.1 condition B for the TSC emergency response facility being out of service for greater than 30 minutes. The total out of service time was 44 minutes. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | HVAC | |
| ENS 46907 | 1 June 2011 13:18:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out of Service Due to Ventilation Condenser Unit Failure | The Technical Support Center (TSC) has been rendered non-functional due to a malfunctioning TSC ventilation system. Investigation into the cause of elevated TSC room temperature led to the discovery of a malfunctioning condensing unit compressor. Repairs to the ventilation system were immediately initiated with high priority. Compensatory measures per FNP-0-EIP-6.0 (TSC Setup and Activation) for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities are being put in place. These measures include the conditional relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC to be uninhabitable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 46829 | 8 May 2011 13:25:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Malfunctioning Technical Support Center Ventilation | The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) has been rendered non-functional due to a malfunctioning TSC ventilation system. Investigation into the cause of elevated TSC room temperature led to the discovery of a tripped condensing unit compressor. Repairs to the TSC ventilation system were immediately initiated with high priority. Compensatory measures per site procedure FNP-0-EIP-6.O (TSC Setup and Activation) for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities were immediately put in place. These measures include the conditional relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC to be uninhabitable. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 46765 | 18 April 2011 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Out of Service for Planned Maintenance | The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) has been rendered non-functional due to a pre-planned and scheduled maintenance period for the Technical Support Center ventilation system. The maintenance activities include replacement of the evaporator coil, fan, and expansion valve. The TSC ventilation maintenance will be worked with high priority and is expected to be complete prior to 1200 EDT on 4/19/11 . Pre-arranged compensatory measures for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities were put in place prior to the beginning of the TSC ventilation maintenance and will remain in place for the duration of the maintenance period. These measures include the relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency IF the Emergency Director deems the TSC uninhabitable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 46539 | 14 January 2011 17:25:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out of Service Due to Planned Maintenance | |||
| ENS 46481 | 14 December 2010 23:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Ens Phone Lines Out of Service Due to a Failed Rectifier | At 1740 CST the control room was notified by a commercial phone provider that they had received alarms indicating the ENS communications lines were out of service. Attempts to use the ENS lines confirmed that the ENS system is not functioning at the site. Commercial lines with an 899 prefix are also not functioning. Alternate commercial lines are available and have been verified functional. The vendor has determined that the loss of the ENS lines are the result of a failed rectifier. It is currently not known when the ENS lines will be returned to service. Farley Nuclear Plant may be contacted via commercial line. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS line at Farley was repaired and successfully tested. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Henson) | ||
| ENS 46266 | 22 September 2010 13:26:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Hvac Unit Out of Service for Maintenance | Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC unit (was) taken out of service for maintenance on (the) unit. The maintenance to be performed includes replacing the evaporator coil, the fan and the expansion valve. This work will be performed with high priority around the clock until the work is completed. Equipment unavailability hours will be reported to and tracked by the TSC HVAC System Engineer. Compensatory measures for performing essential TSC functions during this maintenance period have been established. These measures include the relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC uninhabitable. The maintenance period is scheduled to last 13 to 16 hours, at which point the TSC HVAC (unit) will be restored to operable status. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | HVAC | |
| ENS 46123 | 23 July 2010 13:52:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Temporary Outage of Public Prompt Notification System Due to a Bomb Threat Offsite | The Siren Control Panel at the Houston County Courthouse was unavailable due to a bomb threat (FNP-0-EIP-8.0, step 13.6.3) which caused a loss to the Public Prompt Notification System (i.e.. Tone Alert Radio system and the Sirens) for greater than one hour. The bomb threat occurred at 0852 (07/23/10) and Houston County Courthouse evacuation was commenced. Farley Nuclear Plant was notified of the bomb threat and subsequent evacuation at approximately 0945 (07/23/10). The bomb threat resulted in the Houston County Emergency Management Agency (HCEMA) and the Houston County Sheriff's dispatcher to be evacuated, which resulted in the Alert Notification System (ANS) activation consoles being inaccessible. The HCEMA office was evacuated at 0915 (07/23/10) and the Houston County Sheriff Dispatcher evacuated at 0925. When Farley Nuclear Plant was notified of the bomb threat, Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel were dispatched to the local MET Tower console for ANS actuation (TAR's and Sirens) per approved plant procedures, if required. Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel were on station at the MET Tower ANS console at 0959 (07/23/10) with capability to activate the ANS console if required. Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel were in contact with HCEMA at 1000 (07/23/10). All clear from bomb threat given by Houston County Sheriff's Department and normal access was restored to the HCEMA office at 1100 (07/23/10). At 1109 (07/23/10) HCEMA notified Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel that the HCEMA office was manned and the MET Tower ANS console manning was secured. During the time that the HCEMA office was unmanned, Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) was the notification point for HCEMA and that any decision to activate the ANS console could be made by HCEMA by direction of AEMA and then performed by Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel. The total length of time that the Alert Notification System was unavailable was 68 minutes. This was based on the bomb threat and evacuation time at 0852 (07/23/10) until Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel were in contact with HCEMA at 1000 (07/23/10). The licensee notified Alabama and Georgia Emergency Management Agencies as well as Houston County and Early County Management Agencies. The licensee also notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 45916 | 11 May 2010 14:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Technical Support Center | On 05-11-10 at 09:30 hours the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation, filtration and climate control system was identified as nonfunctional. The TSC was declared nonfunctional. A plan has been implemented for performance of TSC functions in alternate locations in accordance with site emergency implementation procedures. At 13:00 hours on 05-11-10, the system was placed back in service but is still considered non-functional while additional trouble shooting is being performed and final repairs are made. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 45906 | 6 May 2010 19:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Nonfunctional | On 05-06-10 at 1440 hours the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation, filtration and climate control system was identified as nonfunctional. The TSC was declared nonfunctional. A plan has been implemented for performance of TSC functions in alternate locations in accordance with site emergency implementation procedures. Site maintenance has initiated trouble shooting and repairs will be implemented. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 43133 | 30 January 2007 14:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Spds Due to Planned Maintenance | Unit 2 SPDS (Safety Parameter Display System) is OOS (Out-of-Service) for planned Plant Computer replacement. System will be out for several days. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | Safety Parameter Display System | |
| ENS 42971 | 8 November 2006 14:05:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Plant Computer Down for Upgrade | Farley Nuclear Plant is replacing the Unit 1 plant computer with an upgraded plant computer. The total time that the plant computer may be down is a maximum of 10 days. The functions for emergency preparedness will be completed within the first 12 hours of the outage. During that first 12 hours a contingency plan is in place to ensure that the TSC would have the required data if an emergency was declared. A 5054Q was written for this and was reviewed by the Region 2 NRC EP staff prior to implementation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee successfully completed functional testing earlier today of the SPDS and has returned it to service as of 2045 EST on 11/17/06. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Chuck Casto). | ||
| ENS 42280 | 20 January 2006 16:17:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Public Prompt Notification Systems Sirens Discovered Inoperable | The Public Prompt Notification System sirens were inoperable from 10:17 CST until 11:36 CST on 01/20/06. (They were inoperable for) a period of one hour and 19 minutes. The siren system was returned to operation when the antennae for operating the sirens was changed. The Tone Alert Radio System was operational during this entire time period and remains operable. The cause of the failure is not clearly understood at this time. The appropriate test equipment is being sent to the site and a complete troubleshooting plan with a test plan will be started on Monday 01/23/06. Until that time a contingency plan is in place that has personnel on call that will report to the three siren sites if an emergency is declared. They will be in communications with the local authorities to activate the sirens locally in accordance with an approved plant procedure. While performing the troubleshooting and maintenance on the siren system we will have staff standing by at the sirens that will be able to activate the sirens in accordance with an approved plant procedure. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 42267 | 18 January 2006 17:34:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Offsite Public Prompt Notification for Greater than One Hour | Offsite Public Prompt Notification System, Sirens and Tone Alert Radios were inoperable for greater than one hour. The Primary Console for siren operation at Houston County was found to be non functional at (approximately) 0820 CST during periodic siren tests. The backup console did successfully operate the sirens. However, at 1030 CST the transport system for actuating system failed at Webb, AL and the Backup Console for siren operation as well as Tone Alert Radios became inoperable. The inoperability of the system lasted for one hour and five minutes, being restored at 1134 CST. Initial troubleshooting indicates the problem was with the fiber coaxial cable to the demultiplexer in the transport. The problem could not be repeated, and investigation continues. Repairs for the Primary Console for siren actuation are being facilitated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Houston County. | ||
| ENS 40443 | 13 January 2004 19:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Communication and Emergency Notification System | General FTS Failure recognized by abnormal ring (long drawn out ring) coming from ENS. System operation verification performed after ring noted. At this time it was realized all lines had no dial tones and were inoperable. In addition to the ENS other FTS phones/lines inoperable noted were the MCL, HPN, PMCL, RSCL, and possibly the LAN line, ERDS 1 and 2. (ERDS, and LAN line not operability tested). ENS Failure- Discovered at 12:55 CST it was inoperable and reportable per FNP-0-EIP-8.0 (non emergency report) para. 12.6.2 at 13:55 CST. Plant Commercial lines not effected. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector |