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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 54345 | 4 September 2019 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Incorrectly Wired Socket Side Quick Disconnect Connectors | The following information was received via fax: To maintain compliance with 10 CFR 21, this initial notification is to document the failure to comply of basic components which were found to have a defect and were supplied to a licensed operating nuclear power plant. On September 4, 2019 Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division, Huntsville Operations was notified by Duke Energy - Catawba Nuclear Station of a possible deviation of a supplied EGS Quick Disconnect Connector (QDC), P/N 880701-102 (S/N: 47801 and 47802) where two socket side connectors were wired incorrectly. Condition Report (H19-4603) was generated to internally document all actions and investigations on this matter. On October 17, 2019, the basic components with the possible deviation were returned to Curtiss-Wright and evaluated. The evaluation found that the socket sides were wired incorrectly by color code but the wire markers were correctly labeled. If installed using the wire marker delineation, the wiring would be correct, but if the basic components were installed using the color code, there could be the possibility of incorrect wiring. Since Curtiss-Wright is not privy to how the operating plant installs these connector(s), if installed using the color code it may cause a possible safety hazard and therefore considered defective. The condition was caused by human error and was isolated to the two subject socket side QDCs. The defected QDCs were returned and replacement connectors were built and supplied to Duke Energy - Catawba Nuclear Station. Even though this is considered an isolated event, corrective actions to help prevent recurrence are in the process of being implemented. These include, but are not limited to, adding an additional specific peer check during manufacturing and adding a specific final inspection check to confirm actual wire insulation color code, if applicable. Based on our evaluation these two connectors were the only ones affected by this defect. They have been removed from service and replacements have been provided. Once all corrective actions to prevent recurrence are completed, an official close out letter will be generated. If you would like to discuss this further please contact the following: Chris Covan, Quality Assurance Manager, at (256) 924-7414 or ccovan@curtisswright.com, or Tim Franchuk, Director of Quality Assurance, at (513) 201-2176 or tfranchuk@curtisswright.com. | ||
| ENS 52756 | 16 March 2017 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 - Potential Defect in Grayboot Socket Contacts | The following information was received via email: This letter is issued to provide an interim notification of a potential defect in certain lots of Grayboot socket contacts supplied with EQ qualified Grayboot Connector Kits. On March 16, 2017, Curtiss-Wright, Nuclear Division, Huntsville Operations was contacted by Georgia Power Vogtle Nuclear Power Plant concerning a potential defect where the socket contact tines were in a relaxed state. Although we have completed some testing and verification activities, additional testing is in progress now and will provide necessary information to complete our evaluation. Current testing will be completed and final conclusions made by May 31, 2017. At this time, based on test results, evaluations and operating experience, Curtiss Wright is confident that any potentially affected Grayboot Assemblies will continue to perform their intended safety functions. As such, if the final recommendation is to replace the potentially defective socket contact, this can be accomplished during subsequent routine maintenance activities. This notification is being made to comply with 60 day interim reporting requirements as defined in 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2). For additional information, please contact Samuel Bledsoe, EGS Products Engineering Manager (1-256-690-7852) or Tony Gill, EGS and Trentec Quality Assurance Manager (1-256-426-4558).
The following information was provided via email: This letter is issued to provide final findings associated with a potential defect concerning GRAYBOOT socket contacts. This issue was initially identified in an interim report dated May 15, 2017. As documented previously, Curtiss-Wright, Nuclear Division, Huntsville Operations was contacted by Georgia Power Vogtle Nuclear Power Plant on March 16, 2017 concerning a potential defect wherein GRAYBOOT socket contact tines were in a relaxed state. This notification of a potential defect concerns model GB-1 GRAYBOOT kits supplied with two-tined, silver-plated, 12-14 AWG socket contacts. Based upon this scope, potentially affected kits/parts are: 1. GB-1(12-14) GRAYBOOT kits, 2. GB-1 (12-14/ 16-18) GRAYBOOT kits, and 3. GB-1-6 GRAYBOOT 12-14 AWG socket contacts. This issue does not affect the following: 1. Any GRAYBOOT 'A' kits/parts, 2. Any model GB-2 or GB-3 GRAYBOOT kits/parts, or 3. Any model GB-1 GRAYBOOT kits/parts with 16-18 AWG socket contacts. Our evaluation is documented in Report No. EGS-TR-880708-15 and is available for review at our facility in Huntsville, AL. The results identify the most likely root cause is improper heat treating of the socket contacts during manufacturing. Additional testing and analysis was performed to confirm that any affected GRAYBOOT assemblies can still preform their safety-related function and do not present a substantial safety hazard . The findings outlined in Report No. EGS-TR-880708-15 provide a high level of confidence that affected GRAYBOOT assemblies do not present a substantial safety hazard. This position is further validated by the lack of negative operating experience over the last 20 plus years from properly installed GRAYBOOT assemblies. However, this condition causes the contact to be more susceptible to damage from handling during connection and disconnection, and therefore the following actions are recommended: 1. Any affected sockets in inventory should be replaced. Affected sockets in service should be replaced during routine maintenance activities. OR 2. In lieu of replacement, it is acceptable to perform the following (steps 1-3) to confirm a separation force greater than 0.19 lbs. This is consistent with existing Curtiss-Wright dedication acceptance criteria. It is recommended that any contacts not meeting this criteria be replaced. 1. Crimp a spare pin contact to an appropriate piece of wire. 2. Connect a force gage or 0.19 lbs. of static weight to the opposite end of the wire. 3. Insert the pin into the socket and confirm that the pin does not separate from the socket under a minimum load of 0.19 lbs. To confirm this deviation is not present in existing inventory or in future purchased lots, the following corrective actions have been or will be implemented by Curtiss-Wright: 1. Micro hardness testing was performed on all socket contact lots in inventory to verify their acceptability. Results confirmed that all lots were acceptable. 2. Acceptance criteria for dedication of socket contacts will be revised to include verification of acceptable contact hardness. This corrective action will be completed by June 9, 2017. No dedication of socket contacts will be performed until this corrective action is complete. A list of affected utilities and associated purchase orders is being developed and will be complete and submitted by June 9, 2017. For additional information, please contact Samuel Bledsoe, EGS Products Engineering Manager (1-256-690-7852) or Tony Gill, EGS and Trentec Quality Assurance Manager (1-256-426-4558). Notified R1DO (Bower), R2DO (Shaeffer), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (O'Keefe) and Part 21 Operating Reactors Group via email.
The following update was received via email: On May 31, 2017, Curtiss-Wright, Nuclear Division, Huntsville Operations issued a letter documenting final findings regarding a potential defect concerning model GB-1 GRAYBOOT kits supplied with two-tined, silver-plated, 12-14 AWG contacts. Please find that letter attached. Pursuant to the attached letter, please find attached a list of affected purchase orders. For additional information, please contact Samuel Bledsoe, EGS Products Engineering Manager (1-256-690-7852) or Tony Gill, EGS and Trentec Quality Assurance Manager (1-256-426-4558). List of Sites Affected: Arkansas Nuclear 1 Bruce Nuclear Power Development Brunswick Callaway Calvert Cliffs Clinton Columbia Cooper CTEAM/CRIT Davis-Besse Diablo Canyon Duane Arnold Farley FMM Fort Calhoun Gentilly Ginna Haddam Neck Harris Indian Point Kewaunee La Salle Limerick Millstone Nine Mile Point North Anna Oconee Oyster Creek Peach Bottom Pilgrim Point Beach Prairie Island Quad Cities River Bend Saint Lucie San Onofre Sizewell B South Texas Summer Turkey Point Vermont Yankee Vogtle Waterford Wolsong Zion Notified R1DO(Welling), R2DO(Suggs), R3DO(Orlikowski), R4DO(Rollins), Part-21 Reactors (via email).
The following information was received via email: At initial issuance, the evaluation documented in Report No. EGS-TR-880708-15 presented metallurgical analysis as well as thermal, functional and seismic testing. This report has been revised to include cycle aging, functional testing and pull-out force. Test results confirm that affected socket contacts will continue to perform their intended safety function throughout their qualified life. Based on these final findings, no further actions are recommended for the potentially affected utilities previously notified. Any potentially affected socket contacts, either in inventory or installed, are acceptable for use in their intended safety-related application. It is recommended that all utilities confirm that installation and handling of GRAYBOOT assemblies is in accordance with Installation Instructions EGS-TR-880707-02. For additional information, please contact Samuel Bledsoe, EGS Products Engineering Manager (1-256-690-7852) or Tony Gill, EGS and Trentec Quality Assurance Manager (1-256-426-4558). Notified R1DO(Dentel), R2DO(Michel), R3DO(Riemer), R4DO(Groom), Part-21 Reactors (via email). |