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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 54772 | 10 July 2020 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Common Emergency Operations Facility Maintenance | At 0900 EDT hours on 7/10/2020 Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson nuclear sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at Brunswick, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 52069 | 6 July 2016 22:07:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Offsite Notification to the United States Department of Transportation | In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Duke Energy is notifying the NRC of a report made to the Department of Transportation concerning the identification of removable contamination in excess of 49 CFR 173.443(a) limits. This report was made at 1807 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). On July 6, 2016, an EnergySolutions 3-60B Transportation Package was received onsite. As a result of receipt surveys, Brunswick Health Physics personnel confirmed removable surface contamination on the transportation package in excess of 49 CFR 173.443(a) limits. The package was shipped as UN2910, Radioactive material, excepted package-limited quantity of material, 7, and was consigned as a non-exclusive use shipment. Surveys identified mixed beta/gamma contamination ranging from approximately 2500 to 4500 dpm/100 sq cm on the surface of the transportation package. All other smears taken on the cask raincover, trailer bed and tires were less than minimum detectable activity for removable contamination. The transportation package is located in a radiological controlled area and access is controlled by Radiation Protection. Surveys have confirmed that the contamination is limited to the surface of the cask. In addition, no personnel contamination events have been attributed to the contamination found on the transportation package. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified. The safety significance of this condition is minimal. There is no indication of onsite or personnel contamination as a result of this event. The transportation package is controlled in a radiological controlled area and access is controlled by Radiation Protection. The originator of the empty cask arriving at the site (Westinghouse-Pittsburgh) was notified of the contamination. The cask is used for control rod blades and local power range neutron monitoring string shipping. | Control Rod | |
| ENS 50459 | 15 September 2014 17:09:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Siren Activation Capability | At 1309 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on September 15, 2014, it was determined that the ability to activate the thirty-eight (38) emergency sirens within the 10 mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) radius of the plant was lost. Subsequently, activation capability was restored when a loose modem cable was discovered and remedied. By approximately 1450 EDT, the ability to activate the emergency sirens had been satisfactorily tested. Activation capability of the emergency sirens was restored in approximately 1 hour and 41 minutes. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a major loss of communications capability. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The Brunswick Nuclear Plant and State of North Carolina Emergency Response Plans include back-up processes to provide warning to affected areas, if required, in the event of the loss of sirens. The cause of the loose modem cable will be investigated. The NRC Senior Resident (Inspector) has been notified. | ||
| ENS 50355 | 12 August 2014 08:32:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Unusual Event for a Halon Release Near the Tsc and Eof | The licensee declared an Unusual Event because of a halon discharge in the simulator. This potentially affects access and habitability of the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The Unusual Event was declared under HU3.1 "toxic, corrosive, asphyxiate, or flammable gases in amounts that have or could have adversely affected normal plant operations." The fire brigade has been dispatched to determine whether a fire actually exists. The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified other FEDS (FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, DHS SWO) and (Nuclear SSA, FEMA NWC) via email.
The Unusual Event was terminated at 0700 EDT. Halon discharged into the plant simulator. There was no actual fire. Offsite assistance was requested. Local fire department and ambulance are on site. The TSC and EOF have been activated. The halon discharge into the simulator building is not impacting normal plant operations where the ERO (Emergency Response Organization) capabilities and staffing are still required. Therefore, activation for UE (Unusual Event) is being terminated. The Incident Commander released the building for normal access at 0717 EDT. The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Nease), IRD (Gott), and NRR (Thomas). Notified other FEDS (FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, DHS SWO) and (Nuclear SSA, FEMA NWC) via email.
EVENT DESCRIPTION: This is an update of a previous notification which was made by telephone to the (NRC) Operations Center at approximately 0504 EDT per Event Number 50355. At approximately 0421 EDT on 08/12/2014, the Halon fire suppression system in the Plant Simulator actuated by releasing the Halon. A Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared at 0432 EDT on the basis that a release of toxic or asphyxiating gas had occurred on site (Emergency Action Level HU3.1). Emergency response personnel reported to the site and prepared to perform emergency response activities. The site fire brigade was dispatched. The local fire department was called and emergency personnel were dispatched to the site. The reason for the Halon discharge is not known at this time and is under investigation. No actual fire was observed. The Plant Simulator is located in the same building with the primary Technical Support Center (TSC) and primary Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Since the Halon discharge occurred in this building, the site incident commander restricted access to these two primary Emergency Response Facilities, rendering them unavailable for use. The NOUE was terminated at 0700 EDT. Normal access to the TSC and EOF was restored at 0717 EDT. INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: This event had no effect on the operating units, and there was no adverse impact on nuclear safety or on the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Offsite fire department personnel assisted by on site fire brigade have validated that no fire condition existed. The building has been ventilated and normal access restored. The failure of the Halon System is being tracked for restoration in accordance with station fire protection documents. Notified R2DO (Hopper) and NRR Daytime EO (Thomas). | ||
| ENS 48362 | 1 October 2012 12:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center (Tsc) / Emergency Operations Facility (Eof) Out-Of-Service for Planned Maintenance | On October 01, 2012, at approximately 09:00 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), the Brunswick TSC/EOF Emergency Ventilation System is scheduled to be removed from service to perform planned maintenance consisting of emergency filtration unit charcoal testing and replacement. The removal of the ventilation system can potentially affect the TSC and EOF habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC/EOF activation during this period, the facilities will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. The Emergency Response Organization duty team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to activate the TSC and EOF at their alternate locations. This condition has no adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The ventilation system is scheduled to be out of service for approximately 2 days. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48032 | 17 June 2012 17:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Outage of Erfis, Spds, Erds, and Ppc | On June 17, 2012, at approximately 1400 hours EDT, the Brunswick Nuclear Plant will be restoring the normal power supply configuration to the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) uninterruptable power supply electrical bus 'A.' This will result in a temporary loss of the site ERFIS, Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and Plant Process Computer (PPC) functions for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Brunswick Units 1 and 2 had established an alternate power supply to the ERFIS UPS electrical bus 'A' on June 13, 2012 (i.e., EN 48019). During the loss of these functions, manual data transfer will be available to the NRC. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), for a loss of emergency preparedness capability. A follow-up notification will be made when the ERFIS, SPDS, ERDS, and PPC functions are restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of these actions. * * * UPDATE FROM STUART BYRD TO PETE SNYDER AT 1757 EDT ON 6/17/12 * * * Units 1 and 2 ERFIS, SPDS and ERDS have been returned to service. The PPC is expected to be returned to service at approximately 1900 EDT. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ayers). | Emergency Response Data System Safety Parameter Display System | |
| ENS 48019 | 12 June 2012 21:57:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of the Plant Process Computer System | At 1757 EDT on 6/12/12, Brunswick Nuclear Plant experienced a fault on the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) uninterruptible power supply (UPS) electrical bus 'A'. This resulted in a loss of site Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and Plant Process Computer (PPC) for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The cause of the fault is not yet understood and under investigation. No other major plant effects occurred and no major plant evolutions are planned. During the loss of SPDS, the emergency response capability of that system was lost to the site. During the loss of ERDS, the automatic data transfer feature of that system was lost for transmissions to the NRC, however manual data transfer is still available. During the loss of the PPC, automatic core thermal power averaging and automatic core thermal limit monitoring was lost. Manual calculations are available for these functions. Unit 1 SPDS was restored to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) at 1949 EDT. Unit 2 SPDS was restored to the EOF at 2030 EDT. ERDS and PPC remain unavailable with troubleshooting in progress. Both units reduced power to 98% as a conservative measure. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Unit 1 and 2 ERFIS, SPDS, and ERDS functions were restored by approximately 0630 hours on June 13, 2012, after an alternate power supply configuration was established. In addition, the PPC functions were restored by approximately 1630. Compensatory actions will be maintained until the UPS 'A' bus is restored and returned to normal configuration. The Brunswick Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been briefed on the compensatory actions in place. Investigation of this condition will be documented in the corrective action program in Condition Report (CR) 542704. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Notified R2DO(Ayres) | Emergency Response Data System Safety Parameter Display System | |
| ENS 47311 | 1 October 2011 20:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Erds Connectivity Due to a Computer Issue | On 10/1/2011, for a period of approximately 4 hours between 1600 EDT to 2000 EDT, the capability of transferring Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) information to the NRC Operations Center was lost for Brunswick Units 1 and 2. The cause was attributed to a software issue affecting communication between plant process computing and the network server. This constituted a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Emergency Response Data System | |
| ENS 47215 | 29 August 2011 16:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Response Data System Out of Service for Maintenance | At 1200 hours on 08/29/11, the ERDS (Emergency Response Data System) was removed from service for a planned maintenance outage on a site network server. The duration of work, which affects ERDS for Brunswick Unit 1 and Unit 2, is expected to be approximately four (4) hours. Since the ERDS will be unavailable during this maintenance activity, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). An update will be provided when the scheduled work has been completed and ERDS has been restored. ERDS is a direct near real-time electronic data link between the licensee's onsite computer system and the NRC Operations Center that provides for the automated transmission of a limited data set of selected parameters. ERDS supplements the existing voice transmission over the Emergency Notification System (ENS) by providing the NRC Operations Center with timely and accurate updates of a limited set of parameters from the Brunswick Plant installed onsite computer system in the event of an emergency. During the time ERDS is unavailable, emergency plan contingency measures are in place to transmit data, if required. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector will be notified of this evolution and the planned return to service of the system.
The licensee reports that the ERDS server replacement maintenance has been completed and ERDS capability was re-established at 2147 EDT on 8/29/11. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Widmann) notified. | Emergency Response Data System | |
| ENS 45813 | 5 April 2010 03:34:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Siren Activation Capability | At 1400 hours Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on April 5, 2010, the Control Room was notified that the ability to activate the thirty-eight (38) emergency sirens within the 10 mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) radius of the plant had been lost for a period of 1 hour and 16 minutes from 2334 hours EDT on April 4, 2010, until 0050 hours on April 5, 2010. The event occurred when an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS), supplying radio repeaters used to activate the sirens failed. Inoperability of the repeaters impacts the ability to actuate the emergency sirens from the New Hanover County and Brunswick County Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) as well as from the Brunswick Nuclear Plant Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF). The failed UPS was reset and emergency siren activation capability was restored at 0050 hours EDT on April 5, 2010. The reportability requirement associated with the inability to activate the emergency sirens was not recognized by personnel who responded to the failure and, as such, the failure was not communicated to the control room. Emergency Preparedness personnel, reviewing emergency siren computer event logs on April 5, 2010, became aware of the failure and understood its impact. This resulted in notification of the event to the control room. The initial safety significance of the event is minimal. The Brunswick and North Carolina Emergency Response Plans include compensatory measures to provide warning to affected areas, if required, in the event of the loss of sirens. The ability to activate the emergency sirens has been confirmed. Investigations into the cause of the UPS failure, as well as interim and long term corrective actions are in progress. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. | ||
| ENS 42724 | 24 July 2006 21:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss and Restoration of Spds System | On 7/24/06, Brunswick Unit 2 experienced a loss of Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) capability for 12 hours and 54 minutes. Operations was informed of the loss (and restoration) of SPDS at 1700 7/24/06. Unit 2 remained at 100 percent power, steady state operation, throughout the time that SPDS was inoperable. The cause of the SPDS failure is under investigation. Note that all other emergency assessment equipment was operable during the time Unit 2 was without SPDS. SPDS was restored at 1330, 7/24/06. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Safety Parameter Display System | |
| ENS 41991 | 14 September 2005 12:32:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Offsite Emergency Preparedness Sirens | On September 14, 2005, at approximately 0832 hours (EDT), Brunswick began losing the function of several offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. There are a total of 36 sirens located in Brunswick and New Hanover Counties, NC. The maximum number of sirens that were inoperable was twenty (20). As of 1330 (EDT), eleven (11) sirens in Brunswick County and four (4) sirens in New Hanover County remain inoperable. The Brunswick and New Hanover County Emergency Operations Centers are aware of the condition of the sirens and maintenance activities are in progress to restore siren capabilities. Other communications with local, state, and federal emergency response organizations have not been affected. The initial safety significance of this condition is considered minimal. Unit 1 and 2 are currently operating in Mode 1 under normal parameters. State and county emergency response officials are aware of the condition and compensatory measures are in place to provide warning to the affected areas if required. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On September 14, 2005, under Event Notification 41991, Brunswick Plant reported the loss of a number of offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. Maintenance activities continue for restoration of the siren capabilities lost. As of 2340 hours (EDT) on September 14, 2005, nine (9) sirens remain inoperable, six (6) sirens in Brunswick County and three (3) sirens in New Hanover County. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday).
On September 14, 2005, at 1411 hours, the Brunswick plant provided a notification (reference Event Number 41991) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for the loss of function several offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. This update is to notify the NRC Operations Center that as of September 15, 2005, at 1600 hours, all but 3 of 36 sirens have been restored and the condition no longer meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Restoration efforts for the remaining sirens are in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday) | ||
| ENS 41926 | 17 August 2005 20:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Offsite Emergency Sirensout of Service Due to Severe Weather | On August 17, 2005 at 1615 (EST), Brunswick lost eight off site emergency preparedness sirens for greater than an hour due to severe weather and lightning strikes. The Brunswick County Emergency Operations Center is aware of the loss and has established Backup Route Alerting. Other communications with local, state, and federal response organizations have not been affected. Safety Significance is minimal. Backup Route Alerting was established as a compensatory measure and the sirens were promptly returned to service. The down time was only 1 hour and 44 minutes. All affected sirens were restored operable at 1759 (EST) 8/17/05. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 40955 | 14 August 2004 16:25:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Several Offsite Emergency Preparedness Sirens Due to Adverse Weather | On August 14, 2004, at approximately 1225 hours (EDT), Brunswick began losing the function of several offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Charley. There are a total of 36 sirens located in Brunswick and New Hanover Counties, NC. The total number of inoperable sirens peaked at 25. As of 1825 hours (EDT), all but 6 sirens located in Brunswick County have been returned to operable status. At present, all inoperabilities have been the result of loss of AC power. The Brunswick County Emergency Operations Center is aware of the condition of the sirens and maintenance activities are in progress to restore the siren capabilities. Other communications with local, state, and federal emergency response organizations have not been affected. The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3 and Unit 2 is operating in Mode 1 under normal parameters. State and county emergency response officials are aware of the condition and compensatory measures are in place to provide warning to the affected areas if required. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 40315 | 12 November 2003 15:03:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Siren Test Failure | On November 12, 2003, at approximately 1003 hours, during an annual emergency preparedness siren test, the five sirens from New Hanover County, NC, did not respond to the signal sent by the New Hanover County Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The sirens were subsequently tested from the Brunswick Nuclear Plant (BNP) Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) and responded as required. Maintenance activities are in progress to restore New Hanover County EOC siren initiation capability. Initiation capability will be maintained at the BNP EOF until the capability is restored to New Hanover County. Of the remaining 31 sirens tested, 30 successfully passed the annual test and are considered to be operable. The additional failed siren blew a control power fuse during the test and has since been repaired, tested, and returned to operable status. The resident inspector has been notified. The safety significance of this event is considered to be minimal. Both Units 1 and 2 are operating in Mode 1 under normal parameters. Compensatory measures are in place to ensure the affected sirens will initiate if required. Activities to restore siren initiation capability are in progress.
Repairs and retesting have been completed and, as of 1530 ET 11/12/03, New Hanover County EOC siren initiation capability has been restored. Notified R2DO (J. Pelchat) |