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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 51976 | 3 June 2016 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Notification of Deviation of K-Line Circuit Breaker Secondary Trip Latch | The following was excepted from a report from ABB, Inc. via email: This letter provides notification of a defect associated with the secondary trip latch, P/N: 716789E00, which is used in the 167710T01 & 167710T03 secondary latch bar assembly and assembly kit, respectively. These assemblies are used in low voltage K-Line 225-800 Amp and 1600-2000 Amp circuit breakers. The reported failure was caused by the pin in the secondary trip latch that the return spring attaches to not being installed properly. The pin hit the tab on the tripper bar when the latch returned to the reset position. This caused the breaker to trip open. This failure was reported by Xcel Energy Prairie Island Nuclear Plant and it is the only reported occurrence of a failure caused by the return spring pin being out of position. The secondary trip latch has been cast by the same since 1996. No other field failures or failures in the ABB Service facilities have been reported as a result of this pin being out of position. Information is provided as specified in 10CFR21 paragraph 21.21(d)(4). Notifying individual: Andrew Wall, Vice President & General Manager, ABB (Electrification Products Medium Voltage Service US), 2300 Mechanicsville Road, Florence, SC 29501 Identification of the Subject component: ABB part numbers 716789E00 (secondary latch bar) and 167710T01 & 167710T03 (secondary latch bar assemblies). The secondary latch bar is available as an individual component and the secondary latch bar assemblies are utilized as components, as part of refurbishment kits, in K-Line operating mechanisms, in new K-Line breakers, and they may be replaced during a K-Line breaker refurbishment. Nature of the deviation: The pin that holds the return spring in place was not properly installed. The defect is believed to have occurred during the assembly process of the latch bar. The latch used in the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant circuit breaker was fabricated in 2013. Corrective actions include: Quarantined and inspected PIN: 716789E00 and 167710T01/167710T03 assemblies in inventory. (Action complete) Notified vendor of the issue via the ABB Supplier Corrective Action Request process. (Action complete) Revised Critical Characteristic card for PIN: 716789E00 to incorporate measurement of the pin in question. (Action complete) Conducted training with QA and Operations personnel for awareness (Action complete) Recommendations: Because of the large potential variety of usages of the potentially affected circuit breakers, ABB (Medium Voltage Service) cannot determine if the potential for a substantial safety hazard exists at any licensee's facility if the circuit breaker fails to operate. It is recommended the Licensees inspect the in-service components at the next convenient maintenance opportunity and components in stock prior to installation. The pin should protrude 0.26 ( +/- 0.02) inches out of both sides of the section of the latch bar assembly. If the latch is installed on a K-Line circuit breaker, the latch can be inspected from the bottom side of the mechanism without disassembly. Questions concerning this notification should be directed to the Quality Manager at the Medium Voltage Service Center in Florence, SC at (843) 413-4782 or Fax (843) 413-4853. HOO Note: See EN #51975 for Part 21 received from Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Station. | ||
| ENS 51975 | 31 May 2016 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 - Notification of Deviation of K-Line Circuit Breaker Secondary Trip Latch | The following was received from Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant via fax: Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission: Thomas A. Conboy Director of Site Operations Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company - Minnesota 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect: ABB Inc. BREAKER, CIRCUIT, SWITCHGEAR, 480, 3, 600 Type: K-600S EO Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: Address on original purchase order: ABB Power Distribution 455 Century Point Lake Mary, FL 32772 Address on current Qualified Supplier List: ABB, Inc. - Protective Relays & Switches 4300 Coral Ridge Dr. Coral Springs, FL 33065 Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply: During surveillance testing of the D5 emergency diesel generator, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) observed the diesel room cooling fan (21 D5 DSL RM CLG FAN) did not start. The fan did not start because the supply breaker (BKR 211D) did not close to provide power to the fan. Visual inspection of the breaker identified the Secondary Trip Latch Assembly had an abnormal pin installation. The diesel room cooling fan assures operability of the emergency diesel generator that is necessary to assure the capability of shutting down the reactor and indefinitely maintaining it in cold shutdown. The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained: May 31, 2016. In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components In use at. supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part: Eleven ABB K-600S EO breakers with 86 Lock Out are on the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) site: BKR 211D, 21 D5 DSL RM COOLING FAN BKR 221D, 22 D6 DSL RM COOLING FAN BKR 112C, MCC 1S1 & PRZR HTRS GRP A BKR 212C, MCC 2S1 & PRZR HTRS GRP A BKR 122C, MCC 1R1 & PRZR HTRS GRP B BKR 222C, MCC 2R1 & PRZR HTRS GRP B Five spares not Installed in plant. The corrective action which has been. is being. or will be taken: the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action: and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action: PINGP entered the breaker failure into the Corrective Action Program. PINGP replaced the two diesel cooling room fan breakers with breakers having no abnormally positioned pins in the secondary trip latch assemblies. PINGP inspected BKR 221D and found a satisfactory Secondary Trip Latch Assembly. PINGP performed extent of condition inspections on the four pressurizer heater circuit breakers and found satisfactory Secondary Trip Latch Assemblies. PINGP will revise Electrical Maintenance Procedure PE 4824, Receipt Inspect 480 Volt Breaker, to visually inspect K-600S EO circuit breakers for Secondary Trip Latch Assembly pin alignment. The revised inspection procedure will prevent recurrence since PINGP performs the inspection prior to installing 480V circuit breakers in the plant. The procedure change is expected to be completed by end of August. Site Transmission and Distribution Coordinator and lead breaker (relay) technician are informed on this issue. PINGP performed a past operability review and determined that the D5 emergency diesel generator would have performed its specified safety function for the time period reviewed. PINGP returned the failed breaker to the manufacturer for evaluation. Additional corrective actions will be taken as necessary. Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been. is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees: Verify alignment of Secondary Trip Latch Assembly pins on K-6008 EO circuit breakers with 86 Lock Out. Contact the K-600S EO manufacturer for additional advice. In the case of an early site permit. the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred: Not applicable. HOO Note: See EN #51976 for Part 21 received from ABB, Inc. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
| ENS 51190 | 29 June 2015 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Notification of Deviation Regarding Com-5 Protective Relay Defective Frame Assembly | The following information was provided by ABB via fax: This letter provides notification of a deviation for Class IE COM-5 (Long Time Overcurrent Relays) styles 1326D81A01, 1326D81A02, and 326D81A09. On April 30, 2015, ABB received a customer complaint regarding a COM-5 relay received with a bracket (ABB Part Number #3518A17H01) detached from the relay frame assembly (ABB Part Number #1456C92G01). ABB's investigation determined that the bracket, which is spot-welded to the frame, can be detached from the frame using a relatively small amount of force. If the weld fails, the Indicating Contactor Switch (ICS) unit held by the bracket could inadvertently close, causing a false trip. The affected frame assemblies were manufactured by ABB on 9/25/2014 (Lot#: 45001414115) by an operator who incorrectly followed the inspection procedure required to verify the integrity of the resistance spot welds. ABB records show a total of 11 suspect relays were provided to two customers as detailed in attachment 1 (BELOW). ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, thus we are notifying the purchasers or affected licensees of this determination so that they may evaluate the deviation, pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(b). ABB recommends that the affected licensees evaluate their specific application and determine whether the deviation described in this notice affects their design basis. If it is determined that it does, the licensees should contact ABB to determine appropriate corrective action. ABB is conducting the following actions: - ABB has improved existing inspection processes used to verify resistance spot welds. - ABB has performed an extent of condition evaluation and determined that this issue is limited to this process. If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact ABB Technical Support at +1-954-752-6700 or+ 1-800-222-1946 Very truly yours, Dennis Batovsky - Managing Director ATTACHMENT 1 Customer List for 1326D81A01, 1326D81A02 and 1326D81A09 COM-5 Relays Exelon Business Services Corporation, Chicago, IL - Clinton Nuclear Station ORDER / CUSTOMER PO / DATE / STYLE / SERIAL NO. / QTY ENW0716 / 00531032 Rev 001 / 9-26-2014 / 1326D81A01 / 12910-12912 / 3 ENW0742 / 00541813 Rev 002 / 3-3-2015 / 1326D81A01 / 12938, 12939 / 2 Westinghouse Electric Corporation, New Stanton, PA ORDER / CUSTOMER PO / DATE / STYLE / SERIAL NO. / QTY VEP10980 / 4500653421 Rev 1 / 12-8-2014 / 1326D81A02 / 12928, 12929 / 2 VEP10976 / 4500653398 Rev 1 / 12-8-2014/1326D81A02 / 12925-12927 / 3 VEP11168 / 4500657304 rev 1 / 1-20-2015 / 1326D81A09 / 12919 / 1 | ||
| ENS 49372 | 23 July 2013 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Abb Solid State Circuit Shield and Power Shield Relays Shipped with Incorrect Certificates of Conformance | The following information was obtained from ABB, Inc. via facsimile: This notification is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii). Solid State Circuit Shield Relays (27, 40, 47, 60, 81, 25V, 27/59, 27D, 27H, 27N, 46D, 46Q, 47H, 50H, 59G, 87M) and Power Shield (K-Line) Relays containing CMOS technology Integrated Circuits (IC's) have been shipped with Certificates of Conformance (CoC's) that incorrectly state that they are qualified to 100,000 rads. On July 23, 2013, ABB discovered that the above radiation tolerance value had been incorrectly communicated to customers due to a reference to an incorrect document. ABB failed to update the reference document following the Part 21 notification dated July 28, 1994. ABB's investigation showed that this issue dates back to the beginning of production of solid state relays in the Coral Springs facility in 2009 when the CoC format changed to include this information. As such, the CoC's that ABB provided incorrectly identified the radiation tolerance as 100,000 rads rather than 1,000 rads. All qualification documents and future CoC's will be reviewed to ensure proper record of radiation tolerance is maintained. This review is to be completed by Dec 31, 2013 ABB will notify the affected customers for the listed relays that they should review their applications which require total radiation tolerance greater than 1,000 rads to determine the effects of a possible device malfunctioning on the system. ABB does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(b), we are making this notification simultaneously to our customers so they may evaluate this issue, pursuant to 10 CFR 21(a). Any customers finding that (ABB's) qualification level is insufficient will be advised to contact (ABB's) customer support line at 1-800-222-1946 or 1-954-752-6700 for discussion of remedial action. This information was provided by: Dennis Batovsky Managing Director ABB, Inc. 4300 Coral Ridge Drive Coral Springs, FL 33065 |