NSD-NRC-97-5329, Forwards Markup of AP600 Ssar,Reflecting Design of Containment Spray Sys.Addl Fire Protection Sys Changes Will Not Affect Representation of Containment Spray Sys
| ML20210V383 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200003 |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1997 |
| From: | Mcintyre B WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | Quay T NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NSD-NRC-97-5329, NUDOCS 9709230302 | |
| Download: ML20210V383 (37) | |
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Westinghouse biargy Systems Ba 355 Electric Corporatien Pmsbu@ Pennsytvarna 15230-0355 DCP/NRC1039 NSD-NRC 97 5329 Docket No.: 52 003 September 17,1997 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: T.R. QUAY
SUBJECT:
AP600 SSAR MARKUP FOR Tile CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM DESIGN
Dear Mr. Quay:
At the August 7,1997, meeting between representatives of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Westinghouse, Westinghouse agreed to document the design of the Containment Spray System in i
the AP600 SSAR. Please find attached, a markup of the AP600 SSAR that reflects the design of the j
Containment Spray System. Changes to the Fire Protection System reflect only the addition of the Containment Spray System. Additional Fire Protection System changes will not affect the representation of the Containment Spray System. The changes identified in this markup will be incorporated into revision 17 of the SSAR.
If you have any questions on this material, please call Susan Fanto at (412) 374-4028.
Bx //F' Brian A. McIntyre, N' anage Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing jml Attachment
- Enclosure ee:
N. J. Liparuto, Westinghouse (w/o Attachment)
T. J. Kenyon, NRC (w/ Attachment) 9709230302 970917
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4 ATTACilMENT TO DCP/NRC1039 nm.,r c.
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SSAR Section.'. 9.5 9
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- 1. Introductio3 cnd G:nercl Description of Pl:nt
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C.5 Decay Heat Update Discussion l
Generic issue C 5 involves followind the work of research groups in determining best-estimate decay heat data and associated uncenainties for use in LOCA calculations.
The staff has determined that the 1979 ANSI 5.1 is technically acceptable and has allowed the use of this data to justify relaxation of non required conservatisms in current ECCS evaluation models. The ECCS rule change allows the use of this new data. This issue was determined to be resolved.
AP600 Response:
He large break LOCA analyses for the AP600, which employ the best-estimate E COBRAfrRAC analysis methodology (subsection 15.6.5). use the decay heat model identified in the 1979 ANSI 5.1 (Reference 26).
C.6 LOCA Heat Sources Discussion:
Generic issue C 6 addresses the impact on LOCA calculations of LOCA heat sources, their associated uncertainties, and the manner in which they are combined. An evaluatien was made of the combined effect of power density, decay heat, stored energy, fission power decay, and their associated uncertainties with regard to calculations of LOCA heat sources.
AP600 Response:
See subsection 15.6.5 for a discussion of LOCA heat sources.
C.10 Efketive Operation of Containment Sprays in a LOCA Discussion:
Generic issue C 10 addresses the effectiveness of containment sprays to remove airbome radioactive materials that could be present within the containment following a LOCA. The NRC considers this issue as being technically resolved with the issuance of ANSI 56.51979
- Reference 28), which is referenced in Standard Review Plan, Section 6.5.2.
Revision: 17 Draft,1997 1.9 54 3 W65tingh00S8 Y
t,1:troductio2 cnd G:neral Description of Pint AP600 Response:
The AP600 design does not employ a 'afetyirilated containment spray system for removal cf s
airborne radioactive materials in :ontainment. Ssubsection 15.6.5.3 provides details of source term and mitigation techniques.
C.17 Interim Acceptance Criteria for Solidification Agents for Radioactive Solid Wastes Discussion Generic Issue C 17 addresses the developinent of criteria for acceptability of radwaste solidification agents. The NRC considers this issue as technically resolved with the issuance
- f 10 CIR 61.56.
AP600 Resp <mse:
The AP600 solid radwaste system transfers, stores, and prepares spen! ion exchange resins for disposal. It also provides for disposal of filter elements; sorting, shredding, and compaction of compressible dry active wastes. The solid radwaste system does not provide for liquid waste concentration or solidification. These functions, if used, are provided using mobile systems. Solidification of wastes is not performed by permanently installed systems.
l.9.4.2.3 New Generic Issues Dese items were identified in NUREG-0933 as New Generic Issues and surfaced after the publication of the NUREGs that included the Task Action Plan items other unresolved safety issues.
Issue 14 PWR Pipe Cracks Discussion:
This issue addresses the occurrences of main feedwater line cracking found in operating plants. This issue was classified as resolved with no new requirements.
AP600 Response:
ne design and inspection requirements for the feedwater lines are discussed in subsection 10.4.7.
Revision: 17
[ W85tinkh0088 1.9 55 Draft,1997
s
- 1. litroduction end Ginerd Description of itzt 1.9.5.2.5 Classification of Alain Steamline of Holling Water Reactors (HWRs)
His issue is specific to BWRs and therefore does not apply to the AP600 design.
1.9.5.2.6 Tornado Design Basis NRC Positiont WASH 1300 (Reference 43) and Regulatory Guide 1.76 contain the current NRC regulatory position fo. design basis tomados. Based on a contractor review of Regulatory Guide 1.76, the NRC recommends a maximum tornado speed of 300 mph be used for design basis tomado for passive ALWR designs.
The tornado design basis requirements have been used in establishing structural requirements against effects not covered explicitly in review guidance such as Regulatory Guides or the SRP. The Combmed License applicant will have to demonstrate that the design will also be sufficient to withstand other site hazards such as aviation crashes, nearby explosions, and explosion debris and missiles.
AP600 Response:
The AP600 is designed in accordance with the NRC recommendations for a maximum tornado wind speed of 300 mph, as described in Section 3.3. The AP600 site interface defined in Chapter 2 provides thr.t the Combined License applicant evaluate other site hazards if appropriate.
1.9.5.2.7 Containment Hypass NHC Position:
Reasonable efforts should be made to minimize the possibility of containment bypass leakage, and ALWR designs should allow for a certain amount of leakage in the containment design.
The NRC is evaluating the need for containment spray for all ALWRs. The containment spray provides containment temperature and pressure suppression effects and sembs the containment atmosphere of fission products, mitigating the effects on the fission product bypass distribution.
AP600 Responset Although the phenomenon described for this item is primarily applicable to BWRs. the AP600 has a variety of design features that help to reduce the potential for containment bypass leakage.
Revision: 17 Draft,1997 1.9 96
.[ W8Stingh00S8
- 1. I:troduction cnd Genercl Descriptio2 of Pirt The response to the containment perfonnance issue in stibsection 1.9.5 provides addit. mal infonnation pertaining to various improsements that help to reduce containment bypass.
The safety related passive containment cooling system design also contributes to the containment performance. The system includes multiple flow paths to provide cooling water for containment during severe accident conditions. The containment is also capable of I
successfully removing core decay heat with air-cooling alone.
The containment has a significantly reduced number of penetrations. The number of normally open containment penetrations is also reduced. The result is a low containment leak rate and a low probability of bypass.
l The response to intersystem LOCA in subsection 1.9.5.1 provides additional information l
penaining to applicable AP600 design features that reduce the potential for intersystem LOCA l
and the potential for containment bypass.
Improvements are made to the steam generator design, such as the use of improved tube materials and tube suppons. These improvements reduce the potential for tube leakage, w hich contnbutes to a reduction in containment bypass. Subsectica 5.4.2 provides additional information on the steam generator design.
During a steam generator tube rupture event, the safety related passive core cooling system automatically mitigates the effects of the event, including automatic safety related protection against steam generator overfill.
The safety related passive core cooling system provides long tenn pH control for the containment sump, which helps to reduce the lesels of airborne radioactivity, thereby reducing the consequences of leakage from the containment.
Section 6.3 includes additional information on the passive core cooling system.
The diverse actuation system includes containment isolation features to provide isolation for the most risk significant containment penetrations. pRA Chapter 24 discusses the provisions for isolating risk significant containment penetrations.
The perfonnance of the passive fission prWuct removal process and minimal potential for containment bypass precludes the need for a safety-related containment spray system on AP600 1.9.5.2.8 Containment 1.eak Rate Testing NRC Position:
SECY 91348 (Reference 44) proposes changes to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J to allow an increased interval from 24 months to 30 months for Type C containment leakage rate tests, until rule change proceedings are completed.
Revision: 17 T Westinghouse 1.9-97 Draft,1997
t, introduction cnd Generci I)escription of Pt:nt
'the acceptability of using active, nonsafety related systems to take a plant to cold shutdown conditions.
AP600 Response:
The AP600 includes safety related passive systems and equipment that are designed to automatically establish aad indefinitely maintain safe shutdown conditions for the plant following design basis eventt Sections 6.3 and 7.4 provide additional informanon pertaining to safe shutdown, using the safety related passive systems.
l.9.5.3.5 Control Room liabitability NRC Position:
i 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19 requires adequate radiation protection to permit access and l
occupancy of the control room under accident conditions without personnel receiving radiation j
exposures in excess of five tem whole body, or its equivalent, to any part of the Udy, for the duration of the accident. Section 6.4 of the Standard Review Plan defines this dose critetion in terms of specific whole body and organ doses (5 rem to whole body, and 30 rem each to thyroid and skin). The NRC requires that the analyses of main control room habitability be based on the dose criterion denned in GDC 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 and Section 6.4 of the Standard Review Plan ($ rem to whole body, and 30 rem each to thyroid and skin).
In addition, the analyses of control room habitability should be based on the duration of the accident according to GDC 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.
AP600 Response:
The AP600 design includes a passive, safety related main control room habitability system to meet the requirements of GDC 19 and Section 6.4 of the Standard Review Plan. Section 6.4 provides additional information.
As described in subsection 15.6.5.3, the main control room operator doses following a design basis loss of coolant accident are within the dose criterion of the Standard Review Plan, Section 6.4.
1.9.5.3.6 Radionuclide Attenuation NRC Position:
The NRC is concerned that use of the auxiliary building for holdup may require additional restrictions 'o be placed on the auxiliary building during normal operation. In addition, the Resision: 17 i
Draft,1997 1.9 104 Westilighouse
- 1. I:.troductioa and Gener:I Descripilon of itnt NR is continuing its evaluation of the need for a containment spray system for passise plant Revision: 17 9_ We'nnghouse 1.9 105 Draft,1997
I,1;troduction tnd G:ncr:1 Description of Pl:nt AP600 Responset The AP600 design does not have a safety-related containment spray or take credit for auxiliary building holdup for mitigation of the design basis loss of coolant accident. The design includes a low leakage rate containment (0.12 percent per day) together with credit for aerosol removal by naturally occurring processes and pool scrubbing in containment. The low leakage containment and natural aerosol removal are adequate to meet 10 CFR 100 dose limits, consistent with the physically based source term.
1.9.5.3,7 Simplification of Off Site Emergency Planning NRC Position:
The NRC states that changes to emergency planning regulatory requirements may be appropriate, but that an NRC determination on this issue will require detailed design evaluation. Summaries of specific NRC conclusions are as follows:
Unique characteristics of the designs should be considered in determining the extent of emergency planning, including the ability to prevent signincant release of radioactive material or to provide delay times for all but the most unlikely events.
A very low likelihood of all containment bypass sequences will be required before relaxing emergency planning requirements.
Lack of information on source tenn and risk precludes further NRC evaluation of emergency preparedness for the passive plants at this time.
Emergency planning requirements following the TMI 2 accident were not premised on specific assumptions regarding severe accident probability. So, as a policy matter, even very low calculated probabilities may not be a sufficient basis for changes to emergency planning requirements.
The industry and the NRC are working to determine a process, including developing technical criteria and methods, that would justify simplification of offsite emergency planning. The results of this process would be used as input to a generic miemaking proposal to be initiated by nuclear industry organizations.
AP600 Response:
The AP600 PRA evaluation risk assessment includes calculations of the AP600 response to severe accidents. This response includes the release of radionuclides following a severe accident. This analysis supports the technical basis for simplification of offsite emergency planning. The offsite emergency planning is the responsibility of the Combined License applicant.
Revision: 17 W Westingh00S8 1.9-105 Draft,1997
o SSAR Appendix 1B 4
6 7
- l. Introduction e.nd Generel Description of PI:nt assuming appropnate timing, containment spray could be used as an alternate means for Gooding the reactor vessel (in vessel retention) and for debris quenching should vessel failure occur, j
l containment spray could also be used to centrol containment pressure for cases in which PCS has failed.
In order to envelop these potential risk benents, the risk reduction evaluation will assume that containment sprays are perfectly effective for each of these benefits, with the exception of fission product scrubbing for containment bypass.
Dus the risk reduction can be conservatively estimated by assuming all release categories except DP are eliminated.
Tnerefore, passise containment spray results in a total avened risk of 6.9 x 10' man rem per
- year, A ddit hmallyr-*-nonsufet y-r elated-et miairmient -+pr ay-+ystem-i*-evaheat ed----%enumsafet y-related-omtainment-+ pray-+ystemantihrewthe-bre" protection-temps a+-e-motive-ftw+-for sprayr4e*femotely-operated +alves4mt4tpprosimately4he+ ante +motmH+f ipinp-It* vill +e t
l conservatively-assim>ed4haHhe-risk-lefit+are-the+amecend-thaHhe-nsk4ethielkm femains the-+ame-for-the-norWtfety4 elated---etmtairmtent-* pray-*y* tem---Thtis -the-fitmsafety-related r
I containment + pray +ystemnesult*4rHHotalstvertedaiskw4h10Nmm-remter-yeari 1 11.7.6 Active liigh Pressure Safety injection System This SAMDA consists of adding a safety related active high pressure safety injection (!! PSI) pump and all associated piping and suppon systems to the AP600 design. A perfect high pressure safety injection system is assumed to prevent core melt for all events but excessive LOCA and ATWS. Therefore, to estimate the risk reduction, only the contributions to each release category of Level I accident classes 3C (vessel rupture) and 3A (ATWS) need be considered. The avened risk is 6.1 x 10'inan. rem per year. This SAMDA would completely change the design approach from a plant with passive safety systems to a plant with passive plus active safety related systems and is not consistent with design objectives.
1 11.7.7 Steam Generator Shell Side lleat Removal System This SAMDA consists of providing a passive safety-related heat removal system to the secondary side of the steam generators. The system would provide closed loop cooling of the secondary using natural circulation and stored water cooling, thus preventing a loss of pnmary heat sink in the event of a loss of startup feedwater and passive RilR heat exchancer. A perfect secondary heat removal system would eliminate transients from each of the release categories. In order to evaluate the benefit of this SAMDA, the frequencies of all the transient sequences is subtracted from the overall frequency of each of the release categories and the nsk is recalculated. %e total risk averted is 5.3 x 10 man rem per year.
4 Revision: 17 3 Westiflgh00S8 1n.)i Draft,1997
- l. Introduction end Genertl Description of PI:nt Table IB&l 4
AP600 SAMDA RESULTS Risk Capital Capital Net Capital Design Alternathe Reduction Ucnefit Cost lienefit (manremly r)
($)
($)
($)
Upgrade CVS for Small LOCA 5,5 x10' 4
1,5(K),000
( 1,5(X),(N K))
Containment Fdtered Vent 1.0 x 10 '
6 5,(XX),000 (5,(XX),(XX))
Self Actuating Containment 7.4. 10' 5
33 (NK)
(33,(KK))
Isolation Vahes Safety Grade 6.9 x 10 '
.14 3.900,(KK)
(3,900,(xx);
Passise Containment S iriiy i
NonJ*fety-GmleContammer+6 9ay 6A4-Mr' 44 445 A xl HIMWo) 1 Active liigh Preuure Safety 61 x 10 '
39 20,(KX),0(K)
(20,(XXMKK))
Injection System SG Shell Side lleat Removal 5.3x10' 3
1.300,(XX)
(1,300,000) l l
SG Relief Ilow to IRWST 4.2 x 10' 3
620,000 (620,000) l increased SG INessure Capability 42 x 10 '
3 H.200,(XX)
(8,000,0(N))
Secondary Containment Ventilation 7.4 x 10' 5
2,200,000 (2.200,(XXh with Filtration Dnerse IRWST injectmn Valves 53 x 10 34 160.lXX)
(160,000) 5 Diverse Containment Recirculation 1.5x10'
<1 150,(KK)
(150,000)
Vah es Ex Vessel Core Catcher 6,1 x 10 39 1,660,000
( 1.660,(XX))
liigh Pressure Con'.ainment Design 6.1 x 10 '
39 50.(xx),(VX)
(50,(XX),(XX))
More Reliable DAS 2.2 x 10' 2
470,(x K)
(470,(XK))
Revision: 17 3 Westinghouse in.i9 I) raft,1997 a
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i SSAR Section 6.5 i
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6 Engineered s:fety Fe:tures 6.5 Fission Product Removal and Control Systems 6.5.1 Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) Filter Systems This subsection is not applicable to the Ap600.
6.5.2 Containment Spray System hHhe nent-+f-a--wre-degradatkm-accidenHhere-emdd-be-e%ignificant-quantity-of radioac4ivit y4eleased-4tH he-eent ai nment-et mosphere-This-et tivit y-would-wnsist -of-noble gases paniculatew-end-a-* mall-amount-of-demental-and-organie-iodinede*-diseuwed-in r
subsection-lM-Wnost+f-the4edine-would4*e4n-the-panieulate-formt-The-AP&ndees ne64nehede-awontaimnent-+ pray-system-to-renxwe-airbome-particulate *-or+1ementaWodine-Removal-of-eit bome-ae4ivit y-is-by-nat ural-preeesse*-t hat-dowmt-depend-4m-* pray *-4 t hat 4*;
x dimentationtdiffusiephoresi+ rand 4hermophwe*is+-These removal meenanismveredi*euwed in-Appernli*-464 in the event of a' design basis LOCA them is an assumed core degradation 'that results in a signi0eant release of radioactivity to the containment atmosphem; Tids activity would consist of noble gases /particulates; and a small atoount of_ elemental and organic iodine (as discussed in subsection 15 A53, most of the iodine;would be'in the particulate form); The AP600 does not include a safety related) containment spray system'to remove airbome paniculates or l
elemental iodinei Removal of airbonte activity' is by natural processes that do not depend on sprays"(that;is sedimentatioo', diffusiophoresis,- and thermophoresis)
These removal mechanisms are discussed in Appendix:15B; Much of the non gaseous airborne activity would eventually be deposited in the containment sump solution. Long term retention of iodine in the containment sump following design basis accidents requires adjustment of the sump solution pH to 7.0 or above, his pH adjustment is accomplished by the passive core cooling system and is discussec in subsection 6.3.2.l A.
In >accordance withL Rsfennee ;12 the' fire, protection system provides.a nonsafety related containment spray function for accident management following a severe accident. This design featum is not safety nlated and is not credited in any accident analysis including thd dose analysis provided in sectionL15.6.5C Dose reduction following a' severe accident may be enhanced owr the natoral removal' mechanisms via the nonsafety related containment spray, Subsection U.6.5.3.2 provides additional discussion of the natural removal mechanisms. The following subsstions provide a discussion of the nonsafety nlated containment spray function provided by the fire protection system.
6.5.2.1-
System Description
he fire protection system pro'vides a rionsafety-related containment spray function for severe accident managementa subsection 9.5.1 pmvides a description of the' Ore protection system including equipment and valves 'that support the containment spray function such as the fire Revision: 17 W Westinghouse 6.5 1 Draft,1997
- 6. Engineered S:fety re:tures pumps and Dre main header, his section pmvides the desedption of the portion of the fin-protection system designed specifically to previde the contaitunent spray function.
he source of water for the contaimnent spray function is provided by either the primary or secondary fire protection system water tank depending on tank and inventory availability.
Either the motor driven or diesel driven fire pmtection sy> tem pump may be 'used to deliver fire water to the containment spray headerDThe flow path to containment is Via the normal Ore main header as shown in Figure 9.11 1 sheets I through 3. The containment spray flow path is fmm the fire main extension, througli the Oro protection system line that penetrates containment: to the containment spray riser that connects to the Ore protection system header inside;_ containment; This riker supplies two ring headers located above the containment polar crane.
6.5.2.1.1 Valses
%e containment spray flow path from the Gre main hsade'~ contains two;normally open r
Inanual: valves (FPS Vlot:and FP5.V(M8)/one normally closed manual valve (PC5.V007),
one lock closed manual containment-isolation volve.outside ~ containment (PCS V050),_ a containment isolation check valve inside containment (FPSLV052K a normally open manual isolation _ valve in the spray riser.(FPS.V700), and a normally closed remotely operated valve (FPS V701) downstream'of the manual isolation valve in the spray riser.
Containment spray is initiated by first opening the manual valvex outside containment, and by opening:the remotely-_ operated; valve ~ inside containment < The manual valves outside contaisiment 'are loested in valve / piping' penhtration room 1306. The vahes are located close to the entrance d6cr such that radiation exposures to an individual required to enter the room and alip the valves would not exceed the presenbed postJaccident dose limits discussed in subsection 12.4.1.8.
Valve FP5.V701 is a fail-ope'rifair. operated valve such that the containment spray Dow path i
itlcan be opened following d loss of the nonsafety rebted compressed air system. During shotdown operationi the fire protection system header inside containment is' pressurized from th'e[ passive containment cooling w~ater storage tank for fire protection and manual isolation valse FPS V700 is closed.
Containment Spray lleadhr;and Noniss 6.5.2;1.2' Tlie containment spray' header consists of a single header that feeds two: ring headers located above the containment polar cranef The containment spray ring headers and spray nozzles are onented to ' maximize contaimnentivolume coverage. A lower ring lieader is located at plant r
elevasiori 235 feet; a'nd containsL44 spray l nozzles.'in upper ring heade't is located at phmt elevation 250 feet, and ' ontairis 24fspray 'noz::les.
c The noules withinlthe spray ring header are conventibnal containmerd spray nozzles utilized in past Westinghouw pressurized water reacton. The spray nozzles are selected on the basis Revision: 17 W Westinghouse Draft,1997 6.5-2 l
t
- 6. Engineered S fety fe:tures of drop' sire to-provide odoquate. absorption of fission products from the containment atmosphere.
6.5.2.1.3 Applicable Codes and Classifliations lhe containment spray function is not ' safety.related, and therefore the valves and piping in the containment spray now patti are not required to be safety.related for the containment spray function, llowever, the containment isolation piping and valves are safety-mlated (AP600 Equipment Class ID :o perform the safety-related function of containment isolation. The classification of the remaining. portions of the Ore header are nonsafety.related': and are classined as Class F as diseuned in sub'ections 3.217 and 9.5.1. The containment spray s
header and valveidowntream of the manual isolation valve indde containment is nonsafety-related and clawined as Class Frihe containment spray header is claniGed as Seismie category II, 6.511.4 System Operation Dtidng normal operation.'the fire protection system header inside containment is isolated from the Ore main header.LThe containment spray piping is therefore not preuttrir.ed during nonoal operation? During plant shutdow1f modevpersonnel access to containment is requiredTand as suchitho fire protection systeni standby header.inside containment is pressuri7ed by tbo water in'ihe passive containment cooling water storage tank.L Dtiring' these modes, manual 161ation valve fps.V700 is closed _to funber holate the containment spray header from the passive containment cooling water stomge tank; Severe accident 'monagement guidelines provido the operator with guid.ince to initiate'the containnient spray feature of the fire protection system. Operator action to open two numual isolation valves outside of containment followed by remotely opening the containment spray isolation valve within containment from either the main control room or the remote shutdown workstation.willinitiate the spray function. Containment spray may be tenninated at any tinie by closing the remotely operated isolation valve within containment, or by closing any of the mantial valves in.the contaimnent spray flow path outside containment.-(Operation 'of the etmtainment spray:Lwilllhavof nofeffection-the availability of the remainder of.the fire protection system other than the loss of inventory due to the sprayed water. Since the fist protection system operates in the active standby modo, i.e; the supply piping is kept full and pressurizedc once the remotely operated isolation valse is opened the systein will perform the containment spray' functions -
When water. pressure in theifiro7m'ain begins to fall, due to~ a demand for water from containment spray, the motor ddven~ 'puisp stans autoniatically on a low-pressure signal. If the motor 4 riven pompifails to, start.:the diesel driven pump stans upon a lower pressure
~
signati The pump continues to nni tmtil it is stopped manually; 6.5.2.2L
. Design Evaluation Resision: 17 3 Westinghouse 6.5 3 Draft,1997
- 6. Engineered sdety I'c:tures 6.5.2.2.1 Contalnment Coserage The containment spray nozzles are tha techler (SPilACO Company', spmy norries or equivalent, which provide a drop sire distribution which has been established by testing and found suitable for fission product removal. - The fire protection system header piovides a containment spray norrie differential pressuto of 40 psid. whkh fises the -drop site distribution. The mau mean drop aire produced at this differential pressure is conu:vatively assumed to be 1000 micronsc The fire'pmtoction system lieader can provide the design flow rate of 15.2 spm to each spray nozzle at a containment backpressure' of-20 psig for;a total. containment spray flow of approsimately-1034 gpon Analyses of severe accident sequences show that containment backpresure is less than 20 psig a0er containment spray flow is initiated.
Figure 6.Sel is a diagram of containment'which shows the developed spray pattems for tbo containment spray ring lieaders.! The overlay of the spray pattems on the containment is usefulin illustrating the completeness of Spray coverage in the sprayed region. Furthennore,
~
as discussed in reference 1:there is significant momentatn exchange between the spray l
droplets acd the closed air volume 'of the containment, whi:h provides far-greater mising within the sprayed region than the idealized spray pattems would indicate. Therefore, even though smad areas of the sprayed region are not directly sprayed by tho developed spray pattems, the sprayed region of the containment is well misedi The sprayed regions of containment include th'e region of containmentibove the operating i
deck,' and the refueling cavity, widch in open at the operating deck lJThe total free volume of the sprayed region is approximately 1.4 s 1(f cubic feet which represents approsimately 83'"c of the total containment free volume.
6.5.2.2.2 Aerosol Removal Effectiveness of Sprays The temovaliof aerosol acti ity from the containment atmosphere by sprays is simply described by:
C, = C,e*
where:
Cg concentration of aemsols at timo ? t C, = initial concentration of nerosols
).4 aerosol removal coefficient for sprays thr')
t ielapsed time (br)
Revision: 17 3 Westinghouse Draft,1997 6.5-4
- 6. Enginected s:tet) l'e:tures l
llowever, to fully model the removal of aeros61x from the containment atmosphere in a severe accident, the analysis also needs to take into account mixing between the sprayed and unkprayed regions and the rate of release of activity from the core into the etmtainment atmosphere 6.52.2.3 Aerosol Removal Coct11cient for Sprays The aerosol nmoval coerncient for sprays'is calculated by the following equation from the Standard Review plan (Reference 3);
A = 3hfE / 2Vd where:
h = average spray drop fall height tft) l f a spray flow rate ift'/ht)
E = collection efficiency V = volume of the containment exposed to sprays d 'a average spray drop diameter (ft)
H!eference 3'identines a value for E/d of 0.305 ft as being conservative. 'Using this together d
with a' nominal spray. fall height' of 100 feet and a nominal flow rate of 1000 ppm 2
(8022 ft /hr), the aerosol removal coefficient for the containment sprays is approximately 2.6 hr'2 in the sprayed volume. 'this spray removal coefficient is signincantly greater than that associated with the natural removal' mechanisms assumed to the design basis analysis (see Appendix ISB) and would enhance dose reduction following a severe accident.
6.5.3 Fission Product Control Systems The containment atmosphere is depleted of eieraental iodine and paniculates as a result of the passive removal processes discussed in SSAR Appendix 158. No active fission product control systems are required in the Ap600 design to meet regulatory requirements.
The passive removal processes and the limited leakage from the containment of less than L, as defined in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, result in doses less than the regulatory guideline limits. (See subsection 15.6.5.3.)
6.5.3.1 Primk-" Containment The containment consists of a freestanding cylindrical steel vessel with ellipsoidal heads. The
- ontainment stmetural design is presented in subsection 3.8.2.
e Resision: 17 W Westinghouse 6.5-5 Draft,1997
- 6. Enginected S:fety Fe:tures The containment.e,sel, penetrations, and isolation valves function to limit the release of radioactise materials following postulated accidents. The resulting offsite doses are less than regulatory guideline limits. Containment parameters affecting fission product release accident analyses are given in Table 6.5.31.
Long term containment pressure and temperature response to the design basis accident are presented in Section 6.2.
The containment air filtration systern may be operated for personnel access to the containment w hen the reactor is at power, as presented in subsection 9.4.7 For this reason, the radiological assessment of a loss of coolant accident assumes that both trains of the air filtration system are in service at the initiation of the event. The isolation valves receive automatic signals to close from diverse parameters. The valves are designed to close automatically as desenbed in subsection 6.2.3.
Centainment hydrogen control systems are presented in subsection 6.2.4.
6.5.3.2 Secondary Containment There is no secondary containment provided for the fission product control following design basis accident.
The annulus between containment and shield building from the elevation 100'-0" to the elevation 132' 3" acts as a holdup volume to limit the spread of fission products following severe accident. Most containment penetrations are located within this holdup volume. It is served by the radiologically controlled area ventilation system (VAS) described in subsection 9.4.3. Isolation dampers are provided to reduce the air interchange between the holdup volume and environment. Fission product control via holdup within the annulus is considered in severe accident dose analysis but excluded from consideration for design basis accident dose evaluations, presented in Chapter 15.
6.5.4 Combined License information This sectinn has no requirernent for additional information to be provided in support of the Combined License applications.
6'5,5 '
References SECY 97 Ot4,
- Policy ' 'rd! Key Technical Issues Pertaining to the Westinghouse AP600 1,,
a Standardised Passise Reactor Design, June 30,1997, 2,
"Ocessin'g Design Basis Sowre Term Update for the Evolutionary' Advanced Light Water Reactor /i Addneed1Reacuir Severe Accident Program (ARSAP) Source Term Expen Ordup,LSeptembir? 1990.
Revision: 17 3 Westingh0US8 Draft,1997 6.5-6
~
- 6. f.cgineered Sity fr:tur:s 3.
NUREGMO,:Section 6.5. ;'Hevision 2. " Containment Spray as a Fission Product Cleanup System.
Resision: 17 W Westinghouse 6.5 7 Draft,1997
- 6. Ergineered S:f;ty Fe-tures Table 6 5.3.I PRI%1AltY CONTAIN51ENT OPERATION FOI.1,0 WING A DESIGN llASIS ACCIDENT Type of structure Freestanding cylindrical steel vessel with cilipsoidal heads 3
l.73x106 Containment free volume (f t ) -
Design Basis Containment leak rate.
0.129 containment volume per day Revision: 17 T Westinghouse Draft,1997 6.5-8
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4 SSAR Section 9.5.1 1
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- 9. Audit:r) S)seems s.
9.5.1.1.3 '. Nonsafety.Related Containment Spray function The fire protection system prmides a nonsafety related containment spray function. This function is discuned in subsection 6,12.
9.5.1.2
System Description
9.5.1.2.1 General Description The Are protection program and the design of the Ore protection system conform to the applicable codes and standards listed in Section 3.2, and the following:
10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection (Reference 15)
General Desig,i Criterion 3. Fire Protection (Reference 16) e SECY 93-087, Section 1.E., Fire Protection (Reference 17)
Table 9.5.1 1 is a point by point description of th e conformance of the Ore protection program with the guidelines of Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.51 (Reference 1). AP600 meets the enhanced fire protection provisions of SECY 93 087 as demonstrated in the fire protection analysis (Appendix 9A).
The plant includes features to minimize the likelihood that a fire will occur and to limit the spread of Gre.
The Gre protection system detects fires and provides the capability to extinguish them using (hed automatic and manual suppression systems, manual hose streams, and/or portable firenghting equipment. The fire protection system consists of a number of fire detection and suppression subsystems. referred to as systems, including:
Detection systems for early detection and notification of a fire A water supply system including the Gre pumps, yard main, and interior distribution piping Fixed automatic fire suppression systems Manual Gre suppression systems and equipment, including hydrants, standpipes, hose stations and portable Gre extinguishers The Sre detection and suppression systems are desenbed later in this subsection.
Revision: 17 W Westinghouse 9.5 3 Draft,1997
1?:
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Table 0.5.12 COMPONENT DATA. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEh!
(NOMINAL val.UES) d Fire Water Storage Tanks Primary Fire Water Tank Nominal capacity (gal)
. 325.00()
Volume dedicated to tire protection (gal)..........
300,(KX)
Design Pressure......,
...... Atmospheric Material Carbon steel Secondary Fire Water Tank Nominal capacity (gal) 400.000 Volume dedicated to fire protection (gal).........
300,(XX)
Design Pressure............
. Atmospheric Material
. Carbon steel Fire Pumps Motor Driven Pump type..
. Horizontal centrifugal Rated flow (gpm).........
2000 Required head, approximate (ft).........
.. 300 Stmetural material Cast iron Diesel Drisen Pu m p ty pe....................
Ilorizontal centrifugal Rated flow (gpm)...
2000 Required head, approximate (ft)
... 300 Structural material Cast iron Motor Driven Jockey Pump Pump type.......
Centrifugal Rated flow (gpm) 30 Required head, approximate (ft) 210 Structural material Cast iron ContAlames Shay Nstles Typei,........
'Lechief(SPRACO) 1713A No'mber n......
.l68 Rated fl6w (gpmN.........
. 15.2 Rated presme desico (psi)f..,
,........ 40 Structural material ^
- Stainless stml Revision: 17 Y Westinghouse 9.5 61 Draft,1997
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Fire Protection System Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (REF FPS 001)
Revision: 17
[ WOStingh0080 9.5 71 A Draft,1997
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- 14. ' Initial Test Program
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The proper operation of the spent fuel pool siphon breakers is verined.
f)
The proper operation of the spent fuel pool post 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> gravity drain flowpaths from the
[
cask washdown pit and the passive containment cooling water storage tank is verified.
14.23 2,8 Fire Protection Sptem Testing Purpose The purpose of the fire protection system testing is to verify the system properly performs the following defense-in depth function as described in subsection 9.5.1:
I Provide equipment for manual fire fit hting in areas containing safe shutdown equipment
'dE'PrdstElinoosfstyfreistEl'c'6sia}o'menDprap to:redcefoffis'te'ddieifotfowing' a'isev' re e
debide'n't Prerequisites The construction tests of *.he fire protection system have been completed. Required preoperational testing of the ac pcwer and distribution systems and other interfacing systems required for operation of the fire protection system. Data collection is available as needed to support the specified teving and system confhurations.
General Test Method and Acceptance Criteria 1
Fire protection systen performance is observed and recorded during a series of individual component and integrated system testing to verify the system perforna its defense-in depth function. The following testing demonstrates that the sptem performs its defense-in-depth functions specified in subsection 9.5.1 and as specified in appropriate design specifications:
a)
The capability of the seismic standpipes to supply the requiied fire water quantity and flow rate is verified.
b)
The operability of the fire detection equipment is verified to be able to properly detect fires and alert personnel.
c)
The proper installation and operation of Dre barriers, fire walls, and fire dampers is verified.
d)
The proper operation of the fire pumps, fire wate storage tank, and fire water supply piping, valves, and instrumentation to provide the as-designed fire water supply is verified.
'f,'dEO[ie/ali6n'.6f tife contdininsnfsgaMeinofelM::oper'isdivAlse and lifeTcEntinuit 'of'alflow e
a phtn'tfir66ith thS contaftiineiitlipdyf iping liners 0ed.
p Revision: 17 3 W8Stiflgh00S8 14.2-51 Draft,1997
Certified Design Material 2,3,4 l
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Certified Design Mit:ri:1 a
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=
Effective:- 5/16/97 2.3,4 Fire Protection System j
Dedgn Description A portion of the fire protection system (FPS) provides equipment for manual fire fighting in plant areas that contain equipment required for safe shutdowr..
- 1. The functional arrangement of the applicable ponions of the FPS is as shown in Figure 2.3.41, i
- 2. The FPS piping identified in Figure 2.3.4-1 remains functional following a safe shutdown earthquake,
- 3. The applicable ponions of the FPS provide the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the FPS line penetrating the containment.
4.
The applicable portions of the FPS provide for manual fire fighting capability in plant areas containing equipment required for safe shutdown.
l 5, Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.41 can be retrieved in the main control room l
(MCR).
l I
I 6.
The applicable portions of the FPS provide nonsafety related containment spray for severe accident i
. management.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.3.4 2 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance crit-6 for the FPS.
2.3.4-1 3 Westinghouse o:vTAAcsvev49to2s:o4 wpf.ib.o90997
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I Diktt Revision: 4 Effective: 5/16/97 Table 2.3,41 Equipment Name Tag No.
Display Control Function hiotor-driven Fire Pump FPS h1P-Ol A Yes (Run Status)
Start Diesel Fire Pump FPS h1P-OlB Yes (Run Status)
Start Jockey Pump FPS h1P-02 Yes (Run Status)
Start 4
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C Effective: 5/16/97 Table 2.3,4 2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The functional arrangement of Inspection of the as built system he as-built FPS conforms with the applicable portions of the FPS will be performed.
the functional arrangement shown is as shown in Figure 2.3.41.
in Figure 2.3.41,
- 2. He FPS piping depicted in i) Inspection will be performed i) He piping depicted in Figure 2.3.4-1 remains functional to verify that the piping depicted Figure 2,3.41 is located on following a safe shutdown in Figure 2.3.41 is located on the Nuclear Island.
earthquake, the Nuclear Island.
l ii) A reconciliation analysis ii) The as built piping stress report using the as designed and as-exists and concludes that the built piping information will be piping remains functional performed, or an analysis of the following a safe shutdown as built piping will be earthquake.
performed.
- 3. The applicable portions of the See Certified Design Material, See Certified Design Material, FPS provide the safety-related subsection 2.2.1, Containment subsection 2.2.1, Containment function of preserving System.
System.
containment integrity by isolation of the FPS line penetrating the containment.
- 4. The applicable portions of the i) Inspection of the passive i) The volume of the PCS tank FPS provide for ma ual fire containment cooline system available to supply the FPS is at fighting capability in plant areas (PCS) storage tank will be least 18.000 gal, containing equipment required for performed.
ii) Testing ivill be performed by ii) Water is simultaneously measuring the water flow rate as discharged from each of the two it is simultaneously discharged highest fire hose stations at not from the two highest fire-hose less than 75 gpm.
stations and when the water for the fire is supplied from the PCS storage tank. Each standpipe will be individually tested.
2.3.4 3
[ WBStingh0tlS8 o:VTAACSVev44t020304 wpf 1t>090997
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'i FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM EE I Draft Revision: 4 Effective: 5/16/97 Table 2.3.4 2 (cont.)
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 5. Displays of the parameters inspection will be performed for The displays identified in Table identified in Table 2.3.41 can be retriesability of the parameters in 2.3.4-1 can be retriesed in the retrieved in the MCR.
I 6.
The applicable portions of the Insocction of the cont
FPS provide nonsafety related spray headers will be pu.ormed.
nozzles as follows:
I containment spray for severe I
accident management.
At least 44 nozzles at plant I
elevation of at least 235 feet, and i
24 nozzles at plant elevation of at I
least 250 feet.
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