NRC Generic Letter 1992-08
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C.20555 December 17, 1992 PERMITS FOR
TO: ALL HOLDERS OF OPERATING LICENSES OR CONSTRUCTION
NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS
92-08)
SUBJECT: THERMO-LAG 330-1 FIRE BARRIERS (GENERIC LETTER
PURPOSE
is issuing this generic letter The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) from licensees to verify that (GL) to obtain additional information needed by Thermal Science, Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barrier systems manufactured comply with the NRC's Incorporated (TSI, the vendor), St. Louis, Missouri,
330-1 fire barriers to satisfy requirements. Many licensees use Thermo-Lagsafe shutdown capability. Some the NRC's fire protection requirements for to create physical independence licensees also use Thermo-Lag 330-1 barriers in and associated with the between the circuits and electric equipment systems actuated or controlled Class lE power system, the protection system, systems that must be by the protection system, and auxiliary or supporting it actuates to perform operable for the protection system and the systems their safety-related functions.
BACKGROUND
barrier system fire endurance The NRC began a review of Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire procedures, and as-built and ampacity derating test reports, installation States Utilities (GSU) about configurations after receiving reports from Gulf problems. The staff issued failed qualification fire tests and installationInformation Notice (IN)92-46, the results of the NRC's initial review in NRC Team Findings, Current Fire
"Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material Special Review June 23, 1992. The special Endurance Tests, and Ampacity Calculation Errors," the technical bases f9r review team report enclosed with IN 92-46 included following regarding this generic letter. The NRC staff found the fire test results, Thermo-Lag 330-1 barriers: incomplete or indeterminate and a wide range of documented questionable ampacity derating test results that are not constructed ampacity derating factors, some barrier installations procedures, incomplete in accordance with the vendor recommended installation configurations that may not installation procedures, and as-built fire barrier evaluated in accordance with be qualified by a valid fire endurance test or in GL 86-10, "Implementation of the guidance previously provided by the staff Fire Protection Requirements," April 24, 1986.
later conducted a series of Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric) Thermo-Lag 330-1 electrical full-scale fire endurance tests to qualify the at its Comanche Peak Steam raceway fire barrier configurations installed of small-scale fire tests Electric Station. The NRC also conducted a series panels at the National Institute of 1-hour and 3-hour Thermo-Lag prefabricated performance of the panels. The of Standards and Technology to assess the fire concerns about the ability of results of these fire tests raised additional G ._5
-
GENERIC LETTER 92-08
-2- ecember 17, 1992 Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barriers to provide specified fire-resistance ratings. fire protection according to their The staff issued the results of the TU
Bulletins 92-01, "Failure of Thermo-Lag Electric and NRC fire tests in
330 Fire Barrier System to Maintain Cabling in Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits June 24, 1992, and 92-01, Supplement 1, Free from Fire Damage,"
Barrier System to Perform its Specified "Failure of Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire August 28, 1992. In the bulletin and its Fire Endurance Function,"
licensees of apparent failures of Thermo-Lagsupplement, the NRC notified the during fire endurance testing. The bulletin 330-1 fire barriers and materials each licensee determine which plant areas and its supplement requested that Thermo-Lag 330-1 panels or conduit shapes use 1-hour or 3-hour prefabricated for equipment enclosure fire barriers; determine raceway, wall, ceiling, or materials to protect or separate safe shutdownthe plant areas that use these accordance with plant procedures, compensatory capability; and implement, in barriers can be declared operable. The measures until the fire inform the NRC in writing whether or not bulletin required that each licensee taken and describe the measures being takenthe above requested actions were operability. to ensure or restore fire barrier AREAS OF CONCERN
The NRC has three principal areas of concern:
of Thermo-Lag 330-1 barriers, the ampacity the fire endurance capability Thermo-Lag 330-1 barriers, and the evaluation derating of cables enclosed in of tests conducted to determine the fire and application of the results endurance derating factors of Thermo-Lag 330-1 barriers. ratings and the ampacity The NRC is concerned that the Thermo-Lag
330-1 fire barrier systems may not provide the level of fire endurance intended licensees that use Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire by licensees and, therefore, that barriers requirements of Section 50.48, "Fire protection," may not be meeting the (GDC) 3, "Fire protection," of Appendix and General Design Criterion Nuclear Power Plants," to Part 50 of Title A, "General Design Criteria for Regulations (10 CFR Part 50). 10 of the Code of Federal Cables routed in electrical raceways are derated to ensure that systems have sufficient capacity and capability to perform Cables routed in raceways enclosed in fire their intended safety functions.
derating because of the insulating effect barriers require additional Cable derating calculations that are based of the fire barrier materials.
derating factors could result in installation on inaccurate or nonconservative overfilling. This could cause operating of undersized cables or raceway within the raceways thereby reducing the temperatures to exceed design limits The NRC is concerned that because of the expected design life of the cables.
wide range of ampacity derating factors documented for Thermo-Lag 330-1 adequately accounted for the insulating materials, some licensees may not have their derating analyses and, therefore, effects of the Thermo-Lag material in GDC 17, "Electric power systems." This may not be meeting the requirements of barriers are used either to protect safe concern applies where Thermo-Lag 330-1 shutdown capability from fire or to achieve physical independence of electrical systems.
~*
V,?
-3- December 17, 1992
- GENERIC LETTER 92-08 have not adequately reviewed and The NRC is also concerned that some licensees ampacity derating test results evaluated the fire endurance test results and
330-1 barriers to determine used as the licensing basis for their Thermo-Lag of the test results to their the validity of the tests and the applicability plant designs.
compliance with The NRC is requiring information needed to verifylicense conditions under the
10 CFR 50.48, GDC 3, and GDC 17, and associated 330-1 barriers are used.
provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(f) where Thermo-Lag FIRE ENDURANCE CAPABILITY
for Fire Barriers The NRC's Qualification Requirements and Guidance nuclear power plant have Section 50.48 of 10 CFR requires that each operating GDC 3 requires that structures, a fire protection plan that satisfies GDC 3.be designed and located to systems, and components important to safety safety requirements, the minimize, in a manner consistent with other features required to probability and effects of fires. Fire protectionone train of those systems satisfy GDC 3 include features to ensure that be maintained free of conditions necessary to achieve and maintain shutdown this requirement is to separate fire damage.' One means of complying with with fire-rated barriers.
one safe shutdown train from its redundant train barriers, 1 hour or 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, The level of fire resistance required of the provided in the fire area.
depends on the other fire protection features of satisfying the regulatory The NRC issued guidance on acceptable methods (BTP) Auxiliary and Power requirements of GDC 3 in Branch Technical Position for Fire Protection for Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1, "Guidelines
9.5-1; BTP Chemical Engineering Nuclear Power Plants;" Appendix A to BTP APCSB Power Plants," July 1981;
Branch (CHEB) 9.5-1, "Fire Protection For Nuclear staff stated that the fire and GL 86-10. In the BTPs and in GL 86-10, theestablished in accordance with resistance ratings of fire barriers should beStandard 251, "Standard Methods of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) by subjecting a test Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials," method of assembly, specimen that represents the materials, workmanship, rating is desired to a dimensions, and configuration for which a fire laboratory. In
"standard fire exposure" at a nationally recognized on fire test acceptance criteria and for GL 86-10, the staff included guidance evaluating deviations from tested configurations.
Program for Nuclear
1 See Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, "Fire Protection
1979."
Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1,
2 American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard E119 was (NFPA) as NFPA
adopted by the National Fire Protection Association Standard 251.
-
GENERIC LETTER 92-08 -4- December 17, 1992 Fire Endurance Testinq and the Evaluation and Application of Fire Test Results On October 26, 1989, the Southwest Research Institute a 3-hour fire endurance test of a cable tray and (SwRI) performed Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barrier for GSU. SwRI found support protected by a the test assembly exceeded the NRC's acceptance that temperatures within that the test assembly collapsed in less than criteria within 60 minutes and
90
raised concerns about the adequacy of Thermo-Lag minutes. These test results The staff informed the licensees of these test 330-1 cable tray enclosures.
results in NRC IN 91-47,
"Failure of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material to Pass Fire Endurance Test,"
August 6, 1991. NRC IN 92-46 contains the staff's test. evaluation of this fire While conducting its review, the NRC staff found tests have been conducted on electrical raceways that many fire endurance Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barrier systems. The staff protected with and 3-hour fire endurance test reports from variousreviewed about forty 1-hour found that testing methods and procedures used testing facilities and during qualification tests did not meet the NRC's guidance some of the engineering practices. In NFPA 251, the NFPA advised and deviated from good should be evaluated carefully because variations that the test conditions test specimen or from the conditions in which it from the construction of the change the performance characteristics of the is tested may substantially assembly. The test reports reviewed did not contain sufficient details of for the test specimens, did not contain details the construction methods used not contain dimensioned drawings. Most of the of the materials used, and did test configurations were atypical of the as-built field configurations observed by the staff.
The NRC recognized that fire endurance testing configuration is not possible. In GL 86-10, theof every as-built fire barrier NRC issued guidance for reviewing deviations from tested fire barrier configurations.
the Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barriers, the NRC staff While reviewing which licensees installed fire barrier configurations found several instances in qualified by fire endurance testing or may not that may not have been accordance with the guidance in GL 86-10. For have been reviewed in example, when the NRC conducted its initial review, some licensees could not justify extrapolating test results from small barrier enclosures their practice of larger enclosures or installing barriers using to significantly were different from those tested. The NRC visitedprocedures and materials that IN.91-47 and also found several licensees that five sites after issuing partitions, and vaults using Thermo-Lag 330-1 as had constructed fire walls, could not provide qualification test reports or a component. These licensees configurations to demonstrate the acceptability justify deviations from tested staff informed the licensees of these issues in of these fire barriers. The Procedures for Installing Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier IN 91-79, "Deficiencies in the December 6, 1991. Materials,"
The staff is concerned that some licensees have applicable fire endurance test results to determinenot adequately reviewed if the test results apply to their plant designs. if the tests are valid and
-5- December 17, 1992
. GENERIC LETTER 92-08 and Inspection Procedures Deficiencies in the Fire Barrier Installation
91-47, the NRC staff observed While conducting site visits after issuing IN procedures without that the vendor had revised its recommended installation procedures are notifying the licensees, that the vendor installation were not constructed in incomplete, that a number of field installations procedures, that some accordance with the vendor recommended installation fire endurance testing, and installations did not appear to be qualified by configurations without that some installations deviated from the tested installation problems justification. In IN 91-79, the NRC staff discussed inadequate licensee resulting from incomplete TSI installation procedures, or incorrect design installation procedures, installer errors, incomplete In IN 91-79, the staff documents, and inadequate quality control oversight. found differences between the also listed the installation details in which itand the vendor installation field installations, the tested configurations, procedures. These details are not repeated here.
AMPACITY DERATING
NRC Requirements and Guidance for AmDacitv Deratinc be provided to permit the GDC 17 requires that onsite electric power systems important to safety. The functioning of structures, systems, and components sufficient capacity and onsite electrical power system is required to have The Institute of capability to ensure that vital functions are maintained. 279, Criteria for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard Stations," includes guidance Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating states that the quality of on acceptable methods of satisfying GDC 17. IEEE by specifying requirements protection system components shall be achieved for the derating of known to promote high quality, such as the requirements with minimum maintenance components, and that the quality shall be consistent IEEE 279 states that type requirements and low failure rates. Furthermore, based on test data shall be test data or reasonable engineering extrapolationequipment continually meets made available to verify that protection systemnecessary for achieving the the performance requirements determined to be system requirements.
of Electric Systems,"
In Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.75, "Physical Independence Standard 279 and GDC 17 the NRC staff gave guidance for complying with IEEE
and electric equipment for-the physical independence of the circuits system, the protection comprising or associated with the Class lE power systems, and system, systems actuated or controlled by the protection operable for the protection auxiliary or supporting systems that must be their safety-related functions.
system and the systems it actuates to perform physical independence Some licensees use Thermo-Lag 330-1 barriers to achieve The staff's concerns about of electrical systems in accordance with RG 1.75.
barriers installed to achieve ampacity derating apply to Thermo-Lag 330-1 installed to protect and to those physical independence of electric systems safe shutdown capability from fire.
GENERIC LETTER 92-08 -6- December 17, 1992 Amoacity Derating Tests and the Apolication of Ampacitv Derating Test Results Cables enclosed in electrical raceways protected with fire barrier materials are derated because of the insulating effect of the fire barrier material.
Other factors that affect ampacity derating include cable fill, cable loading, cable type, raceway construction, and ambient temperature. The National Electrical Code, Insulated Cable Engineers Association (ICEA) publications, and other industry standards provide general ampacity derating factors for open air installations, but do not include derating factors for fire barrier systems. Although a national standard ampacity derating test method has not been established, ampacity derating factors for raceways enclosed with fire barrier material have been determined for specific installation configurations by testing.
The vendor has documented a wide range of ampacity derating factors that were determined by testing. For example, between 1981 and 1985, the vendor provided test reports to licensees that document ampacity derating factors for cable trays that range from 5.3 to 12.48 percent for 1-hour barriers and from 16.15 to 20.55 percent for 3-hour barriers. On October 2, 1986, TSI
informed the NRC and its customers by Mailgram that, while conducting a special services investigation in September 1986 at the Underwriters Laboratories, Incorporated (UL), it found that the ampacity derating factors for Thermo-Lag 330-1 barriers were greater than previous tests indicated
(28.04 percent for 1-hour barriers and 31.15 percent for 3-hour barriers).
However, the cable fill and tray configuration for each test differed from those tested previously. The NRC learned that UL performed duplicate cable tray baseline tests using a longer stabilization period (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> instead of 15 minutes) after the final current adjustment and obtained a higher baseline current, which yielded higher derating factors (36.1 percent for 1-hour barriers and 38.9 percent for 3-hour barriers). UL gave these test results to the vendor, but they were not submitted to the NRC or to licensees. While reviewing tests which had been conducted at SwRI in 1986, the staff learned that the ampacity derating factor for the tested configuration was 37.4 percent for a 1-hour Thermo-Lag 330-1 barrier. The test procedures and test configurations differed for each of the aforementioned tests. Therefore, the results from these different ampacity tests may not be directly comparable to each other.
The staff is concerned that the ampacity derating factors derived from the UL
tests for similar Thermo-Lag 330-1 barrier designs are inconsistent with one another because of differing stabilization times, which calls into question the validity of the ampacity derating tests. While reviewing Industrial Testing Laboratories (ITL) test reports, the NRC staff noticed that ambient temperature and maximum cable temperature were allowed to vary widely for some tests (48 *C Instead of 40 TC for ambient temperature and 94.4 Qc instead of 90 eC for maximum cable temperature). ITL then used an ICEA procedure to calculate the ampacity derating factors by adjusting the tested current to 40 eC ambient and 90 *C cable temperature. Those tests may not be valid because the ambient and maximum cable temperatures were not maintained within specified limits in some tests. In IN 92-46, the NRC informed licensees that a licensee also discovered a mathematical error in the calculation of the ampacity derating factor as published in an ITL test report. A preliminary assessment of the use of lower-than-actual ampacity derating factors indicates
GENERIC LETTER 92-08 -7- December 17, 1992 that Thermo-Lag 330-1 barrier installations may allow cables to reach temperatures that exceed their ratings, which could accelerate cable aging.
The staff is also concerned that some licensees have not adequately reviewedand the results of ampacity derating tests to determine if the tests are valid if the test results apply to their plant designs. The staff ampacity derating concerns apply to the use of Thermo-Lag 330-1 on electrical raceways both as fire barriers to protect the safe shutdown capability and as barriers to create physical independence between electrical systems.
ACTIONS REQUESTED
NRC regulations require that safe shutdown equipment be protected from fire, that onsite electric power systems have sufficient capacity and capability to ensure that vital functions are maintained, and that certain circuits and electric equipment be physically independent. The NRC has found test assemblies that failed qualification fire tests, fire test results that are incomplete and indeterminate, installation problems, questionable ampacity derating tests, and differences between reported ampacity derating factors.
The NRC also found that some licensees have not adequately evaluated the results of tests for fire endurance and ampacity derating. Therefore, licensees are requested to confirm (1) that the Thermo-Lag 330-1 barrier systems have been qualified by representative fire endurance tests, (2) that the ampacity derating factors have been derived by valid tests, and (3) that these qualified barriers have been installed with appropriate procedures and quality controls to ensure that they comply with the NRC's requirements.
The staff is continuing to review technical issues associated with Thermo-Lag 330-1 barriers. The NRC staff will evaluate other fire barrier materials and systems used by the licensees to satisfy the NRC's requirements.
If the staff finds concerns, it will address them through appropriate communications. This generic letter does not request actions for barrier materials and systems other than the Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barrier system.
However, the staff expects that the recipients of this generic letter will review the information to determine if it applies to other barrier materials and systems used at their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
All addressees are required, pursuant to Section 182(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.54(f), to submit a written report within 120 days from the date of this generic letter. In this written report, the licensee shall address the following items. Where applicable, the written report can reference previous responses to Bulletin 92-01 and Supplement 1 to Bulletin 92-01 in its response to this generic letter.
1. State whether Thermo-Lag 330-1 barriers are relied upon (a) to meet
10 CFR 50.48, to achieve physical independence of electrical systems, (b) to meet a condition of a plant's operating license, or (c) to satisfy a licensing commitment. If applicable, state that Thermo-Lag 330-1 is not used at the facility. This generic letter applies to all 1-hour and all 3-hour Thermo-Lag 330-1 materials and
GENERIC LETTER 92-08 -8- December 17, 1992 barrier systems assembled by any assembly preformed panels and conduit shapes, as well method such as by assembling on applications. as spray, trowel and brush-
2. If Thermo-Lag 330-1 barriers are used at the facility, (a) State whether or not the licensee has qualified the Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barriers by conducting in accordance with the NRC's requirements fire endurance tests licensing commitments. and guidance or (b) State (1)whether or not the fire barrier configurations installed in the plant represent the materials, workmanship, assembly, dimensions, and configurations of methods of assembly configurations; and (2)whether or the qualification test evaluated any deviations from the tested not the licensee has configurations.
(c) State (1)whether or not the as-built configurations are consistent with the Thermo-Lag barrier
330-1 barrier during the ampacity derating tests relied configurations used the ampacity derating factors used for all upon by the licensee for Thermo-Lag 330-1 (for fire protection of raceways protected by safe shutdown capability or to achieve physical independence of electrical
(2)whether or not the ampacity derating test systems) and by the licensee are correct and applicable results relied upon to the plant design.
3. With respect to any answer to items 2(a),
negative, (a)describe all corrective actions 2(b), or 2(c) above in the schedule by which such actions shall be completed needed and include a compensatory measures taken in accordance and (b)describe all specifications or administrative controls. with the technical When been completed, confirm in writing their completion. corrective actions have
4. List all Thermo-Lag 330-1 barriers for which provided in'the response due within 120 days answers to item 2 cannot be generic letter, and include a schedule by from the date of this provided. which such answers shall be The licensee should retain all documentation satisfy the reporting requirements for future of any reviews performed to NRC audits or inspections.
If the addressee cannot submit the information deadline, it shall include in the response required or meet the reporting of this generic letter, a Justification, due within 120 days from the date alternative approaches, and a schedule undera description of any proposed actions will be completed. The NRC encourageswhich responses and proposed develop acceptable generic solutions to the licensees to work together to letter. problems addressed in this generic The written reports required shall be addressed Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory affirmation. A copy of the report shall alsoWashington, D.C. 20555 under oath or regional administrator. be submitted to the appropriate
-9- December 17, 1992 GENERIC LETTER 92-08
BACKFIT DISCUSSION
generic letter are currently installed The types of barriers addressed in thisand are required to meet either a at many operating power reactor sites or NRC requirements such as condition of a plant's operating license Part 50. The information required by Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFRverify licensees' compliance with their this generic letter is necessary to no new staff position reflected in this current licensing bases. There is taken by licensees concomitant with generic letter. Therefore, any actionsnecessary to bring licensees into responding to this generic letter areand regulations, and are not the resultis of compliance with existing NRC rules Accordingly, this generic letter any new staff requirement or position.under the terms of 10 CFR
being issued as a compliance backfit Section 50.109(a)(4).
in accordance with the charter of The staff evaluated this generic letter (CRGR) and will place that evaluation Committee to Review Generic Requirementsthe minutes of the October 6, 1992, in the NRC's public document room with meeting of the CRGR.
DATA
REQUEST FOR VOLUNTARY SUBMITTAL OF IMPACT
Management and Budget Clearance This request is covered by Office of 30, 1994. The estimated average number Number 3150-0011, which expires June for each addressee's response, including of burden hours is 300 person-hours for information, search data the time required to assess the requirements and prepare the required letters. This sources, gather and analyze the data, hours pertains only to the identified estimated average number of burden not include the time to implement the response-related matters and does applicable regulations, license actions required to comply with the on the accuracy of this estimate and conditions, or commitments. Comments be directed to Ronald Minsk, Office of suggestions to reduce the burden may
(3150-0011), NEOB-3019, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs D.C. 20503, and to the U.S. Nuclear Management and Budget, Washington, and Records Management Branch, Division of Regulatory Commission, Information of Information and Resources Management, Information Support Services, Office Washington, D.C. 20555.
information would assist the NRC in Although not required, the following this generic letter:
evaluating the cost of complying with perform requested inspections,
1. The licensee staff time and costs totesting;
corrective actions, and associated prepare the required reports and
2. the licensee staff time and costs to documentation;
as a result of the inspection
3. the additional short-term costs incurred actions or the costs of findings such as the costs of the corrective down time; and
GENERIC LETTER 92-08 -10- December 17, 1992
4. an estimate of the additional long-term costs that will be the future to implement commitments such as the estimated incurred in conducting future inspections or increased maintenance. costs of If you have any questions about this matter, please contact contact or the lead project manager listed below. the technical Sincerely, JOmes G. Partlow Rssociate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:
List of Recently Issued Generic Letters TECHNICAL
CONTACT
- Steven West, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Mail Stop 9 A2, Washington, D.C. 20555, telephone (301) 504-1220
LEAD PROJECT MANAGER: Armando Masciantonio, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Mail Stop 13 D18, Washington, D.C. 20555, telephone
(301) 504-1337
ENCLOSURE
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED GENERIC LETTERS
Generic Date of Letter No. SubJect Issuance Issued To
92-07 OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR 10/10/92 ALL HOLDERS OF
REGULATION REORGANIZATION OPERATING LICENSES
OR CONSTRUCTION
PERMITS FOR NPRs
83-28 REQUIRED ACTIONS BASED ON 10/07/92 ALL LIGHT-WATER
SUPPLEMENT 1 GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF SALEM REACTOR LICENSEES
ATWS EVENTS AND APPLICANTS
92-06 OPERATOR LICENSING NATIONAL 09/06/92 ALL POWER REACTOR
EXAMINATION SCHEDULE LICENSEES AND
APPLICANTS FOR AN
OPERATING LICENSE
92-05 NRC WORKSHOP ON THE 09/04/92 ALL HOLDERS OF
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF OP LICENSES OR
LICENSEE PERFORMANCE CONST. PERMITS FOR
(SALP) PROGRAM NUCLEAR PWR REACTORS
RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES 08/19/92 ALL BWR LICENSEES
RELATED TO REACTOR VESSEL FOF OPERATING
WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION IN REACTORS
BWRs PURSUANT TO 1OCFR50.54(F)
90-02 ALTERNATIVE REQUIREMENTS 07/31/92 ALL LWR LICENSEES
SUPPLEMENT 1 FOR FUEL ASSEMBLIES IN THE AND APPLICANTS
DESIGN FEATURES SECTION OF
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
87-02 SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT 05/22/92 ALL USI A-46 SUPPLEMENT 1 NO. 2 ON SQUG GENERIC LICENSEES WHO
IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE, ARE SQUG MEMBERS
REVISION 2.
92-03 COMPILATION OF THE CURRENT 03/19/92 ALL NUCLEAR POWER
LICENSING BASIS: REQUEST PLANT APPLICANTS
FOR VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND LICENSEES
IN PILOT PROGRAM
92-01 REACTOR VESSEL STRUCTURAL 03/06/92 ALL HOLDERS OF OP
REVISION 1 INTEGRITY, IOCFR50.54(f) LICENSES OR CONST.
PERMITS FOR NUCLEAR
PWR PLANTS (EXCEPT
YANKEE ATOMIC FOR
DISTRIBUTION
SPLB TSI File Central File TMurley NRC PDR
FMiraglia WRussell JPartlow AThadani GHolahan CMcCracken RArchitzel SWest PMadden IMoghissi CBerlinger PGill RJenkins APal ERossi JLee BGrimes GMarcus AChaffee LMarsh ELeeds MBoyle AMasciantonio DWilliams, OIG
GMulley, OIG
EPawlik, RIII
JFouchard, OPA
MCallahan, OCA
JGoldberg, OGC
SHom, OGC
SLewis, OGC
RHoefling, OGC
LPlisco, EDO
GENERIC LETTER 92-08 -10- December 17, 1992
4. an estimate of the additional long-term costs that will be incurred in the future to implement commitments such as the estimated costs of conducting future inspections or increased maintenance.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical contact or the lead project manager listed below.
Sincerely,
/ORIGINAL SIGNED BY/
James G. Partlow Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:
List of Recently Issued Generic Letters TECHNICAL
CONTACT
- Steven West, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Mail Stop 9 A2, Washington, D.C. 20555, telephone (301) 504-1220
LEAD PROJECT MANAGER: Armando Masciantonio, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Mail Stop 13 D18, Washington, D.C. 20555, telephone
(301) 504-1337 DISTRIBUTION:
See next page
- See previous concurrences.
NOTE: The Technical Editor has reviewed this generic letter.
SPLB:DSSA SPLB:DSSA SPLB:DSSA DD:DSSA D:DSSA ADT:NRR
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CBerlinger* JGoldberg* RKiessel* GMarcus* BGrimes* JPartlow \I
12/03/92 12/04/92 12/04/92 12/04/92 12/10/92 12/A /92
[G:\GL92XX\GL92XX.R5]
GENERIC LETTER 92-XX -10-
4. an estimate of the additional long-term costs that will be incurred in the future to implement commitments such as the estimated costs of conducting future inspections or increased maintenance.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical contact or the lead project manager listed below.
Sincerely,
/ORIGINAL SIGNED BY/
James G. Partlow Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:
List of Recently Issued Generic Letters TECHNICAL
CONTACT
- Steven West, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Re ulation, Mail Stop 9 A2, Washington, D.C. 20555, tel phone (301) 504-1220
LEAD PROJECT MANAGER: Armando Masciantonio, U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of N ear Reactor Regulation, Mail Stop 13 D18, Washingto D.C. 20555, telephone
(301) 504-1337 DISTRIBUTION:
See next page
- See previous concurrences, SPLB:DSSA FSPLB:DSSA DD:DSSA D:DSSA ADT:NRR
SWest * :McCracken* GHolahan* AThadani* WRussell*
12/2 /92 12/ 3/92 12/3 /92 12// 12/3 /92 EELB:DE OGC OGCB:DORS OGCB:DORS ADPR:NRR
CBerlinger* JGoldberg* RKiessel* GMarcus* JPartlow
12/3 /92 12/4 /92 12/4 /92 12/4 /92 12//92 12/ /92
[G:\GL92XX\GL92XX.R4]
GENERIC LETTER 92-XX -10-
4. an estimate of the additional long-term costs that will be incurred in the future to implement commitments such as the estimated costs of conducting future inspections or increased maintenance.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical contact or the lead project manager listed below.
Sincerely,
/ORIGINAL SIGNED BY/
James G. Partlow Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosure:
List of Recently Issued Generic Letters TECHNICAL
CONTACT
- Steven West, U.S. Nuclear Regu -tory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Re ation, Mail Stop 9 A2, Washington, D.C. 20555, tel hone (301) 504-1220
LEAD PROJECT MANAGER: Armando Masciantonio, U. . Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of N lear Reactor Regulation, Mail Stop 13 D18, Washingto:, D.C. 20555, telephone
(301) 504-1337 DISTRIBUTION:
See next page SPLB Yn-v SCB-DSSA
SPLB-(DSSA . D:D ADT:NRR
SWes RArchitzel CMcCracke G lahan AT dani IWRussell
12/oL./92 12/3 /92 12/9 /92 2/3/92 12/3 /92 12/ 3,/92 EELB: E *3 OGCdd tz, OGCB: OGCB:DORS 6t:DORS ADPR:NRR
CBerl ingerr QGoldberg RKiess 1 GMarcus M BGrimes JPartlow
12/;53/92 12/ / /92 12/9 92 12/L /92 12/ /92 12/ /92
[G:\GL92XX\GL92XX.R4]