NOC-AE-00000840, 1,Unauthorized Entry Into Protected Area,Safeguards Event Report
| ML003714431 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/2000 |
| From: | Head S, Mangan F South Texas |
| To: | NRC/OCIO/IMD/RMB |
| References | |
| -RFPFR, NOC-AE-00000840 LER 00-S01-00 | |
| Download: ML003714431 (6) | |
Text
Nuclear Operating Company SouMTCWsPmP/Zd~ku GwfinafinSt*,Ao PO BaY 289 Wjdawg, T=s77483 -vvv'--l May 4, 2000 NOC-AE-00000840 File No.: G26 10CFR73.71 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 South Texas Project Unit 1 Docket No. STN 50-498 Safeguards Event Report 00-SO1 Unauthorized Entry into the Protected Area Pursuant to 10CFR73.71, the South Texas Project submits the attached Unit 1 Safeguards Event Report 00-SO1 regarding Unauthorized Entry into the Protected Area. This event did not have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public. The only commitments in this letter are contained in the Corrective Action section of the attachment.
This Safeguards Event Report is submitted in response to a personnel error under 10CFR73.55.
Therefore, there is no impact on the South Texas Project performance indicators.
If there are any questions, please contact either Mr. S. M. Head at (361) 972-7136 or me at (361) 972 7528.
F. K. Mangan Vice President, Business Services PLW
Attachment:
Safeguards Event Report 00-SO1 (South Texas, Unit 1)
C:ALER-SERMSEROO-sO1 .doe
NOC-AE-00000840 File No.: G26 Page 2 cc:
Ellis W. Merschoff Jon C. Wood Regional Administrator, Region IV Matthews & Branscomb U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One Alamo Center 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 106 S. St. Mary's Street, Suite 700 Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 San Antonio, TX 78205-3692 John A. Nakoski Institute of Nuclear Power Project Manager, Mail Code 0-4D3 Operations - Records Center U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 700 Galleria Parkway Washington, DC 20555-0001 Atlanta, GA 30339-5957 Cornelius F. O'Keefe Richard A. Ratliff c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bureau of Radiation Control P. O. Box 910 Texas Department of Health Bay City, TX 77404-09 10 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756-3189 A. H. Gutterman D. G. Tees/R. L. Balcom Morgan, Lewis & Bockius Houston Lighting & Power Co.
1800 M. Street, N.W. P. 0. Box 1700 Washington, DC 20036-5869 Houston, TX 77251 M. T. Hardt/W. C. Gunst Central Power and Light Company City Public Service ATTN: G. E. Vaughn/C. A. Johnson P. 0. Box 1771 P. 0. Box 289, Mail Code: N5012 San Antonio, TX 78296 Wadsworth, TX 77483 A. Ramirez/C. M. Canady U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission City of Austin Attention: Document Control Desk Electric Utility Department Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704 C:LER-SERMSER00-s01.doc
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 (6-1998) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of (See reverse for required number of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or digits/characters for each block) sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)
South Texas Unit 1 05000-498 1 of 4 T'ILE (4)
Unauthorized Entry into the Protected Area EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER
_ South Texas Unit 2 05000499 2
04 05 2000 00 -- S01 -- 00 05 04 000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING [ Defieled THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR I: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER [ 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) X 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73 (a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract below or in 120.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73 (a)(2)(vii) NRC Form366A LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Scott Head - Licensinz Supervisor (361 972-7136 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPO RT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX TO EPIX SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR
[YES X NO SUBMISSION I f DATEI ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On April 5, 2000, Unit 1 was in a steam generator replacement/refueling outage at zero power and Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100% power. At 1145 hours0.0133 days <br />0.318 hours <br />0.00189 weeks <br />4.356725e-4 months <br />, a recently terminated contract employee entered the Protected Area. The employee's badge should have been invalid and access authorization terminated. However, because of incorrect information, another employee's badge was deactivated in its place. The terminated individual intended to process into the Protected Area as a visitor, but was told that the badge was valid. The individual then accessed the Protected Area unescorted. A plant employee identified the individual as no longer having authorized access to the Protected Area. The individual was escorted to Plant Security, and subsequently exited the Protected Area. The root causes of this event were insufficient management oversight over the badge termination process with lack of understanding of duties and responsibilities, and appropriate notification of termination of the employee's unescorted access was not accomplished. A contributing factor was failure to confirm that the information provided was accurate prior to taking action. Corrective actions include: integrating an electronic employee checkout process with terminating badges on the Unescorted Access Badge Transaction Form; adding a step to the badge process to retrieve the security badge upon termination, or place it on hold; providing instruction on security badge processing requirements; requiring that termination of badges or placing them on hold have concurrence from the alarm station; and discontinuing use of e-mail for badge transactions.
NRC FORM 366 (6-1998)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIlOI (6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
South Texas, Unit 1 05000 498 I ISEQUENTIAL YEAR NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 22oof 4 S01 -- 00 0
00--
TEXT (Ifmore space is required,use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:
On April 5, 2000, Unit 1 was in a refueling/steam generator replacement outage and Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100% power.
On April 4, 2000, a contract employee was scheduled to change employers and be transferred to another company located at the South Texas Project site. The employee was told that the badge for access to the Protected Area was to be placed on hold until the transfer occurred. The Contract Technical Aide was instructed to generate the paperwork to terminate the employee. The Contract Technical Aide had not performed this task for this company previously, and the Aide had not been provided with documentation showing identification of the subject employee other than the employee's name and company. Consequently, the Aide requested the employee badge information and social security number from the South Texas Project Central Processing Facility. The Central Processing Coordinator mistakenly gave the Aide the badge number and Social Security number for another employee with the same last name. The employee information was not verified.
The Aide notified Plant Security via e-mail to terminate the employee's security badge, but the incorrect information led Plant Security to terminate a badge different from the one intended. The Badging Coordinator accessed the badge database, entered the social security number provided and confirmed the employee's last name and the badge number. The information was not verified prior to taking action. The Badging Coordinator assumed that this was the correct employee and proceeded to terminate the badge.
On April 5, 2000, the terminated contract services employee returned to the South Texas Project site, intending to enter the Protected Area for an appreciation lunch. The employee advised the security officer on duty that the status of the employee's security badge was uncertain because of the pending transfer to another company onsite. The security badge was confirmed to be still valid in the security system and was cleared to be used for access into the Protected Area.
The employee entered the Protected Area at 1145 hours0.0133 days <br />0.318 hours <br />0.00189 weeks <br />4.356725e-4 months <br /> on April 5, 2000, and reported to the Unit 1 turbine generator deck for the social function. There was no accompanying escort. The Main Turbine-Generator Project Manager, who was aware of the employee's actual status, confronted the employee and asked where was the escort required to accompany an individual without unescorted access (a visitor) inside the Protected Area. The employee was wearing a security badge and did not have a visitor badge as expected. The Main Turbine-Generator Project Manager confirmed that the employee's security badge was to have been terminated on April 4, 2000, at 1559 hours0.018 days <br />0.433 hours <br />0.00258 weeks <br />5.931995e-4 months <br /> and immediately notified Plant Security to advise them of the situation. The individual was escorted to Plant Security, and subsequently exited the Protected Area. A condition report was generated and a one-hour report was made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
NRC FORM 366 (6-1998)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
South Texas, Unit 1 05000 498 ERR Mm ]VISIONuMBER 3 of 4 00 -- Sol 00 TEXT (Ifmore space is required,use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
CAUSE OF THE EVENT:
The root causes of this event were:
"* Insufficient management oversight over the badge termination process. The Contract Technical Aide did not fully understand the duties and responsibilities of the position. See Corrective Action #4.
" Ineffective corrective actions for a previous event (see Additional Information) involving unauthorized access. The Plant Access Authorization Program was revised to require badge action by the releasing employer for any terminated employee. However, the action required was not specified, leading to indecision. In addition, previous training did not reach the target audience. See Corrective Actions #2, #3, and #4.
A contributing factor in this event was failure of plant staff to confirm that the information provided was accurate prior to taking action. This is not consistent with the expectations of station management. See Corrective Action #5.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT:
This event is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR73.71(b) for entry of an unauthorized person into a protected area. This event did not have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public. This event did not result in damage to safety-related equipment, personnel injury, or radiological concerns.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
- 1. The contract employee was immediately escorted to the Security Force Supervisor's office, and then exited the Protected Area at 1305 hours0.0151 days <br />0.363 hours <br />0.00216 weeks <br />4.965525e-4 months <br />, April 5, 2000.
- 2. An electronic employee checkout process will be integrated with terminating badges on the Unescorted Access Badge Transaction Form. This electronic badge termination/checkout process will assist the users in obtaining the correct employee status. This will be implemented prior to the next refueling outage, which is currently scheduled for March, 2001.
- 3. a) A process step will be added to retrieve the security badge upon termination. The security badge will be placed on hold when transferring between employers on site. Completion is expected by June 30, 2000.
NRC FORM 366A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
South Texas, Unit 1 05000 498 YEAR ER NUMBER 00 -- Sol 00 TEXT (If more space is required,use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17) b) Management expectations will be issued to ensure this badge control process is implemented until the procedure is revised accordingly. Completion is expected by May 30, 2000.
- 4. Cognizant management personnel and contract technical processing personnel will be instructed regarding needed oversight as well as the necessary requirements for processing security badges to control unescorted access. This will ensure that essential information is provided when a security badge is to be placed on hold or terminated. Completion is expected by June 30, 2000.
- 5. a) To ensure that information used for the changing the status of unescorted access is correct, the badging process will be revised to require that badge terminations and placing badges on hold have concurrence from the alarm station. Alarm station concurrence requires the security officer in the alarm station to independently verify information before completing the badge activity change. Completion is expected by June 30, 2000.
b) Management expectations will be issued to Security personnel to ensure concurrence is obtained from the alarm station until the procedure is revised accordingly. Completion is expected by May 30, 2000.
- 6. Use of e-mail for badge transactions will be discontinued. As an interim compensatory measure, procedures will be revised so that all terminations of security badges require a hard copy of the Unescorted Badge Transaction Form until the electronic employee badge termination process is implemented (Action #2). Completion is expected by June 30, 2000.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Safeguards Event Report 99-S04, "Unauthorized Entry into the Protected Area," was submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 1, 1999, following entry of a recently terminated contract employee into the Protected Area. This was addressed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50 498/00-03;50-499/00-03 as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1.a of the Enforcement Policy (EA 00-064).