NG-97-2036, Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR50.55(h) Re Draft RG DG-1042, Criteria for Safety Sys. Amended Rule Not Clear Regarding Application to Plants That Received Their Const Permits Prior to 1971

Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR50.55(h) Re Draft RG DG-1042, Criteria for Safety Sys. Amended Rule Not Clear Regarding Application to Plants That Received Their Const Permits Prior to 1971

ML20199K792
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	11/25/1997
From:	Peveler K IES UTILITIES INC., (FORMERLY IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
FRN-62FR53932, FRN-62FR53975, RULE-PR-50, TASK-*****, TASK-RE 62FR53975-00002, 62FR53975-2, NG-97-2036, NUDOCS 9712010203
Download: ML20199K792 (5)

Text

Lkre Arnwd rnemy ccnts

• 3271 rIAEC Road 9240.IA 52324

- **'*'"'3" 00CKEIED "'*" "

USNRC UTILITIES VI NOV 26 P1 :47 November 25,1997 OFFICE '

x ugy NG-97 2036 [UU'~~ ~

_:AFF DOCET M Secretary, PROPOSED RLA.E N so '

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I(p2/4S3974)

Atta: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff ( G A F#53 95.2)

Washington. DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Duane Amold Energy Center Docket No: 50 331 Op. License No: DPR-49 Comment on Direct Final Rule and Proposed Rule 10 CFR 50.55egi). Protection and Safety Systems File: A-106 On October 17,1997, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published for public comment a drail Regulatory Guide DG 1042," Criteria for Safety Systems."

Attached are IES Utilities Inc.'s comments on the proposed rulemaking.

Should you have any questions regarding the attached information, please contact this ofrice.

Sincerely, l &wbl[

I Kenneth E. Peveler

\

Manager, Regulatory Perfonnance i

Attachment:

Comment on Direct Final Rule and Proposed Rule 10CFR50.55a(h)

Protection and Safety Systems ec: E. Protsch J, Franz D. Wilson G. Kelly (NRC-NRR)

A. B. Beach (Region 111)

NRC Resident Of6ce lJlj lj lllljj]l l l ll DOCU 20 203 971125 D.$ / O 50 62FR53932 PDR ts iwarms concany

A tachment to NG 97 2036 Page1of4 Comment on Direct Final Rule und Proposed Rule 10CFR50.55afh)

Protection and Safety Systems IES Utilities would like to document Sienificant Adverse Comments concerning the direct Unal rule (62 Fed. Reg. 53932) and the proposed rule (62 Fed. Reg. 53975) amending 10CFR50.55a(h), Protection systems, to incorporate by reference Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard (IEEE) std. 6031991," Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," and changing the section title to

" Protection and Safety Systems."

The mnended rule is not clear regarding application to plants that received their construction permits prior to 1971. This is of particular concern to IES Utilities because the construction pemtit for the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) was issued on June 17,1970 prior to IEEE 279(71) being issued. Plant protection systems were designed to meet General 1:lectric (GE) Design Safety Standards. GE NEDO 10139 describes how the DAEC e. sign meets the intem of IEEE 279 with exceptions. 10CFR50.55a(h) presentit requires protection systems of plants that received a Construction Permit after 1/1/1971 to comply with IEEE 279. The amended rule would require compliance with either ILEE 279 or IEEE 603(91) by those plants. Ilowever, it adds a separate sentence stating thu changes to protection systems initiated after January 1,1998 must meet IEEE-603(91). The language of the amendment can be interpreted as requiring that after January 1,1998, changes to plants will be required to meet IEEE-603(91), regardless of the original Design Safety Standards. We understand that the intent is that plants which have not been previously required to meet IEEE 279 will continue to be permitted to make changes to their plant consistent with Licecsing Basis and commitments made to the NRC, without regard to either IEEE-279 or IEEE 603(91).

Ilowever, this intent is not clearly stated. The proposed rule should b:: revised to make its intent in this regard clear. Our concern about this lack of cimity is heightened by the discussion of the rule change in the Federal Register, which states: "the rule would require future changes to existing power and instrumentation and control portions of protection systems to comply with the new standard. This would not be considered a backlit, since the changes ne voluntarily initiated by the licensee, or separately imposed by the NRC aller a separate backfit analysis." The quoted language does not distinguish between plants that are required to meet IEEE 279 and those that are not. The distinction is important because it would be particularly burdensome to apply IEEE-603(91) to plants that were not designed to IEEE-279. To make this intent clear, we suggest that proposed paragraph 50.55a(h)(3) be revised by inserting "in such plants" in the second sentence after the words " changes to protection systems "

Attachment to NO.97 2036 page 2 of 4 If this is not the intent, then the application of this rule to plants with Construction Permits before 1/1/71 would constitute a "backfit" under 10CFR50.109. The language quoted above from the Federal Register notice argues that requiring changes to comply with IEEE 603(91) should not be viewed as a backfit because changes are " voluntary."

This is not correct; most plant changes are not voluntary, but are imposed by new standards or lack of equipment availability of "like for like" replacement. Equipment obsolescence is a primary reason for many plant upgrades to r.ew design and technology.

These plant changes are often the only feasible "fix" to maintain the integrity and operational compliance of plant safety systems, and cannot be viewed as voluntary Some of this work is done under Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operations (LCOs), where time is limited to repair equipment, or seek 10CFRSO.12 exemption requests. Before NRC imposes new requirements that may impede resolution of such issues within the times pemiitted by LCOs, it should conduct a careful analysis of the impacts and safety benents in accordance with 10CFR50.109.

We also belieu imposing IEEE std. 603(91) on future plant upgrades would significantly impact IRS without a commensurate safety benefit. An exhaustive comparison ofIEEE std. 603 against DAEC plant design would be a large effort. Completion of this comparison would be needed before the full impact of the new rule on future modifications can be known. Ilowever, a cursory review indicates that the impact would be significant. For example, in planning replacement of Reactor Water Cleanup GEMAC,"like-for like" replacement of the obsolete GEMAC control compon nts is not .

feasible. IfIEEE std. 603 is applied, it would require the use of other standards by use of the word "shall", none of which were in effect at the time of the DAEC Construction License, and to none of which the DAEC is committed. As a result, it would impose IEEE-384 redundancy and separation requirements, which were not required in the original design. Since this system is not required to be redundant, and there would be no redundancy thr system components that were not replaced, the imposition of a redundancy requirement to the replacement components would not significantly enhance the safety of the overall system. The replacement components would also have to meet the requirements of IEEE-323(83) for meeting mild environment qualification testing requirements, while other components in the same system are not designed to such requirements.

Another concern is having a mix of plant equipment and systems that have different s

requirements for maintenance .and testing. This would compound the number at tes' procedures for equipment (IEEE-338(87)), and increase the documentation in the Design Bases Documents and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for describing the interfaces between the different code applications. If a component in an instrument channel is changed, the extent of application of the new standards to other channel

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O Attach'nent to NG 97 2036 l' age 3 of 4 components, or the whole channel itself would need to be decided. Then separation between channeli might not meet the requirement of the new standard.

Another example is the limited confonnance to IEEE-384. The DAEC UFSAR states that "... input and output power and instrumentation cables are routed independently and in separate conduit or cable trays to meet the divisional requirements of IEEE-384. l DAEC was not built to other separation requirements ofIEEE-384, for instance in the Control Room where divisions come together in some control panels, which is permitted per our original licensing bases.

Maintaining the integrity of the plant's design and licensing bases is the foundation of nuclear safety. Arbitrarily requiring future changes to comply with a new standard is clearly a backfit. To conclude that it is not a backlit based on changes being voluntary is not generally well founded.

The Federal Register Notice argues that a direct final rule is appropriate because there were not significant comments on draft Reg. Guide DG 1042, issued in November 1995, which proposed R:v. I to Reg. Guide 1.153, Criteria for Safety Systems, endorsing IEEE 603(91). This argument is misleading. Regulatory Guides are acceptable, but not the ,

only means of meeting NiiC requirements. Regulatory Guides merely describe methods acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with NRC regulations. Commitment to a Regulatory Guide is voluntary on the part of a licensee and there is no requirement to comment on Regulatory Guides (draft or final). IES has not committed to RG 1.153 (rev.

1) and has no plans to commit to it in the future. IES did not respond to DraR Reg. Guide DG-1042 because it did not apply to us. The burdens that would result if changes to DAEC must cotnply with IEEE-603(91), were not imposed by the approval of Rev. I to Reg. Guide 1.153.

The proposed amendments would apply to changes " initiated" after January 1,1998. The word " initiated" is not defined in the regulation, but we understand that the modifications are considered to be " initiated" once design responsibility is assigned to a designer or design team. An interpretation that a change is not " initiated" until the start of fabrication of components or ofinstallation in the plent, would work a particular hardship if it were applied to IES. The designs of many changes are already completed and are ready for installation in support of our April 1998 Refuel Outage (RFO), and in conformance to the existing design and licensing bases. Requiring such modifications to comply with this new standard would create significant impact on the RFO schedule or require IES to request exemption frorn the new regulation. With the limihd amount of notice of the final rule, it is not practical for us to review all of these changes for compliance to this new requiren ent and make any necessary changes to comply, nor to do the research to support individual exemption requests per 10CFR50.12 This could result in the Startup

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a Attachment to NG-97-2036 Page 4 of 4 from 'he refueling outage being delayed at significant cost uid inconvenience to IES. It appears that this additional burden on licensees was not considered in the staffs evaluation of this rule.

c The discussion above points out the significant hardship that would be imposed on IES if it is required to apply lEEE 603(91) to future plant changes and shows that there would

{ 4 not be a enmmensurate safety benefit. If the Commission nevertheless proceeds to require compliance with IEEE-603(91), it should revise the dennition of changes in the ,

t direct / proposed rule. As written, it includes modi 0 cations, augmentations or F *eplacements pursuant to license amendments and changes pursuani to 10 CFR 50.59.

I This definition should be revised to exclude application to 10 CFR 50 59 changes. No sa!by benefit would be achieved by requiring IEEE-603(91) to apply to changes made

} purruant to 10 CFR 50.59, since by deOnition, such changes do not involve an unrevi-wed safety question. The majority of changes mde pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 are minor, and a requirement to analyze each against a ew standard, particularly one not 1 previously applied to the plant, would impose a signi0 cant burden on the engineering process that has no apparent safety bene 01.

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